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THESIS SUMMARY 
This thesis examines the application and interplay of international humanitarian law (IHL) and 
human rights law (HRL) during peace operations. For the interaction of the different substantive 
provisions under both legal regimes, the thesis’ focus is specifically on the circumstances and 
modalities under which physical force may be used against individuals. 
As for the application of IHL, the ordinary threshold requirements (i.e. on intensity) constitute 
the primary tool for examining whether a peace operation has become a party to an armed con-
flict. This thesis, however, suggests an additional participation-based test for situations where 
the peace operation directly supports a party to a pre-existing armed conflict in the mission area. 
IHL continues to apply – without strict spatial limitation – until the overall armed conflict 
comes to an end or the peace operation ceases its hostile acts and support. The application of 
HRL in the mission area is, as this thesis argues, subject to a gradual test: negative obligations 
need to be observed at all times, while the application of positive HRL obligations is context-
specific (e.g. degree of control). In addition, the thesis offers different models to overcome the 
legal challenges in relation to extra-territorial derogations and shows how the procedural re-
quirements and additional safeguards may operate in the context of a peace mission. 
As a consequence, IHL and HRL often apply to the same situation in the field – both in time 
and space. This leads to a potential conflict between the different sets of use-of-force rules 
applicable to peace operations. In a nutshell: while HRL only allows for killings in response to 
threats to life and limb, IHL provides for lethal targeting based on status and conduct (even 
absent such threats), but contains stricter rules on the use of specific weapons and methods. 
Neither the individual scopes of application, nor the traditional interaction models (i.e. lex spe-
cialis and most-favourable-protection principle) are able to overcome this norm conflict.  
That is why this thesis suggests a model based on a distinction between two mutually exclusive 
paradigms: (1) the paradigm of hostilities involving active combat and governed by IHL, and 
(2) the paradigm of law-enforcement, which covers all remaining situations and is based on 
ordinary HRL standards. Usually, the IHL categories of the person in question (i.e. combatants 
vs. civilians) may give a first indication as to which paradigm applies. However, even for per-
sons generally targetable under IHL, the use of force against them shifts towards the law-en-
forcement paradigm once the area in question is under the firm control of the peace operation 
or its allies. In addition, the specific IHL rules on certain weapons and methods provide for a 
sufficiently broad law-enforcement exception. This makes it even more necessary for com-
manders to provide careful planning and real-time instructions in order to fully operationalise 
the suggested distinction between the two paradigms.
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
In the past few decades, the use of peace operations has rapidly increased, both in size and in 
structure. There are currently around 100,000 troops from various countries deployed as blue-
helmet peacekeepers in operations directly commanded by the United Nations.1 In addition, 
peace operations are also increasingly conducted by regional organisations, such as the African 
Union, the European Union and NATO. But the functions of peace operations and their man-
dates have also changed dramatically. Unlike the first missions, which were usually meant to 
serve as a buffer between former warring parties, today’s peace operations almost always have 
a robust mandate, allowing them to use active force to carry out their tasks. These tasks may 
range from providing security and safety in certain areas, and protecting the civilian population 
to actively supporting local authorities. In some exceptional cases, they may even be part of an 
international territorial administration, which assumes the full governing authority in certain 
regions affected by state collapse or a breakdown of law and order, as in the case of Kosovo 
and East Timor in 1999. As a result, the use of force in peace operations may often involve 
crowd-control in a climate of inter-ethnic violence and offensive measures against criminal 
gangs or pirates. 
On some occasions, however, they may also get involved in large-scale combat. Only in rare 
cases has this involved hostilities with regular state armed forces. Following earlier examples 
in Korea and Iraq, the most recent case was the NATO-led operation ‘Unified Protector’ in 
2011, which involved several thousand air strikes against pro-Gaddafi forces in an effort to 
protect the civilian population during the unfolding Libyan Civil War. The far more likely en-
emy of today’s peace operations, however, are non-state armed groups (including their various 
splinter groups) that actively resist local peace efforts and often pose a serious threat to the local 
population and the overall stability in the region. When taking measures against such groups, 
international forces usually cooperate closely with the security forces of the host states and may 
even embark on joint operations. Cases in point are, for instance, the former NATO-led ISAF 
                                               
1  See more generally: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping. 
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mission in Afghanistan,2 the African Union’s mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the UN-led 
operation in Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO). One of the greatest challenges for 
the soldiers involved is the special nature of these missions. Unlike in the case of high-intensity 
warfare, for which they are normally trained, these overseas deployments usually involve a 
broad variety of different tasks.  
This challenge is perhaps best illustrated by the concept of ‘three-block warfare’, coined by 
US General Charles Krulak. In a nutshell, forces deployed to such missions may be required to 
conduct fully-fledged combat, carry out security tasks and deliver humanitarian aid in three 
adjacent areas (or city blocks) at one and the same time.3 The dilemma of being confronted with 
such a wide spectrum of different situations is a core aspect of modern counter-insurgency ap-
proaches, which are of great relevance for contemporary peace operations in their efforts against 
armed groups.4 It undoubtedly poses a serious challenge for military trainers and operational 
planners, but the complexity of the mission scenarios may also have direct international legal 
ramifications. For instance, what measures are international forces allowed to take when they 
are part of a peace operation? When would it be permissible to use firearms against individuals, 
including direct lethal force? And does it make a difference whether they are armed, commit 
acts of violence or are even members of a hostile group?  
These questions raise a number of complex legal issues which cannot be answered simply by 
reference to the mandate under which the mission operates. But these questions should not be 
avoided, because legal uncertainty among the relevant actors may greatly undermine the effec-
tiveness of the peace operations and may in some cases even lead to mission failure. Identifying 
the relevant international legal rules and understanding their relationship is therefore a crucial 
first step before legal advisers and commanders can draft the specific rules of engagement for 
their forces in the field. 
                                               
2  The ISAF mission in Afghanistan was completed at the end of 2014 and replaced by a smaller mission 
(code-named ‘Resolute Support’) to provide further training and assistance to the Afghan authorities and 
security forces. 
3  Gen. Charles Krulak, ‘The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War’, Marines Magazine, 
January 1999, www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm. The concept was also specifi-
cally mentioned in Canada’s defence policy planning: Welsh, ‘The 2005 International Policy Statement: 
Leading with Identity?’, 61 International Journal (2006), 909-28, p. 915. 
4  Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, Field Manual, FM 3-24, December 2006, pp. 1-19; see also, 
Department of the Army, Operations, Field Manual, FM 3-0, February 2008. 
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1.2 TERMINOLOGY AND RELEVANT 
LEGAL REGIMES 
For the purpose of this thesis, the term ‘peace operation’ is used in a very broad sense: it is 
meant to cover any international military operation that has received an explicit mandate from 
the UN Security Council to stabilise the security situation in a certain region. The exact man-
dates of these operations may differ (sometimes even considerably), which is why it has been 
common practice for decades to distinguish between peacekeeping and (peace) enforcement 
operations.5 This distinction, however, is not based on strict legal concepts and has become 
increasingly meaningless in light of the more robust mandates of today’s peace operations.6 
The use of the term ‘peace operation’ is also not limited to missions directly commanded by 
the United Nations, but also covers those led by regional organisations or a handful of states 
forming a coalition of the willing. Indeed, practice shows that operations with different man-
dates and command arrangements may ultimately face exactly the same operational challenges 
and raise the same legal questions, which is why they should be considered together. 
The mandates of the Security Council usually authorise the peace operation’s personnel to take 
a wide range of measures, including armed force, in order to discharge the functions entrusted 
to them. But they do not provide clear guidance on the circumstances under which (coercive) 
actions can be employed, including the use of military force. These are essentially matter of 
international humanitarian law and human rights law – the two fields of international law that 
govern the use of force and exercise of other forms of public power vis-à-vis individuals, across 
the full spectrum between war and peace. 
Humanitarian law – also known as the jus in bello, the law of war or law of armed conflict – 
governs the conduct of the belligerent parties in times of armed conflict and during military 
occupations.7 It reflects a careful balance between military necessity and considerations of hu-
manity. Its major treaty provisions can be found in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and 
the two Additional Protocols of 1977, as well as a number of specific treaties on weapons and 
cultural property.  
                                               
5  For a slightly different use of the terminology: Gill and Fleck (eds.), The Handbook of the International 
Law of Military Operations (OUP 2010), pp. 135-62 (featuring chapters under the heading ‘Peace Opera-
tions’) and pp. 81-133 (featuring chapters under the heading ‘Enforcement and Peace Enforcement Opera-
tions’). 
6  For an extensive discussion of the mandate and the use of force: see from p. 9. 
7  However, for the sake of consistency, we will almost exclusively use the term ‘humanitarian law’ and use 
the abbreviation ‘IHL’ in footnotes.  
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By contrast, human rights law has its origins in domestic constitutional law and is essentially 
based on the vertical relationship between the state and the individual. It is thus a much younger 
part of international law, which saw most of its development after the adoption of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.8 The first phase of human rights treaties codified what 
is widely known as civil and political rights, which are meant to shield an individual’s funda-
mental freedoms and liberties (such as their right to life, to physical integrity as well as liberty) 
from undue and arbitrary state interference; but they also entail a duty to protect and fulfil.  
This second element – of fulfilling the rights – became even more central in relation to what is 
often referred to as human rights of the ‘second and third generation’.9 These include economic, 
social and cultural rights as well as rights of specifically (vulnerable) groups, such as children, 
women and persons with disabilities.10 The role of these rights in times of armed conflict and 
military operations has been a matter of increased scholarly attention in recent years.11 Never-
theless, the use of physical force by military personnel – a central theme throughout this thesis 
– is much more likely to affect the category of civil and political rights, enshrined in general 
human rights treaties like the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) and the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966),12 which will be the main focus throughout 
this study. 
                                               
8  UNGA, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III). 
9  See more generally: De Schutter, International Human Rights Law: Cases, Materials, Commentary 
(2nd edn., CUP 2014), pp. 427-526 (on the duty to protect) and pp. 527-82 (on the duty to fulfil). 
10  In particular, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion Against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). 
11  See, for instance: Gilles, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Armed Conflict (OUP 2014); Riedel, 
‘Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Armed Conflict’, in: Clapham and Gaeta (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict (OUP 2014), 441-68; Mottershaw, ‘Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights in Armed Conflict: International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian 
Law’, 12 (3) The International Journal of Human Rights (2008), 449-70. Note also the effects that military 
operations and armed conflict situations may have on the protection of the environment, which may also 
(indirectly) affect the enjoyment of HRL in addition to the protection issues raised under IHL itself. The 
ILC included the topic in 2013 into its programme of work: ILC, Preliminary Report on the Protection of 
the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts, submitted by Marie Jacobsson, Special Rapporteur, 30 
May 2014, A/CN.4/674, pp. 42-45 (on HRL alone); ILC, Second Report on the Protection of the Environ-
ment in Relation to Armed Conflicts, submitted by Marie Jacobsson, Special Rapporteur, 28 May 2015, A 
/CN.4/685. 
12  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, hereinafter: European Con-
vention or ECHR in footnotes; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, hereinafter: Interna-
tional Covenant or ICCPR in footnotes. 
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1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION, METHODOLOGY 
AND STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The overall question that this thesis tries to answer is as follows: when and how do the regimes 
of humanitarian law and human rights law apply during a peace operation and how do their 
different sets of rules interact when they are both applicable? 
Most of the underlying issues have been discussed for many years and there is a wealth of 
literature on the matter.13 It is nevertheless apt to engage with the topic again in more detail. 
This allows us to take due regard of new case-law from international and national courts as well 
as relevant practice from the field. Moreover, there are still a number of under-researched ques-
tions that give rise to legal uncertainty and call for innovative and principled solutions. This 
thesis tries to take up the challenge and to fill some of the remaining gaps. 
Throughout the thesis, the application of human rights and humanitarian law in peace operation 
will be examined in a comprehensive manner so as to capture as many mission scenarios as 
possible. However, when considering the substantive provisions and their interaction in situa-
tions when both regimes are applicable, the focus will be exclusively on the circumstances and 
modalities under which (potentially) lethal force may be used against individuals in non-custo-
dial situations.14 It is precisely on this topic that human rights law and humanitarian law differ 
the most, which is why it is the most relevant topic for the discussion on the regime interplay.15  
Certainly, the issue of detention is also of relevance. But it has been covered quite extensively 
in recent years,16 including the adoption of the so-called Copenhagen Process Principles and 
                                               
13  For instance: Mujezinović Larsen, The Human Rights Treaty Obligations of Peacekeepers (CUP 2012); 
Naert, International Law Aspects of the EU’s Security and Defence Policy, with a Particular Focus on the 
Law of Armed Conflict and Human Rights (Intersentia, 2010); Beruto (ed.), International Humanitarian 
Law, Human Rights and Peace Operations. XXXIst Sanremo Round Table 2008 (IIHL 2009); Kolb, Por-
retto and Vité, L’Application du Droit International Humanitaire et des Droits de l’Homme aux Organisa-
tions Internationales. Forces de Paix et Administrations Civiles Transitoires (Bruylant 2005); Zwanenburg, 
Accountability of Peace Support Operations (Martinus Nijhoff 2005); Kolb, Droit Humanitaire et Opé-
rations de Paix Internationales (Helbing & Lichtenhahn 2002); Seyersted, United Nations Forces in the 
Law of Peace and War (Sijthoff 1966). 
14  The main reason for excluding these situations for the legal analysis is because the limitations on the use 
of force against persons in custody are largely the same under both IHL and HRL. Among other misconduct, 
they clearly prohibit: torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; and extra-judicial ex-
ecutions. See, in particular: Rodley, The Treatment of Prisoners under International Law (3rd edn., OUP 
2009). 
15  This is perhaps best exemplified by the title of the following article, at least in relation to NIACs: Sassòli 
and Olson, ‘The Relationship between International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law Where It Mat-
ters: Admissible Killing and Internment of Fighters in Non-International Armed Conflicts’, 90 
IRRC (2008), 599-627. 
16  For a number of excellent contributions on this issue, with a special focus on peace operations and similar 
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Guidelines (2012), which deal specifically with the handling of detainees in international mili-
tary operations.17 Moreover, the task of status determination for detainees can be assigned to 
senior legal officers. By contrast, targeting decisions cannot be delegated entirely to higher 
command levels and ambiguity as to which set of rules applies may have serious, irreversible 
consequences for the victim. This is why it seems appropriate to focus exclusively on the cir-
cumstances and modalities under which (potentially) lethal force may be used. 
This thesis follows a doctrinal positivist approach.18 Positivism is the legal method par excel-
lence for ascertaining the lex lata, i.e. the law as it is.19 This is what is ultimately required for 
clarifying the specific issues raised by the overall research question. Moreover, unlike other 
more critical approaches,20 positivism incorporates a degree of objectivity, which is essential 
for developing legal arguments on politically sensitive matters, such as the one at issue here. 
Nevertheless, this should not prevent us from critically examining the practice of states, inter-
national organisations and judicial bodies, and from identifying the underlying policy choices 
and driving forces behind certain decisions.21 
The thesis considers primarily the most relevant humanitarian law and human rights conven-
tions as well as the practice of the respective treaty bodies, namely the UN Human Rights Com-
mittee and its regional equivalents in Europe, the Americas and Africa.22 It considers, however, 
also other legal sources, including general international law as well as the jurisprudence of some 
international criminal tribunals. Special attention will also be given to the work of the Interna-
                                               
overseas military operations: Direk, Security Detention in International Territorial Administrations: Ko-
sovo, East Timor, and Iraq (Brill 2015), pp. 58-216; Debuf, Captured in War: Lawful Internment in Armed 
Conflict (Hart Publishing 2013); Mujezinović Larsen (2012), supra note 13, pp. 393-418; Sassòli, ‘The 
Role of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law in New Types of Armed Conflicts’ in: Ben-
Naftali (ed.), International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law: Pas de Deux (OUP 
2011), 34-94; Naert (2010), supra note 13, pp pp. 624-33. 
17  See also: Copenhagen Process on the Handling of Detainees in International Military Operations – Princi-
ples and Guidelines, 19 October 2012. 
18  Hutchinson and Duncan, ‘Deﬁning and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research’, 17 (1) Deakin 
Law Review (2012), 83-119. 
19  See more generally: Kammerhöfer and D’Aspremont (eds.), International Legal Positivism in a Post-Mod-
ern World (CUP 2014). 
20  See, for instance: Tuori, Critical Legal Posititivism (Ashgate 2002). Note, however, that democracy and 
civil-society participation, which Kaarlo Tuori considers the main ethical foundations of law, play a much 
less prominent role in the field of international law and international adjudication. For a more critical ap-
proach: Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (CUP 
2005). 
21  See, for instance, more generally: Ratner and Slaughter, ‘Appraising the Methods of International Law: A 
Prospectus for Readers’, 93 AJIL (1999), 291-302; Slaughter and Ratner, ‘The Method is the Message’, 93 
AJIL (1999), 410-23.  
22  Some weight is also given to the case-law of national courts to the extent that they refer directly to IHL and 
HRL.The most prominent group of cases have been decided by British courts on the basis of the UK Human 
Rights Act, which incorporates the ECHR (as interpreted by the ECtHR). 
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tional Law Commission in clarifying and developing international law and to the (quasi) au-
thoritative interpretations that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has pro-
vided on a number of IHL-related issues. 
Moreover, rather than following an instrument-by-instrument approach, the analysis is struc-
tured along different themes. This allows us to see more closely to what extent the rules from 
different sources set similar standards and to clarify the merit of different approaches used by 
(quasi) judicial bodies in order to resolve the complex legal issues at stake and overcome in-
herent challenges. 
This leads to the following structure of the thesis: Chapter 2 sets the scene for a more detailed 
enquiry in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. For that purpose, it provides a detailed outline on the authorisa-
tion of peace operations to use force under their respective mandates. This is followed by a 
discussion of the command and control arrangements and of the impact they may have on the 
distribution of international responsibility between international organisations and states in-
volved in peace operations. Thereafter, Chapter 2 examines the obligations of such states and 
organisations under human rights law and humanitarian law, followed by an enquiry into the 
impact of the relevant Security Council mandate on the operation of both bodies of law. Chap-
ters 3 and 4 consider the circumstances under which the application of the two legal regimes – 
humanitarian law and human rights law, respectively – will be triggered in the course of peace 
operations and to what extent its scope may be limited, before turning to the discussion on the 
interplay between both regimes in Chapter 5.  
Chapter 3 begins with considering the relevant threshold requirements for the application of 
humanitarian law in view of the fact that it only applies in times of armed conflict and during 
military occupations. The key question is therefore whether and how a peace operation may 
become a party to an armed conflict and to what extent its special nature may have an impact 
on the classification of the conflict and the threshold of violence required to trigger the appli-
cation of humanitarian law. In addition, this chapter will also examine if participation in a pre-
existing armed conflict may serve as an additional test, which will be followed by an enquiry 
into the temporal and geographic scope of application once the peace operation has indeed be-
come a party to an armed conflict. The chapter concludes by briefly examining the special case 
of military occupations and the approach of applying humanitarian law by analogy as a matter 
of policy. 
Chapter 4 considers the modalities for the application of human rights law during peace opera-
tions. Most of the relevant human rights treaties contain jurisdiction clauses, which may pose 
an obstacle to the application of the relevant human rights treaties in overseas deployments. 
The chapter will therefore explore different models for their extra-territorial application. More-
over, even if human rights law applies in the midst of a peace operation, it may be subject to 
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far-reaching limitations. Chapter 4 will, therefore, examine the circumstances under which per-
missible restrictions and derogations may be available and the possible challenges that need to 
be addressed. 
Chapter 5 is concerned with the likely scenario during peace operations when human rights and 
humanitarian law apply to the same situation – both in space and time. This may lead to a 
potential norm conflict between opposing rules. That is why this chapter focuses on the relevant 
use-of-force rules to clarify the interplay between both legal regimes. It will first consider the 
general features of norm interaction and the norm conflicts tools, which will then be applied to 
the concurrent application of human rights and humanitarian law. This will be followed by a 
detailed examination of the substantive rules on the use of force under both regimes to identify 
differences between them as a possible source of norm conflicts. Chapter 5 concludes with a 
survey of different models in order to identify the best solution for overcoming these apparent 
norm conflicts. 
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2 GENERAL ISSUES ON 
PEACE OPERATIONS 
2.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to set the scene for the following three substantive chapters. It 
provides insights into a number of international law issues in relation to peace operations, all 
of which have received considerable scholarly attention in recent years. The chapter will sketch 
the most relevant aspects of the debate and consider some new trends in recent practice. It will 
first consider the authorisation of peace operations to use force under their respective mandates 
within the overall framework of the UN Charter. This will be followed by a discussion of the 
command and control arrangements and the impact they may have on the apportionment of 
international responsibility between international organisations and states involved in peace 
operations. Thereafter, we will closely examine the obligations of such states and organisations 
under human rights law and humanitarian law. The chapter concludes with examining the im-
pact of the relevant Security Council mandate on the operation of both bodies of law. 
2.2 MANDATE AND USE OF FORCE 
On the basis of the definition adopted for this study, all peace operations are established by a 
resolution of the UN Security Council. Nevertheless, their mandates may differ considerably, 
especially on the extent to which they may resort to the use of armed force. The UN Charter 
provides a comprehensive system of collective security to enforce the universal prohibition on 
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the use of force.1 In addition to the right of individual or collective self-defence, explicitly rec-
ognised in Article 51,2 the UN Security Council may take measures under Chapter VII of the 
Charter. In case of a ‘threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’, and if other 
measures prove inappropriate,3 it may use its powers under Article 42 to take military actions: 
[T]he Security Council … may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be nec-
essary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include 
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of 
the United Nations.4  
Originally, such enforcement actions were aimed at repelling aggressor states that had used 
force against another state in violation of the Charter. This option, however, has remained an 
exception. In fact, enforcement actions in the traditional sense have only been used twice: in 
response to North Korea’s invasion of South Korea in 1950 and to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait 
in 1990. Both operations attracted the participation of a large number of UN member states, 
who placed their troops under US command. The Security Council’s authorisations comple-
mented the right of collective self-defence on the part of South Korea and Kuwait, respectively.5 
Given the political stalemate in the Security Council during the Cold War period, for most of 
that time the United Nations had to rely on non-coercive measures for maintaining international 
peace and security, which in time became known under the term ‘peacekeeping’. The UN Emer-
gency Force I (UNEF I) on the Sinai Peninsula was the first genuine peacekeeping force6 and 
was meant to serve as a buffer between Egypt and Israel after the Suez crisis in 1956.7 Tradi-
tional peacekeeping operations, like UNEF I, were often deployed as an interposition force 
between the parties to the conflict in order to prevent the resumption of hostilities. The UN 
forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and in the Golan Heights (UNDOF) are present-day examples of 
                                               
1  Art. 2 (4) UN Charter (‘All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner incon-
sistent with the Purposes of the United Nations’). See more generally: Weller (ed.), The Oxford Handbook 
of the Use of Force in International Law (OUP 2015). 
2  See, infra note 11. 
3  Arts. 39 and 41 UN Charter, respectively. 
4  Emphasis added. 
5  Strictly speaking, the Korea campaign was not authorised, as the relevant resolutions only recommended 
military assistance, although the forces were authorised to use the UN flag: S/RES/83 (Korea), 27 June 
1950, and subsequent resolutions. For the US-led operation in Iraq: S/RES/678 (Iraq-Kuwait), 29 Novem-
ber 1990, para. 2 (‘Authorizes Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait … to use all 
necessary means … to restore peace and security in the area’). 
6  There had been some earlier observer missions, but these were small in size, had a very limited mandate 
and their personnel was usually unarmed: Bowett, United Nations Forces. A Legal Study of United Nations 
Practice (Stevens & Sons 1964), p. 71. 
7  This operation was also an exception in that it had been authorised by the UN General Assembly rather 
than the Security Council: GA Res. 998, 4 November 1956. 
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this traditional concept of peacekeeping. Not explicitly mentioned in the UN Charter, it consti-
tutes a progressive reading of the UN Security Council’s broad powers under Chapter VI to 
offer its services towards a peaceful settlement of disputes in conjunction with its right to es-
tablish its own subsidiary bodies.8  
The so-called Capstone Doctrine, issued by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations in 
2008,9 defines three basic, inter-related and mutually reinforcing principles on which peace-
keeping is premised:  
1. Consent of the parties, 
2. Impartiality,  
3. Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. 
Hence, as a matter of principle, all parties involved have to consent to the deployment of the 
operation, which in return is expected to implement its mandate without favour or prejudice to 
any of the parties concerned. In most cases, status-of-force agreements are concluded between 
the United Nations and the host state to define the status, rights and privileges of the mission. 
The third principle, which limits the use of force to situations of self-defence and defence of 
the mandate, has been extended to include also ‘resistance to attempts by forceful means to 
prevent the force from discharging its duties’.10 This goes far beyond the limits of inter-state 
self-defence, which would normally require an (imminent) attack.11 The exact legal basis and 
scope of the right to use force in defence of the mandate remains unclear.12 But it seems rather 
                                               
8  Art. 29, UN Charter. 
9  Department of Peacekeeping Operations, ‘Capstone Doctrine: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. 
Principles and Guidelines’, 18 January 2008, pp. 31-35. For earlier attempts to define these three principles: 
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, ‘General Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations’, 
UN/210/TC/GG95, October 1995; Supplement to the Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-
General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, A/50/60-S/1995/1, 3 January 
1995, para. 33. Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A/59/565, 2 December 
2004, para. 213. 
10  Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council resolution 340 (UNEF II), 
UN Doc. S/11052/Rev. 1, 27 October 1973, para. 5. This broad concept of self-defence has been confirmed 
in subsequent UN documents: General Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations (1995), supra note 9, para. 
35; Capstone Doctrine (2008), supra note 9, p. 34. 
11  In an inter-state context, the term (national) self-defence refers to the proportionate use of force in response 
to an (imminent) armed attack, in line with Art. 51 UN Charter and its customary law equivalent. It serves 
as an exception to the non-use of force principle in Art. 2 (4) UN Charter, and needs to be distinguished 
from personal self-defence by individuals as a criminal law defence. Yet, many incidents may involve both 
levels of self-defence, which continues to cause confusion as to the exact limits of self-defence in peace-
keeping operations, infra note 12. See also: Knoops, The Prosecution and Defense of Peacekeepers under 
International Criminal Law (Transnational Publishers, Ardsley 2004), pp. 166-86 (providing a detailed 
outline of the limits of self-defence by individuals as a criminal law defence under domestic law and inter-
national criminal law). 
12  Findlay, The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations (OUP 2002), pp. 14-19 and 355-59; Sheeran, ‘The Use 
of Force in United Nations Peace-keeping Operations’, in: Weller (2015), supra note 1, 347-74, pp. 360-
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unlikely that peacekeepers would invoke this overly broad concept to justify the use of force 
against state armed forces without further authorisation.13  
With the end of the Cold War, the UN Security Council became increasingly involved in civil 
wars and authorised peacekeeping operations with increasingly robust mandates, thus blurring 
the traditional distinction between consent-based peacekeeping and coercive enforcement ac-
tions.14 A precursor to this trend was the UN operation in the Congo (ONUC) in the early 1960s. 
In order to ensure the unity and territorial integrity of the Congo, the Security Council author-
ised ONUC forces already deployed in the area to take all appropriate measures, including ‘the 
use of force, if necessary, in the last resort’.15 As a result, ONUC troops engaged in intense 
fighting with Katangese secessionist forces between 1961 and 1963.16 
Thirty years on, the UN operations in the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) and Somalia (UN-
OSOM I and II) followed a similar trend. Starting as traditional peacekeeping operations, they 
relied increasingly on mandates with references to Chapter VII powers and explicit authorisa-
tions to use force. Resolution 836 in June 1993 tasked UNPROFOR with the defence of a num-
ber of safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina17 and even authorised a NATO-led coalition of 
                                               
65. See, in particular, the following comprehensive study: Gill et al., ‘General Report’, in: Horvat and 
Benatar (eds.), Legal Interoperability and Ensuring Observance of the Law Applicable in Multinational 
Deployments. Conference Proceedings (ISMLLW 2013), 121-71, pp. 140-43. The report concludes that the 
views of states on the precise legal basis of self-defence in peacekeeping operations differ greatly, includ-
ing: (1) national/inter-state self-defence (Art. 51 UN Charter), (2) personal/individual self-defence (i.e. as 
criminal law defence under domestic law), and (3) more open-ended terms and concepts, e.g. unit defence, 
force protection and military self-defence. 
13  Two different ‘defence of the mandate’ scenarios must be distinguished here, depending on who is being 
targeted: (1) State armed forces: any use of force against the armed forces of a state (e.g. the host state) 
falls under Art. 2 (4) UN Charter (and its customary equivalent) and would be unlawful, unless there is an 
actual case of national/inter-state self-defence. Preventing peacekeepers from discharging their duties (e.g. 
by blocking roads) is hardly enough to meet that high threshold. The peacekeeping mission would thus 
have to refrain from using force, unless it operates under a robust mandate with Chapter VII authorisation. 
(2) Non-state armed groups: using force against recalcitrant armed groups (in UN jargon often referred to 
as ‘spoilers to the peace process’) in support of the host state raises no legal problem under the jus ad 
bellum, even absent a robust mandate with Chapter VII authorisation. 
14  Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats (2004), supra note 10, paras. 210-13; Gardam, Necessity, Pro-
portionality and the Use of Force by States (CUP 2004), pp. 194-99; Gray, International Law and the Use 
of Force (2nd edn., OUP 2004), pp. 210-51. 
15  S/RES/161 (Congo), 21 February 1961, para. 1 (without any clear reference to Chapter VII, but finding a 
‘threat to international peace and security’). See also: S/RES/169 (Congo), 24 November 1961, para. 4 
(‘take vigorous action, including the use of the requisite measure of force, if necessary’). 
16  See generally: Draper, ‘The Legal Limitations upon the Employment of Weapons by the United Nations 
Force in the Congo’, 12 (2) ICLQ (1963), 387-413; Bothe, Le Droit de la Guerre et les Nations Unies. A 
Propos des Incidents Armés au Congo (IUHEI 1967), pp. 135-242. 
17  S/RES/836 (Bosnia and Herzegovina), 4 June 1993, para. 9 (‘to take the necessary measures, including the 
use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas by any of the parties or to armed incursion 
into them’). 
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states to carry out air strikes in support of UNPROFOR forces on the ground.18 This led to 
intense fighting with Bosnian-Serb forces and massive air raids against their targets. In Somalia, 
the Security Council tasked the Unified Task Force (UNITAF),19 a multinational force under 
US command, with using all necessary means to provide a secure environment in support of 
UNOSOM I, before merging both operations into UNOSOM II under an extended and robust 
mandate.20 In its effort to disarm local militia, UNOSOM II saw itself drawn into fierce battles 
with armed groups, leading to heavy casualties on both sides, and was subsequently withdrawn. 
While the Somalia campaign proved a failure, culminating in a hasty withdrawal, the United 
Nations and NATO eventually managed to secure peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A sizeable 
NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) was tasked with the enforcement of the 1995 Dayton 
Peace Accords, for which it was given a Chapter VII mandate,21 but it never had to resort to its 
full power to use force. This approach – of giving robust Chapter VII mandates to a multina-
tional operation, with a strong deterrent effect on local forces – had already been used for re-
storing peace and public order in Haiti in 1994.22 The authorisation and deployment of the Ko-
sovo Force (KFOR) and the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) in 1999 followed 
the same pattern, in order to facilitate the establishment of UN-led territorial administrations in 
both regions.23 
In August 2000, the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations issued its final report, better 
known as the ‘Brahimi Report’. In view of the failure of the UN mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) 
to halt the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and the mixed performance of other UN peacekeeping 
forces, the report embraced a robust peacekeeping doctrine, aimed at the protection of civilians, 
and called for realistic mandates coupled with adequate resources and personnel.24 Since then, 
virtually all new UN peace operations have been set up with a broad and robust mandate under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter,25 such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in Sudan, Ivory 
                                               
18  Ibid, para. 10 (‘all necessary measures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas’). The 
use of airpower in defence of a no-fly zone had been authorised some time before, S/RES/816 (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina), 31 March 1993, para. 4. 
19  S/RES/794 (Somalia), 3 December 1992, para. 10. 
20  S/RES/814 (Somalia), 26 March 1993, paras. 5-6 (reference to SG’s report for use of force). 
21  S/RES/1031 (Bosnia and Herzegovina), 15 December 1995, paras. 14-17. 
22  Multinational Force Haiti, S/RES/940 (Haiti), 31 July 1994, para. 4 (‘use all necessary means to facilitate 
the departure from Haiti of the military leadership’). 
23  S/RES/1244 (Kosovo), 10 June 1999, paras. 7-9; S/RES/1264 (East Timor), 15 September 1999, para. 4. 
24  Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (‘Brahimi Report’), A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 
August 2000, paras. 48-64. 
25  Zacklin, ‘The Use of Force in Peacekeeping Operations’, in: Blokker and Schrijver (eds.), The Security 
Council and the Use of Force: Theory and Reality – A Need for Change? (Martinus Nijhoff 2005), 91-106, 
pp. 91-100. 
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Coast, Haiti as well as Mali.26 Similar authorisations were also added to some of the existing 
operations.27  
Robust mandates under Chapter VII have also been given to peace operations carried out by 
regional organisations: to the African Union missions in Somalia and Mali,28 to the NATO-led 
operations in Kosovo (KFOR) and in Afghanistan (ISAF),29 and a number of missions under 
the command of the European Union,30 including its counter-piracy operation off the coast of 
Somalia.31 The same is true for the US-led multinational force in Iraq, both during the occupa-
tion phase until June 2004 and thereafter.32  
In peace operations with Chapter VII mandate, the use of force is authorised either explicitly 
by reference to ‘all necessary means’ or implicitly by assigning a wide range of tasks that may 
necessitate the use of force in certain situations, including the protection of civilians, the mainte-
nance of law and order, disarmament of irregular fighters or support and training of the security 
forces of the host state.33 Moreover, the Chapter VII authorisation is complemented by a num-
ber of other legal bases under international law: the mission’s inherent right to self-defence,34 
counter-piracy authorisations under the law of the sea35 and the host state’s explicit consent to 
                                               
26  MINUSCA (CAR): S/RES/2149, 10 April 2014; UNISMA (Mali): S/RES/2100, 25 April 2013; 
MONUSCO (DRC): S/RES/291, 24 February 2000; UNOCI (Ivory Coast): S/RES/1528, 27 February 2004; 
UNISFA (Abyei Sudan): S/RES/1990, 27 June 2011; MINUSTAH (Haiti): S/RES/1542 30 April 2004, 
para. 7; S/RES/2070, 12 October 2012; UNIMIL (Liberia): S/RES/1509, 19 September 2003; S/RES/2066, 
17 September 2012; UNMIS (Sudan): S/RES/1590, 24 March 2005; UNAMID (Sudan Darfur): 
S/RES/1769, 31 July 2007. 
27  UNIFIL (Lebanon): S/RES/1701, 11 August 2006; MINURCAT (Central African Republic and Chad): 
S/RES/1861, 14 January 2009; UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone): S/RES/1270, 22 October 1999; S/RES/1389, 16 
January 2002. 
28  AMISOM (Somalia): S/RES/1744, 21 February 2007; MISCA (CAR): S/RES/2127, 5 December 2013; 
AFISMA (Mali): S/RES/2085, 20 December 2012. 
29  S/RES/1244 (Kosovo), 10 June 1999, paras. 7-9; S/RES/1386 (Afghanistan), 20 December 2001. 
30  Althea (Bosnia and Herzegovina): S/RES/1575, 22 November 2004; Artemis (DRC): S/RES/1484, 30 May 
2003. 
31  Atalanta (Somalia): S/RES/1851, 16 December 2008. EU Council Joint Action 2008/851, Article 2(d) 
(‘take the necessary measures, including the use of force, to deter, prevent and intervene in order to bring 
to an end acts of piracy and armed robbery’).  
32  S/RES/1483, 22 May 2003; S/RES/1546, 5 June 2004. 
33  Zacklin (2005), supra note 26, pp. 95-101. See also more generally: Mollard-Bannelier and Pison (eds.), 
Le Recours à la Force Autorisé par le Conseil de Sécurité : Droit et Responsabilité (Pedone 2014). For this 
reason, there is no pressing need to discuss in detail the legality of humanitarian interventions (without or 
in excess of a UN mandate). For an innovative contribution on this matter: Burke, An Equitable Framework 
for Humanitarian Intervention (Hart Publishing 2013).  
34  Knoops, ‘The Transposition of Inter-State Self-Defense and Use of Force onto Operational Mandates for 
Peace Support Operations’, in: Arnold (ed.), Law Enforcement within the Framework of Peace Support 
Operations (Martinus Nijhoff 2008), 3-21. 
35  Arts. 100-107 and 110 UNCLOS. See also, more generally: Treves, ‘Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of 
Force: Developments of the Coast of Somalia’, 20 (2) EJIL (2009), 399-414; Geiss and Petrig, Piracy and 
Armed Robbery at Sea: The Legal Framework for Counter-Piracy Operations in Somalia and the Gulf of 
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intervene.36 As for the latter, this is especially so for the most likely case of actions against 
recalcitrant non-state armed groups,37 who in UN jargon are usually referred to as ‘spoilers’ to 
the local peace process.38 An illustrative case is Resolution 2098, adopted in March 2013, which 
set up an Intervention Brigade as part of the UN operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(MONUSCO) explicitly authorised to: 
carry out targeted offensive operations … in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner 
… to prevent the expansion of all armed groups, neutralize these groups, and to disarm 
them in order to contribute to the objective of reducing the threat posed by armed groups 
on state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and to make space for stabilization 
activities.39 
Another passage of the same resolution, however, made clear that the explicit authorisation was 
only made as an exceptional measure and did not create ‘a precedent or any prejudice to the 
agreed principles of peacekeeping’.40  
At the beginning of the Libyan Civil War (2011) between pro-Gaddafi forces and insurgents, 
the Security Council authorised member states to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya41 and to 
take:  
all necessary measures … to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of 
attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign oc-
cupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory …42 
This led to an intense air campaign by a NATO-led coalition against Gaddafi forces and has so 
far been the last example of international forces taking military actions against states with ex-
plicit authorisation of the Security Council.43 The increased relevance of civilian protection is 
a distinguishing feature of the Libya campaign in comparison to the actions taken against Iraq 
and North Korea, solely motivated by the latters’ aggression against their neighbours. This 
                                               
Aden (OUP 2011), pp. 55-136. 
36  Fox, ‘Intervention by Invitation’, in: Weller (2015), supra note 1, 816-40. 
37  Current, topical examples are: Afghanistan, the DRC, Mali and Somalia. 
38  Capstone Doctrine (2008), supra note 9, pp. 34-35.  
39  S/RES/2098 (DRC), 28 March 2013, para. 12 (b), emphasis added. 
40  Ibid, para. 9. 
41  S/RES/1973 (Libya), 17 March 2011, paras. 6-8. 
42  Ibid, para. 4, emphasis added. 
43  For the Russian claim that NATO acted ultra vires: Reuters, ‘NATO war in Libya Violates U.N. Mandate, 
Russia Says’, 19 April 2011, www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/19/us-russia-libya-idUSTRE73I26D2011 
0419. For a more nuanced analysis: Bassiouni, Libya: From Repression to Revolution. A Record of Armed 
Conflict and International Law Violations, 2011-2013 (Martinus Nijhoff 2013), pp. 223-30 (considering 
NATO strikes on military installations in Tripolis – far away from the frontline – and later against Gaddafi’s 
last stronghold around the city of Sirte at variance with S/RES/1973). 
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shows the once clear boundary between peacekeeping and enforcement has become ever more 
blurred.  
Chapter VII authorisations give a great deal of flexibility to the relevant missions, but overall 
the use of force is limited by the terms of the mandate, including time and location, and the 
principle of necessity and proportionality.44 Nevertheless, the mandates as such and the jus ad 
bellum as a whole, do not provide any guidance as to when and how force may be used against 
individuals. These questions are rather matters of human rights law and humanitarian law,45 to 
which many of the more recent mandates explicitly refer.46 
2.3 COMMAND AND CONTROL, AND 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
COMMAND-AND-CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS 
Peace operations are either carried out directly by the United Nations or by a coalition of the 
willing, usually under the command of a regional organisation, such as NATO and the European 
Union. In addition, some operations, so-called hybrid missions, are run by two organisations 
together, such as UNAMID in Darfur, which is under the joint command of the United Nations 
and the African Union. As outlined above, command can also shift from one organisation to 
another; and it is also possible that two or more operations under different mandates and com-
mands are deployed in the same area and cooperate closely. 
                                               
44  Okimoto, The Distinction and Relationship between Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello (Hart 2011), pp. 173-
83. 
45  It is for the same reason that the so-called ‘naked self-defence’ doctrine fails to provide sufficient guidance 
for lethal targeting operations against individuals, as claimed by the US administration: Harold Hongju Koh 
(US DoS Legal Adviser), ‘The Obama Administration and International Law’, Speech at the Annual ASIL 
Meeting, Washington DC, 25 March 2010, www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm (‘a state that is 
engaged in an armed conflict or in legitimate self-defense is not required to provide targets with legal pro-
cess before the state may use lethal force’, emphasis added). 
46  For instance: S/RES/2246 (Somalia), 10 November 2015, para. 7 (‘measures undertaken pursuant to this 
paragraph shall be consistent with applicable international law, in particular international human rights 
law’); S/RES/2164 (Mali), 25 June 2014, para. 29 (‘calls upon MINUSMA … to abide by international 
humanitarian, human rights and refugee law’); S/RES/2085 (Mali), 20 December 2012, para. 9 (‘take all 
necessary measures, in compliance with applicable international humanitarian law and human rights law’); 
S /RES/2073 (Somalia), 7 November 2012, para. 1 (‘take all necessary measures, in compliance with ap-
plicable international humanitarian and human rights law’). 
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One of the main challenges for the United Nations and regional organisations is that they do 
not possess their own armed forces. While they could potentially recruit their own troops in a 
similar way as their civilian staff members, this option has to date never been used by any 
organisation. Instead, these organisations have been relying on troop contributions from their 
member states. Articles 43 and 47 of the UN Charter were designated to regulate the acquisition 
and command of UN troops on a standby basis, but this legal mechanism never materialised. 
Instead, the Security Council has been depending on ad hoc measures from troop-contributing 
states to set up their operations.47 The picture is the same for regional organisations, although 
there have been some attempts towards standby arrangements.48 
When sending states contribute their troops, they place them at the disposal of the organisation 
or the lead nation in command. However, they usually delegate only ‘operational command’ or 
‘operational control’ to the mission commander in question, which in military terminology 
means the authority to deploy, direct and command the forces for the accomplishment of the 
specific mission.49 In other words, when contributing troops to operations commanded by the 
United Nations or by regional organisations, states almost never relinquish ‘full command’ over 
their troops.50 They continue to exercise administrative and disciplinary authority – the most 
effective means for commanding military forces – as well as criminal jurisdiction over them. 
The command and control arrangements are further complicated by specific caveats that indi-
vidual states may enter, thereby restricting the use of certain equipment or measures by their 
national contingents. Moreover, there are also cases – especially in UN-led operations – in 
which the chain of command existing within the operation is bypassed by the instructions of 
the national authorities to their respective contingents in the field,51 which further undermines 
the effectiveness of unified command within the operation. 
                                               
47  Zwanenburg, Accountability of Peace Support Operations (Martinus Nijhoff 2005), p. 35. 
48  For instance, the NATO Response Force, EU Battlegroups and the AU Standby Force. 
49  For the different definitions used by the UN and NATO: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and 
Department of Field Support, Authority, Command and Control in UN Peacekeeping Operations, 15 Feb-
ruary 2008, Ref. 2008.4, p. 4; NATO Standardisation Agency (NSA), NATO Glossary of Terms and Def-
initions, AAP-06, 2013, p. 2-O-3. 
50  Cathcart, ‘Command and Control in Military Operations’ in: Gill and Fleck (eds.), The Handbook of the 
International Law of Military Operations (OUP 2010), 235-44, p. 235; Cammart and Klappe, ‘Authority, 
Command, and Control in United Nations-led Peace Operations’, in: Gill and Fleck (2010), ibid, 159-62, 
p. 159; Murphy, UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo. Operational and Legal Issues in 
Practice (CUP 2007), p. 115-34. 
51 Zwanenburg (2005), supra note 47, pp. 37-41. 
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ATTRIBUTION AND RESPONSIBILITY 
The command and control arrangements pertaining to peace operations have a direct impact on 
the responsibility of the relevant states and international organisations involved, which is ulti-
mately of relevance for the question as to whose obligations are engaged by the actions of the 
peace operation: the obligations of the individual states, the relevant international organisation 
or even both?  
In addition to states, whose legal personality is beyond doubt, international organisations are 
generally considered to have an international legal personality distinct from their member 
states, for the purpose of carrying out their functions. Hence, they are capable of having rights 
and obligations under international law.52 The International Law Commission considered the 
issue of responsibility for several decades and finally adopted its Articles on State Responsibil-
ity (ASR) in 2001 and its Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations (ARIO) 
in 2011, respectively.53 While not necessarily binding in the strict sense, they constitute an au-
thoritative clarification of the responsibility of states and international organisations.54  
As a general rule, states and international organisations incur responsibility under international 
law for wrongful conduct that is attributable to them.55 This is most evidently the case in rela-
tion to acts and omissions of their own organs, as suggested by Articles 4 ARS and 6 ARIO, 
respectively.56 As far as UN-led operations are concerned, they are subsidiary bodies of the 
                                               
52  ICJ, Reparations (1949), infra note 129, p. 179. See also: Art. 2 (a) ARIO, infra (‘“International organiza-
tion” means an organization established by a treaty or other instrument governed by international law and 
possessing its own international legal personality. International organizations may include as members, in 
addition to States, other entities’). 
53  Usually both collections are referred to as ILC ‘draft articles’ (DARS and DARIO, respectively). However, 
having been endorsed by the UN GA (see infra note 54), it is more appropriate to use the term ‘articles’ 
instead. ILC, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commen-
taries, Report of the International Law Commission’, Fifty-third session 2001, UN Doc. A/56/10, hereinaf-
ter: ARS with Commentaries. ILC, ‘Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, 
with commentaries, Report of the International Law Commission’, Sixty-third session (26 April - 3 June 
and 4 July - 12 August 2011), UN Doc. A/66/10, hereinafter: ARIO with Commentaries. 
54  Both have been endorsed by the UN General Assembly: A/RES/56/83, 28 January 2002, para. 3 (‘Takes 
note of the articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts … and commends them to 
the attention of Governments without prejudice to the question of their future adoption or other appropriate 
action’). A/RES/66/100, 27 February 2012, para. 3 (‘Takes note of the articles on the responsibility of 
international organizations … and commends them to the attention of Governments and international or-
ganizations without prejudice to the question of their future adoption or other appropriate action’). 
55  Art. 3 ARS and Art. 4 ARIO, respectively.  
56  Art. 4 (1) ARS (‘The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international 
law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it 
holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central Government or 
of a territorial unit of the State’); Art. 6 (1) ARIO (‘The conduct of an organ or agent of an international 
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UN Security Council and placed under the authority of the UN Secretary-General. Operations 
under the command of regional organisations follow the same pattern and usually become an 
organ within the institutional setting of the organisation in question.  
However, as we have seen above, the national contingents of which the operations consist do 
not necessarily cease to be organs of their states. Indeed, in view of the complex command 
arrangements in multinational military operations, Article 7 of ARIO (2011) provides for a 
factual test:  
The conduct of an organ of a State or an organ or agent of an international organization 
that is placed at the disposal of another international organization shall be considered under 
international law an act of the latter organization if the organization exercises effective 
control over that conduct.57 
Thus, where the United Nations or a regional organisation exercises effective control over the 
relevant conduct, the latter is attributable to that international organisation. Conversely, the 
conduct can be attributed to the sending state if its troops acted under its effective control, for 
instance, by following instructions from their national command. The same test applies to the 
question of attribution when a national contingent is put at the disposal of a lead nation instead 
of an international organisation. Indeed, in order to be attributable to the receiving state, the 
ARS Commentaries require that such contingent act:  
in conjunction with the machinery of that State and under its exclusive direction and con-
trol, rather than on instructions from the sending State.58 
Yet, practice has not always been consistent with this test. For instance, in response to the works 
of the International Law Commission, the UN Office for Legal Affairs maintained that: 
[F]orces placed at the disposal of the United Nations are “transformed” into a United Na-
tions subsidiary organ and, as such, entail the responsibility of the Organization, just like 
any other subsidiary organ, regardless of whether the control exercised over all aspects of 
the operation was, in fact, “effective”. … Mindful of the realities of peacekeeping opera-
tions but keen to maintain the integrity of the United Nations operation vis-à-vis third par-
ties, the United Nations has struck a balance, whereby it remains responsible vis-à-vis third 
parties, but reserves the right in cases of gross negligence or wilful misconduct to revert to 
the lending State.59  
                                               
organization in the performance of functions of that organ or agent shall be considered an act of that organ-
ization under international law, whatever position the organ or agent holds in respect of the organization’). 
57  Emphasis added. 
58  ARS Commentaries, commentary to Art. 6 ARS (Conduct of Organs Placed at the Disposal of a State by 
Another State), p. 44, para. 2, emphasis added. 
59  ILC, ‘Responsibility of International Organizations: Comments and Observations Received from Interna-
tional Organizations’, 17 February 2011, UN Doc. A/CN.4/637/Add.1, pp. 13-14. 
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Thus in defiance of the factual test suggested by the International Law Commission, the United 
Nations seems to rely in principle on the attribution of UN peace operations as a whole. The 
same statement made, however, clear that this practice is mainly driven by political considera-
tions and that the Secretariat indeed supported the inclusion of the ‘effective control’ test as a 
general guiding principle in the determination of responsibilities between the United Nations 
and the relevant state.60 
The European Court of Human Rights developed its own test in Behrami and Saramati (2007), 
involving the actions and omissions of international forces in Kosovo. Based on the fact that 
KFOR was acting pursuant to a Chapter VII resolution, the Court held that the UN Security 
Council exercised ‘ultimate authority and control’ and thus attributed KFOR’s conduct to the 
United Nations.61 Unlike UNMIK, however, KFOR is neither a subsidiary body of the organi-
sation, nor has it ever been placed under the command of the United Nations. Instead, KFOR 
carries out the tasks entrusted to it by the Security Council under unified command of NATO. 
The Court’s decision has drawn strong criticism among scholars for confusing the delegation 
of powers with the issue of attribution.62 Moreover, it has also been criticised by the UN Sec-
retariat63 and the International Law Commission.64 But in the Al-Jedda case, concerning deten-
tion by British forces in post-occupation Iraq, the Court followed the view of the House of 
Lords65 and distinguished the situation from the case of Kosovo.66 Moreover, in the more recent 
                                               
60  Ibid, p. 14. 
61  ECtHR, Behrami v. France & Saramati v. Norway, Decision, 2 May 2007, Application nos. 71412/01 and 
78166/01, paras. 133-41. 
62  Milanović and Papić, ‘As Bad as It Gets: The European Court of Human Rights Behrami and Saramati 
Decision and General International Law’, 58 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2009), 267-
96, pp. 283-86; Mujezinović Larsen, ‘Attribution of Conduct in Peace Operations: The “Ultimate Authority 
and Control” Test’, 19 (3) EJIL (2008), 509-31; Krieger, ‘A Credibility Gap: The Behrami and Saramati 
Decision of the European Court of Human Rights’, 13 Journal of International Peacekeeping (2009), 159-
80. 
63  ILC, Comments and Observations Received from International Organizations (2011), supra note 59, p. 12. 
64  ILC, Giorgio Gaja, ‘Seventh Report on Responsibility of International Organizations’, 27 March 2009, UN 
Doc. A/CN.4/610, pp. 10-12. 
65  UKHL, Al-Jedda v. Secretary of State for Defence, Opinions of the Lords, 12 December 2007, UKHL 58, 
paras. 22-24, 124, 131, 141-149. See also: UK EWHC, Serdar Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence, 2 May 
2014, 1369 (QB), paras. 171-78 (considering the ‘ultimate authority and control’ test but distinguishing the 
facts in Afghanistan from those in Kosovo). 
66  ECtHR, Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, Judgement, 7 July 2011, Application no. 27021/08, para. 56. The 
ECtHR maintained its verdict in only a few closely-related cases from Kosovo and Bosnia: ECtHR, 
Kasumaj v. Greece, Decision, 5 July 2007, Application no. 6974/05; ECtHR, Gajić v. Germany, Decision, 
28 August 2007, Application no. 31446/02; ECtHR, Berić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Decision, 16 Octo-
ber 2007, Application nos. 36357/04 et al. 
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case of Jaloud v. Netherlands (2014), the Court dropped its reference to the ‘ultimate authority 
and control’ test altogether.67 
What is more, the European Court had stopped its analysis in Behrami and Saramati once it 
had concluded that KFOR’s actions were attributable to the United Nations. It thus failed to 
consider the possible concurrent responsibility of NATO or the individual troop-contributing 
states. In its more recent case-law, however, the Court no longer rules out the possibility of dual 
or multiple attributions to other states and international organisations.68 British and Dutch 
courts have also raised this possibility, but without considering it necessary to assess whether 
concurrent responsibility did in fact arise in the cases under review.69 Also the International 
Law Commission refers to dual and multiple attribution, but says that it does ‘not frequently 
occur in practice’: 
Thus, attribution of a certain conduct to an international organization does not imply that 
the same conduct cannot be attributed to a State; nor does attribution of conduct to a State 
rule out attribution of the same conduct to an international organization. One could also 
envisage conduct being simultaneously attributed to two or more international organiza-
tions, for instance when they establish a joint organ and act through that organ.70 
A case in point is UNAMID, the hybrid mission in Darfur, jointly commanded by the United 
Nations and the African Union. This special case aside, it is rather unlikely that the attribution 
question can be answered for a peace operation en bloque. Instead, the assessment needs to be 
made on a case-by-case basis for each individual action or omission, regardless of whether they 
arise at the strategic, operational, or tactical level.71 This is also evident in the recent jurispru-
dence of the European Court and national courts, which have engaged in a detailed analysis of 
                                               
67  ECtHR, Jaloud v. Netherlands, Judgement, 20 November 2014, Application no. 47708/08. 
68  For instance, ECtHR, Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom (2011), supra note 66, para. 80; ECtHR, Jaloud v. Neth-
erlands (2014), supra note 67, para. 153; ECtHR, Hassan v. United Kingdom, Judgement, 16 September 
2014, Application no. 29750/09, para. 78 (albeit less explicit). 
69  UK EWHC, Serdar Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence (2014), supra note 65, para. 187 (deeming it unnec-
essary to consider the possibility of joint responsibility of ISAF i.e. NATO and the UN). Confirmed on 
appeal: UK EWCA, Serdar Mohammed et al. v. Ministry of Defence, Judgment, 30 July 2015, EWCA Civ 
843, para. 72. Hague Appeals Court, Mustafić-Mujić & Nuhanović (2011), infra note 81, para. 5.9. Con-
firmed on appeal: Supreme Court of the Netherlands, Mustafić-Mujić & Nuhanović (2013), infra note 85, 
para. 3.11.2. Also maintained in: Hague District Court, Mothers of Srebrenica (2014), infra note 86, para. 
4.34. 
70  ARIO Commentaries (2011), supra note 53, p. 16, para. 4, emphasis added. See also: ARS Commentaries 
(2001), supra note 53, p. 44, para. 3 (‘Situations can also arise where the organ of one State acts on the 
joint instructions of its own and another State, or there may be a single entity which is a joint organ of 
several States. In these cases, the conduct in question is attributable to both States’). 
71  Within NATO, for instance, target lists are usually approved at the highest level, i.e. by consensus among 
all NATO members represented in the North Atlantic Council, upon the recommendation of the Military 
Committee: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49633.htm (‘In times of crises, tension or war, and 
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the factual circumstances in order to attribute the specific acts raised by the case in question, 
rather than the totality of the peace operation’s acts as a whole.72 Moreover, each action may 
be further divided into different sub-elements, which may possibly yield different results on 
attribution.73 In other words, the more limited the conduct in question, the more likely its at-
tribution to only one entity. Hence, wherever it is possible to identify distinct rather than over-
lapping areas of control, multiple attribution of the same conduct (or sub-element thereof) will 
be rather the exception than the norm. This may explain the reluctance of the International Law 
Commission and some academics to accept multiple attribution as the solution for apportioning 
responsibility in complex peace operations.74 
Despite the broad acceptance of the ‘effective control’ test for the purpose of attribution, the 
International Law Commission does not provide a precise definition of ‘effective control’ and 
its constitutive elements.75 According to James Crawford, the ‘essential ambiguity of the term’ 
was somewhat intended, coupled with the hope that its application would prove feasible in 
actual practice.76 The ARIO Commentaries, however, acknowledge that retention of compe-
tences by the sending state for criminal and disciplinary matters is one of those cases.77 More-
over, the detailed account of state practice and jurisprudence to which they refer shows that 
                                               
in relation to military operations undertaken by the Alliance … [the Military Committee] advises the Coun-
cil of the military situation and its implications, and makes recommendations on the use of military force, 
the implementation of contingency plans and the development of appropriate rules of engagement’). On the 
other end of the spectrum are those acts, usually occurring at the strategic level, that were either not taken 
pursuant to instructions from higher command levels or are even in clear violation of the latter. 
72  See, for instance, ECtHR, Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom (2011), supra note 66 (in relation to the detention 
of Mr. Al-Jedda); ECtHR, Jaloud v. Netherlands (2014), supra note 67, para. 147-51 (in relation to the use 
of force by Dutch soldiers in the specific area). See also: UK EWHC, Serdar Mohammed v. Ministry of 
Defence (2014), supra note 65, paras. 188-87 (in relation to detention by British forces in Afghanistan). 
73  See, in particular, the step-by-step assessment as to who was in effective control of a number of very dif-
ferent, specific acts and omissions at different points in time before and after the fall of Srebrenica: Hague 
District Court, Mothers of Srebrenica (2014), infra note 86, paras. 4.32-4.144 (concluding that only some 
of the acts and omissions were attributable to the Netherlands). 
74  Spijkers, ‘The Netherlands’ and the United Nations' Legal Responsibility for Srebrenica Before the Dutch 
Courts’, 50 Military Law and the Law of War Review (2011), 517-34, pp. 528-29. Tsagourias, ‘The Re-
sponsibility of International Organisations for Military Missions’, in: Odello and Piotrowicz (eds.), Inter-
national Military Missions and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2011), 245-66, pp. 253-60. 
75  Crawford, State Responsibility. The General Part (CUP 2013), pp. 203 (‘‘Effective control’ appeared first 
as a test of attribution in the Nicaragua case, and was influential in the drafting of ARSIWA Article 8. It 
was further elaborated on by the International Court in Bosnian Genocide. In describing the test of ‘effective 
control’ as it appears in DARIO Article 7, however, the ILC gave no indication as to the extent of the debt 
owed to these decisions’). 
76  Ibid, p. 205, footnote text. 
77  ARIO Commentaries (2011), supra note 53, p. 21, para. 7. 
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whenever national contingents act outside the usual chain of command, their conduct is attribut-
able to the state in question rather than to the organisation.78 It is therefore the actual authority 
over the specific conduct that needs to be assessed in each particular case. 
Specifically insightful are the decisions of courts in Belgium and the Netherlands. 
In Mukeshimana-Ngulinzira v. Belgium,79 the Brussels Court of First Instance had to assess 
whether the acts of the Belgian contingent to UNAMIR, the UN-led peacekeeping mission in 
Rwanda, were attributable to Belgium. In April 1994, at the beginning of the Rwandan Geno-
cide, Belgian troops evacuated from their compound, where 2,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus 
had sought refuge, thus leaving them unprotected against Interhamwe militiamen, who killed 
most of them shortly afterwards. The court concluded that the decision to evacuate was made 
by the Belgian contingent in close cooperation with the Belgian army’s chiefs of staff and with-
out consulting the UNAMIR force commander.80 Similar questions had to be addressed by 
courts in the Netherlands in relation to the acts and omissions of the Dutch UNPROFOR con-
tingent during the Srebrenica massacre in summer 1995. The Hague District Court in Mustafić-
Mujić & Nuhanović found that the Dutch battalion had remained within the UN chain of com-
mand, making their actions thus only imputable to the United Nations. The Appeals Court, 
however, attributed the conduct to the Netherlands.81 For the ‘effective control’ assessment, the 
Appeals Court held, particular attention should be given: 
to the question whether that conduct constituted the execution of a specific instruction, 
issued by the UN or the State, but also to the question whether, if there was no such specific 
instruction, the UN or the State had the power to prevent the conduct concerned.82 
Hence, in the view of the court, the concept of ‘effective control’ also encompasses the ability 
to prevent misconduct, following the definition previously suggested by Tom Dannenbaum.83 
It is, however, unclear whether it was really necessary for the court to adopt such a broad con-
                                               
78  Ibid, p. 22, para. 8. 
79  Brussels Court of First Instance, Mukeshimana and Others v. Belgian State and Others, Interim Judgement, 
8 December 2010, Case nos. RG 04/4807/A and 07/15547/A,  
80  Ibid, para. 38. 
81  Hague Appeals Court, Mustafić-Mujić et al. v. Netherlands & Nuhanović v. Netherlands, Judgement, 5 July 
2011, Case nos. 200.020.173/01 and 200.020.174/01, para. 5.20 (in relation to the eviction of the victims 
from their compound). 
82  Ibid, para. 5.9, emphasis added. 
83  Dannenbaum, ‘Translating the Standard of Effective Control into a System of Effective Accountability: 
How Liability Should Be Apportioned for Violations of Human Rights by Member State Troops Contin-
gents as United Nations Peacekeepers’, 51 Harvard International Law Review (2010), 113-192, pp. 157-92 
(‘control most likely to be effective in preventing the wrong in question’). 
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cept of ‘effective control’, as it was able to clearly show on the basis of the facts that the evac-
uation of the refugees and the Dutch battalion from its compound in Srebrenica was carried out 
pursuant to decisions and instructions received from the Dutch government.84  
The broadened concept of ‘effective control’, covering also the ability to prevent misconduct, 
was also upheld by the Dutch Supreme Court,85 and subsequently applied in the related Mothers 
of Srebrenica case (2014).86 Also here, however, it played no decisive role in the actual assess-
ment of the facts, on the basis of which the court concluded that a number of Dutchbat acts and 
omissions after the fall of Srebrenica were indeed attributable to the Netherlands.87 It is there-
fore unclear how much credit should be given to this broad ‘effective control’ concept. Indeed, 
the International Law Commission has so far refrained from endorsing it.88 The verdict in aca-
demic circles on this broader concept of ‘effective control’, covering also the ability to prevent 
misconduct, has also been rather mixed,89 with only few commentators expressing explicit sup-
port.90 James Crawford sees in it a welcome step forward in securing a more effective regime 
of accountability for peace operations, but he cautions that it has the potential of: 
making the distinction between the state and organization in terms of attribution – long 
maintained by the UN as an article of faith – effectively meaningless.91 
                                               
84  Ibid, paras. 5.11-19. 
85  Supreme Court of the Netherlands, Mustafić-Mujić et al. v. Netherlands & Nuhanović v. Netherlands, 
Judgement, 6 September 2013, para. 3.12.2.  
86  Hague District Court, Mothers of Srebrenica v. The Netherlands, Judgement, 16 July 2014, Case no. 
C/09/295247, para. 4.46. 
87  Ibid, paras. 4.61-4.144. 
88  Indeed, the ILC only referred to it in a footnote, while reserving its opinion on the merit of this broad 
‘effective control’ concept. ARIO Commentaries (2011), supra note 53, p. 25, para. 14. For an interesting 
account of the discussions on the matter: Crawford (2013), supra note 75, pp. 205-206 (‘Towards the end 
of the ILC’s consideration of the issue, questions emerged as to whether actual, positive control over the 
particular act (i.e. the giving of direct instructions) was required in order for attribution to occur, or whether 
the capacity to exercise control combined with a failure to prevent a particular act from taking place could 
be sufficient. Such comments were driven in large part by a desire to ensure that the law of responsibility 
for states and organizations constituted an effective regime of accountability’, emphasis added). 
89  Ryngaert, ‘Apportioning Responsibility between the UN and Member States in UN Peace Support Opera-
tions: An Inquiry into the Application of the ‘Effective Control’ Standard after Behrami’, 45 (1) Israel Law 
Review (2012), 151-78, pp. 173-74 (referring to the ‘power to prevent’ addition, but not explicitly discuss-
ing its merit de lege lata or de lege ferenda). Remaining silent on the ‘power to prevent’ aspect introduced 
by the Nuhanović case: Mujezinović Larsen (2012), infra note 185, pp. 143-44; Spijkers (2011), supra note 
74, pp. 527-29. 
90  For instance: Direk, Security Detention in International Territorial Administrations: Kosovo, East Timor, 
and Iraq (Brill 2015), pp. 39-40; Boutin, ‘Responsibility of the Netherlands for the Acts of Dutchbat in 
Nuhanović and Mustafić: The Continuous Quest for a Tangible Meaning for ‘Effective Control’ in the 
Context of Peacekeeping’, 25 (2) LJIL (2012), 521-35, p. 529. 
91  Crawford (2013), supra note 75, p. 210. Indeed, the ‘power to prevent’ concept would mean for virtually 
all acts and omissions of peace operations to be attributable both to the sending states and to the interna-
tional organisation involved. It would also create a similar duty for international organisations (e.g. UN or 
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Indeed, the characteristic retention of criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction by the sending state 
and right to request its troops’ withdrawal from the mission at any time means that the state has 
virtually always the power to prevent acts or omissions by its troops. In view of this, it appears 
more reasonable to reject this broad concept and to base the attribution test instead on the tra-
ditional understanding of effective control: the question of who gave the direct order or instruc-
tion for the specific conduct. 
There is certainly a significant overlap between the responsibility of states for conduct duly 
attributable to them and the issue of ancillary responsibility that states may incur by virtue of 
the acts of an international organisation,92 including as a result of their membership in that or-
ganisation.93 Its relevance for peace missions and other international military deployment has 
attracted a significant degree of scholarly attention. But, for the sake of brevity, it is fair to 
conclude that it is highly unlikely for a state to incur any considerable degree of responsibility 
for the acts of an international organisation of which it is a member in relation to military op-
erations conducted abroad.94 In view of the discussion on the application of humanitarian law 
and human rights law in the following chapters,95 it should also be recalled that the application 
of both regimes is subject to certain threshold requirements: whether the entity in question is a 
party to an armed conflict or an occupying power, or whether it exercises jurisdiction, respec-
tively. In relation to a state, the assessment can only be made on the basis of conduct that is 
duly attributable to it; ancillary responsibly of the state arising from the acts of an international 
organisation is simply not enough in order to meet the threshold requirements.96 
                                               
the relevant regional organisation) to take measures to prevent wrongful conduct by state armed forces with 
whom they operate. 
92  Ibid, p. 211 (acknowledging some practical overlap between the attribution of state conduct and ancillary 
state responsibility in relation to IO activities, despite the conceptual differences between both legal con-
cepts).  
93  See, in particular: Art. 61 ARIO (member state circumventing its own obligations by acting through IO) 
and Art. 62 ARIO (member state accepting responsibility or having led the injured party to rely on its 
responsibility). See also: Art. 58 ARIO (aid or assistance by a non-member state in the IO’s commission of 
the wrongful act) and Art. 59 ARIO (direction and control by a non-member over the IO’s commission of 
the wrongful act). For a more detailed discussion of these articles and their merit de lege lata or de lege 
ferenda: Crawford (2013), supra note 75, pp. 395-434. 
94  Mujezinović Larsen (2012), infra note 185, pp. 156-64. For an excellent discussion on this issue in relation 
to the EU: Naert, International Law Aspects of the EU’s Security and Defence Policy, with a Particular 
Focus on the Law of Armed Conflict and Human Rights (Intersentia 2010), pp. 435-52 (on the secondary 
responsibility of member states for delegating powers without equivalent protection guarantees and for their 
conduct within the framework of that organisation), and pp. 506-14 (on IHL) and pp. 641-44 (on HRL). 
95  Chapters 3 and 4, respectively. 
96  The special duty under CA1 to ensure respect for IHL in all circumstances is often addressed in conjunction 
with the issue of attribution. However, CA1 concerns a substantive rule of IHL applicable to states (even 
to those not party to an armed conflict). Its effect will therefore be discussed in the following section below, 
from p. 45. 
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CONCLUSION 
The exercise of ‘effective control’ over specific acts and omissions is the appropriate yardstick 
for identifying areas of responsibility of states and international organisations involved in peace 
operations.97 The detailed command and control arrangements considered above will usually 
be of help in order to provide an answer to the critical question: who gave the direct order or 
instruction for the specific conduct. While dual or multiple attribution – that is, attribution of 
the same act to two or more entities – cannot be excluded, it is rather the exception than the 
norm. Instead, a specific act or its different sub-elements will usually only be attributable to 
one entity. Taken together, however, the totality of all acts and omissions of the peace operation 
will typically engage the responsibility of a great number of actors. The picture is therefore very 
similar to a mosaic, where the different sets of coloured pieces represent those acts and omis-
sions attributable to a specific entity, which may be one of the troop-contributing states or in-
stead the relevant organisation. In more abstract terms, the states and the organisation do indeed 
share the responsibility for the peace operation, but only as a total sum of all specific individual 
acts, which will usually yield very different results on attribution. 
2.4 OBLIGATIONS UNDER HUMANITARIAN LAW 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
Peace operations are authorised under increasingly robust mandates to take measures in their 
area of deployment. In addition, their mandates often require them to comply with human rights 
and humanitarian law. As the discussion in the previous section showed, the actions of peace 
operations may engage the responsibility of the sending states as well as the relevant organisa-
tion. It is therefore apt to consider in more detail the different obligations of states in both fields 
of law. Moreover, states have – at least as a matter of legal policy – a strong interest in ensuring 
that international organisations have similar obligations under human rights law and humani-
tarian law. This section will therefore specifically consider the source and the extent to which 
international organisations have genuine obligations under both legal regimes. 
                                               
97  Note here that ‘effective control’ for the purpose of attribution is distinct from ‘effective control’ as a 
threshold requirement for the application of IHL (i.e. effective control over territory as an essential require-
ment of military occupations) and human rights law (i.e. effective control over territory or persons), which 
will be addressed in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively. 
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OBLIGATIONS OF STATES 
States remain undoubtedly the most important subjects of international law and are thus the 
primary addressees of the different legal sources of international law listed in Article 38 of the 
ICJ Statute.98 This section will therefore first outline the different treaty law obligations of 
states before moving to other possible sources of obligations under human rights and humani-
tarian law.99 
Treaty Law 
All states have become a party to the four Geneva Conventions (1949) and the vast majority of 
them have also ratified the two Additional Protocols (1977). However, some major contributors 
to international military operations are not party to the protocols, including India, Indonesia, 
Nepal, Turkey and the United States. Also the ratification of specific treaties on cultural prop-
erty and weapons, including on anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions,100 varies greatly 
from country to country.  
The picture is even more fragmented in the field of human rights law. The vast majority of them 
are party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)101 as well as to other 
universal human rights treaties.102 In addition, regional human rights systems have emerged 
with their own general human rights instruments, namely: the American Declaration on the 
                                               
98  The sources explicitly listed under Art. 38 ICJ Statute are: (a) international conventions (i.e. treaties); (b) in-
ternational custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c) the general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations; and (d) judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 
99  Note that unilateral acts by states are also capable of creating legally binding obligations for them, even 
though they are not specifically mentioned in Art. 38 ICJ Statute. See in particular: ILC, Guiding Principles 
Applicable to Unilateral Declarations of States Capable of Creating Legal Obligations, With Commentaries 
Thereto, 2 YILC (2006), p. 369-81. However, Hugh Thirlway sees the legal relevance of unilateral acts in 
the form of ‘inchoate treaties’: Thirlway, The Sources of International Law (OUP 2014), pp. 20-23. For the 
sake of brevity, the legal effects of unilateral acts will not be specifically discussed for the purpose of state 
obligations under IHL and HRL. 
100  Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (1997) with 162 state parties; and the Convention on Cluster Muni-
tions (2008) with 98 state parties. For a brief discussion on the challenges arising from coalition warfare 
see the section on inter-operationality and legal challenges further below, from p. 43. 
101  Prominent exceptions are: People’s Republic of China, Fiji, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia. 
102  In particular, Convention against Torture (CAT) and those conventions dealing with economic, social and 
cultural rights, as well as rights of specifically (vulnerable) groups, such as children, women and persons 
with disabilities. 
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Rights and Duties of Man (1948)103 and the American Convention on Human Rights (1969),104 
the European Convention on Human Rights (1950),105 the African Charter on Human and Peo-
ples’ Rights (1981),106 the CIS Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(1995),107 and the Arab Charter on Human Rights (2004).108 While they often differ as to the 
exact rights listed and their specific scope, they nevertheless share a relatively large core of 
rights. 
General International Law 
In addition to the complex framework of treaty obligations, states are also bound by general 
international law. In line with the approach used in other academic treatises, the term ‘general 
international law’ refers here primarily to international customary law and general principles.109 
General principles are not only limited to those principles deriving from the domestic legal 
orders of states, to which Article 38 of the ICJ Statute refers, but also to general principles of 
international law, which may also derive from widely ratified multilateral treaties and general 
international practice.110 There is therefore a high level of cross-fertilisation between general 
principles and customary law. Traditionally, a norm may only assume customary status if there 
is sufficiently wide practice and opinio juris to that effect. However, in the absence of clear and 
consistent state practice, a stronger emphasis is put on opinio juris expressed by states in inter-
national fora. Under this, more modern concept of custom evolution, state practice is either 
equated to opinio juris or plays a rather marginal role in identifying a customary norm.111 
                                               
103  On the binding nature of the ADRDM, especially relevant for states not party to the ACHR: Cerna, ‘Re-
flections on the Normative Status of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man’, 30 (4) 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law (2009), 1211-38. 
104  Twenty-three state parties from Latin-America. 
105  Forty-seven state parties from Europe, with the exception of Belarus and the Holy See. 
106  Parties are: all African states, with the exception of Morocco and South Sudan. 
107  Parties are: Russia, Belarus, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. 
108  Parties are: Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, 
Syria, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. 
109  Kamminga and Scheinin (eds.), The Impact of Human Rights Law on General International Law (OUP 
2009), in particular, the following chapter: Wouters and Ryngaert, ‘Impact on the Process of the Formation 
of Customary International Law’, 111-132. In a very similar way: Rodley, The Treatment of Prisoners 
under International Law (3rd edn., OUP 2009), pp. 64-81 (being even more inclusive by extending it to 
cover also other, more subsidiary sources); Naert (2010), supra note 94, p. 5. 
110  Wouters and Ryngaert (2009), ibid, p. 119. 
111  Wouters and Ryngaert (2009), ibid, pp. 114-17. 
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On the basis of this approach, customary law has gained a particularly important role in the 
field of humanitarian law. The ICRC’s Customary IHL Study (2005) brought some important 
clarification,112 as it was long unclear which humanitarian law rules actually constitute custom-
ary law.113 Despite some criticism,114 the Study is widely accepted and has been cited by na-
tional courts.115 It identifies 161 customary rules of humanitarian law, which reflect a great 
number of the provisions enshrined in the Geneva Conventions (1949), the Additional Protocols 
(1977) and more specific treaties. Most importantly, the Study considers the vast majority of 
these rules applicable also in non-international armed conflicts. A more cautious account of 
applicable customary rules is provided by the drafters of the Sanremo Manual of the Law of 
Non-International Armed Conflict (2006),116 which nonetheless confirms the trend that most 
rules of the law of international armed conflict apply equally in non-international armed con-
flicts. Hence, customary law proves to be of utmost importance for this particular type of armed 
conflict. Moreover, it also levels quite significantly the differences that exist between those 
states that have ratified Additional Protocol I and other relevant treaties and those states that 
have not yet become a party.117 
By contrast, there is no equally authoritative study on human rights law under general interna-
tional law. Nevertheless, the approach taken by some early authors trying to clarify this field of 
law appears to be very similar to the methodology used by the authors of the Customary IHL 
Study.118 Others have instead focussed on the crystallisation of human rights obligations as gen-
eral principles, as they do not necessarily require uniform state practice: either as fundamental 
                                               
112  Greenwood, ‘Customary Law Status of the Protocols’, in: Delissen and Tanja (eds.), Humanitarian Law of 
Armed Conflict. Challenges Ahead (1991), 93-114. 
113  Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume I Rules (CUP 2005), 
hereinafter: CIHL Study. 
114  Bothe, ‘Customary International Humanitarian Law: Some Reflections on the ICRC Study’, 8 YIHL 
(2005), 143-78; Wilmshurst and Breau (eds.), Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary International 
Humanitarian Law (CUP 2007); Bellinger and Haynes, ‘A US Government Response to the International 
Committee of the Red Cross Study Customary International Humanitarian Law’, 89 IRRC (2007), 443-71. 
115  Among others: Supreme Court of Israel, The Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. the Government 
of Israel, Judgement, 14 December 2006, paras. 23-46. 
116  IIHL, The Manual on the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict. With Commentary, drafted by Michael 
Schmitt, Charles Garraway and Yoram Dinstein, Sanremo, 2006, hereinafter: Sanremo NIAC Manual. 
117  In addition, specific rules on the law of occupation are contained in the co-called Hague Regulations of 
1907 (HRLW). While not universally ratified, their customary status was explicitly recognised by the Nu-
remberg Tribunal: IMT Nuremberg, USA et al. v. Göring et al., Judgment, 1 October 1946, p. 219. 
118  Sohn, ‘Ideal to Law to Practice: The Universal Declaration Today and Tomorrow’, 11 (1) Pace International 
Law Review (1999), 71-78; Humphrey, ‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its History, Impact 
and Juridical Character’ in: Ramcharan (ed.), Human Rights. Thirty Years after the Universal Declaration 
(Martinus Nijhoff 1979), 21-37; American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States (American Law Institute Publishers 1987), para. 702; Meron, Human Rights and Human-
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principles of humanity,119 referred to by the International Court of Justice,120 or as general prin-
ciples deriving from the domestic legal orders of states.121 As noted above, however, the dis-
tinction between the different sources of general international law has become somewhat 
blurred in legal writing and jurisprudence. For instance, the Hague Appeals Court found that 
the right to life and the prohibition of inhuman treatment contained in human rights conven-
tions: 
belong to the most fundamental legal principles of civilized nations [and] need to be con-
sidered as rules of customary international law that have universal validity and by which 
the State is bound.122 
While some authors regard the entire set of rights listed in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948) as part of general international law,123 others have been more cautious.124 There 
is, however, strong support that at least the following rights fall into that category: the prohibi-
tion of arbitrary deprivation of life; the prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment of punishment; the prohibition of slavery; the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of 
liberty; and – albeit in somewhat more limited terms – the right to non-discrimination, fair trial 
rights, the right to free movement, and the most basic political rights.  
Some of these rights are also likely to qualify as peremptory rules of general international law 
(also known as jus cogens), which are generally defined as follows: 
[A] peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by 
the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is 
                                               
itarian Norms as Customary Law (Clarendon Press 1989), pp. 79-135; Hannum, ‘The Status of the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law’, 25 Georgia Journal of International 
and Comparative Law (1995-1996), 287-395. 
119  Simma and Alston, ‘The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles’, 12 
Australian Yearbook of International Law (1992), 82-108. 
120  ICJ, Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Judgement, 9 April 1949, ICJ Reports (1949), 4, p. 22. 
See also: Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards (Turku Declaration), UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/1995/116, 2 December 1990. As a follow-up to this document, the UN Secretary-General issued 
reports seeking to identify fundamental standards of humanity applicable in times of peace and war. This 
process was discontinued following the CIHL Study’s publication in 2005: Report of the Secretary-General, 
UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/87, 3 March 2006. 
121  Wouters and Ryngaert (2009), supra note 109, pp. 121-22. 
122  Hague Appeals Court, Mustafić-Mujić et al. v. Netherlands & Nuhanović v. Netherlands, Judgement, 5 July 
2011, Case no. 200.020.174/01, para. 6.3, emphasis added. 
123  Sohn (1999), supra note 118, pp. 71-78; Humphrey (1979), supra note 118, p. 37.  
124  American Law Institute (1987), supra note 118, para. 702; Lillich (1995-1996), supra note 118, pp. 1-30; 
Hannum (1995-1996), supra note 118, pp. 340-46; Meron (1989), supra note 118, pp. 79-135. Schachter, 
International Law in Theory and Practice (Recueil des Cours, Martinus Nijhoff 1982), pp. 333-42. For an 
even more cautious view on HRL as part of customary law and general principles: Thirlway (2014), supra 
note 99, pp. 175-81; Goldsmith and Posner, The Limits of International Law (OUP 2005), pp. 132-133. 
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permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international 
law having the same character.125 
It has been a matter of extensive debate as to exactly which rights fall into this hierarchically 
superior category.126 Trying to provide additional clarification on this issue may be a laudable 
endeavour but would go far beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is also unnecessary for the 
question at issue. As the definition above makes clear, the term jus cogens does not denote a 
special, independent legal source, but simply a more exclusive part of general international law. 
Having found the above-listed human rights to be part of general international law is in itself 
sufficient to prove that states are directly bound by these standards, irrespective of additional 
treaty obligations they may have entered into. Certainly, their jus cogens character may have 
an impact on the question of derogation. However, much of this question would in turn depend 
on the exact formulation of the rights in question and their built-in limitations and exceptions.127  
Likewise, it is not necessary to engage in a detailed analysis as to which rules of humanitarian 
law qualify as jus cogens.128 For the purpose of this thesis, it is sufficient to note that most 
humanitarian law provisions that can be found in a number of multilateral treaties, including 
the Geneva Conventions (1949) and the two Protocols (1977), are equally binding on states as 
a matter of general international law. 
OBLIGATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 
The inquiry into the obligations of international organisations is particularly challenging due to 
the fact that they are not states. Nevertheless, the International Court of Justice found in its 
advisory opinion on Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations 
                                               
125  Art. 53 VCLT. 
126  For an outline of which human rights may have jus cogens status: Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in 
International Law (OUP 2006), pp. 53-60; Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International 
Law (Finnish Lawyers’ Publishing Company 1988), pp. 425-520. More generally: ILC, Report of the Study 
Group of the International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from 
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, 13 April 2006, 
UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (hereinafter: ILC Fragmentation Report), para. 33 (‘most frequently cited examples 
of jus cogens norms are the prohibition of aggression, slavery and the slave trade, genocide, racial discrim-
ination apartheid and torture, as well as basic rules of international humanitarian law applicable in armed 
conflict, and the right to self-determination’). 
127  On the issue of derogation from human rights law, see the discussion from p. 170. 
128  Orakhelashvili (OUP 2006), supra note 126, pp. 61-64; ILC Fragmentation Report (2006), supra note 126, 
para. 33 (referring to the most basic rules of IHL without further explanation). 
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(1949) that the United Nations Organisation possesses the necessary international personality 
in order to effectively discharge the functions entrusted to it by its members: 
That is not the same thing as saying that it is a State, which it certainly is not, or that its 
legal personality and rights and duties are the same as those of a State. … What it does 
mean is that it is a subject of international law and capable of possessing international rights 
and duties, and that it has capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims.129 
The same holds true for any other international organisation that has been entrusted with far-
reaching functions by their member states, including the European Union, the African Union, 
and NATO. Consequently, they are bound by those international agreements to which they are 
parties.130 
Treaty Law 
Humanitarian law and human rights conventions are generally not open to international organ-
isations, because their accession clauses are usually restricted to states.131 Moreover, many of 
their substantive provisions presuppose the existence of a state apparatus. Hence, international 
organisations have not become parties to any of the relevant treaties, with the exception of the 
European Union, which has already ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Dis-
abilities (2007)132 and is currently in the process of acceding to the European Convention. For 
                                               
129  ICJ, Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 11 April 
1949, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 179. 
130  ICJ, Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 
20 December 1980, ICJ Rep. (1980), para. 37. 
131  GC I-IV and AP I-II use the term ‘power’, but it is widely held that it only covers states: Schindler, ‘United 
Nations Forces and International Humanitarian Law’, in: Swinarski (ed.), Studies and Essays on Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles in Honour of Jean Pictet (Martinus Nijhoff 1984), 521-
30, p. 529. 
132  Arts. 41-44 of the Convention explicitly allows for the accession of ‘regional integration organizations’. 
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the latter case, it was necessary to amend the Convention.133 Moreover, an accession agree-
ment134 will set out in detail the modifications with which certain provisions will apply to ac-
count for the non-state character and the limited competences of the European Union.135  
No such amendments have ever been adopted for humanitarian law conventions to allow for 
the accession of international organisations. In fact, the United Nations rejected the idea of 
including a specific provision to that effect in the Additional Protocols (1977), as it considered 
itself unable to observe the provisions in their entirety.136 It is probably for the same reason that 
the United Nations and other organisations have never issued a declaration to be bound by any 
of the Conventions and Protocols.137 There has been much debate as to whether and how an 
international organisation could ever comply with the often very technical provisions designed 
for states as duty holders.138 However, this should not pose an insurmountable obstacle. Many 
provisions may simply be irrelevant to international organisations, while others may use termi-
nology that can easily be interpreted as a reference to international organisations or their per-
sonnel and equipment. Moreover, the organisation in question may also delegate certain func-
tions to troop-contributing states or host states, for instance, for duties in relation to disciplinary 
and criminal matters, for which it may lack competence.139  
                                               
133  Protocol 14 to the ECHR, 13 May 2004, which specifically allows for the accession of the EU. 
134  Draft Revised Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Final Report to the CDDH, 5 April 2013, 47+1(2013)008. In 
December 2014, the CJEU struck down the draft accession agreement for being incompatible with the EU 
Treaties: CJEU, Compatibility of the Draft Agreement with the EU and FEU Treaties, Opinion 2/13, 18 De-
cember 2014. While Opinion 2/13 led to the suspension of the accession process, it is by no means impos-
sible to draft a new accession agreement that takes due regard of the CJEU’s concerns (especially to safe-
guard the autonomy of EU law): Lock, ‘The Future of EU Accession to the ECHR after Opinion 2/13: Is It 
Still Possible and Is It Still Desirable?’, EU Constitutional Law Review (http://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=2616175, forthcoming 2015), pp. 23-27 (explicitly discussing the CJEU’s concerns 
in relation to the ECtHR’s jurisdiction to review acts of the EU under its common foreign and security 
policy). 
135  For instance, Art. 44 (1) of the Disabilities Convention leaves it to the regional integration organisations to 
declare ‘the extent of their competence with respect to matters governed by this Convention’. See also: De 
Schutter, ‘Human Rights and the Rise of International Organisations: The Logic of Sliding Scales in the 
Law of International Responsibility’, in: Wouters et al. (eds.), Accountability for Human Rights Violations 
by International Organisations (Intersentia 2010), 51-128, pp. 113-16, who calls for a distinction between 
negative obligations (which can always be observed by simply abstaining from a certain act) and positive 
obligations (for which the organisation would need extra competences). 
136  Schindler, supra note 131, p. 525. 
137  For this option: CA2 (3) GC I-VI and Art. 96 (2) AP I. 
138  Some early authors were extremely sceptical on this point: Draper (1963), supra note 16, pp. 408-10; 
Bowett (1964), supra note 5, pp. 511-16. 
139  Bothe (1967), supra note 16, 135-242, pp. 198-204; Risse, Der Einsatz Militärischer Kräfte durch die 
Vereinten Nationen und das Kriegsvölkerrecht (Peter Lang 1988), pp. 80-104; Kolb, Droit Humanitaire et 
Opérations de Paix Internationales (Helbing & Lichtenhahn 2002), pp. 60-61 and 80-87. 
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As an alternative solution, some authors have considered the possibility that international or-
ganisations could be bound by the treaty obligations of their member states as a functional 
succession due to the significant transfer of powers by these states. While this approach may 
be of some limited relevance in other areas of law, practice does not support its application to 
human rights and humanitarian law conventions, especially considering the great disparity of 
member states treaty obligations in both fields.140  
Another but closely related approach focuses on the treaty obligations of the host states on 
whose territory the United Nations perform state-like functions through an international terri-
torial administration, as in the case of UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).141 However, while it 
is true that UNMIK committed itself to observe the human rights standards reflected in a num-
ber of human rights treaties,142 and even participated in the reporting procedure before the Hu-
man Rights Committee, it made clear that it considered itself in no way bound by any of these 
conventions.143 Such practice may, however, be indicative of the existence or evolution of ob-
ligations under general international law.144 
General International Law 
According to the International Court of Justice, international organisations are not only bound 
by the treaty obligations that they have undertaken, but also by those ‘obligations incumbent 
upon them under general rules of international law’.145 This is a clear reference to the field of 
                                               
140  For humanitarian law: Schindler (1984), supra note 131, p. 528. For human rights law: Naert, ‘Binding 
International Organisations to Member State Treaties or Responsibility of Member States for Their Own 
Actions in the Framework of International Organisations’, in: Wouters et al. (eds.), Accountability for Hu-
man Rights Violations by International Organisations (Intersentia 2010), 129-168, pp. 138-39; De Schutter 
(2010), supra note 135, pp. 57-68; Reinisch, ‘Securing the Accountability of International Organizations’ 
7 (2) Global Governance (2001), 131-149, p. 143. 
141  John Cerone held that this was the case for UNMIK and KFOR in Kosovo: Cerone, ‘Minding the Gap: 
Outlining KFOR Accountability in Post-Conflict Kosovo’, 12 EJIL (2001), 469-88, pp. 474-75. There is 
no indication that a similar approach has been invoked for humanitarian law treaties. If territorial control 
was to trigger succession in treaty obligations, occupying powers would be directly bound by the humani-
tarian law conventions to which the occupied state had previously become a party – an assertion for which 
there is no support in state practice. 
142  Sect. 1 (3), UNMIK/REG/1999/24, 12 December 1999, listing also conventions to which Yugoslavia was 
not yet a party when UNMIK was established in 1999. 
143  HRC, Report Submitted by UNMIK to the HRC on the Human Rights Situation in Kosovo since June 1999, 
CCPR/C/UNK/1, 13 March 2006, paras. 110-24. 
144  See the brief discussion on unilateral acts and decisions of international organisations by Thirlway, who 
sees their legal relevance mainly in the form of inchoate treaties and practice (contributing to general inter-
national law): Thirlway (2014), supra note 99, pp. 20-23. 
145  ICJ, Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 
20 December 1980, ICJ Rep. (1980), para. 37 (’International organizations are subjects of international law 
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general international law considered above.146 In other words, international organisations can 
be equated to newly independent states, which are born into an existing legal order and there-
fore bound by its rules.147 The fact that international organisations are established by states and 
enjoy far-reaching immunities from their jurisdiction further strengthens the argument that they 
are bound by the same rules as states under general international law.  
The difficulty with this analogy, however, is that international organisations are structurally 
very different from states. It is therefore rather unclear whether rules of general international 
law that have evolved in relation to states can – without further ado – have a binding effect on 
international organisations.148 To visualise the problem more clearly: it would seem utterly ab-
surd to argue that the European University Institute has obligations under humanitarian law 
simply because it is an international organisation and thus automatically bound by any rule of 
general international law.149 What seems much more important is the potential scope of ad-
dressees envisaged by the relevant set of rules. 
The scope of addressees may be difficult to ascertain for norms of customary law or general 
principles, which are generally formulated in more abstract terms and whose determination may 
be driven by a more limited agenda. This is particularly apparent in the structure and method-
ology of the above-mentioned Customary IHL Study, which was primarily meant to clarify the 
set of customary rules applicable to armed conflicts between states and to non-international 
armed conflicts, involving at least one non-state armed group. Quite understandably, the focus 
is (nearly) exclusively on state practice.150 The practice of international organisations plays 
some role but only in relation to states as norm addressees.151 However, the vast majority of the 
rules identified simply spell out the relevant prohibition or duty or are addressed to ‘parties to 
the conflict’ rather than states alone.152 In other words, their scope of addressees is open-ended 
                                               
and, as such, are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international law, 
under their constitutions or under international agreements to which they are parties’). 
146  See again, for further guidance, from p. 30. 
147  Cahin, La Coutume Internationale et les Organisations Internationales (Pedone 2001), pp. 485-512. 
148  Schermers and Blokker, International Institutional Law: Unity Within Diversity (5th edn., Martinus Nijhoff 
2011), para. 1579. 
149  That is why Andrew Clapham’s conclusion – that international organisations are automatically bound by 
customary law by virtue of their independent legal personality alone – is too broad: Clapham, Human Rights 
Obligations of Non-State Actors (OUP 2006), p. 111. 
150  CIHL Study, Introduction, p. xlii (‘The practice of armed opposition groups, such as codes of conduct, 
commitments … and other statements, does not constitute State practice as such. While such practice may 
contain evidence of the acceptance of certain rules in non-international armed conflicts, its legal signifi-
cance is unclear’, emphasis added). 
151  The notable exception (mentioned in ibid, p. xli) is a brief reference to the UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin 
(1999), which is discussed extensively at p. 41. 
152  Only very few are addressed only to ‘states’, which are mainly those concerned with the implementation 
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and thus directed at any entity capable of becoming a party to an armed conflict. While this 
capacity was traditionally reserved to states and non-state armed groups, there is no obvious 
reason to exclude international organisations, which (as public agents) share many institutional 
features with states.  
Hence, it is the capacity of the organisation to fall within the material scope (ratione materiae) 
of the relevant rule or body of law that determines whether it is bound by it (ratione personae). 
We will discuss the modalities of this question in greater detail in the following chapter. How-
ever, the fact alone that certain international organisations (like the United Nations and NATO, 
as opposed to the EUI) may establish and command military operations is a strong indication 
that these organisations may become a party to an armed conflict or an occupying power and 
must therefore be bound by the relevant law in the same way as states or non-state armed 
groups. It is therefore the functional capacity of these organisations to engage in pertinent ac-
tivities that gives rise to their humanitarian law obligations under general international law.153 
The same reasoning applies to human rights law, which is primarily concerned with constrain-
ing the power of the state vis-à-vis individuals – most visibly exercised through its security 
forces and other executive agents. Thus, if international organisations that command military 
operations may become a party to an armed conflict, then a fortiori they can also exercise power 
over individuals to the detriment of the latter. Moreover, established by their member states and 
having many institutional features of modern bureaucracies usually associated with states, in-
ternational organisations are able to (and indeed often do) exercise public authority over indi-
viduals in a state-like manner, either through their own security forces or other executive agents. 
In view of this functional capacity, they must be considered to have genuine human rights ob-
ligations binding on them as a matter of general international law.154 
                                               
of IHL (CIHL Rules 141-44, 149-50, 157-58 and 161). 
153  This argument is largely based on the following, excellent treatise: Kolb, Porretto and Vité, L’Application 
du Droit International Humanitaire et des Droits de l’Homme aux Organisations Internationales. Forces de 
Paix et Administrations Civiles Transitoires (Bruylant 2005), pp. 127-29. In a similar way: Sams, ‘IHL 
Obligations of the UN and other International Organisations Involved in International Missions’ in: Odello 
and Piotrowicz (eds.), International Military Missions and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2011), 45-
71, pp. 52-57; Bothe (1967), supra note 16, p. 191; Emanuelli, Les Actions Militaires de l’Organisation des 
Nations Unies et le Droit International Humanitaire (Wilson & Lafleur 1995), pp. 41-43; Greenwood, ‘In-
ternational Humanitarian Law and United Nations Military Operations’, 1 YIHL (1998), 3-34, p. 16. See 
also: Kolb (2002), supra note 139, pp. 27-30. 
154  This position is largely supported by: Kolb et al. (2005), supra note 153, pp. 237-45; Mégret and Hoffmann, 
‘The UN as Human Rights Violator? Some Reflections on the United Nations Changing Human Rights 
Responsibilities’ 25 Human Rights Quarterly (2003), 314-342, p. 317; Quénivet, ‘Human Rights Law and 
Peacekeeping Operations’ in: Odello and Piotrowicz (eds.), International Military Missions and Interna-
tional Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2011), 99-143, pp. 125-26; Cerone, ‘Reasonable Measures in Unreasonable 
Circumstances: A Legal Responsibility Framework for Human Rights Violations in Post-Conflict Territo-
ries under UN Administration’, in: White and Klaasen (eds.), The UN, Human Rights and Post-Conflict 
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General practice in peace operations tends to support the finding that international organisations 
are bound by human rights and humanitarian law alongside states.155 Moreover, rather than 
being only bound by the pre-existing legal order, international organisations may also actively 
contribute to the evolution and crystallisation of general international law.156 
During the UN operation in Congo (ONUC) in the early 1960s, the Secretary-General instructed 
his forces to ‘observe principles and spirit of the general international conventions applicable 
to the conduct of military personnel’.157 Similar instructions were given in subsequent opera-
tions and the commitment to observe the ‘principles and spirit’ of the conventions was formal-
ised in the Model Participating State Agreement (1991)158  and more recent status-of-force 
agreements.159 The exact meaning of the ‘principles and spirit’ formula remained vague, but it 
was widely seen as a reference to customary law.160 The wording of the Convention on the 
Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel (1994) seems to reflect a broader concept 
of humanitarian law binding on UN forces,161 insofar as it refers to ‘international humanitarian 
law and universally recognized standards of human rights as contained in international instru-
ments’, without limiting it to the ‘principles and spirit’.162 
An important breakthrough was the promulgation of the Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the 
Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law (1999),163 which 
abandoned the vague ‘principles and spirit’ formulation. Instead, it sets out the ‘fundamental 
                                               
Situations (Manchester University Press 2005), 42-80, p. 66. See also: ILA, Final Report, Berlin Confer-
ence on Accountability of International Organisations (2004), pp. 22-25. 
155  As we have seen above in the section on treaty law, international organisations may face difficulties in 
observing all rules to the letter of the law, which makes it necessary to allow for some flexibility and certain 
modifications. As a matter of principle, this should be less of an issue for rules of general international law 
as they are often termed in a more abstract manner. As mentioned above, some CIHL Rules (i.e. Rules 141-
44, 149-50, 157-58 and 161) refer specifically to ‘states’, as they are mainly concerned with the implemen-
tation of IHL, which would usually require state-like structures. Nonetheless, with the exception of those 
referring to criminal prosecutions, they could also be observed by the UN and other international organisa-
tions without great difficulty. 
156  Klein, La Responsabilité des Organisations Internationales dans les Ordres Juridiques Internes et en Droit 
des Gens (Bruylant 1998), p. 364. 
157  Art. 43, Regulations Issued by the Secretary-General for the United Nations Forces in the Congo (ONUC), 
UN Doc. ST/SGB/ONUC/1, 15 July 1963. 
158  Art. 28, Model Participating State Agreement, 1991, UN Doc. A/46/185, 23 May 1991.  
159  For instance, Art. 7, Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of the Republic of 
Rwanda on the Status of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, 5 November 1993. 
160  Seyersted, United Nations Forces in the Law of Peace and War (Sijthoff 1966), p. 187-196. 
161  Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, 17 February 1995. 
162  Art. 20 (‘Nothing in this Convention shall affect: (a) The applicability of international humanitarian law 
and universally recognized standards of human rights as contained in international instruments … or the 
responsibility of such personnel to respect such law and standards’). 
163  Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian 
Law, UN Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13, 6 August 1999, hereinafter: SG Bulletin.  
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principles and rules’ of humanitarian law.164 Issued as an internal administrative order, the Bul-
letin is intended as a teaching tool rather than a restatement of all rules binding on the United 
Nations.165 It therefore only summarises those principles and rules that are considered most 
fundamental.166 
There is also reported practice of regional organisations engaged in peace operations that have 
committed themselves to the respect for humanitarian law. For instance, the African Union has 
followed the example of the United Nations and has pledged compliance with humanitarian law 
in their status-of-force agreements.167 Moreover, both the NATO Allied Joint Doctrine on 
Peace Support Operations (2011)168 and the Salamanca Presidency Declaration on EU Opera-
tions (2002) call for respect of humanitarian law in the course of their respective peace opera-
tions.169 This supports the view that regional organisations engaged in peace operations are 
bound by humanitarian law obligations along similar lines as as the United Nations.170 
Regrettably, there has been no similarly detailed instruction on the observance of human rights 
law from the UN headquarters to this day.171 Nevertheless, the fact that the United Nations is 
expected under its own Charter to promote respect for human rights may be seen as evidence 
that it considers itself bound by human rights law.172 The above-mentioned announcement by 
                                               
164  Ibid, Preamble and Section 1 (1). 
165  Gillard, ‘The International Committee of the Red Cross Perspective: Applicable Law and Operational In-
teraction’, in: Ravasi and Beruto (eds.), Protection of Human Beings in Disaster Situations: Application of 
International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights and Refugee Law (IIHL 2006), 138-44, p. 140-41. 
166  Sect. 1 (1) SG Bulletin (‘The present provisions do not constitute an exhaustive list of principles and rules 
of international humanitarian law binding upon military personnel’). 
167  Art. 9 (a) SOFA between the Transitional Federal Government of the Somali Republic and the AU, 6 March 
2007 (‘The African Union shall ensure that the mission conducts its operation in Somalia with full respect 
for the principles and rules of the international Conventions applicable to the conduct of military and dip-
lomatic personnel’). 
168  NATO Allied Joint Doctrine, Peace Support Operations, July 2001, AJP-3.4.1, para. 4B6. For a discussion 
as to whether NATO has genuine obligations under IHL. See also: Zwanenburg (2005), supra note 47, pp. 
179-82. 
169  2002 Salamanca Presidency Declaration on EU Operations. For a comprehensive outline of IHL obligations 
on the part of the EU: Naert (2010), supra note 94, pp. 641-52; Falco, ‘The Internal Legal Order of the 
European Union As a Complementary Framework for its Obligations under IHL’, 42 (1) Israel Law Review 
(2009), 168-205.  
170  Kolb et al. (2005), supra note 153, pp. 92-95; Zwanenburg (2005), supra note 47, pp. 179-182. 
171  Gillard (2006), supra note 165, p. 141 (stressing this gap and lack of legal clarity, especially in relation to 
international territorial administrations). 
172  Arts. 1 (3) and 55 (c) UN Charter. 
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UNMIK in Kosovo to comply with the human rights standards laid down in a number of con-
ventions has probably been the clearest commitment so far.173 However, human rights compli-
ance has also become increasingly important in other peace operations. For instance, the Cap-
stone Doctrine (2008) emphasised that: 
United Nations peacekeeping personnel – whether military, police or civilian – should act 
in accordance with international human rights law …174 
Moreover, appeals for compliance with human rights law and humanitarian law have been in-
cluded in a number of recent resolutions establishing peace operations. This was the case for 
the ongoing mission in Mali (MINUSMA), which is commanded by the United Nations.175 Its 
African-led precursor mission (AFISMA) received the same instruction.176 Moreover, the Hu-
man Rights Due Diligence Policy, issued by the UN Secretary-General in 2013,177 clearly states 
that: 
Support by United Nations entities to non-United Nations security forces must be con-
sistent with the Organization’s purposes and principles as set out in the Charter of the 
United Nations and with its obligations under international law to respect, promote and 
encourage respect for international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law.178 
This confirms that the Secretary-General considers the United Nations bound by human rights 
and humanitarian law and that the same obligations attach to regional organisations involved in 
peace operations.179 
INTEROPERABILITY AND CHALLENGES 
ARISING FROM DIFFERENT STANDARDS 
States have undertaken very different treaty obligations under human rights and humanitarian 
law. While some multilateral agreements – like the four Geneva Conventions (1949) and the 
                                               
173  See supra note 104. 
174  Capstone Doctrine (2008), supra note 9, p. 14, emphasis added. 
175  S/RES/2164 (Mali), 25 June 2014, para. 29 (‘calls upon MINUSMA … to abide by international humani-
tarian, human rights and refugee law’). 
176  S/RES/2085 (Mali), 20 December 2012, para. 9 (‘take all necessary measures, in compliance with applica-
ble international humanitarian law and human rights law’). The fact that it is addressed to the AU and 
ECOWAS confirms the claim that the UN Security Council considers both regional organisations to be 
equally bound by human rights law and humanitarian law. 
177  UNSG, ‘Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations Support to Non-United Nations Security 
Forces’, 5 March 2013, A/67/775 - S/2013/110. 
178  Ibid, para. 1, emphasis added.. 
179  Indeed, the term ‘non-United Nations security forces’ includes not only national security forces, but also 
‘Peacekeeping forces of regional international organizations’, para. 7. 
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) – enjoy (nearly) universal ratifica-
tion, there is great disparity between states when it comes to other, more specific treaties, in-
cluding a number of different arms control conventions and regional human rights treaties. 
However, as the foregoing sections have tried to show, these differences are to a large extent 
levelled out by the fact that many of the substantive treaty provisions form also part of general 
international law, binding on all states. General international law, which covers both customary 
law and general principles, is also the primary source of obligations for international organisa-
tions, as they have largely abstained from becoming parties to human rights and humanitarian 
law treaties. Hence, despite the fragmented ratification record under treaty law, states and in-
ternational organisations share a wide range of similar obligations in the field of human rights 
and humanitarian law. 
Certain differences may, however, remain and may affect the way in which different troop-
contributing states and international organisations operate effectively together in the course of 
a peace mission. The problem is not new, as it may arise in any other multinational military 
coalition, and has therefore received considerable scholarly attention. The term often referred 
to in this context is ‘interoperability’, which is generally understood as the ability to operate in 
synergy by exchanging services with other units and forces.180 The perhaps most illustrative 
example of the legal dilemma can be found in Article 1 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Con-
vention (1997), which does not only prohibit the use of anti-personnel mines but also assisting 
in such activities. While this may indeed create operational challenges, it does not necessarily 
prevent state parties from participating in combined operations with non-party states.181  
It is also worth recalling that the Mine Ban Convention (1997) and the more recent Convention 
on Cluster Munitions (2008) are not humanitarian law treaties sensu stricto. Indeed, like other 
arms control agreements, their scope is much broader and does not only prohibit the use but 
also the development, production, stockpiling, retention or transfer of anti-personnel mines and 
clust munitions, including in peacetime. At the same time, many forms of their use are also 
prohibited for non-party states, as they would violate more general humanitarian law rules, in-
cluding the principle of distinction and the duty to take feasible precautions.182 Susan Breau 
illustrates by reference to detailed practice from coalition warfare in Kosovo, Afghanistan and 
                                               
180  Walsh, ‘Interoperability of United States and Canadian Armed Forces’, 15 Duke Journal of Comparative 
and International Law (2005), 315-31, p. 316. 
181  Watkin, ‘Coalition Operations: A Canadian Perspective’, 84 International Law Studies (2008), 251-62, p. 
254 (under the condition that the state’s own forces ‘may not use anti-personnel mines and cannot request, 
directly or indirectly, the protection of those mines’). 
182  See also CIHL Study: Rule 71 (on weapons that are by nature indiscriminate) and Rules 80-83 (on limita-
tions and duties in relation to booby-traps and landmines). 
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Iraq that it was not the alleged difference of obligations that created interoperability problems, 
but rather the misapplication of and blatant disregard for existing customary obligations binding 
on all coalition members.183 She therefore concludes that joint military operations have the ten-
dency of clarification towards the highest normative denominator of existing rules.184  
Kjetil Mujezinović Larsen sees relatively little room for interoperability problems in relation to 
human rights law:  
If a particular conduct is recognised as a violation of the right to life under the ECHR but 
not under other conventions, then a troop contributing state that is a state party to the ECHR 
must refrain from the conduct even if the conduct is not considered as a human rights vio-
lation under the conventions applicable to another troop contributing state that is not a state 
party to the ECHR.185  
As we concluded above, there is strong support for the assertion that, irrespective of their indi-
vidual treaty obligations, all states and international organisations are bound by a set of human 
rights obligations, deriving from general international law, most importantly: the right to life, 
the ban on torture and slavery and the right to liberty. Determining the exact formulation of 
these rights, including their built-in limitations and exceptions, would require a more detailed 
discussion better conducted at a different place in this treatise.186 A topical case where interop-
erability questions arise concerns the transfer of detainees to coalition partners or the host state 
authorities, which is why it has received particular attention in recent years,187 in particular the 
so-called Copenhagen Process Principles and Guidelines (2012), which deal specifically with 
the handling of detainees in international military operations.188 
It is also necessary to mention the special role of Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions: 
The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present 
Convention in all circumstances.189 
                                               
183  Breau, ‘A Single Standard for Coalitions: Lowest Common Denominator or Highest Standard?’, in: Odello 
and Piotrowicz (eds.), International Military Missions and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2011), 73-
97, pp. 90-96 (in particular the excessively broad definition of ‘military objectives’ and disregard for the 
fundamental guarantees of detainees by US forces). 
184  Ibid, pp. 96-97. In a similar way: Stein, ‘Coalition Warfare and Differing Legal. Obligations of Coalition 
Members Under International Humanitarian Law’, 78 International Law Studies (2003), 315-35, p. 335. 
185  Mujezinović Larsen, The Human Rights Treaty Obligations of Peacekeepers (CUP 2012), p. 356 (‘interop-
erability appears not to raise particular problems from a human rights perspective’). 
186  See, in particular, the detailed discussion of the different right-to-life provisions in Chapter 5, from p. 220. 
187  Droege, ‘Transfers of Detainees – Legal Framework, Non-Refoulement and Contemporary Challenges’, 
871 IRRC (2008), 669-701. 
188  Copenhagen Process on the Handling of Detainees in International Military Operations – Principles and 
Guidelines, 19 October 2012. 
189  The same formulation can be found in Art. 1 (1) of AP I (1977). It is also considered a norm of custom-
ary IHL: CIHL Study, Rule 144 (Ensuring Respect for International Humanitarian Law Erga Omnes).  
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Hence, states are also required to take active measures to ensure respect for humanitarian law 
by armed forces other than their own, including forces belonging to third states and international 
organisations with whom they may be cooperating closely.190 The above-mentioned Human 
Rights Due Diligence Policy (2013) is evidence of the existence of a similar duty to ensure 
respect under human rights law. It provides clear guidance on the circumstances under which 
support to the security forces of states and other international organisations may be given and 
when it must be withheld.191 
2.5 IMPACT OF THE MANDATE AND ARTICLE 103 
OF THE UN CHARTER 
This section will briefly consider to what extent the specific mandate of the peace operation 
may obstruct the application of humanitarian law or human rights law: either of the legal re-
gimes as a whole or of their specific rules. This inquiry is premised on the hierarchy of the UN 
Charter and its overriding effect vis-à-vis other obligations under international law, as enshrined 
in Article 103 of the UN Charter: 
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations 
under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, 
their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.192 
This conflict clause raises a number of complex legal issues in relation to peace operations, 
which shall be considered here. First, one may wonder whether Article 103 refers only to the 
Charter text itself or whether it also covers decisions by competent UN bodies (secondary law). 
On the basis of Article 25,193 it is widely accepted that Article 103 applies at least to UN Secu-
rity Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter.194 The case, however, is less 
                                               
190  CIHL Study, Rule 144 (‘… They must exert their influence, to the degree possible, to stop violations of 
international humanitarian law’, emphasis added). Boisson de Chazournes and Condorelli, ‘Common Arti-
cle 1 of the Geneva Conventions Revisited: Protecting Collective Interests’, 837 IRRC (2000), 68-86, pp. 
73-74. 
191  Art. 1 of the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy speaks of ‘obligations under international law to respect, 
promote and encourage respect for international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law’ (emphasis 
added). 
192  Emphasis added. 
193  Article 25 UN Charter states that ‘The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the 
decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter’. 
194  Paulus and Leiß, ‘Article 103’ in: Simma et al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 
Vol II (3rd edn, OUP 2012), 2110-37, pp. 2124-25; Mujezinović Larsen (2012), supra note 185, p. 318. See 
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clear for other decisions of the Security Council, including those setting up more traditional 
peacekeeping missions without a Chapter VII mandate.195  
Second, the resolutions setting up peace operations are not phrased in mandatory terms. Indeed, 
they usually only authorise states and regional organisations to provide troops and to carry out 
the tasks under the mandate. This practice is a result of the way in which the framework devel-
oped, which left the Security Council without its own forces on standby as initially planned 
during the drafting process of the UN Charter. In view of the drafters’ intention to establish an 
effective system of international security and to relieve states participating in that effort of un-
due legal constraints, it seems fair to presume that Article 103 also applies to authorisations 
rather than obligations alone. This is also widely accepted among legal scholars and finds some 
support in practice.196  
Third, Article 103 only refers to the obligations of UN member states and does not directly 
affect the obligations of international organisations, such as the African Union or NATO, which 
may be acting alongside states in peace operations. However, the UN Charter also enjoys an 
increasing recognition as a constitutional framework for the international legal order as evi-
denced by the practice of international organisations to accept its binding and supreme nature. 
Hence, Article 103 may – at least indirectly – have a very similar effect on the obligations of 
international organisations that may be in conflict with the UN Charter and Security Council 
resolutions adopted under Chapter VII.197  
Finally, due to the very same constitutional considerations, the overriding effect of Article 103 
is not only limited to treaty law as the wording ‘other international agreement’ may suggest. 
Indeed, since many treaty law rules have an equivalent in general international law (customary 
law and general principles), Article 103 would serve no purpose if it only relieved member 
states of their treaty law obligations. It is therefore well accepted that the Charter, including 
binding Security Council resolutions, also prevails over conflicting obligations under general 
                                               
also: ICJ, Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the 
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v US), Order, 14 April 1992, para. 42; Kolb, L’Arti-
cle 103 de la Charte des Nations Unies (Recueil des Cours, Martinus Nijhoff 2013). 
195  Peters, ‘Article 25’ in: Simma et al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary Vol I (3rd 
edn, OUP 2012), 787-854, pp. 793-94 (arguing that Art. 25 UN Charter does not only apply to Chapter VII 
resolutions but also to those adopted under Chapter VI of the UN Charter). 
196  Paulus and Leiß (2012), supra note 194, pp. 2125-27; Mujezinović Larsen (2012), supra note 194, pp. 320; 
Kolb, ‘Does Article 103 Apply to Authorizations’, 64 Zeitschrift für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und 
Völkerrecht (2004), 21-35; Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security: The 
Delegation by the UN Security Council of its Chapter VII Powers (OUP 1999), pp. 149-51. 
197  Paulus and Leiß (2012), supra note 194, pp. 2130-32. 
 44 
 
international law,198 with the important exception of those constituting peremptory norms of 
international law (jus cogens).199 In the latter case, the jus cogens rule would invalidate the 
resolution with which it stands in conflict. Consequently, not even the Security Council can 
derogate from peremptory norms. 
As we have seen in the previous section, Security Council resolutions often explicitly require 
respect for human rights law and humanitarian law. Since the application of both legal regimes 
is a matter of the law itself – including certain threshold requirements, as we will see below – 
it is highly doubtful that the Security Council could possibly modify the application of human 
rights law and humanitarian law as a whole.200 There may, however, be a conflict between some 
of the measures contained in the mandate and a specific obligation under one of the two re-
gimes. The only relevant case in relation to a peace operation for which a conflict with human-
itarian law has been discussed is the political transformation of Iraq during the coalition-led 
occupation (2003-04). In a number of resolutions,201 the Security Council allowed for far-reach-
ing changes to the political and legal landscape of Iraq in preparation for the post-occupation 
period, which would perhaps not have been possible under the preservation rule enshrined in 
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations (1907).202 But the case seems rather inconclusive, partly 
due to the vague meaning of Article 43 itself.203 
The discussion on the effects of Article 103 has played a much greater role in relation to human 
rights law.204 In the Al-Jedda case, British courts had previously found that Resolution 1546 
(2004) had allowed for administrative detentions by the Multi-National Force in post-occupa-
tion Iraq, because an accompanying letter by Colin Powel had explicitly mentioned internment 
where this was ‘necessary for imperative reasons of security’ among other possible activities.205 
                                               
198  Ibid, pp. 2132-33. 
199  It is very likely that the drafters of the UN Charter rejected any reference to customary law precisely because 
they wanted to avoid a possible conflict with peremptory norms. 
200  Nevertheless, there has been some discussion on the effects of certain resolutions adopted on the occupation 
of Iraq (2003-04), namely on the limited group of occupying powers and the exact duration of the occupa-
tion: Fox, ‘The Occupation of Iraq’ 36 (2) Georgetown Journal of International Law (2005), 195-297. 
201  In particular, S/RES 1483, 22 May 2003, para. 4; S/RES 1500, 14 August 2003, para. 1. 
202  Art. 43 HRLW obliges the occupying power to respect, ‘unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in 
the country’. 
203  Scheffer, ‘Beyond Occupation Law’, 97 (4) AJIL (2003), 842-60, pp. 844-47; Sassòli, ‘Legislation and 
Maintenance of Public Order and Civil Life by Occupying Powers’, 16 EJIL (2005), 661-94, p. 681; Fox, 
‘Transformative Occupation and the Unilateralist Impulse’, 94 IRRC (2012), 237-66. 
204  For a detailed account of relevant case-law on the UN terror-listing practice: Scheinin, ‘Is the ECJ Ruling 
in Kadi Incompatible with International Law?’, 28 (1) Yearbook of European Law (2009), 637-53; 
Scheinin and Ginsburg, ‘You Can’t Always Get What You Want: The Kadi II Conundrum and the Security 
Council 1267 Terrorist Sanctions Regime’, 8 (1) Essex Human Rights Review (2011), 7-19. 
205  UKHL, Al-Jedda v. Secretary of State for Defence (2007), supra note 65, paras. 30-35. 
 45 
 
The European Court, however, did not find this language sufficiently clear for a genuine con-
flict of obligations to arise, since other parts of the same resolution had called for the respect of 
human rights law. The Court therefore concluded that:  
In the absence of clear provision to the contrary, the presumption must be that the Security 
Council intended States within the Multi-National Force to contribute towards the mainte-
nance of security in Iraq while complying with their obligations under international human 
rights law.206 
The presumption of compatibility employed by the Court made the operation of Article 103 
unnecessary, which allowed the Court to find that the European Convention applied in an un-
modified way.207 The same approach was recently used by a British court in Serdar Mohammed 
v. Ministry of Defence (2014) with regard to administrative detention by British forces as part 
of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan.208 It follows that the relevant resolution needs to use very 
explicit language in order to rebut the presumption that the mandate is fully compatible with 
human rights law. The same approach seems warranted in relation to humanitarian law; in other 
words, there is a rebuttable presumption of compatibility between the mission’s mandate and 
the obligations under humanitarian law. 
There is no indication that the overriding effect of Article 103 has ever been invoked for rules 
relevant to the use of force against individuals, either under human rights or humanitarian 
law.209 Indeed, in view of the foregoing it is rather unlikely that there could ever be sufficient 
support for such an assertion in the relevant resolution or related documents attached thereto.210 
For these reasons, we will proceed on the assumption that the mandate – in particular the spe-
cific resolution authorising the peace operation in question – does not set aside the application 
of human rights law and humanitarian law as such, nor any specific rule relevant for our study. 
The mandate may, however, play an important role for clarifying the scope of certain provisions 
                                               
206  ECtHR, Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom (2011), supra note 66, paras. 105-106, emphasis added. 
207  On the question of norm conflict and presumption of compatibility: Paulus and Leiß (2012), supra note 
194, pp. 2118-19, and the chapter below, p. 210. 
208  UK EWHC, Serdar Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence (2014), supra note 65, paras. 188-227. Confirmed 
on appeal: UK EWCA, Serdar Mohammed et al. v. Ministry of Defence, Judgment, 30 July 2015, EWCA 
Civ 843, paras. 138-63. 
209  For instance: UK EWHC, Serdar Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence (2014), supra note 65, para. 219 
(where the Court simply referred to the use of force authorisation under the mandate: ‘the UNSCRs relating 
to Afghanistan were plainly intended to authorise the use of lethal force at least for the purposes of self-
defence’). 
210  See, however: Wills, ‘The Law Applicable to Peacekeepers Deployed in Situations where there is No 
Armed Conflict’, EJIL talk, 10 April 2013, www.ejiltalk.org/the-law-applicable-to-peacekeepers-de-
ployed-in-situations-where-there-is-no-armed-conflict/ (who entertains the idea that a peace operation not 
party to an armed conflict may be using force in a way similar to humanitarian law, simply because of its 
robust Chapter VII mandate). 
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and resolving obstacles in the application of the law. It will therefore be used for the purpose 
of interpretation throughout this thesis. 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter shows that the traditional distinction between peacekeeping and peace-enforce-
ment has become increasingly blurred. Today, almost all peace operations operate under a ro-
bust mandate based on a Security Council resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter. This allows for significant levels of military force to be used, especially in support 
of the host states’ authorities against members of non-state armed groups.  
The exercise of ‘effective control’ over specific acts and omissions is the appropriate yardstick 
for identifying areas of responsibility of states and international organisations involved in peace 
operations. The detailed command and control arrangements considered above will usually be 
of help in order to provide an answer to the critical question: who gave the direct order or 
instruction for the specific conduct. While dual or multiple attribution be excluded, it is rather 
the exception than the norm. Instead, a specific act or its different sub-elements will usually 
only be attributable to one entity. Taken together, however, the totality of all acts and omissions 
of the peace operation will typically engage the responsibility of a great number of actors, usu-
ally the international organisation in command as well as the different sending states. 
States have undertaken very different treaty obligations under human rights and humanitarian 
law. While some multilateral agreements – like the four Geneva Conventions (1949) and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) – enjoy (nearly) universal ratifica-
tion, there is great disparity between states when it comes to other, more specific treaties, in-
cluding a number of different arms control conventions and regional human rights treaties. 
However, these differences are to a large extent levelled out by the fact that many of the sub-
stantive treaty provisions form also part of general international law, binding on all states. Gen-
eral international law, which covers both customary law and general principles, is also the pri-
mary source of obligations for international organisations, as they have largely abstained from 
becoming parties to human rights and humanitarian law treaties. Hence, despite the fragmented 
ratification record under treaty law, states and international organisations share a wide range of 
similar obligations in the field of human rights and humanitarian law. 
Even though the mandates have been adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, they do 
not obstruct the application of human rights and humanitarian law, either as a whole or of some 
of their specific rules. Whether the obligations of the states and the organisations actually apply 
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in the context of a peace operation depends on their specific actions and whether they meet the 
threshold requirements set by the regimes themselves for their application.  
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3 APPLICATION OF 
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN 
PEACE OPERATIONS 
3.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW 
States have undertaken very different treaty obligations under humanitarian law. But these dif-
ferences are to a large extent levelled out by the fact that many of the substantive treaty provi-
sions form also part of general international law, binding on all states. Humanitarian law obli-
gations under general international law are also binding on international organisations with a 
military capacity like the United Nations and certain regional organisations. But are these obli-
gations actually triggered during peace operations? 
Humanitarian law applies only in times of armed conflict and military occupations. A key ques-
tion is therefore whether and how international forces involved in a peace operation may be-
come a party to an armed conflict and to what extent its special nature may have an impact on 
the classification of the conflict and the threshold of violence required to trigger the application 
of humanitarian law. In addition, this chapter will also examine whether participation in a pre-
existing armed conflict may serve as an additional test. This will be followed by an enquiry into 
the temporal and geographic scope of application once the peace operation has indeed become 
a party to an armed conflict. The chapter concludes with a brief examination of the special cases 
of military occupations and of applying humanitarian law by analogy as a matter of policy. 
 50 
 
3.2 PEACE OPERATIONS AS PARTIES TO 
AN ARMED CONFLICT 
MANDATE AND LEGITIMACY CONSIDERATIONS 
The scope of application of humanitarian law is premised on the notion of ‘armed conflict’. 
Hence, once a situation of armed conflict arises, the law applies. It makes no difference which 
side resorted to force in the first place. Rather, international law clearly distinguishes between 
the jus ad bellum (the law on the use of force) and the jus in bello (the law of armed conflict or 
humanitarian law). The strict distinction between both regimes has been widely accepted, be-
cause it follows a sound logic: if the primary rule (the jus ad bellum) is violated, there are still 
remedial rules (the jus in bello) that ensures the protection of war victims on both sides.1 This 
principle can also be found in the preamble of Additional Protocol I, which calls on the parties 
to apply the rules: 
without any adverse distinction based on the nature or origin of the armed conflict or on 
the causes espoused by or attributed to the Parties to the conflict. 
Therefore, in a situation of armed conflict, humanitarian law applies equally to both parties to 
the conflict irrespective of who is considered the aggressor. When it comes to peace operations, 
however, this clear distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello has not always been up-
held – both by representatives of states and the United Nations, and among academics. Indeed, 
in the wake of the Korea campaign, the American Society of International Law made the fol-
lowing statement: 
The Committee agrees that the use of force by the United Nations to restrain aggression is 
of a different nature from war-making by a State. The purposes for which the laws of war 
were instituted are not entirely the same as the purposes of regulating the use of force by 
the United Nations. This we may decide without deciding whether the United Nations en-
forcement action is war, police enforcement or sui generis. In the present circumstances, 
then, the proper answer would seem to be, for the time being, that the United Nations should 
                                               
1  Sassòli, ‘Ius ad Bellum and Ius in Bello – The Separation between the Legality of the Use of Force and 
Humanitarian Rules to Be Respected in Warfare: Crucial or Outdated?’, in: Schmitt and Pejic (eds.), Inter-
national Law and Armed Conflict: Exploring the Faultlines (Martinus Nijhoff 2007), 241-64.  
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not feel bound by all the law of war, but should select such of the laws of war as may seem 
to fit its purposes.2 
There is no indication that this advice was followed either in Korea or during the Gulf War 
against Iraq (1991). Moreover, the position that peace operations under the aegis of the United 
Nations could cherry-pick the humanitarian law rules as they see fit has also been explicitly 
rejected by the Institute de Droit International.3 However, in more recent times, similar argu-
ments have been advanced. Indeed, during the NATO air campaign in support of the UN mis-
sion in Bosnia (UNPROFOR) against recalcitrant Bosnian-Serb forces, some NATO states even 
held that their pilots were not combatants at all but rather ‘experts on mission’ and thus immune 
from attacks when conducting air strikes.4  
Similar claims have been made in relation to the air campaign over Libya in 2011 due to their 
UN mandate.5 It appears, however, that such statements need to be taken with caution, as they 
are mainly driven by political considerations and aimed at the national audience rather than 
constituting a real legal assessment. Indeed, some military manuals clearly stress the need to 
distinguish between the jus ad bellum and jus in bello during peace operations. A good example 
is the New Zealand Manual: 
Military operations by or on behalf of the United Nations will only be taken against a State 
regarded as an aggressor, or otherwise in breach of its obligations under international law. 
To the extent that the law of armed conflict applies to such operations, it does so on a basis 
of complete equality. That is to say, the fact that one side is acting as a law-enforcer against 
another party which is a law-breaker does not invalidate the operation of the law.6 
                                               
2  ASIL, Report of the Committee on the Study of Legal Problems of the United Nations, 46 ASIL Proceed-
ings (1952), p. 220, emphasis added. For similar suggestions, see also: Wright, ‘Outlawery of War and the 
Laws of War’, 47 AJIL (1953), 365-76; Bivens, ‘Restatement of the Laws of War as Applied to the Armed 
Forces of Collective Security Arrangements’, 48 AJIL (1954), 141-45. 
3  IDI, ‘Conditions of Application of Humanitarian Rules of Armed Conflict to Hostilities in which United 
Nations Forces May be Engaged’, Zagreb Session III, 3 September 1971; IDI, ‘Conditions of Application 
of Rules, other than Humanitarian Rules, of Armed Conflict to Hostilities in Which United Nations Forces 
May be Engaged’, Wiesbaden Session II, 13 August 1975. 
4  Reported by: Sassòli (2007), supra note 1, p. 260 (when captured, the pilots should not be considered pris-
oners of war and should be released immediately). 
5  Reported by: Engdahl, ‘Multinational Peace Operations Forces Involved in Armed Conflict: Who Are the 
Parties?’, in: Mujezinović Larsen et al. (eds.), Searching for a ‘Principle of Humanity’ in International 
Humanitarian Law (CUP 2013), 233-71, p. 259 (‘Prime Minister stated that Norway was, in terms of in-
ternational law, not participating in war. If that had been the case, Norwegian soldiers would have been 
legitimate targets. Norwegian soldiers executed a UN mission and were therefore not legitimate targets for 
the soldiers of the regime in Libya’). 
6  New Zealand Defence Force, Interim Law of Armed Conflict Manual, DM112, Directorate of Legal Ser-
vices, New Zealand, 1992, p. 19-3, para. 1902. 
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However, this does not mean that such considerations have fully disappeared. Especially in 
relation to peacekeeping operations, they continue to be popular. Traditionally, the United Na-
tions maintained that:  
UN peacekeeping forces which carry with them the stamp of international legitimacy 
should be, and be seen to be impartial, objective and neutral, their sole interest in the con-
flict being the restoration and maintenance of international peace and security.7 
Gert Van Hegelsom – currently Legal Adviser to the Director-General of the EU Military 
Staff – held in 1993 that the application depends on the mandate of the peace operation, arguing 
that a traditional peacekeeping operation can never become a party to a conflict; only where it 
obtains a robust mandate under Chapter VII may it be required to observe humanitarian law.8 
This position is, however, hardly convincing. In view of the current common use of robust 
mandates with Chapter VII powers, this categorical distinction between peacekeeping and en-
forcement can hardly be maintained. Moreover, not every Chapter VII operation will be drawn 
into combat, as its strong mandate, troop strength and equipment may already serve as an ef-
fective deterrent. Moreover, Finn Seyersted noted already in 1966 that peacekeeping forces can 
be ‘involved in genuine hostilities with another organised force, even if this was not expected 
when the force was set up’.9 This view has been shared by many scholars for a long time.10 The 
irrelevance of the exact mandate terms is also reflected in the Secretary-General’s Bulletin. 
Section 1.1 states that the rules of humanitarian law are applicable to UN personnel: 
                                               
7  Documented by: Shraga, ‘The United Nations as an Actor Bound by International Humanitarian Law’, 5 
(2) International Peacekeeping (1998), 64-81, p. 67. 
8  Van Hegelsom, ‘The Law of Armed Conflict and UN Peace-keeping and Peace-enforcing Operations’, 6 
Hague Yearbook of International Law (1993), 45-58, pp. 54-57. Similarly: Rosas, The Legal Status of Pris-
oners of War: A Study in International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (2nd edn, Institute 
for Human Rights 2005), p. 238, footnote text. A similar view was held by a Canadian court which found 
that the UN operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) in 1993 was not involved in an armed conflict: Court 
Martial Appeal Court of Canada, Her Majesty the Queen v. Private DJ Brocklebank, 2 April 1996, Court 
File No. CMAC-383. Similar considerations drawing on impartiality and intention have also been expressed 
by a minority of experts: ICRC, Expert Meeting on Multinational Peace Operations. Applicability of Inter-
national Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law to UN Mandated Forces, organized by 
the International Committee of the Red Cross in Cooperation with the University Centre for International 
Humanitarian Law, Geneva, 11-12 December 2003, report prepared and edited by Alexandre Faite and 
Jérémie Labbé Grenier, pp. 9-10. 
9  Seyersted, United Nations Forces in the Law of Peace and War (Sijthoff 1966), p. 210. 
10  Bothe, Le Droit de la Guerre et les Nations Unies. A Propos des Incidents Armés au Congo (IUHEI 1967), 
p. 215; Risse, Der Einsatz Militärischer Kräfte durch die Vereinten Nationen und das Kriegsvölkerrecht 
(Peter Lang 1988), pp. 112-14; Schindler, ‘United Nations Forces and International Humanitarian Law’, 
in: Swinarski (ed.), Studies and Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles in 
Honour of Jean Pictet (Martinus Nijhoff 1984), 521-30, p. 527; Oeter, ‘Civil War, Humanitarian Law and 
the United Nations’, 1 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (1997), 195-230, p. 217; Emanuelli, 
Les Actions Militaires de l’Organisation des Nations Unies et le Droit International Humanitaire (Wilson 
& Lafleur 1995), pp. 31-32. 
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when in situations of armed conflict they are actively engaged therein as combatants, to 
the extent and for the duration of their engagement. They are accordingly applicable in 
enforcement actions, or in peacekeeping operations when the use of force is permitted in 
self-defence.11 
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon gave, however, a different assessment at the final stage of 
the Ivorian Civil War in spring 2011, when UN attack helicopters were used to shell the last 
positions held by pro-Gbagbo forces: 
Let me emphasise that UNOCI is not a party to the conflict. … In line with its Security 
Council mandate, the mission has taken this action in self defence and to protect civilians.12 
Despite these inconsistencies,13 it appears clear that the assessment as to whether the peace 
operation has become a party to an armed conflict has to be made on the basis of the facts on 
the ground. While considering this question in the following sections, we will continue to en-
counter similar arguments based on mandate and legitimacy considerations.14  
ORDINARY THRESHOLDS OF ARMED CONFLICT 
The application of humanitarian law is generally premised on the existence of an armed con-
flict.15 This section will therefore examine the two types of armed conflict with their respective 
threshold requirements in order to clarify the circumstances under which a peace operation may 
become a party to an armed conflict. 
                                               
11  Sect. 1.1, SG Bulletin, emphasis added. For a discussion on the shortcomings of this provision: Gillard, 
‘The International Committee of the Red Cross Perspective: Applicable Law and Operational Interaction’, 
in: Ravasi and Beruto (eds.), Protection of Human Beings in Disaster Situations: Application of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law, Human Rights and Refugee Law (IIHL 2006), 138-44, pp. 140-41; Zwanenburg, 
‘The Secretary-General’s Bulletin on Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian 
Law: A Pyrrhic Victory?’, 39 Military Law and Law of War Review (2000), 13-43, pp. 20-24. 
12  Reuters, ‘Ban Ki-Moon says U.N. Not Party to I. Coast Conflict’, 4 April 2011, www.reuters.com/arti-
cle/2011/04/04/uk-ivorycoast-un-ban-idUKTRE73364Z20110404. 
13  Again, some of the statements referred to above need to be taken with caution. Rather than implying a 
different, more privileged status for peace operations under IHL, they may also be driven by the (mistaken) 
belief that the application of IHL is only triggered in case of large-scale, high-intensity attacks, even when 
they involve state armed forces on the enemy side. As the following section tries to show, this is a misread-
ing of the relevant thresholds of armed conflict, especially for IACs.  
14  For a strong position in that direction de lege ferenda: Sharp, ‘Revoking an Aggressor’s License to Kill 
Military Forces Serving the United Nations: Making Deterrence Personal’, 22 Maryland Journal of Inter-
national Law & Trade (1998), 1-80. 
15  Belligerent occupations constitute another ground for triggering the application of humanitarian law, even 
in the absence of hostilities. We will consider this question in a separate section below from p. 110. 
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International Armed Conflicts 
International armed conflicts were historically initiated by a declaration of war, issued by one 
state against another. Common Article 2 to the four Geneva Conventions, however, states that 
declarations of war are no longer required for there to be an armed conflict between states,16 
which is reflective of the fact that such declarations have virtually disappeared17 and that the 
notion of armed conflict is essentially based on facts. The term of armed conflict in the law of 
international armed conflict has been a matter of debate, as all conventional texts failed to pro-
vide a definition. The ICRC Commentary to the 1949 Geneva Conventions states that:  
Any difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of armed forces 
is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2, even if one of the Parties denies the 
existence of a state of war. It makes no difference how long the conflict lasts, or how much 
slaughter takes place. The respect due to human personality is not measured by the number 
of victims. Nor, incidentally, does the application of the Convention necessarily involve 
the intervention of cumbrous machinery. It all depends on circumstances. If there is only a 
single wounded person as a result of the conflict, the Convention will [apply].18 
This so-called first-shot approach sets an explicitly low threshold for conflicts arising between 
states. It is, however, far from clear whether the first-shot approach is supported by state prac-
tice, as states seem reluctant to openly acknowledge the application of the law of international 
armed conflict to isolated and low-intensity incidents involving their armed forces.19 In light of 
this, it has been argued by some legal scholars20 and the Study Group of the International Law 
Association21 that a high level of intensity is required in order to trigger an armed conflict be-
                                               
16  CA2 (‘the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which 
may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized 
by one of them’, emphasis added). 
17  Note, however, that states do issue statements to the effect that they consider themselves involved in an 
armed conflict with another state. 
18  Pictet, The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Commentary I (ICRC 1952), p. 32; ibid, Commen-
tary III (ICRC, Geneva 1960), p. 23; ibid, Commentary IV (ICRC 1958), p. 20. 
19  Greenwood raises doubts as to whether state practice supports the low threshold advocated by the ICRC. 
As a rare case confirming the first-shot approach, he refers to Lieutenant Goodman, a US air force pilot 
who was shot down over Lebanon and captured by Syrian forces in 1983 and for whom the US government 
invoked GC III: Greenwood, ‘Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law’, in: Fleck (ed.), The Handbook 
of International Humanitarian Law (2nd edn., OUP 2008), 45-78, p. 48, para. 202. 
20  Dahl and Sandbu, ‘The Threshold of Armed Conflict’, 45 Military Law and War Review (2006), 369-88, 
p. 378 (‘We believe that States may use a certain amount of force, even deadly force, in their inter-State 
relations, without applying the Law of Armed Conflict’). 
21  ILA, Final Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict in International Law, Hague Conference 2010 (which 
applies the same high-intensity requirement to international and non-international armed conflicts). The 
methodology of the study is, however, highly questionable: it appears that public announcements by state 
officials on highly sensitive issues, such as the existence of an armed conflict with another state, are rather 
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tween states. However, to subject the law of international armed conflicts to an intensity re-
quirement overlooks the protective purpose of this body of law to provide a coherent legal 
framework for any form of inter-state use of force.22 This appears to be also the prevailing view 
in the legal literature.23 This is also reflected in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals, which have played a key role in clarifying and developing the threshold of 
armed conflict. In its Tadić decision on jurisdiction, the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that an 
international armed conflict exists ‘whenever there is a resort to armed force between States’.24 
This standard follows the low threshold suggested by the first-shot approach and has also been 
used by the ICRC and the ILC.25 It can also be found in some military manuals, including the 
Australian Air Force Manual: 
A state of international armed conflict exists when states resort to the use of armed force 
against another or others. The duration and intensity of the conflict are not relevant to 
whether an armed conflict exists.26 
In conclusion, there appears to be strong support for a low threshold of international armed 
conflict, whereby any use of force by one state against another will amount to an international 
armed conflict and will trigger the application of this body of international humanitarian law. 
                                               
a matter of policy and thus do not necessarily carry real weight in terms of practice and opinio juris. More-
over, it seems even less appropriate to refer to proceedings of national immigration tribunals in asylum 
cases (pp. 22-23), as their notion of armed conflict may differ considerably from the one used under inter-
national humanitarian law. 
22  Some authors suggest that while isolated and short-lived incidents involving state armed forces (e.g. the 
capture of foreign military personnel) may give rise to an IAC, they will not necessarily trigger the full 
application of the full plethora of humanitarian law, but only those provisions at stake (e.g. on prisoners of 
war as enshrined in GC III): Kleffner, ‘Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law: General Issues’, 
in: Gill and Fleck (ed.), Handbook of the International Law of Military Operations (OUP 2010), 51-
77, p. 52; Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (CUP 2005), pp. 17-18. However, such a fragmen-
tation runs counter to the aim of humanitarian law to provide a comprehensive legal framework for situa-
tions of international armed conflict. 
23  Schmitt, ‘Classification in Future Conflict’, in: Wilmshurst (ed.), International Law and the Classification 
of Conflicts (OUP 2012), 455-77, pp. 459-60 (confirming the definitions provided by the ICRC Commen-
taries and the ICTY); Kolb and Hyde, An Introduction to the International Law of Armed Conflicts (Hart 
Publishing 2008), pp. 75-76; David, Principes de Droit des Conflits Armés (4th edn, Bruylant 2008), 
pp. 122-124, para. 156 (referring to the Shat-Al Arab incident in June 2004, involving an exchange of fire 
and subsequent capture of British servicemen by Iranian naval forces). 
24  ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case 
No. IT-94-1-AR72, 2 October 1995, para. 70. See also: ICTY, Prosecutor v. Zdravko Mucić et al., Judge-
ment, Case No. IT-96-21-T, 16 November 1998, para. 184 (‘the existence of armed force between States is 
sufficient of itself to trigger the application of international humanitarian law’). 
25  ICRC, How Is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law?, Opinion Paper, 
March 2008, p. 5.  
26  Royal Australian Airforce, Operations Law for RAAF Commanders, AAP 1003, Second Edition, May 
2004, p. 42, para. 5.6, emphasis added. See also: German Federal Ministry of Defence, Law in Armed 
Conflict – Manual, Joint Service Regulation (ZDv) 15/2, issued in May 2013, p. 29, para. 203 (‘An inter-
national armed conflict triggering the applicability of LOAC exists if one State Party to a conflict uses 
armed force against another State’). 
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This may involve any form of armed engagement between the armed forces of one state against 
another, any capture of foreign armed forces personnel and any unauthorised penetration by 
armed forces into foreign territory. Eric David, however, suggests an additional requirement to 
exclude situations of violence involving soldiers acting in their private capacity rather than 
pursuant to orders from higher command levels.27 Such a requirement may also prove useful to 
exclude situations of accidental use of force by one state against another.28 
Non-International Armed Conflicts 
In non-international armed conflicts, the threshold of application is much higher. The principle 
of sovereignty has been a major obstacle to promptly applying the law of non-international 
armed conflict to situations of intra-state violence. It has been in the interest of states to maintain 
a vertical relationship vis-à-vis those challenging their power within their own borders. Com-
mon Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions (1949) was the first treaty provision to regulate the 
conduct of non-international armed conflicts and can be considered a convention en miniature. 
It failed, however, to adequately define such conflicts.29 The scope of the Additional Protocol 
II (1977) is confined to armed conflicts between state armed forces and armed groups with 
control over territory and thus very restrictive.30 The ICTY Appeals Chamber clarified the 
threshold in the Tadić decision, by stating that a non-international armed conflict exists when-
ever there is: 
protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups 
or between such groups within a State. 
Following this standard, the two essential elements are: the level of intensity (protracted armed 
violence) and organisation (organised armed groups). These elements distinguish a non-inter-
national armed conflict from mere internal disturbances, which have to be addressed by law-
                                               
27  David (2008), supra note 23, p. 124, para. 1.57 (making clear that otherwise, bar brawls would also be 
included in the IAC concept). 
28  See, for instance: UK Ministry of Defence, The Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Joint 
Service Publication 383, 2004 edition, para. 3.3.1 (‘… an accidental border incursion by members of the 
armed forces would not, in itself, amount to an armed conflict, nor would the accidental bombing of another 
country’). 
29  Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict (CUP 2002), pp. 33-34. 
30  Art. 1 (1) AP II (‘shall apply to all armed conflicts … which take place in the territory of a High Contracting 
Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under 
responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sus-
tained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol’, emphasis added). 
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enforcement measures, usually subject to human rights standards. In the recent Đorđević judg-
ment (2011), the ICTY defined the two terms ‘intensity’ and ‘organisation’, by providing an 
illustrative list of indicative factors.31 Accordingly, intensity may be reflected by:  
The seriousness of attacks and whether there has been an increase in armed clashes, the 
spread of clashes over territory and over a period of time, any increase in the number of 
government forces and mobilisation and the distribution of weapons among both parties to 
the conflict, as well as whether the conflict has attracted the attention of the United Nations 
Security Council, and whether any resolutions on the matter have been passed.32 
On the organisation of armed groups, the ICTY held that they do not necessarily need to be as 
organised as state armed forces, but that their leadership must have at least the ability to exercise 
some control over its members,33 which may be reflected by different groups of factors:  
First, are the factors signalling the presence of a command structure. Secondly, are factors 
indicating that an armed group could carry out operations in an organised manner. Thirdly, 
are factors indicating a level of logistics have been taken into account. Fourthly, are factors 
relevant to determining whether an armed group possessed a level of discipline and the 
ability to implement the basic obligations of Common Article 3. A fifth group includes 
factors indicating that the armed group was able to speak with one voice.34 
The test based on intensity and organisation is now the most accepted standard of application 
for those customary humanitarian law rules applicable in non-international armed conflicts.35 
The above-mentioned Customary IHL Study and the Sanremo NIAC Manual found that the vast 
majority of customary rules of humanitarian law apply to both categories of armed conflict. 
Yet, despite this convergence, there is still an important difference between international and 
non-international armed conflicts, the most essential being the lack of a combatant status in 
                                               
31  Partly building on: ICTY, Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al., Judgement, Case no. IT-04-84-T, 3 April 2008, 
paras. 49 and 60. 
32  ICTY, Prosecutor v. Đorđević, Judgement, 23 February 2011, Case no. IT-05-87/1, para. 1523, references 
omitted. Nevertheless, it seems that a high level of organisation on the part of the armed group can outweigh 
the lack of high-intensity confrontations. For instance, where an armed group is organised in a state-like 
manner or controls territory along a demarcation line following an effective cease-fire, even short-lived or 
low-intensity use of force will likely trigger a (new) armed conflict, similar to the case of inter-state use of 
force. 
33  Ibid, para. 1525, references omitted. 
34  Ibid, para. 1526, references omitted. 
35  Article 8 (2) (c) and (f) of the ICC Statute uses two different thresholds: paragraph (c) essentially follows 
CA3, while paragraph (f) mirrors the Tadić test, using ‘protracted armed conflict’. Despite the different 
wording, however, both paragraphs are materially the same, supporting the claim that there is only one 
body of the law of non-international armed conflict: Fleck, ‘The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict’, 
in: Fleck (ed.), The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law (2nd edn., OUP 2008), 581-610, pp. 587-
89; Cullen, ‘Key Developments Affecting the Scope of Internal Armed Conflict in International Humani-
tarian Law’, 183 Military Law Review (2005), 66-109. For a different view: Bothe, ‘Customary Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law: Some Reflections on the ICRC Study’, 8 YIHL (2005), 143-78, p. 175. 
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internal armed conflicts.36 In other words, fighters involved in a non-international armed con-
flict have no combatant privilege – i.e. the right to participate directly in hostilities.37 Quite the 
opposite, states have reserved the right to hold members of armed groups criminally responsible 
for their participation in hostilities.38  
CHARACTER OF ARMED CONFLICTS 
INVOLVING PEACE OPERATIONS 
Introduction 
On the basis of the two types of armed conflict just outlined, it is apt to consider how they apply 
to the reality of peace operations. This analysis is crucial, as both regimes strongly differ on the 
threshold requirement, namely the level of intensity to trigger the application of humanitarian 
law. Depending on the operational circumstances, the nature of the armed conflict thus has an 
impact on the question as to whether and when humanitarian law becomes applicable in the 
course of a peace operation. Moreover, as concerns the scope of protection, the most crucial 
difference between both regimes remains the lack of combatant status in non-international 
armed conflicts. Given these important differences, this section will examine the nature of 
armed conflicts involving peace operations. 
The most essential question that needs to be answered at the outset is the following: which 
entity involved in the peace operation should be seen as the (potential) party to the armed con-
flict, the different sending states or the organisation (i.e. United Nations, AU, NATO or EU)? 
Early authors held that it should in fact be both: the sending states and the international organ-
isation. But they failed to explain in detail the reasoning behind that conclusion.39 In more re-
                                               
36  Hellestveit, ‘The Geneva Conventions and the Dichotomy Between International and Non-International 
Armed Conflict: Curse or Blessing for the ‘Principle of Humanity’?’, in: Mujezinović Larsen et al. (eds.), 
Searching for a ‘Principle of Humanity’ in International Humanitarian Law (CUP 2012), 86-123, p. 103. 
For a more critical view on this distinction: Crawford, ‘Unequal Before the Law: The Case for the Elimi-
nation of the Distinction between International and Non-international Armed Conflicts’, 20 Leiden Journal 
of International Law (2007), 441-65.  
37  Art. 43 (2) AP I (Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel and 
chaplains …) are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate directly in hostilities’, em-
phasis added). 
38  On many occasions, they are charged with treason, which often carries the death penalty. 
39  Bothe (1967), supra note 10, p. 51; Seyersted (1966), supra note 9, p. 323; Schindler (1984), supra note 
10, p. 524; Risse (1988), supra note 10, pp. 133-50. For a different view: Bowett, United Nations Forces. 
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cent years, legal commentators tend to argue instead that it will be either the state or the inter-
national organisation that will be the party to the armed conflict, but usually not both at the 
same time.40 Their assessment is largely based on the attribution test in conjunction with the 
command-and-control arrangements, which we have covered at great length in Chapter 2 
above.41 While it is true that attribution is usually only possible to one entity instead of two or 
more, this refers only to a specific act or omission, but not to all activities of the peace operation 
en bloque. Taken together – as we concluded above – the totality of all acts and omissions of 
the peace operation will typically engage the responsibility of a great number of actors. The 
picture is therefore very similar to a mosaic, where the different sets of coloured pieces repre-
sent those acts and omissions attributable to a specific entity, which may be one of the different 
sending states or instead the relevant organisation.  
Hence, it is possible and indeed very likely that both the states and the organisation are to be 
considered the relevant parties to the conflict. But again, in a specific peace mission the assess-
ment cannot be made in general terms but only on the basis of the specific acts attributable to 
the relevant state or organisation. This means that the question – whether a state has become a 
party to an armed conflict or not – can differ greatly from sending state to sending state. That 
was indeed the reasoning behind the position maintained by Germany and Sweden until 2009 
that humanitarian law did not apply to their forces in Afghanistan, because (unlike other ISAF 
contingents) they were deployed in the more peaceful north of the country and did not engage 
in fighting with the Taliban.42 A clear shortcoming of this focus on the respective conflict rela-
tionships of each individual state is that it may provide a highly fragmented picture as to which 
state (involved in the relevant peace mission) is in fact a party to an armed conflict. What is 
more, the picture is highly fluid, as the facts may change at any time. This makes it difficult not 
only for the personnel of the peace operation, but also for (potential) enemy forces as well as 
humanitarian actors (like the ICRC) to assess the situation and the status of the parties. The 
dilemma is one of the reasons why this thesis suggests an additional test, in one of the later 
                                               
A Legal Study of United Nations Practice (Stevens & Sons 1964), p. 503. 
40  Zwanenburg, ‘International Organisations vs. Troop Contributing Countries: Which Should Be Considered 
As the Party to an Armed Conﬂict during Peace Operations?’, Proceedings of the 12th Bruges Colloquium, 
International Organisations’ Involvement in Peace Operations: Applicable Legal Framework and the Issue 
of Responsibility, 20–21 October 2011, Collegium No. 42, Autumn 2012, College of Europe-ICRC, 23-28, 
p. 27; Debuf, Captured in War: Lawful Internment in Armed Conﬂict (Pédone 2013), p. 135. In a similar, 
albeit less categorical, way: Engdahl (2013), supra note 5; Ferraro (2013), supra note 5, pp. 586-95 (stress-
ing, however, the special case of command and control in NATO, which means that it will usually be NATO 
and the participating states that need to be considered as a party to the conflict). 
41  See, in particular: sub-section 2.3, from p. 17. 
42  See the positions of both governments as documented by: Engdahl (2013), supra note 5, pp. 235-36.  
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sections of the present chapter,43 to complement the ordinary threshold requirements, which are 
solely based on the use of armed force between the potential parties. 
Hence, when it comes to a peace operation whose personnel is engaged in hostilities, both the 
participating states and the organisation may possibly (depending on the facts) qualify as the 
parties to the conflict. This will trigger the application of their respective humanitarian law 
obligations, which they have to observe neatly while carrying out their own military actions. 
By contrast, the peace operation as such cannot sensu stricto be considered a party to the con-
flict, because it has no distinct legal personality. Nevertheless, and despite this important clari-
fication, it is appropriate – for the sake of simplicity throughout this chapter – to refer to a peace 
operation as the party to the conflict (covering states and the organisation, as the case may be). 
Only where the distinction between the states and the organisation as the party to the conflict is 
of actual relevance for the application of humanitarian law, will the distinction be explicitly 
raised in the following subsections. 
Armed Conflicts with States 
As far as the sending states are concerned, any military engagement of the peace operation with 
the armed forces of another state would fall squarely within the international armed conflict 
regime, subject to the low threshold requirement outlined above. The case is, however, more 
challenging for international organisations, as the notion of international armed conflict con-
tained in the Geneva Conventions (1949) and interpreted in recent jurisprudence is essentially 
based on states as opponents. Consequently, only the regime of non-international armed con-
flicts appears to be available to international organisations.44 This would, however, lead to a 
rather absurd solution, which seems to have no support in international practice. Indeed, it is 
rather unlikely that states would treat forces belonging to an international organisation any dif-
ferently from state armed forces or question their combatant privilege if captured. Set up ini-
tially by states, such organisations have their grounding in the sovereign powers of states and 
enjoy privileges and immunities to accomplish their mandates. Hence, from the perspective of 
states who engage in fighting with the forces of an international organisation, it would seem 
reasonable to apply the same logic as to conflicts with other states. In the same vein, the inter-
national organisation has little interest in applying the law of non-international armed conflict. 
To argue otherwise would imply a hierarchically higher status for the international organisation 
                                               
43  See the subsection dealing with participation in a pre-existing armed conflict, from p. 84. 
44  According to the wording and logic of the Geneva Conventions, armed conflicts between a state and an 
international organisation do not amount to an IAC within the meaning of CA2. Consequently, they would 
only be regulated by CA3 as a ‘case of armed conflict not of an international character’. 
 61 
 
as opposed to the state in question, which we have rightly rejected in the section above. Hence, 
the concept of international armed conflicts applies equally to the United Nations and other 
international organisations as it does in relation to states. 
On the basis of this determination, it seems reasonable to conclude that any use of armed force 
between a peace operation and the armed forces of a state will trigger an international armed 
conflict between them. A single exchange of fire or the capture of enemy forces will be enough 
for that matter. Hence, peacekeeping forces will become involved in an international armed 
conflict when they come under hostile fire from state armed forces, however unprovoked this 
incident may be. Whether they return fire in self-defence has no bearing on the existence of an 
armed conflict in that case. As we concluded above, the mandate may give an indication on the 
likelihood and the extent to which the operation may resort to force; but the determination of 
whether or not an armed conflict exists will depend on the facts on the ground. By the same 
token, a Chapter VII mandate is in itself not enough to trigger the application of an international 
armed conflict in the absence of hostilities with state armed forces.45  
Apart from the cases of Korea and Iraq, peace operations will usually not get involved in pro-
tracted and large-scale hostilities with state armed forces. Such confrontations are rather rare 
and short-lived, as usually neither side has an interest in prolonged hostilities and further esca-
lation.46 Two more recent exceptions to this rule are the NATO air strikes carried out against 
pro-Gaddafi forces in Libya in 2011, and actions taken by the UN mission in Ivory Coast (UN-
OCI) and French troops against forces loyal to Laurent Gbagbo in spring of the same year.47 
What complicates the characterisation of these actions was the question of whether at the time 
of the events the regimes of Colonel Muhammad Gaddafi and Laurent Gbagbo could still be 
regarded as legitimate governments of Libya and Ivory Coast, respectively. Only some states 
                                               
45  It could perhaps be argued that Security Council resolutions authorising enforcement operations against an 
aggressor state – as in the case of Korea (1950-53) and Iraq (1991) – qualify as a declaration of war and 
thus as a self-standing ground for the application of the law of international armed conflicts within the 
meaning of CA2. However, the declaration of war would sensu stricto be made by the United Nations rather 
than the relevant states (or regional organisation) carrying out the operations (as in case of Korea and Iraq). 
It is also unclear whether there is an armed conflict between states if the declaration of war is not followed 
by hostilities. A textual interpretation would lead to an affirmative answer to this question. Nevertheless, it 
could be argued that in the absence of ensuing hostilities, the duration of the armed conflict is reduced to 
almost nothing – similar to a single, isolated air strike in an otherwise peaceful situation – which raises the 
issue of the temporal scope of application of humanitarian law, which will be considered further below. 
46  The exact end of the armed conflict and the application of humanitarian law is governed by the temporal 
scope of application discussed further below. 
47  BBC, ‘Ivory Coast: UN Forces Fire on Pro-Gbagbo Camp’, 5 April 2011, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
africa-12960308. 
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participating in the NATO-led air campaign had recognised the Benghazi-based National Tran-
sitional Council as the legitimate government of Libya. By contrast, Laurent Gbagbo was no 
longer considered the president of Ivory Coast after the elections and a resolution by the Secu-
rity Council.48 Hence, only where there has been a universal shift towards recognising a differ-
ent authority as the official government (as in the case of Ivory Coast) does a requalification of 
the conflict appear appropriate. However, the determination in these two specific cases is only 
of real relevance if there is indeed a difference in characterising armed conflicts against non-
state armed groups compared to those against states. 
Armed Conflicts with Non-State Armed Groups 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, armed confrontations are much more likely to occur 
between the peace operation and members of non-state armed groups. On some occasions, in-
ternational forces provide direct support to the armed forces of the host states or even carry out 
joint manoeuvres with them. Practice from earlier peace operations that had gotten involved in 
heavy fighting with members of armed groups is rather inconclusive as to the nature of the 
conflict, because the United Nations or the states involved often denied that they had become a 
party to an armed conflict. The above-mentioned Secretary-General’s Bulletin (1999) acknowl-
edges at least that the United Nations may be engaged in hostilities, but fails to distinguish 
between the two categories of armed conflicts, which has led to different interpretations.49 In 
the section on the treatment of detained persons, the Bulletin deems numerous provisions of 
Geneva Convention III applicable; these are, however, limited to treatment only and do not 
mention prisoner-of-war status at all. In other words, captured fighters do not necessarily enjoy 
combatant privilege, which leaves open the question of the nature of armed conflict. 
It was traditionally held among most scholars and the ICRC that any conflict involving the 
United Nations or other peace operations would be, by default, international in nature and may 
                                               
48  S/RES/1962 (Ivory Coast), 20 December 2010, para. 1 (‘Urges all the Ivorian parties and stakeholders to 
respect the will of the people and the outcome of the election in view of ECOWAS and African Union’s 
recognition of Alassane Dramane Ouattara as President-elect of Côte d’Ivoire and representative of the 
freely expressed voice of the Ivorian people as proclaimed by the Independent Electoral Commission’).  
49  Kolb et al., L’Application du Droit International Humanitaire et des Droits de l’Homme aux Organisations 
Internationales. Forces de Paix et Administrations Civiles Transitoires (Bruylant 2005), p. 186 (holding 
that this means that it must always be the law of IAC that applies). By contrast: Ryniker, ‘Respect du Droit 
International Humanitaire par les Forces des Nations Unies. Quelques Commentaires Apropos de la Circu-
laire du Secretaire Général des Nations Unies du 6 Août 1999’, 81 IRRC (1999), 795-805, p. 800 (who 
claims that the Bulletin does not rule out the application of the law of NIAC). 
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even in certain cases internationalise the pre-existing armed conflict between the local parties.50 
It is less clear to what extent this option also includes the low threshold of international armed 
conflicts outlined above. A major argument refers to the international character of peace oper-
ations, often involving the United Nations or regional organisations, which in principle inter-
nationalises the armed conflict.51 However, this view is seriously flawed. There is simply no 
support for the claim that an international force changes qua persona the nature of an armed 
conflict in which it may get involved.52 As a general rule of interventional conflicts, the classi-
fication depends rather on the adversary of the intervening force. Only armed conflicts with 
state armed forces or forces of another intervening state are considered international, while 
armed conflicts with insurgents are to be considered non-international in nature.53 The same 
logic should be applied to conflicts between a peace operation and an organised armed group. 
This position has found increasing support in recent years among legal scholars54 and has also 
been adopted by the ICRC, as expressed in its 2011 Challenges Report.55 
                                               
50  For the ICRC: Bouvier (1995), infra note 90, p. 652. See also: Benvenuti, ‘The Implementation of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law in the Framework of UN Peace-Keeping’, 1 Law in International Crisis (1995), 
83-119, p. 96; David (2008), supra note 10, p. 152.  
51  See, for instance: Hampson, ‘States’ Military Operations Authorized by the United Nations and Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law’ in: Condorelli et alia (eds.), Les Nations Unies et le Droit International Human-
itaire Actes du Colloque International, 19-21 Octobre 1995, Genève (Pedone 1996), 371-426, pp. 390-91 
(‘It seems no more sensible, however, to regard a group of foreigners fighting to protect a «safe area» as 
engaged in a non-international conflict. The very involvement of the United Nations and its determination 
that an internal situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security would seem to deny such a 
characterization’). Note, however, that the author seems to have changed her view in the meantime: Hamp-
son, ‘Afghanistan 2001-2010’, in: Wilmshurst (ed.), International Law and the Classification of Conflicts 
(OUP 2012), 242-79. 
52  Admittedly, CA3 refers to non-international armed conflicts ‘occurring in the territory of one of the High 
Contracting Parties’ and Article 1 (1) AP II requires that the armed conflict take ‘place in the territory of a 
High Contracting Party between its armed forces’, which gives the impression that non-international armed 
conflicts can only exist on the territory of one state and thus rules out situations in which multinational 
forces could be involved in a NIAC taking place abroad. Nevertheless, while this may be a possible reading 
of the plain text of the two treaty provisions, practice seems to support the view that a state can also be 
involved in a NIAC taking place entirely outside of its own territory. 
53  Schindler (1979), supra note 10, p. 150-55. 
54  Cho, ‘International Humanitarian Law and United Nations Operations in an Internal Armed Conflict ‘, 26 
Korean Journal of International and Comparative Law (1998), 85-111, p. 93; McCoubrey and White, In-
ternational Organizations and Civil Wars (Dartmouth Publishers 1995), p. 172; Tittemore, ‘Belligerents in 
Blue Helmets: Applying International Humanitarian Law to United Nations Peace Operations’, 33 Stanford 
Journal of International Law (1997), 61-117, p. 110; Naert, International Law Aspects of the EU’s Security 
and Defence Policy, with a Particular Focus on the Law of Armed Conflict and Human Rights (Intersentia, 
2010), pp. 478-92. See also: Faite, ‘Multinational Forces Acting Pursuant to a Mandate of the United Na-
tions: Specific Issues on the Applicability of International Humanitarian Law’, 11 International Peacekeep-
ing (2007), 143-157, pp. 146-48 (mainly pointing at the issue of POW status); Federal Prosecutor General 
(Germany), Final Report on Preliminary Investigations against Colonel Klein and Sergeant Wilhelm, 16 
April 2010, 3 BJs 6/10-4, pp. 41-42. 
55  ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, Report Pre-
pared for the 31st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva, Switzerland, 28 
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There are a number of reasons that have facilitated this development. First, as we have seen 
above, a great number of customary humanitarian rules are today considered to be equally ap-
plicable in non-international armed conflicts. This has effectively removed the bias among 
scholars and the ICRC in favour of the law of international armed conflicts. At the same time, 
states have remained reluctant to grant fighters of non-state armed groups the combatant privi-
lege, that is to say a licence to kill members of the states’ own armed forces. This is one of the 
main reasons why states and international organisations involved in peace operations have often 
been unwilling to acknowledge the existence of an armed conflict altogether, running the risk 
of undermining the application of humanitarian law in such situations. Moreover, the increased 
clarification of the threshold of non-international armed conflicts has made sure that armed 
conflicts with armed groups will normally only start once the violence reaches a high level of 
intensity. 
Despite this development, there remains a group of legal scholars that adheres to the traditional 
view, whereby armed conflicts between international forces and non-state armed groups are by 
default international in nature.56 According to a major argument advanced by them, the distinc-
tion between both types of armed conflicts has its origin in the principle of sovereignty. Since 
peace operations do not enjoy territorial sovereignty over the area of deployment, they cannot 
invoke the right to put down any form of rebellion and punish the insurgents, which is inherent 
in the law of non-international armed conflicts. As a consequence, only the international armed 
conflict regime would be available to them.57  
This argument seems, however, to overlook that many peace operations do indeed embark on 
combat missions alongside the armed forces of the host states. Illustrative cases are the ISAF 
mission in Afghanistan or the UN operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC 
and later MONUSCO). Captured fighters are usually handed over to the local authorities and 
prosecuted for their acts. It is precisely the respect for the sovereignty of the host state that 
would seem to prevent the granting of prisoner-of-war status to such detainees, who in the eyes 
of local authorities are mere criminals.58 Admittedly, the case becomes more challenging where 
                                               
November – 1 December 2011, p. 31. Critical of the novel ICRC view: Lagot, Quel Droit International 
Humanitaire pour les Conflits Armés Actuels? (L’Harmattan 2010), pp. 25-28. 
56  La Haye, War Crimes in Internal Armed Conflicts (CUP 2008), p. 19-21; David, ‘How Does the Involve-
ment of a Multinational Peacekeeping Force Affect the Classiﬁcation of a Situation?’, 95 IRRC (2013), 
659-79. 
57  Glick, ‘Lip Service to the Laws of War: Humanitarian Law and United Nations Armed Forces’, 17 Michi-
gan Journal of International Law (1995), 53-108, p. 91; Bothe (1967), supra note 10, p. 212. 
58  The same would appear to be the case for peace operations who conduct their actions more independently, 
but on the basis of a status-of-force agreement concluded with the host state. 
 65 
 
any form of central government has collapsed in the host state. A case in point is the UN pres-
ence in Somalia following the overthrow of the Barre regime in 1991 and where none of the 
local groups could be considered to represent the state as such. However, in view of the broad 
mandate peace operations usually enjoy in such cases, it is fair to say that they assume the role 
of a quasi-sovereign.59 Consequently, just like state governments, the mission is entitled to en-
force law and order and if necessary to crack down on civil unrest. If the violence reaches a 
higher level of intensity and involves organised armed groups, the law of non-international 
armed conflicts becomes applicable.60 
Nevertheless, there are a number of exceptions to the general rule just outlined. For instance, 
the non-state armed group opposing the peace operation may claim to be a national liberation 
movement within the meaning of Article 1 (4) Additional Protocol I holds, which would mean 
that the armed conflict would have an international character, including the full combatant priv-
ilege for the freedom fighters and subject to the low intensity threshold. But it is highly ques-
tionable whether Article 1 (4) can really be considered a rule of customary law, rather than only 
binding on those states party to Additional Protocol I.61 Most importantly, however, it is rather 
unlikely that a peace operation that has been authorised by the UN Security Council would 
engage in fighting with a group that can reasonably be considered a ‘national liberation move-
ment’.  
Cases in which the non-state armed group acts on behalf of a third state forms another exception 
to the general rule. Hence, any use of force between the peace operation and members of such 
armed groups would trigger an international armed conflict. What remains at issue is the level 
of control required for this to be the case. In the Tadić judgment, the ICTY Appeals Chamber 
held that the Bosnian-Serb forces had acted under the overall control (and thus as an agent) of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.62 Hence, by reverse logic, also the NATO air strikes 
against Bosnian-Serb positions amounted to an international armed conflict.63 The ICRC fol-
lowed the same reasoning when claiming prisoner-of-war status for pro-Indonesian militiamen 
                                               
59  The same conclusion seems warranted for cases of international territorial administrations (like previously 
in Kosovo or East Timor). 
60  Consequently, the peace operation would not have to grant prisoner-of-war status to captured fighters, but 
rather retains the right to have them prosecuted for committing hostile acts against their forces. 
61  Akande, ‘Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts’, in: Wilmshurst (ed.), International 
Law and the Classification of Conflicts (OUP 2012), 32-79, p.49 
62  ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Judgement, 15 July 1999, Case No. IT-94-1-T, paras. 146-62. 
63  This is also reflected by the fact that France secured prisoner-of-war status for its pilots that had been shot 
down during these strikes, as reported above: Sassòli (2007), supra note 1, p. 260. Note, however: Shraga 
(2009), infra note 146, p. 362 (who claims in relation to a different incident involving French UNPROFOR 
soldiers that the ‘Bosnian-Serbs captured by the French Force, not being “members of the armed forces of 
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captured by the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), since they had acted under 
the overall control of Indonesia and had thus been captured in the context of an international 
armed conflict.64 Nevertheless, recent jurisprudence seems to require a much higher control 
level for similar cases,65 which may be reflective of the fact that international courts no longer 
see a pressing need to argue for an internationalisation of an otherwise non-international armed 
conflict, coupled with the concern among states to grant members of armed groups full com-
batant privilege.66  
Even though an armed conflict between a peace operation and a non-state armed group will 
under normal circumstances take a non-international character, both parties are free to agree by 
means of special agreements to mutually apply (some or all of the) additional rules of the law 
of international armed conflicts.67 Such agreements may grant full prisoner-of-war status (in-
cluding full combatant privilege) to captured fighters and may thus prove useful in cases where 
a considerable number of the peace operation’s own personnel have been captured. Where no 
such agreement can be reached, the peace operation may also unilaterally internationalise the 
existing armed conflict with the non-state armed group by formally recognising belligerency,68 
even though such recognitions appear to have fallen out of practice.69 Yet, given the great num-
ber of different actors involved – namely the contributing states, international organisations and 
                                               
a Party to the conflict” within the meaning of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention, were not entitled to a 
“prisoner of war” status; pending their release and for the duration of their detention, however, they were 
entitled to common Article 3 minimum standards of humane treatment’). 
64  Levrat, ‘Le Droit International Humanitaire au Timor Oriental: Entre Théorie et Pratique’, 841 IRRC 
(2001), 77-100, pp. 92-95. 
65  SCSL, Prosecutor v. Sesay et al., Trial Chamber Judgement, 2 March 2009, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, paras, 
974-77 (holding that the control exercised by Charles Taylor over the RUF was not sufficient to make the 
latter an agent of the Republic of Liberia for the purpose of internationalising the non-international armed 
conflict in Sierra Leone); ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Trial Chamber Judgement, 14 March 2012, 
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, paras. 552-67 (finding no support for the Pre-trial Chamber’s previous classi-
fication of the armed conflict as international, as there was insufficient control exercised by Uganda, 
Rwanda and the DRC over their ‘proxy’ armed groups engaged in fighting with each other). 
66  Note, however, that even if the armed conflict were deemed international in character, members of the 
armed group in question could still forfeit their right to full prisoner-of-war status by failing to meet the 
minimum requirements of regular combatants, including to wear a distinctive emblem and to carry their 
weapons openly. 
67  Parties to the conflict are particularly encouraged to conclude such special agreements by CA3 (2) para. 2 
(‘The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, 
all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention’). Also suggested by McCoubrey and White 
(note), p. 172. 
68  Sassòli, ‘The Role of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law in New Types of Armed Con-
flicts’ in: Ben-Naftali (ed.), International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law: Pas de 
Deux (OUP 2011), 34-94, p. 89.  
69  The doctrine of recognition of belligerency is, however, explicitly mentioned in ICRC Commentary: Com-
mentary to GC III, p. 36. More generally on recognition of belligerency: Akande (2012), supra note 61, 
pp. 49-50; Cullen, The Concept of Non-international Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law 
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the host state – the question remains as to who is entitled to recognise belligerency in the case 
at hand. Moreover, both options are obviously only available where the level of violence has 
already reached the intensity required for the existence of a non-international armed conflict 
and thus do in no way affect the threshold requirement. 
In sum, it appears more reasonable to apply the law of non-international armed conflict to situ-
ations of armed conflict between a peace operation and non-state armed groups. In other words, 
where the peace operation in question is involved in fighting of sufficient intensity with well-
organised armed groups – e.g. currently in Afghanistan, Mali, Somalia and the Democratic Re-
public of Congo – there is a non-international armed conflict. Conversely, where one or both 
of these requirements is not met, humanitarian law does not apply. This was arguably the case 
with the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), whose forces clashed frequently 
with local criminal gangs in certain areas of the capital Port-au-Prince between 2004 and 
2007.70 Since the clashes did not lead to sustained fighting and involved only poorly organised 
groups, they qualified rather as internal disturbances. A similar conclusion can be drawn from 
the activities of the EU-led anti-piracy mission (Atalanta), operating off the coast of Somalia: 
clashes with pirate vessels have been rather short-lived and do not involve sophisticated wea-
ponry, nor do the individual pirate groups seem sufficiently organised for qualifying as a party 
to an armed conflict.  
Conclusion 
The foregoing shows clearly that the characterisation of the armed conflict in which a peace 
operation may become involved has to be based on the ordinary test. Hence, when states and 
international organisations acting as part of a peace operation engage in fighting with state 
armed forces, however sporadic and short-lived this may be, there will be an international armed 
conflict. By contrast, violence with non-state armed groups may (only) qualify as a non-inter-
national armed conflict, provided that it reaches a high level of intensity and that the group in 
question is sufficiently organised. Even though the law of non-international armed conflict is 
more limited and does not guarantee a combatant immunity to captured enemy fighters, there 
are circumstances under which the full set of rules may become applicable, most notably by 
                                               
(CUP 2010), pp. 5-24.  
70  BBC, ‘UN Troops Flood into Haiti Slum’, 11 February 2007, http://www.bbc.co.uk/caribbean/news/story/ 
2007/02/070211_unhaiti.shtml. 
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mutual agreement between the parties. Becoming parties to an armed conflict triggers the ap-
plication of their respective humanitarian law obligations, which they have to observe neatly 
while carrying out their own military actions.71 By contrast, the peace operation as such cannot 
sensu stricto be considered a party to the conflict, because it has no distinct legal personality. 
PROTECTION REGIME AND HIGHER THRESHOLD 
As shown above, UN and national officials have been reluctant to acknowledge that their troops, 
involved in a peace operation, have become a party to an armed conflict. This view reflects the 
intention of raising the threshold of armed conflict for peace operations so as to keep their 
troops immune from attack for as long as possible. It is, however, doubtful whether this practice 
has given rise to a sui generis threshold for peace operations as part of the lex lata, as suggested 
by some authors.72 Nevertheless, the tendency of raising the threshold of humanitarian law 
could perhaps be reinforced by a recently developed regime to enhance the protection and safety 
of peacekeeping personnel. 
Safety Convention 
In response to increasing attacks on peacekeepers in the early 1990s, states adopted the Con-
vention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel (1994).73 Under the Safety 
Convention, states are prohibited from attacking United Nations or associated personnel, their 
equipment and premises, or otherwise preventing them from discharging their mandate; they 
are also under an obligation to take all appropriate measures to ensure their safety and security.74 
                                               
71  For both scenarios, the different participating states and the organisation may (depending on the facts) 
qualify as the parties to the conflict, but sensu stricto not the peace operation as such, because it has no 
distinct legal personality. 
72  Greenwood, ‘International Humanitarian Law and United Nations Military Operations’, 1 YIHL (1998), 3-
34, pp. 24-25 (‘It appears, therefore, that a United Nations force and national units operating in association 
with it but under national command will be regarded as parties to an armed conflict only when they have 
engaged in hostilities on a scale … considerably higher than that which is used to define an armed conflict 
for other purposes’). 
73  For a detailed description of the drafting process of the 1994 Safety Convention and its main features: 
Engdahl, Protection of Personnel in Peace Operations: The Role of the ‘Safety Convention’ against the 
Background of General International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2007), pp. 205-92. 
74  Art. 7, Safety Convention (1994). 
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If captured or detained, such personnel are to be promptly released and returned.75 The Con-
vention defines a range of hostile acts against the personnel of peace operations as crimes, 
namely murder, kidnapping or other attacks upon the person or their liberty,76 and obliges states 
to enact criminal statutes penalising these acts at the domestic level.77  
Hence, the Safety Convention (1994) runs the risk of prohibiting acts by state armed forces that 
would otherwise be permissible in times of armed conflict – namely attacks against or detention 
of enemy forces – and for which members of their armed forces are shielded from criminal 
prosecution.78 The term ‘United Nations or Associated Personnel’ is broad enough to cover the 
military personnel of a wide range of different peace operations,79 including those carried out 
by regional organisations or states that may be more likely to become involved in fighting or-
ganised armed forces. The relationship between the Safety Convention (1994) and humanitarian 
law was therefore specifically discussed during the drafting process, with most delegates argu-
ing that both regimes should be mutually exclusive. For this purpose, the drafters included Ar-
ticle 2 (2), which serves as an exclusion clause: 
This Convention shall not apply to a United Nations operation authorized by the Security 
Council as an enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations 
in which any of the personnel are engaged as combatants against organized armed forces 
and to which the law of international armed conflict applies.80 
In other words, peace operations are excluded from the scope of the Safety Convention (1994), 
if they meet the following three cumulative requirements:  
                                               
75  Art. 8. 
76  Art. 9. 
77  Art. 10, ibid. Furthermore, states party to the Convention have the duty to prevent the commission of such 
acts and to ensure the prosecution or extradition of the offenders, as well as to co-operate with the UN and 
other states for this purpose, Arts. 11-16, Safety Convention (1994). 
78  This would obviously presuppose that the attacked side had already been the enemy before the attack, or 
that the attack itself triggers the armed conflict between the attacking and attacked side. In view of the 
extremely low IAC intensity threshold (i.e ‘first-shot’ approach), such a scenario is indeed not unlikely. 
79  UN personnel includes members of the military component of a UN operation, i.e. conducted under UN 
authority and control, whereas the term ‘associated personnel’ may be broadly interpreted, covering also 
members of peace operations carried out by regional organisations or individual states, provided they are 
accompanied by a UN presence (e.g. SFOR in Bosnia Herzegovina, KFOR in Kosovo and ISAF in Afghan-
istan). On this issue: Engdahl (2007), supra note 73, pp. 218-33. UNGA, Official Records 49th Session, UN 
Doc. A/49/PV.84, 9 December 1994, p. 15 (US delegate: ‘all recent operations authorized by the Security 
Council would be covered, including the current operations in Haiti, Rwanda and Bosnia and the prior 
operation in Somalia. Thus, both United Nations forces and associated forces would be covered, including 
for example, the multinational force in Haiti and assistance provided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation (NATO) to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia’). 
80  Emphasis added. 
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1. The UN operation is authorised by the Security Council as an enforcement action under 
Chapter VII; 
2. Its personnel are engaged as combatants against organised armed forces; and  
3. The law of international armed conflict applies to the operation.  
To begin with the third criterion, it has been suggested that this reference is only of declarative 
nature, since the drafters believed that any armed conflict in which the United Nations becomes 
involved would be international in character.81 This reasoning is, however, hardly convincing. 
As we have seen above, it is perfectly possible for a peace operation to become a party to an 
armed conflict with organised armed groups, to which the law of non-international armed con-
flict would normally be applicable. Christiane Bourloyannis-Vrailas calls it doubtful why such 
cases should remain protected under the Convention.82 It is, however, reported that the United 
States83 and some other delegations84 explicitly called for the inclusion of non-international 
armed conflicts within the scope of the Convention so as to compensate for the perceived pro-
tection gap under the few humanitarian law provisions applicable to this type of conflict. More 
importantly, even considering the recent convergence of customary rules for both types of 
armed conflict, there is no norm conflict between the provisions of the Safety Convention 
(1994) and those under the law of non-international armed conflicts. First, the obligation under 
the Convention to refrain from attacks against UN and associated personnel is only addressed 
to states and not to armed groups. Moreover, the combatant privilege only applies in interna-
tional armed conflicts and thus does not prevent the criminalisation and subsequent prosecution 
of hostile acts committed by insurgents against the peace mission’s personnel, as explicitly 
required under the Convention. There is thus no need to exclude situations of non-international 
                                               
81  Kirsch, ‘The Convention on the Safety of the United Nations and the Associated Personnel’, 2 International 
Peacekeeping (1995), 102-106, p. 105 (‘it was generally agreed that it was impossible for the UN itself to 
be involved in an internal armed conflict since once UN or associated personnel became engaged in conflict 
with a local force (as opposed to merely acting in self-defence), the conflict becomes, by definition, ‘inter-
national’ in character’); Kolb et al. (2005), supra note 49, p. 186-87.  
82  Bourloyannis-Vrailas, ‘The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel’, 44 (3) 
ICLQ (1995), 560-90, p. 568. 
83  Lepper, ‘The Legal Status of Military Personnel in United Nations Peace Operations: One Delegate’s Anal-
ysis’, 18 Houston Journal of International Law (1996), 359-464, p. 395. See also the comments by the US 
delegate during adoption of the Safety Convention: UNGA, Official Records of the 49th session, 84th Meet-
ing, UN Doc. A/49/PV.84, 9 December 1994, p. 15 (‘When common article 2 of the Geneva Conventions 
does not apply, for example in non-combat situations or in internal armed conflicts, the Convention we are 
adopting today will apply and will fill any gap in the law by criminalizing attacks on United Nations and 
associated personnel’, emphasis added). 
84  Arsanjani, ‘Defending the Blue Helmets: Protection of United Nations Personnel’, in: Condorelli et al. 
(1996), supra note, 115-147, p. 143, footnote 77 (‘Apparently, during the negotiation of the Convention, a 
number of Third World States opposed [sic] to any reference to internal armed conflicts. It seems, however, 
clear that the negotiators of the Convention were aware of the consequences of the language’). 
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armed conflict from the scope of the Safety Convention. On the contrary, it may even prove 
particularly useful to extend this special protection regime to such situations.85 Hence, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that the Safety Convention (1994) continues to protect UN and associ-
ated personnel engaged in an armed conflict with a non-state armed group.86  
This finding also has an impact on the operation of the second requirement of the exclusion 
clause in Article 2 (2), namely that the personnel be ‘engaged as combatants against organized 
armed forces’. While this passage could be read as referring to an involvement in any armed 
conflict, regardless of its nature,87 the third criterion makes clear that only those operations that 
have become a party to an international armed conflict lose their protection under the Conven-
tion. This conclusion is further restricted by the first criterion of the exclusion clause, referring 
only to operations ‘authorised by the Security Council as an enforcement action under Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations’.88 As we have seen above, however, the mandate of a 
peace operation should have no bearing on the application of humanitarian law. Indeed, a tra-
ditional peacekeeping operation with a Chapter VI mandate has to be considered a party to an 
international armed conflict if it comes under deliberate attack from state armed forces. Cer-
tainly, almost all of the more recent peace missions operate under robust Chapter VII mandates; 
but it remains unclear whether they can be considered ‘enforcement actions’ as required by the 
exclusion clause. In other words, Article 2 (2) fails to properly exclude all cases in which a 
peace operation could become involved in an international armed conflict. The Safety Conven-
tion (1994) thus runs the risks of potentially clashing with some of the provisions under the law 
of international armed conflict. However, this dilemma seems to be mitigated by the following 
saving clause in Article 20 of the Convention, which ensures that:  
Nothing in this Convention shall affect: (a) The applicability of international humanitarian 
law … in relation to the protection of United Nations operations and United Nations and 
                                               
85  First, under the Convention states would be obliged to take appropriate measures to prevent armed groups 
from attacking UN and associated personnel or committing other hostile acts against them. Second, states 
would be enabled to vest universal jurisdiction in their courts to prosecute members of armed groups re-
sponsible for crimes as defined by the Convention. 
86  Engdahl (2007), supra note 73, p. 237-241. For a different view: Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Scope 
of Legal Protection under the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel’, UN 
Doc. A/55/637, 21 November 2000, p. 9, endnote 3; Glick (1995), supra note 57, p. 82-83; Rowe, ‘Main-
taining Discipline in United Nations Peace Support Operations: The Legal Quagmire for Military Contin-
gents’, 5 JCSL (2000), 45-62, p. 53-54. 
87  Along the same lines as Sect. 1 (1) SG Bulletin, which also uses the term ‘combatants’ without, however, 
limiting its application to international armed conflicts alone.  
88  Art. 2 (2), Safety Convention (1994), emphasis added. By reverse logic, Chapter VII operations that are not 
a party to an international armed conflict remain under the protection of the Convention. 
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associated personnel or the responsibility of such personnel to respect such law and stand-
ards.89 
Hence, despite the flawed wording of its exclusion clause in Article 2 (2), the Safety Convention 
(1994) cannot be invoked by states for deviating from their obligations under humanitarian law, 
which prohibits any possible prosecution of members of state armed forces for attacking the 
personnel of the peace operations, regardless of their exact mandate. This shows that the Safety 
Convention and humanitarian law are two distinct legal regimes.90  
As a consequence, the Convention does in no way raise the threshold of humanitarian law for 
international armed conflicts involving peace operations.91 This conclusion is also supported 
by the poor ratification record of the Safety Convention, especially among host states, who are 
the most likely candidates for states becoming involved in (sporadic) fighting with members of 
a peace operation.92 Moreover, as we have already seen above, there is no obvious conflict 
between the Safety Convention and the law of non-international armed conflict, whose appli-
cation is already subject to a higher gravity threshold.  
Special Protection under Humanitarian Law 
In addition to the Safety Convention (1994), a special protection regime has evolved in the field 
of international criminal law and humanitarian law. In the lead-up to the adoption of the Rome 
Statute, the International Law Commission issued in 1996 a ‘Draft Code of Crimes Against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind’. In Article 19, the Draft Code introduced a new category of 
‘Crimes Against United Nations and Associated Personnel’,93 which was essentially modelled 
                                               
89  Emphasis added. 
90  Bouvier, ‘Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel’, 35 IRRC (1995), 638-
66, p. 664; Kolb, Droit Humanitaire et Opérations de Paix Internationales (Helbing & Lichtenhahn 2002), 
p. 46 
91  See also: Kellenberger, ‘Keynote address at the 31st Round Table on Current Issues of International Hu-
manitarian Law’, International Institute of Humanitarian Law, San Remo, 4 September 2008, p. 36. For the 
opposite view: Glick (1995), supra note 57, pp. 81-96 (who criticises the Convention for criminalising acts 
that are covered by the combatant privilege); Greenwood (2008), supra note 19, p. 53 (‘It seems highly 
unlikely that those who drafted this Convention intended it to cease application as soon as there was any 
fighting, however low-level, between members of a UN force and members of other organized armed forces 
as this would reduce the scope of application of the Convention to almost nothing. There is, therefore, an 
inevitable tension between the very broad definition of armed conflict … and the policy behind the 1994 
Convention’). 
92  For an excellent outline of the ratification record: Fleck, ‘The Legal Status of Personnel Involved in United 
Nations Peace Operations’, 891-92 IRRC (2013), 613-36, pp. 627-29. 
93  ILC, Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 2 YILC (1996), p. 7. 
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on the Safety Convention (1994).94 However, the drafters of the Rome Statute (1998) followed 
a different approach and criminalised attacks on peacekeeping missions under the general war 
crimes section. Accordingly, the following acts constitute a war crime in both international and 
non-international armed conflicts:  
Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles 
involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civil-
ians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict.95 
The same war crime was also included in the statutes of the East Timor Panels96 and of the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone.97 In this context, the UN Secretary-General emphasised that: 
Attacks against peacekeeping personnel, to the extent that they are entitled to protection 
recognized under international law to civilians in armed conflict, do not represent a new 
crime. Although established for the first time as an international crime in the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, it was not viewed at the time of the adoption of the Rome 
Statute as adding to the already existing customary international law crime of attacks 
against civilians and persons hors de combat. Based on the distinction between peacekeep-
ers as civilians and peacekeepers turned combatants, the crime defined in article 4 of the 
Statute of the Special Court is a specification of a targeted group within the generally pro-
tected group of civilians which because of its humanitarian or peacekeeping mission de-
serves special protection.98 
In other words, the personnel of peacekeeping missions are already protected under the generic 
protection of civilians under humanitarian law. Moreover, this specification also clarifies that 
the protection does not only cover civilian staff involved in a peacekeeping mission, but also 
                                               
94  It reproduces the crimes listed in paras. (a) and (b) of Art. 9 (1) and the exclusion clause in Art. 2 (2) of the 
Safety Convention. 
95 Art. 8 (b) (iii) and (e) (iii), ICC Statute. The wording differs considerably from the treaty crime set out in 
Article 19 of the above mentioned ILC Draft Code (supra note 93), which would have created a new crime 
in its own right. 
96 Sect. 6 (1) (b) (iii) and (e) (iii), UNTAET Reg. No. 2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive 
Jurisdiction Over Serious Criminal Offences, 6 June 2000.  
97 Art. 4 (b), SCSL Statute, as adopted by agreement between the United Nations and Sierra Leone, 16 January 
2002. 
98 UN Secretary-General, Report on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, UN Doc. 
S/2000/915, 4 October 2000, para. 16. 
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extends to military personnel,99 unless they have forfeited their protected status.100 This is also 
reflected in the wording of the Secretary-General’s Bulletin (1999).101  
The view that peacekeepers deployed in a zone of armed conflict enjoy prima facie the same 
protection as civilians is supported by the recent jurisprudence in the field of international crim-
inal law.102 Moreover, this position is also shared by the ICRC, whose Customary IHL Study 
contains a special rule on the protection of peacekeepers, modelled on the wording of the war 
crime.103 
That peacekeeping missions that are not a party to an ongoing conflict enjoy civilian status is 
widely accepted in the literature.104 Some authors have, however, raised doubts as to whether 
military personnel could ever enjoy civilian status under humanitarian law. Tania Bolaños 
Enríquez, for instance, contends that peacekeeping units maintain their military character when 
deployed to crisis regions and thus qualify at all times as combatants – thus ruling out any 
possible civilian protection – regardless of whether they take part in hostilities or not.105 It does 
indeed appear difficult to reconcile the military character of such personnel with the status of 
civilians.  
Yet, the essential question – seemingly overlooked by those sceptics – is whether soldiers of a 
state not party to the armed conflict in question qualify as armed forces within the meaning of 
humanitarian law. Under the law of international armed conflicts, Article 43 of Additional Pro-
tocol I and Article 4 (A) of Geneva Convention III only provide a definition of (members of) 
                                               
99 Cottier, ‘Article 8 War Crimes - para. 2 (b) (iii)’ in: Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court - Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (2nd edn, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 
2008), 187-96; Bothe, ‘War Crimes’, in: Cassese et al. (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Crim-
inal Court: A Commentary (Vol. I, OUP 2002), 379-425, pp. 410-12 and 422. 
100 The exact modalities of losing the protection of civilians will be examined in the following section. 
101 Section 1.2, Secretary-General’s Bulletin, supra note (‘The promulgation of this bulletin does not affect the 
protected status of members of peacekeeping operations … as non-combatants, as long as they are entitled 
to the protection given to civilians under the international law of armed conflict’, emphasis added). 
102 See infra notes 141-143. 
103 Rule 33, CIHL Study (‘Directing an attack against personnel and objects involved in a peacekeeping mis-
sion in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection 
given to civilians and civilian objects under international humanitarian law, is prohibited’). This rule applies 
to international and non-international armed conflicts. 
104 Dörmann, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (CUP 
2003), pp. 153-160 and 452-457; Engdahl (2007), supra note 73, pp. 293-307; and the authorities cited 
above, supra note 99. 
105  Bolaños Enríquez, Anwendung des Humanitären Völkerrechts auf Militärische Interventionen der 
Vereinten Nationen in Internen Bewaffneten Konflikten (Hartung-Gorre 2011), pp. 126-28. For a similar 
view: Kolb et al. (2005), supra note 49, p. 182 (‘[L]eur statut de membres de forces armées ne permet pas 
de leur octroyer la protection que prescrit le droit international humanitaire pour les civils’). 
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armed forces belonging to a party to the conflict.106 Hence, soldiers that do not belong to a party 
to the conflict are not covered by this term. Consequently, they can only be considered civil-
ians.107 The requirement of ‘belonging to a party to the conflict’ is also part of the definition of 
armed forces under customary law as reflected by the Customary IHL Study.108 The same con-
clusion can be drawn from the ICRC’s Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Partic-
ipation in Hostilities (2009),109 which makes clear that only members of armed forces or organ-
ised armed groups belonging to a party to the conflict are excluded from the category of civil-
ians, both in international armed conflicts110 and non-international armed conflicts.111 
The position that armed forces not belonging to a party to the armed conflict must be considered 
civilians is further supported by the definition of perfidy under humanitarian law,112 which con-
tains a list of examples constituting acts of perfidy, including: 
the feigning of protected status by the use of signs, emblems or uniforms of the United 
Nations or of neutral or other States not Parties to the conflict.113 
                                               
106 Art. 43 AP I, (‘1. The armed forces of a Party to a conflict … 2. Members of the armed forces of a Party 
to a conflict (other than medical personnel and chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention) 
are combatants …’, emphasis added). See also Art. 4 (A) Geneva Convention III, where the requirement of 
‘belonging to a party to the conflict’ is explicitly stated for the categories mentioned in paras. 1, 2 and 5, 
and implicit for the remaining ones. 
107 Art. 50 (1) AP I, (‘A civilian is any person who does not belong to one of the categories of persons referred 
to in Article 4 A (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Convention and in Article 43 of this Protocol. In case of 
doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian’). 
108 Rule 4, CIHL Study (‘The armed forces of a party to the conflict consist of all organized armed forces, 
groups and units which are under a command responsible to that party for the conduct of its subordinates’). 
Also the accompanying commentary stresses the requirement of ‘belong to a party to the conflict’, see pp. 
14-15. Armed forces of a state (or organisation) that has not (yet) become a party to the conflict would thus 
enjoy the protection of civilians, although this conclusion is less evident under Rule 5, which simply defines 
civilians as persons who are not members of the armed forces, without clarifying whether such forces have 
to belong to a party to the conflict. 
109 ICRC, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Hu-
manitarian Law, prepared and edited by Nils Melzer, May 2009. 
110 Ibid, p. 20 (‘all persons who are neither members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict nor partici-
pants in a levée en masse are civilians’, emphasis added). Also the accompanying commentary stresses the 
‘belonging to a party to the conflict’ requirement, see pp. 23-24. 
111 Ibid, p. 27 (‘all persons who are not members of State armed forces or organized armed groups of a party 
to the conflict are civilians’, emphasis added). 
112 Art. 37 (1) AP I and Rule 65 of CIHL Study (applicable in international and non-international armed con-
flicts), Vol. I, pp. 223-24, define perfidy as follows: ‘Acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead 
him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law 
applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence’. 
113 Art. 37 (1) (d) AP I, emphasis added. 
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This implies that the armed forces of the United Nations or of neutral or other states not parties 
to the conflict114 – namely those usually entitled to use such signs, emblems or uniforms – enjoy 
a protected status under humanitarian law.115 
Based on this contextual interpretation of the relevant rules and categories under humanitarian 
law, it is reasonable to conclude that military personnel deployed in the theatre of an armed 
conflict but not belonging to any of the parties to that conflict enjoy prima facie the same pro-
tection as civilians. The protection applies to the armed forces of neutral states as well as to the 
armed forces of any other state or international organisation that has not (yet) become a party 
to the conflict in question.116 This clarification is an important contribution to the discussion on 
the protection of peace operations: Civilian protection is thus not only limited to the personnel 
of operations qualifying as ‘peacekeeping missions in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations’, however broadly or narrowly this term may be interpreted in practice.117 Rather, the 
protection extends to the personnel of all peace operations, provided that they have not (yet) 
become a party to the conflict. This finding also helps to demystify the whole concept of civilian 
protection of peacekeepers, since the same protection applies to any other type of armed forces 
of a state or organisation not party to the armed conflict in question. 
                                               
114 This fact is also mentioned by Greenwood without, however, specifying the nature of the protection: Green-
wood, ‘Protection of Peacekeepers: The Legal Regime’, 7 Duke Journal of Comparative and International 
Law (1996), 185-208, p. 190. 
115 The provision remains unclear as to the exact nature and origin of this status. Yet, in the absence of any 
other possible category, it is fair to say that it can only refer to the status of civilians. There are indeed a 
number of alternatives that could possibly give rise to special protection under IHL. None of them seems, 
however, available to armed forces of a state of organisation not party to the armed conflict. First, they 
cannot be considered non-combatant members of the armed forces protected under IHL, because such pro-
tection only covers medical and religious personnel (Arts. 24-26 GC I, 36 GC II, and Rules 25 and 27 CIHL 
Study) and members of the armed forces assigned to civil defence organisations (Art. 67 AP I), and includes 
the requirement to belong to a party to the conflict. Second, they cannot be considered persons hors de 
combat (as suggested by Shraga (2009), infra note 146, p. 363), because this status presupposes that they 
have previously taken part in hostilities or are otherwise linked to the armed forces of a party to the conflict: 
Art. 41 AP I and Rule 47 ICRC Study. Third, they can also not be considered parlementaires, as this status 
also presupposes that the person in question acts on behalf of a party to the conflict: Art. 32 HRLW (‘A 
person is regarded as a parlementaire who has been authorized by one of the belligerents to enter into 
communication with the other, and who advances bearing a white flag. He has a right to inviolability …’). 
116 The analogous status of UN military personnel with neutral armed forces has also been highlighted by: De 
Mulinen, Handbook on the Law of War for Armed Forces (ICRC 1987), pp. 56-57, para. 248. 
117 The personal scope of Art. 8 (b) (iii) and (e) (iii) of ICC Statute has been a matter of debate. Cottier defines 
the term ‘peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations’ narrowly, excluding 
operations established under Chapter VII (Cottier (2008), supra note 99, p. 191). This view is rejected by 
Engdahl, who believes that the wording ‘in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations’ suggests a 
wider meaning of the term ‘peacekeeping missions’: Engdahl (2007), supra note 73, p. 301. The CIHL 
Study supports this claim in Rule 33; the volume on practice includes a variety of peacekeeping operations 
differing both in mandate and command structure, ranging from traditional to robust peacekeeping and 
including both UN-led and UN-authorised missions: CIHL Study, Volume II, Practice 2, Section on Rule 
33, pp. 640-59, paras. 43-121. For a comprehensive outline of practice, including military manuals and 
pronouncements by international organisations: www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule33. 
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Conclusion 
As we have seen above, the Safety Convention (1994) does in no way raise the threshold of 
humanitarian law for international armed conflicts involving peace operations. The same con-
clusion can be drawn for the special protection of peacekeepers under humanitarian law. The 
protection ends once the peacekeeping personnel do become a party to the conflict, which is a 
question entirely governed by humanitarian law itself. This will most evidently be the case 
where violence crosses the threshold of armed conflict. Hence, the civilian protection does in 
no way raise the threshold of armed conflict in relation to peacekeepers or members of other 
peace operations. Quite the contrary: the concept of civilian protection and the modalities under 
which it ends may help to identify additional circumstances under which international forces 
may become involved in a pre-existing armed conflict.  
PARTICIPATION IN A PRE-EXISTING ARMED CONFLICT 
The previous sections considered the scenario in which a peace operation becomes a party to 
an armed conflict from the very outset, either in the form of an international or non-international 
armed conflict, by crossing the required threshold of intensity. This section will consider the 
specific situation where there is already a pre-existing armed conflict in the area of deployment 
and will examine the additional modalities under which the peace operation may become in-
volved in that armed conflict. 
Introduction 
Given that most peace operations are deployed to countries where there already is an ongoing 
armed conflict between local armed forces or armed groups, the existence of an armed conflict 
in the mission area is a very likely scenario. It is clear that the mere presence of international 
forces in an area affected by an armed conflict does not turn them automatically into a party to 
the conflict. Although this fact is not always clearly stressed in the literature,118 it is reflected 
in the practice pertaining to peace operations. The above-mentioned Secretary-General’s Bul-
letin (1999) states that:  
                                               
118 See, however: Naert (2010), supra note 54, p. 470; Bothe and Dörschel, ‘The UN Peace-keeping Experi-
ence’ in: Fleck (ed.), The Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces (OUP 2001), 487-506, pp. 501-502. 
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The fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law set out in the pre-
sent bulletin are applicable to United Nations forces when in situations of armed conflict 
they are actively engaged therein as combatants.119  
This formulation may give rise to varying interpretations,120 but it seems evident that an en-
gagement in the conflict as combatants is tantamount to belonging to a party to the conflict.121 
The ordinary thresholds of armed conflict provide relatively little guidance for assessing when 
and how a peace operation may become a party to a pre-existing conflict. Admittedly, the low 
threshold of international armed conflict may blur a clear distinction in this regard, as any use 
of force – even of low intensity and short duration – between state armed forces and the peace 
operations will give rise to an international armed conflict, either as part of a pre-existing armed 
conflict or in addition thereto.  
The case is, however, more complex in relation to an organised armed group involved in a pre-
existing non-international armed conflict. In order to turn the peace operation into a party to the 
conflict, would the violence taking place between the peace operation and the armed group will 
have to reach the high level of intensity as required at the outset of the conflict, i.e. threshold 
of non-international armed conflicts? Or would a single exchange of fire perhaps be enough? 
Moreover, even absent any use of force involving the peace operation, the latter may also be-
come involved in the ongoing conflict by other means. In order to ascertain when and how a 
peace operation may become a party to a pre-existing conflict, it is necessary to apply a more 
nuanced approach that takes into account the status and conduct of the peace operation in the 
field. 
For this purpose, one may be tempted to examine the law of neutrality for guidance. This field 
of international law applies, however, only to international armed conflicts and even then it 
seems only of little help for identifying the circumstances under which a neutral state may be-
come involved in a pre-existing armed conflict. While it is obvious that neutral states should 
abstain from acts of war against any of the parties to the conflict, it is much less clear what this 
term actually entails, apart from active fighting.122 Overall, as poignantly put by Christopher 
Greenwood: 
                                               
119 Section 1.1, UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin (1999), supra note. 
120 See the discussion in the following sections on the temporal and geographic scope of application below. 
121 The UK Joint Service Manual (2004) seems to be more explicit in this regard. UK Ministry of Defence, 
Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, 2004, para. 14.6 (‘A PSO force which does not itself 
take an active part in hostilities does not become subject to the law of armed conflict simply because it is 
operating in territory in which an armed conflict is taking place between other parties’). 
122  Some authors have, however, provided some useful guidance: Bothe, ‘The Law of Neutrality’, in: Fleck 
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The line between participation in an armed conflict and neutrality is no longer as clear as 
it once was. Between the two there is now a grey area in which a state engages in non-
neutral service without overtly becoming a party to the conflict.123 
Consequently, the law of neutrality fails to provide a useful test for the modalities of becoming 
a party to a pre-existing armed conflict, both of international and non-international nature. It 
may therefore be more appropriate to examine the recent judicial practice in relation to the war 
crime of attacking peacekeeping missions, which we considered in the previous section.  
Origin and Constitutive Elements of the Test 
In the Sesay case (2009), the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) had to ascertain whether 
members of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) were entitled to civilian protection 
when they were attacked by fighters of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) at the end of 
Sierra Leone’s civil war in May 2000.124 In doing so, it considered the totality of the circum-
stances existing at the time of the attacks, based on a non-exhaustive list including: 
the relevant Security Council resolutions for the operation, the specific operational man-
dates, the role and practices actually adopted by the peacekeeping mission during the par-
ticular conflict, their rules of engagement and operational orders, the nature of the arms and 
equipment used by the peacekeeping force, the interaction between the peacekeeping force 
and the parties involved in the conflict, any use of force between the peacekeeping force 
and the parties in the conflict, the nature and frequency of such force and the conduct of 
the alleged victim(s) and their fellow personnel.125 
While these are all relevant aspects to be considered, the over-inclusiveness of this list prevents 
it from providing a workable framework for participation in an ongoing armed conflict. 
If the personnel of a peace operation not party to the conflict enjoy the same protection as 
civilians, it is reasonable to argue that the same modalities of losing their protection should 
apply.126 Civilians forfeit their immunity from attack when they take a direct part in hostilities. 
                                               
(ed.), The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law (OUP 2013), 549-80, p. 562, para. 1111 (‘A neu-
tral state may in no circumstances participate in acts of war by a party to the conflict … It may be question-
able what is considered to be forbidden participation in a particular case. If the neutral state takes part by 
engaging its own military forces, this is a clear example. Another example might be the supply of military 
advisors to the armed forces of a party to the conflict’); Greenwood (2008), supra note 19, p. 58, para. 214 
(‘Support for a third party’s acts of war shall generally be rated as an act of war of the supporting state if it 
is directly related, i.e. closely related in space and time, to measures harmful to the adversary’).  
123  Greenwood (2008), supra note 19, p. 58, para. 214. 
124 SCSL, Prosecutor v. Sesay et al. (2009), supra note 65, paras. 213-235 and 1749-1944. 
125 Ibid, para. 234. 
126 For a similar view: Tittemore (1997), supra note 54, p. 107; Lee, ‘The United Nations – Peacekeeping 
Successes But Peace Enforcement Failures’, 8 Australian International Law Journal (2000), 180-99, p. 195. 
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In 2009, the ICRC issued its Interpretive Guidance clarifying the notion of direct participation 
in hostilities. The last chapter of this thesis will consider in detail the circumstances under which 
specific acts of civilians may qualify as direct participation in hostilities.127 It suffices here to 
note that a specific act must meet the three following cumulative criteria: (1) threshold of harm, 
(2) direct causation, and (3) belligerent nexus.128 
Admittedly, these criteria are primarily designed to define the conduct entailing loss of protec-
tion for individual civilians rather than persons organised in a military command structure. They 
may nevertheless provide guidance for clarifying when individual soldiers belonging to a state 
or international organisation may become involved in a pre-existing conflict. Some major ca-
veats must, however, be made: First, unlike combatants or members of organised armed groups 
with a continuous combat function, civilians only lose their protection from direct attack for the 
duration of their acts amounting to direct participation in hostilities.129 Yet, it appears difficult 
to apply this reasoning to soldiers who are only afforded civilian protection for the mere fact 
that they do not (yet) belong to a party to the conflict. Hence, it would seem more appropriate 
to subject their loss of protection to stricter rules, for instance, by analogising them to the med-
ical and religious personnel and other non-combatant members of the armed forces, whose loss 
of protection for committing hostile acts is permanent.130 Second, when troops commit acts 
amounting to direct participation in hostilities, this will arguably have direct consequences for 
the status of the force as a whole. Indeed, actions undertaken by individual troops do not occur 
in an operational vacuum but are usually the result of decisions at higher command levels 
(e.g. unit, contingent, and headquarters). Moreover, in many situations they are based on the 
specific tasks assigned to them in their mandate as laid down in the relevant Security Council 
resolution or other publically available operational documents. Finally, it is difficult to imagine 
that the party to the conflict directly affected by the actions of such troops would be willing to 
distinguish between those soldiers that take a direct part in hostilities and those that do not; 
rather, it may treat the entire peace operation as an enemy. Hence, the loss of protection of 
individual troops will rapidly lead to the involvement of the entire force as a party to the con-
flict.  
Hence, the three-prong test for acts amounting to direct participation in hostilities may help – 
in addition to the ordinary thresholds of armed conflicts – to examine whether and when the 
                                               
127  See the discussion below, p. 236. 
128 ICRC, Interpretative Guidance (2009), p. 46. See the detailed explanations of the three criteria, pp. 47-64. 
129 Ibid, pp. 70-73. 
130 They are protected against direct attacks (and enjoy a number of other privileges), unless they take a direct 
part in hostilities or engage in other acts harmful or hostile to the enemy. For an excellent discussion on the 
loss of their protection as opposed to civilians: Melzer, Targeted Killing in International Law (OUP 2008), 
pp. 329-30 
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armed forces of third states or international organisations, including peace operations, become 
a party to a pre-existing armed conflict.  
Different Mission Scenarios 
As shown below, this test may be applied to four different mission scenarios involving peace 
operations in the field. First, all elements are clearly met where peace forces are present in an 
area affected by an armed conflict and participate directly in genuine combat on the side of a 
party to the armed conflict. The direct participation test proves especially useful in the context 
of a non-international armed conflict, if the violence involving the peace forces has not yet 
reached the high level of intensity normally required by the ordinary threshold for triggering 
the application of humanitarian law. Hence, if they support the host government forces in their 
fight against members of an organised armed group, the peace operation will become a party to 
the ongoing armed conflict, regardless of the level of intensity. In view of this, it is difficult to 
understand the statements in relation to attacks against the UN mission in the Democratic Re-
public of Congo (MONUSCO), which must be clearly seen as a party to the armed conflict 
there in support of the Congolese government.131 
Second, the test proves even more useful in cases where the peace operation is not necessarily 
engaged in any form of combat, but provides significant support to the armed forces of one 
party to the armed conflict; such support may range from joint planning of military operations, 
the training of troops or provision of logistical support (transport of troops, arms and ammuni-
tion to the frontline) to the gathering and sharing of military intelligence. These acts readily 
meet the three constitutive criteria for the direct participation in hostilities. Moreover, the pro-
vision of operational support to a party to the conflict is normally part of a policy approved at 
high command levels, which can already be reflected in the mandate of the peace operation in 
question, at least in general terms.132 Hence, a peace operation providing such support to one 
                                               
131  Statement by the French Government, ‘RDC - Bombardements dans la Région de Goma’, 23 August 2013, 
www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/republique-democratique-du-congo/la-france-et-la-republique-
1219/evenements-3672/article/rdc-bombardements-dans-la-region (‘La France condamne … en particulier 
les attaques perpétrées par le M23 contre les populations civiles et les installations de la MONUSCO, qui 
constituent des crimes de guerre’, emphasis added). See also, S/RES/2211 (DRC), 26 March 2015, para. 
15 (‘Strongly condemns all armed groups operating in the region and their violations of international hu-
manitarian law as well as other applicable international law, and abuses of human rights including attacks 
on the civilian population, MONUSCO peacekeepers and humanitarian actors’). 
132 See for instance the mandate of MONUC: S/RES/1856, 22 December 2008, para. 3 (g), (‘Coordinate oper-
ations with the FARDC [Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo] integrated brigades 
deployed in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and support operations led by and 
jointly planned with these brigades … with a view to: Disarming the recalcitrant local armed groups …’). 
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side becomes itself a party to the existing armed conflict.133 The same logic applies to a peace 
operation providing support to another peace mission involved in an armed conflict in the same 
area.134 
The situation may be slightly different where the peace operation conducts a number of tasks 
aimed at maintaining law and order, which are usually carried out by the police forces of the 
host state. Assuming arguendo that a peace operation could be analogised to police forces (de-
spite their military nature), this would not necessarily prevent the forces from becoming a party 
to the conflict by virtue of their conduct. While there is a clear distinction under the law of 
international armed conflicts between the armed forces and the police (unless they are formally 
incorporated into the armed forces),135 the status of police forces is more controversial in non-
international armed conflicts. The travaux préparatoires of Additional Protocol II suggest that 
they fall under the broad concept of the armed forces.136 In any case, they must be normally 
presumed to have functions involving direct participation in hostilities, for instance, when they 
set up checkpoints or carry out cordon-and-search operations in order to arrest members of 
organised armed groups.137 Hence, where the personnel of peace operations engage in such 
activities, they may also be considered to take a direct part in hostilities and thus have to be 
considered a party to the conflict.138 
                                               
133 For a very similar position taken by the ICRC: Ferraro (2013), supra note 5, pp. 583-87 (calling it the 
‘support-based approach’ based on a 4-prong test). See also: Chatham House, Discussion Summary: The 
Applicability and Application of International Humanitarian Law to Multinational Forces, 20 November 
2014, www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20141120 IHLMultinational 
Forces.pdf, pp. 5-7 (generally supportive with some participants, however, expressing concern over the 
unclear legal basis of this new test). 
134 UNPROFOR in Bosnia is a case in point: to the extent that UNPROFOR provided NATO forces engaged 
in air strikes against Bosnian-Serb position (as part of Operation Deliberate Force) with vital military in-
telligence, it would appear that UNPROFOR was also a party to the conflict. 
135 See Art. 43 (3) AP I. 
136 Sandoz et al., Commentary on the Additional Protocols (ICRC), Art. 1 AP II, para. 4462, p. 1352, (‘The 
term ‘armed forces’ of the High Contracting Party should be understood in the broadest sense. In fact, this 
term was chosen in preference to others suggested such as, for example, ‘regular armed forces’, in order to 
cover all the armed forces, including those not included in the definition of the army in the national legis-
lation of some countries (national guard, customs, police forces or any other similar force)’). 
137 Summary Report of the Fifth Expert Meeting on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, co-organ-
ised by the ICRC and the TMC Asser Institute, Geneva, 5-6 February 2008, p. 54. For a similar conclusion: 
Römer, Killing in a Gray Area Between Humanitarian Law and Human Rights. How Can the National 
Police of Colombia Overcome the Uncertainty of Which Branch of International Law to Apply? (Springer 
2010), pp. 26-28. 
138  In view of this, it is difficult to understand the following statement in relation to attacks on UN personnel 
in Mali (MINUSMA): UNSC, Statement by the President of the Security Council, 6 February 2015, 
S/PRST/2015/5, p. 2 (‘The Security Council reiterates its strongest condemnation of all attacks against 
MINUSMA peacekeepers, personnel and property, and underlines that attacks targeting peacekeepers may 
constitute war crimes under international law’). 
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Third, situations also often arise in which the personnel of a peace operation have to resort to 
the use of force in response to an unprovoked attack by one of the parties to the pre-existing 
armed conflict. Provided that they have not yet become a party to the armed conflict or other-
wise participate directly in hostilities, the peace forces enjoy prima facie the same protection 
as civilians. It is clear that the use of force by civilians to defend themselves or others against 
an unlawful attack may directly cause the required level of harm to the attacking party but lacks 
belligerent nexus, as it is not the purpose of such use of force to favour a specific party to the 
conflict. Moreover, if self-defence were to lead to the loss of protection, this ‘would have the 
absurd consequence of legitimizing a previously unlawful attack’.139 It is thus accepted that 
cases of individual self-defence by civilians do not amount to direct participation in hostilities, 
provided the force used does not exceed what is strictly necessary and proportionate in such 
situations.140 This limitation is common to the concept of individual self-defence under domes-
tic criminal law in a great number of states.  
It is here where cases of self-defence by the personnel of peace operations may prove most 
problematic – for practical and conceptual reasons. Due to their genuine military capacities, 
peace forces hold a far greater firepower than individual civilians and can call for back-up from 
other units and contingents. Most troublesome is, however, the concept of self-defence itself. 
As outlined in Chapter 2, self-defence in peacekeeping missions is normally not confined to 
situations of individual self-defence, but may also include the resistance against attempts by 
forceful means to prevent the discharge of their duties under the mandate, including restrictions 
to their freedom of movement. Resort to self-defence in such an expansive manner would be 
clearly unnecessary and disproportionate and thus qualify as direct participation in hostilities, 
making the peace operation a party to the armed conflict. The SCSL Trial Chamber did not take 
the limitations of self-defence in relation to direct participation in hostilities sufficiently into 
account when dealing with the RUF attacks on UNAMSIL peacekeepers: 
As with all civilians, their protection would not cease if the personnel use armed force only 
in exercising their right to individual self-defence. Likewise, the Chamber opines that the 
use of force by peacekeepers in self-defence in the discharge of their mandate, provided 
that it is limited to such use, would not alter or diminish the protection afforded to peace-
keepers.141  
                                               
139 ICRC, Interpretative Guidance (2009), p. 61. 
140 Ibid. See also, 2003 DPH report, p. 6 (‘All the experts who spoke on the subject stressed that individual 
civilians using a proportionate amount of force in response to an unlawful and imminent attack against 
themselves or their property should not be considered as directly participating in hostilities’, emphasis 
added). 
141 SCSL, Prosecutor v. Sesay et al. (2009), supra note 65, para. 233. 
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This seems to be a conflation of the notion of individual self-defence acceptable under human-
itarian law.142 It is, however, noteworthy that in a similar case – concerning a rebel attack 
against the base of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in Darfur in 2007, which left twelve 
peacekeepers killed – the International Criminal Court made no reference to self-defence in the 
‘discharge of their mandate’.143 An important caveat must be made for situations in which peace 
operation personnel are attacked by forces belonging to other states. Due to the extremely low 
intensity threshold, such attacks will usually trigger an international armed conflict. Hence, 
regardless of how much force is used in response to the attack, the peace operation will invari-
ably become a party to an international armed conflict, either as part of the pre-existing armed 
conflict or in addition thereto. 
Conclusion 
The foregoing shows that in addition to the ordinary threshold of armed conflict, a participation 
test can be used in order to ascertain whether and when a peace operation becomes a party to 
the pre-existing armed conflict. Hence, where the personnel engage in acts meeting the three 
constitutive elements, they directly participate in hostilities, with the potential of making the 
entire peace operation a party to the conflict. As a consequence, attacks against the military 
personnel involved in the peace operation will no longer be unlawful under humanitarian law, 
while the peace operation itself will be bound to observe the detailed provisions of this body of 
law. 
As a welcome side-effect, the same test may be used also for qualifying the interaction between 
the different actors involved in the peace operation itself. Indeed, some states may manage to 
keep their contingents away from active fighting and claim – as the Swedish and German gov-
ernments did for a long time during their deployment in Afghanistan – not to be a party to the 
ongoing conflict, as opposed to other sending states, whose forces are involved in battles on a 
                                               
142 Ibid. paras. 1926-1937. This view was also upheld on appeal: SCSL, Prosecutor v. Sesay, Appeals Cham-
ber, Judgement, 26 October 2009, SCSL-04-15-A, paras. 524-32. Nevertheless, the facts of the case indicate 
that the actual response by the UNAMSIL peacekeepers to counter the attacks did not go so far and probably 
stayed within the limits of what would have been necessary and proportionate in cases of individual self-
defence by civilians stricto sensu. A similar conclusion can be drawn from two other cases involving attacks 
against peacekeeping personnel in Rwanda: ICTR, Prosecutor v. Theoneste Bagosora, Gratien Kabiligi, 
Aloys Ntabakuze and Anatole Nsengiyumva, Trial Chamber I, Judgement and Sentence of 18 December 
2008 (ICTR-98-41-T). The case involved the lynch killing of ten Belgian peacekeepers belonging to the 
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) by Rwandan government soldiers in April 
1994. See in particular para. 2239 (‘The fact that one of the Belgians was able to obtain a weapon and use 
it for self-defence during the course of the attack does not alter their status. This happened only after the 
mob of soldiers at the camp began brutally beating the peacekeepers to death’). 
143 ICC, Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 8 February 
2010, ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red.  
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near-daily basis. If the forces of the first state do in fact provide direct support (along the lines 
described above) to their colleagues from other sending states who perform a clear belligerent 
role, the former will also become a party to the ongoing armed conflict and must observe the 
humanitarian law obligations of their sending state in respect of their own actions. The test may 
help – in addition to the ordinary threshold of armed conflict – to clarify as to which sending 
states can be considered a party to the armed conflict. 
TEMPORAL SCOPE OF APPLICATION 
Introduction 
The foregoing sections outlined under which circumstances a peace operation – or more pre-
cisely, the states and international organisation involved therein – may become a party to an 
armed conflict. This raises the question as to how long humanitarian law applies, once its ap-
plication has been triggered, and on which requirements the end of application depends. This 
question is particularly pertinent in the context of peace operations, for which states and inter-
national organisations involved have been trying to limit the application of humanitarian law 
and thus the targetability of their own forces. The Secretary-General’s Bulletin states that it 
applies to: 
United Nations forces when in situations of armed conflict they are actively engaged 
therein as combatants, to the extent and for the duration of their engagement.144  
The last part of the provision seems to imply that a UN peace operation can switch between 
belligerency and non-belligerency from one moment to another, depending on whether they are 
actively engaged in actual combat or not.145  This interpretation was indeed supported by 
Daphna Shraga, then principal legal officer at the UN Office of the Legal Advisor, who claimed 
that humanitarian law as a whole – not only the Bulletin – only applies for the short duration of 
                                               
144  Sect. 1.1, SG Bulletin, emphasis added. 
145  Such an interpretation has been criticised by some authors as incompatible with the jus in bello: Zwanen-
burg, Accountability of Peace Support Operations (Martinus Nijhoff 2005), p. 190; Sams, ‘IHL Obligations 
of the UN and other International Organisations Involved in International Missions’ in: Odello and Pi-
otrowicz (eds.), International Military Missions and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2011), 45-71, p. 
64. 
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combat involving the UN peace operation.146 Referring to a brief engagement between French 
UNPROFOR troops and Bosnian-Serb forces, she states that:  
[T]he French counter attack to re-take the bridge was a “combat mission” … and was gov-
erned in its entirety, but for its duration only, by international humanitarian law.147 
However, humanitarian law does not allow for such a flexible concept of intermittent belliger-
ency. The temporal scope of application is essentially linked to its material scope. In other 
words, humanitarian law applies whenever and for so long as there is a situation triggering its 
application: an armed conflict or an occupation. Hence, it generally applies from the beginning 
until the end of such situations.  
The full picture is even more complex and perhaps best illustrated by Article 3 of Additional 
Protocol I (1977). While it only defines the temporal scope of the Protocol I and the four Geneva 
Conventions with regard to international armed conflicts and occupations, it shows the full 
complexity of the temporal scope of application, which is equally relevant for customary hu-
manitarian law and situations of non-international armed conflict: 
Without prejudice to the provisions which are applicable at all times: 
(a) the Conventions and this Protocol shall apply from the beginning of any situation 
referred to in Article 1 of this Protocol; 
(b) the application of the Conventions and of this Protocol shall cease, in the territory 
of Parties to the conflict, on the general close of military operations and, in the 
case of occupied territories, on the termination of the occupation, except, in either 
circumstance, for those persons whose final release, repatriation or re-establish-
ment takes place thereafter. These persons shall continue to benefit from the rele-
vant provisions of the Conventions and of this Protocol until their final release, 
repatriation or re-establishment.148 
The chapeau reminds us that certain rules have to be observed at all times, even in times of 
peace.149 Yet, the full set of humanitarian law only applies from the beginning of an armed 
                                               
146  Shraga, ‘The Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations Forces of International 
Humanitarian Law: a Decade Later’, 39 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights (2009), 357-77, pp. 359-60 
(‘Conditioned upon a “double-key” test, international humanitarian law applies to UN operations for the 
duration of the Force engagement and for as long as both elements are present. When the UN combat mis-
sion ends – regardless of whether or not the situation as a whole still qualifies as an armed conflict – inter-
national humanitarian law ceases to apply to the UN operation’, emphasis added). 
147  Ibid, pp. 361-62, emphasis added. 
148  Art. 3 of AP I, emphasis added. This provision is essentially modelled on Article 6 of Geneva Convention 
IV. There is merit to claim that Article 3 of Additional Protocol I defines the temporal scope of the Geneva 
Conventions even for states not party to Additional Protocol I by virtue of subsequent practice or subsequent 
agreement, see infra note. 
149  CA2 refers to ‘provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime’. These are mainly provisions involving 
 87 
 
conflict or an occupation. For the end of application, there are three different stages. In the 
territories of the parties to the conflict the application ends on the general close of military 
operations, whereas in occupied territories humanitarian law ceases to apply on the termination 
of the occupation.  
As a special case, the instruments continue to apply – even after the general end of their appli-
cation – to persons pending ‘final release, repatriation or re-establishment’, for instance, pris-
oners of war or civilian internees.150 Additional Protocol II (1977) contains a similar provision 
with regard to persons whose liberty has been restricted in the context of a non-international 
armed conflict.151 It is already here where the wording of the Secretary-General’s Bulletin ap-
pears too restrictive; if humanitarian law only applied for the duration of combat, captured en-
emy forces would lose their protection immediately once the engagement ends.152 Hence, what 
needs to be stressed is that also in the context of a peace operation humanitarian law continues 
to apply to persons until their final release, repatriation or re-establishment. 
General End of Application 
The general end of application is marked by the general close of military operations.153 This 
notion is, however, not defined and its relationship with other terms used in the instruments 
remains ambiguous. For instance, the ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols tries to 
distinguish the general close of military operations from the cessation of hostilities,154 a term 
used in other provisions of the Geneva Conventions.155 This would lead to the absurd result 
where the parties to the conflict have to release and repatriate prisoners of war even before the 
actual end of the armed conflict. There is, however, ample support in the travaux préparatoires 
                                               
preparatory measures and rules on implementation and enforcement. For a detailed list of provisions ap-
plicable at all times: Sandoz et al., Commentary on the Additional Protocols (ICRC 1987), pp. 66-67, 
para. 149. 
150  The following provisions contain a similar standard: Arts. 5 GC I, 5 (1) GC III and 6 (4) GC IV. 
151  Art. 2 (2) AP II (‘At the end of the armed conflict, all the persons who have been deprived of their liberty 
or whose liberty has been restricted for reasons related to such conflict, as well as those deprived of their 
liberty or whose liberty is restricted after the conflict for the same reasons, shall enjoy the protection of 
Articles 5 and 6 until the end of such deprivation or restriction of liberty’). By contrast, CA3 does not 
contain an analogous provision nor any other rule on the general end of its application. 
152  This example is provided by: Zwanenburg (2005), supra note 145, p. 190. 
153  As mentioned above, this is only the case for the territories of the parties to the conflict.  
154  Sandoz et al., Commentary on the Additional Protocols (ICRC 1987), pp. 67-68, para. 153 (‘The general 
close of military operations may occur after the “cessation of active hostilities” referred to in Article 118 
of the Third Convention’, emphasis added). 
155  The cessation or close of hostilities triggers the duty to release and repatriate prisoners of war and internees, 
and to end other restrictive measures (Art. 118 GC III, and Arts. 133 and 46 GC IV, respectively). 
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of the Geneva Conventions156 as well as in military manuals157 and in scholarly writing158 that 
the term ‘general close of military operations’ has the same meaning as ‘cessation of hostilities’ 
and ‘end of the armed conflict’, and that these terms are based on a factual test. The same logic 
arguably applies to non-international armed conflicts, even though the relevant instruments 
contain less explicit language on the end of application.159 Hence, once fighting related to an 
armed conflict comes to an end, for instance by the total defeat of the adversary or by (tacit) 
mutual agreement between the parties, this will also mark the end of the armed conflict itself. 
Formal acts, such as cease-fire agreements or peace treaties, are not required, but may be evi-
dence of the intentions of the parties and may help to determine the exact moment when hostil-
ities come to an end. Yet, if fighting goes on, humanitarian law will continue to apply.  
In the Tadić case, the ICTY appears to have taken a broader view with regard to the temporal 
limits of armed conflicts and the end of application of humanitarian law. After a detailed review 
of the respective treaty provisions, the Appeals Chamber held that: 
International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and ex-
tends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, 
in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved.160 
                                               
156  For instance, the initial ICRC draft of the same provision used the term ‘close of hostilities’: Swiss Federal 
Political Department, Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Vol. I, Bern, 1963, 
p. 114. For a discussion of the reason why the delegates eventually chose the term ‘close of military oper-
ations’, see ibid, Vol. II-A, p. 815 and ibid, pp. 624-25. Also Pictet uses the terms synonymously: Pictet, 
Commentary on Geneva Convention I (1952), p. 65 (Article 5), and Commentary on Geneva Convention 
IV (1958), pp. 62-63. 
157  Australian Airforce Manual (2004), p. 43, para. 5.8; New Zealand Defence Force, Interim Law of Armed 
Conflict Manual, DM 112, 1992, para. 313. UK Joint Service Manual (2005), para. 3.10. 
158  Greenwood (2008), supra note 19, pp. 70-72, paras. 246-49 (‘Nowadays, armed conflicts are often termi-
nated merely by a ceasefire without any peace treaty, or by mere cessation of hostilities. It is not clear 
whether a formal instrument is needed to terminate an armed conflict ... Since armed conflict is not a tech-
nical, legal concept but a recognition of the fact of hostilities, the cessation of active hostilities should be 
enough to terminate the armed conflict’); Kolb and Hyde (2008), supra note 23, pp. 101-102 (‘An effective 
and final cessation of hostilities, whether set out in writing or merely de facto, is enough to bring the ap-
plicability of the LOAC to a close’). See also David (2008), supra note 23,, p. 261, para. 1235; Sassòli et 
al., How Does Law Protect in War? (3rd edn, ICRC 2011), p. 134. 
159  Sandoz et al., Commentary on the Additional Protocols (ICRC 1987), p. 1360, para. 4492, which states that 
AP II ‘does not contain any indication as regards the end of its applicability. Logically this means that the 
rules relating to armed confrontation are no longer applicable after the end of hostilities’. A similar proposal 
had been made during the drafting process, whereby the Protocol should cease ‘to apply upon the general 
cessation of military operations’, but was eventually not adopted: Swiss Federal Political Department, Of-
ficial Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Hu-
manitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974-1977), Vol IV, Bern, 1978, p. 12. See also: 
Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict (OUP 2012), pp. 251-53 (who fails, however, 
to clarify how the different terms interact). 
160  ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (1995), supra note 24, para. 70, emphasis added. 
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The wording has been criticised by some commentators for being overly expansive161 and it 
seems unclear on what the Tribunal has based its finding. The only passage in the entire decision 
discussing the reach of humanitarian law beyond the end of hostilities merely refers to the fact 
that humanitarian law continues to apply to persons pending final release, repatriation or re-
settlement.162 By reverse logic, this reinvigorates rather the general rule that the end of appli-
cation of humanitarian law coincides with the cessation of hostilities. It is unclear whether the 
Tribunal had this specific exception in mind when using the terms ‘general conclusion of peace’ 
and ‘peaceful settlement’. However, if these terms were supposed to have another meaning – 
for instance, the conclusion of a peace agreement – the legal basis for such a claim is rather 
ambiguous, because humanitarian law instruments do not contain such a requirement for bring-
ing the application of humanitarian law to an end.163 Moreover, practice shows that nowadays 
armed conflicts are virtually never concluded by a peace agreement; even less so where a peace 
operation has become involved in hostilities.164 
The Tadić formula, requiring a ‘general conclusion of peace’ or ‘peaceful settlement’, has also 
been used in subsequent jurisprudence165 as well as in submissions by the ICC Prosecutor,166 
                                               
161  See, for instance: Quéguiner, ‘Dix Ans Après la Création du Tribunal Pénal International Pour l’Ex-
Yougoslavie: Evaluation de l’Apport de sa Jurisprudence au Droit International Humanitaire’, 85 (850) 
IRRC (2003), 271-311, pp. 282-83. 
162  ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (1995), supra note 24, para. 67, (‘With respect to the temporal frame of 
reference of international armed conflicts, each of the four Geneva Conventions contains language intimat-
ing that their application may extend beyond the cessation of fighting. For example, both Conventions I and 
III apply until protected persons who have fallen into the power of the enemy have been released and 
repatriated’, emphasis added). 
163  The common article on denunciation in the four Geneva Conventions uses similar language, stating that 
‘until peace has been concluded’, see Arts. 63 (3), 62 (3), 142 (3) and 158 (3) of GC I-IV, respectively. 
According to the Commentary, this refers to the ‘formal conclusion of a peace treaty’ or, in the case of a 
non-international armed conflict, the ‘effective re-establishment of a state of peace’ (Pictet, Commentary 
on Geneva Convention IV (1958), p. 625, footnote 3). By contrast, the denunciation provision in Art. 99 
(1) AP I uses the terms ‘end of the armed conflict or occupation’, due to the often delayed conclusion or 
total absence of a peace treaty (see Commentary on the Additional Protocol (1987), supra note, p. 1109, 
para. 3843). In any event, the fact that a denunciation has not yet taken effect only means that the Geneva 
Conventions remain on stand-by (ratione personae), without prejudice to the applicability of its provisions 
to an actual situation (ratione materiae). 
164  Note that neither the Korean War (1950-1953) nor the Gulf War for the liberation of Kuwait (1991) ended 
with an official peace agreement, but only with armistice agreements. Moreover, although the Dayton Peace 
Agreement (1995) finally ended the war in Bosnia in 1995, neither NATO and its participating states nor 
the UN – both previously involved in hostilities with Bosnian-Serb forces – were a party to that agreement. 
165  ICTY, Prosecutor v. Ljube Boškoski and Johan Tarčulovski, Trial Chamber, Judgement, IT-04-82-T, 10 
July 2008, paras. 293-94 (‘This finding [i.e. the Tadić formula] is not to be understood as limiting the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal to crimes committed until a peace agreement between the parties was achieved; 
rather, if armed violence continues even after such agreement is reached, an armed conflict may still exist 
and the laws and customs of war remain applicable … Further, the temporal scope of the armed conflict 
covered and extended beyond 12 August and the Ohrid Framework Agreement of 13 August to at least the 
end of that month’). 
166  ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Office of the Prosecutor, Request for Authorisation of an 
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but it remains unclear to what extent the use of these terms serves as a real alternative to the 
factual test based on the end of hostilities. It may, however, ensure greater continuity for a 
judicial body in applying humanitarian law, regardless of the changing intensity of the hostili-
ties. This may be particularly relevant for non-international armed conflicts. For instance, in 
the Haradinaj case the ICTY noted that: 
[S]ince according to the Tadić test an internal armed conflict continues until a peaceful 
settlement is achieved, and since there is no evidence of such a settlement during the in-
dictment period, there is no need for the Trial Chamber to explore the oscillating intensity 
of the armed conflict in the remainder of the indictment period.167 
Likewise, the Court in the Gotovina case cautioned against a ‘revolving door between applica-
bility and non-applicability’ of humanitarian law.168 The Chamber thus rejected the Defence’s 
submission, which had argued that the ostensibly non-international armed conflict between the 
Croatian army and Serb-Krajina separatist forces had come to a sudden end shortly after the 
beginning of Operation Storm, due to a significant fall in the intensity of the fighting in the 
area.169 A similar Defence argument had been rejected by the ICC Prosecutor in the Lubanga 
case concerning the duration of the armed conflict in the Congolese Ituri region between 2002 
and 2003.170 This highlights the difficulties in determining the end of non-international armed 
conflicts as opposed to inter-state conflicts. Given the extremely low threshold of intensity, it 
is possible that an international armed conflict only lasts for a very short time171 and may come 
                                               
Investigation Pursuant to Article 15, ICC-02/11, 23 June 2011, para. 171 (‘In one instance, the relevant 
crimes were committed in the immediate aftermath of the cessation of the armed hostilities, but prior to 
reaching a general conclusion of peace’); ICC, Situation in Mali, Office of the Prosecutor, Article 53(1) 
Report, 16 January 2013, para. 86 (‘The armed conflict started on or around 17 January 2012 and is ongoing, 
since no peace settlement has been reached at the time of writing’). 
167  ICTY, Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al., Trial Chamber, Judgement, Case No. IT-04-84-T, 3 April 2008, para. 
100, emphasis added. 
168  ICTY, Prosecutor v. Gotovina et al., Trial Chamber, Judgement, Case No. IT-06-90-T, 15 April 2011, para. 
1694. The Trial Chamber found that military operations, including large-calibre shelling and search opera-
tions, had continued throughout the indictment period and therefore concluded that there had not been a 
general close of military operations or general conclusion of peace (paras. 1695-97). 
169  ICTY, Prosecutor v. Gotovina et al., Defence Counsel for Mladen Markač, Final Trial Brief, Case No. IT-
06-90-T, 8 September 2010, paras. 32-37. Note, however, that the Trial Chamber rightly classified the 
conflict as an international armed conflict and that hostilities moved into Bosnia and Herzegovina, where 
they continued for several months (supra note 326, para. 1693-1697). 
170  ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Office of the Prosecutor, Prosecution’s Reply to the « Conclusions 
finales de la Défense », Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, 1 August 2011, para. 125 (‘It is also established that 
non-international armed conflicts cease only upon “peaceful settlement”. Reduction in hostilities is not 
peaceful settlement’, references removed). 
171  For instance, in the case of an incidental attack or capture of an enemy soldier not followed by other hos-
tilities. 
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to a sudden end. If hostilities between the same parties resume at a later stage, this may be 
considered the beginning of a new, separate international armed conflict.  
The issue is far more complicated in relation to non-international armed conflicts. At first sight, 
it would appear that an armed conflict comes to an end once the violence falls below the high 
level of intensity required at the outset. As a consequence, the application of humanitarian law 
would only be triggered once the intensity level has been reached again. Meanwhile, civilians 
would no longer be protected by humanitarian law.172 This would cause a serious protection 
gap, especially for those affected by acts of armed groups: even where such groups are in con-
trol of territory, they are no longer bound by humanitarian law, as the law of occupation does 
not apply to non-international armed conflicts; moreover, there is continuous controversy as to 
the obligations of armed groups under human rights law.173 For these reasons, there is a strong 
presumption that a non-international armed conflict continues to exist despite low intensity vi-
olence or protracted lulls in fighting. Only where there have been no hostile acts for a consid-
erable period of time can the armed conflict be considered to be over. 
In addition to the intensity element, the organisation element of one of the parties – the second 
constitutive requirement of a non-international armed conflict – may also disappear and prompt 
the end of the armed conflict and the applicability of humanitarian law. This is relatively un-
problematic in the case of a total defeat of one of the parties, as it will generally lead to an 
immediate end of hostilities.174 Yet, it is also possible that after the conclusion of a peace set-
tlement a faction of the armed group breaks away and continues fighting. It thus appears that 
as long as that splinter group is sufficiently organised to commit acts of violence amounting to 
hostilities, the armed conflict continues between this newly formed armed group and its previ-
ous adversary. 
Conclusion 
What follows from the considerations above is that humanitarian law ceases to apply to a peace 
operation when there is no longer an armed conflict between its own and enemy forces, which 
boils down to the question of whether hostilities have come to an end; this may be more difficult 
                                               
172  Unless their liberty has been restricted in relation to the preceding armed conflict. 
173  See, in particular: Henckaerts and Wiesener, ‘Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Armed Groups: A 
Possible Contribution from Customary International Law?’, in: Kolb and Gaggioli (eds.), Handbook of 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (Elgar Publishing 2013), 146-169 (showing that up until now inter-
national practice only confirms the existence of human rights obligations on the part of armed groups when 
they have control over territory, allowing them to exercise de facto government functions). 
174  The end of the civil war in Sri Lanka following the defeat of the LTTE in 2009 is a case in point: Report of 
the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, 31 March 2011, p. 53, para. 185. 
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to ascertain when the armed conflict involves a non-state armed group on the opposing side. 
What needs to be emphasised is that as much as an armed conflict may be initiated by only one 
side against the will of the other, it may also persist for as long as one of the parties so desires 
and continues fighting. Hence, there needs to be mutual agreement among the parties opposing 
each other to bring the conflict to an end. Although this analysis is essentially based on an 
objective test, the conclusion of formal agreements between the parties may be evidence of the 
intentions of the parties. Practice shows, however, that peace operations (or the states and or-
ganisations involved therein) only rarely become a party to official cease-fire and peace agree-
ments,175 although they may often play the role of a facilitator for the adoption of such agree-
ments among local actors.  
A special case exists when international forces fight an armed conflict together with co-bellig-
erents (for instance, the host state) against another state or armed group. While the ICRC Com-
mentaries require a complete cessation of hostilities between all belligerents involved to bring 
the application of humanitarian law to an end,176 it seems more reasonable to consider each 
individual conflict relationship between the opposing parties to determine the end stage for each 
party involved. Hence, a peace operation may also leave an armed conflict that continues be-
tween the other parties, provided that hostilities involving its forces come to an effective end 
and it refrains from any acts amounting to participation in that conflict. It goes without saying 
that irrespective of the exact moment of the general end of application, humanitarian law con-
tinues to bind peace forces as well as their adversary with regard to persons deprived of their 
liberty, such as captured enemy fighters or civilians, until their final release, repatriation or re-
establishment.  
                                               
175  Besides the armistice agreements ending the conflict in Korea in 1953 and the Gulf War in 1991, the few 
reported cases include, for instance, a formal cease-fire signed between high-level representatives of the 
Congolese army and ONUC, ending a series of armed clashes between Congolese forces and members of 
a Sudanese detachment of ONUC in March 1961 (Report to the Secretary-General from his Special Repre-
sentative on the Congo, S/4761, 8 March 1961, paras. 11-42 and Annex II) and a similar agreement con-
cluded between Katanga and ONUC in January 1963, marking the end of the armed conflict there (Report 
to the Secretary-General from the Officer-In-Charge of the United Nations Operation in the Congos, 
S/5053/Add. 15, Annex IX). 
176  Pictet, Commentary on Geneva Convention IV (1958), p. 62 (‘It must be agreed that in most cases the 
general close of military operations will be the final end of all fighting between all those concerned’); 
Sandoz et al., Commentary on the Additional Protocols (1987), supra note, p. 68, para. 153 (‘the general 
close of military operations could mean the complete cessation of hostilities between all belligerents, at 
least in a particular theatre of war’). This requirement is, however, unnecessarily restrictive, and is not 
supported by the travaux préparatoires of the instruments or by state practice; moreover, it has been rightly 
rejected by a number of scholars, for instance: Bothe et al., New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts 
(Martinus Nijhoff 1982), p. 58. 
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GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE OF APPLICATION 
Introduction 
Closely related to the temporal scope of application is the question of where humanitarian law 
applies once there is a situation of armed conflict. This issue is especially relevant in the context 
of a peace operation which has become a party to an armed conflict. Is the jus in bello only 
applicable where armed confrontations take place, or does it also apply in the entire theatre of 
operation or even beyond? So far, these questions have received rather limited scholarly atten-
tion.177 This is somewhat surprising, given the direct impact they might have on a number of 
related operational and legal issues, such as the exact geographical location where peace forces 
may have to observe the humanitarian law rules in their targeting decisions and where they may 
themselves be targeted by enemy forces under such rules.  
It is thus not surprising that states and international organisations have tried to restrict the geo-
graphical scope of armed conflicts in which their forces may become involved in the course of 
a peace operation so as to limit the application of humanitarian law. For instance, the Secretary-
General’s Bulletin (1999) – besides its temporal limitation already discussed above – also 
seems to suggest a spatially limited application when it states that its principles and rules are 
applicable to: 
United Nations forces when in situations of armed conflict they are actively engaged 
therein as combatants, to the extent and for the duration of their engagement.178 
Another prominent example concerns some ISAF contingents in Afghanistan. Up until 2009, 
both the German and the Swedish governments maintained that humanitarian law did not apply 
to their forces, because they were deployed in the more peaceful north of the country, which 
was allegedly not affected by the armed conflict between the Taliban and international forces 
in other parts of the country.179 
                                               
177  For instance: Sams (2011), supra note 145, pp. 65-66 (who discusses the issue only in a short paragraph). 
See also: Tristan (2013), supra note 5, pp. 608-12. For an early contribution on the spatial scope of IHL: 
Gillard, ‘International Humanitarian Law and Extraterritorial State Conduct’, in: Coomans and Kamminga 
(eds.), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (Intersentia 2004), 25-39, pp. 31-32 (raising 
many issues of continuous relevance, e.g. spill-over scenarios). 
178  Sect. 1.1, SG Bulletin, emphasis added. 
179  See the positions of the German and the Swedish governments as documented by: Engdahl (2013), supra 
note 5, pp. 235-236. See also: Hampson (2012), supra note 51, p. 257 (who argues with regard to Afghan-
istan ‘that it is indeed possible to have different classifications of armed conflict in different parts of a 
territory’). 
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Areas of Active Fighting or Territories of the Parties 
Treaty-based humanitarian law is rather silent on the precise geographical scope of application, 
but the provisions discussed above in relation to the temporal reach seem to provide some guid-
ance. Both Article 6 (2) of Geneva Convention IV and Article 3 (b) of Additional Protocol I 
stipulate that humanitarian law ceases to apply in the territories of the parties to the conflict on 
the general close of military operations. By reverse logic, this implies that humanitarian law 
must have previously been applicable in these territories. The ICTY Appeals Chamber used the 
same legal construction in the Tadić case, in which it held that humanitarian law applies: 
in the whole territory of the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole 
territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there.180 
This statement is remarkable for two reasons. First, it extends the territory-based concept to 
non-international armed conflicts, whose treaty law provisions are rather silent on the spatial 
scope of application.181 As a matter of law, non-state armed groups do not possess their own 
territory; the Tribunal had thus to rely on a slightly modified term, namely the ‘whole territory 
under the control of a party’, in order to secure the same outcome. Yet, it remains unclear what 
degree of control is required for this purpose. Is it enough that members of an armed group are 
merely present in one area or sporadically patrol it? Or is it necessary to have virtually exclusive 
control over the area in question? 
Second and more importantly, the Tribunal made clear that humanitarian law applies in the 
whole territory ‘whether or not actual combat takes place there’. It thus rejected the Defence’s 
submission arguing that the concept of armed conflict and the application of humanitarian law 
should be limited to the area of active fighting.182 The Appeals Chamber showed that, while 
some provisions are bound up with the hostilities, many others must clearly apply outside the 
actual theatre of combat operations.183 Likewise, the ICTR held in the Akayesu case that: 
the mere fact that Rwanda was engaged in an armed conflict meeting the threshold require-
ments of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II means that these instruments would 
                                               
180  ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (1995), supra note 24, para. 70, emphasis added. 
181  As we have seen above, supra note 52, both CA3 and Art. 1 (1) AP II refer to the territory of the state party. 
However, while both provisions may restrict the way in which CA3 and AP II apply to certain conflict 
scenarios, neither of them defines the geographical scope of the armed conflict or the reach of the humani-
tarian law once the conditions have been met. 
182  Ibid, para. 66. 
183  Ibid, para. 68-69. See in particular para. 69 (‘This conception is reflected in the fact that beneficiaries of 
common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions are those taking no active part (or no longer taking active 
part) in the hostilities. This indicates that the rules contained in Article 3 also apply outside the narrow 
geographical context of the actual theatre of combat operations’). 
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apply over the whole territory hence encompassing massacres which occurred away from 
the war front.184 
The position that humanitarian law applies to the whole territory of the parties to the conflict 
finds support in the legal literature.185 Reference is generally made to Article 29 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), which states that ‘[u]nless a different intention ap-
pears from the treaty or is otherwise established, a treaty is binding upon each party in respect 
of its entire territory’.186 Furthermore, the approach based on the unity of territory also prevents 
fragmentation of the applicable law and thus ensures greater legal certainty for the actors in-
volved.187  
Nevertheless, recent international practice on the subject remains ambiguous. The territory-
based approach has been confirmed by the ICC Prosecutor in the case of Mali. By contrast, the 
UN Commission of Inquiry on Ivory Coast188 and the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights 
and Counter-Terrorism189 have taken the position that non-international armed conflicts and the 
applicable humanitarian law are limited in scope to areas of active fighting. The issue and its 
relevance in the context of a peace operation has been explicitly discussed in a report of the 
German Federal Prosecutor-General’s on preliminary investigations against a German com-
mander who had authorised a NATO air strike in September 2009 against two Taliban high-
jacked fuel trucks in the Kunduz region (Afghanistan), which is believed to have caused dozens 
                                               
184  ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Trial Chamber, Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998, para. 
636, emphasis added. 
185  Greenwood (2008), supra note 19, p. 59, para. 216; Kolb and Hyde (2008), supra note 23, p. 94; David 
(2008), supra note 23, pp. 256-60, paras. 1231-32. Kolb, Ius in Bello: Le Droit International des Conflits 
Armés (2nd edn, Bruylant 2009), pp. 218-19. 
186  It remains unclear whether the same can be said about customary international humanitarian law. Moreover, 
as will be shown further below, hostilities may also take place outside the territory of the parties to the 
armed conflict, such as on the high seas or on the territory of other states. 
187  Cullen (2010), supra note 69, p. 142. Schöberl, ‘Konfliktpartei und Kriegsgebiet in Bewaffneten 
Auseinandersetzungen – Zur Debatte um den Anwendungsbereich des Rechts Internationaler und Nicht-
Internationaler Bewaffneter Konflikte’, 25 (3) Journal of International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict 
(2012), 128-138, p. 133. 
188  HR Council, Rapport de la Commission d’Enquête Internationale Indépendante sur la Côte d’Ivoire, 1 July 
2011, A/HRC/17/48, p. 20, para. 89, (‘Il est à noter que le conflit ne s’est pas déroulé sur toute l’étendue 
du pays, le droit international humanitaire s’appliquant donc uniquement au territoire où un conflit armé 
non international a effectivement eu lieu’, emphasis added). 
189  Statement by Ben Emmerson, UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, Concern-
ing the Launch of an Inquiry into the Civilian Impact, and Human Rights Implications of the Use Drones 
and other Forms of Targeted Killing for the Purpose of Counter-terrorism and Counter-insurgency, 24 Jan-
uary 2013, p. 4 (‘[W]ithin a country like Yemen, there may be parts of the country in which some would 
take the view that there is an internal armed conflict taking place, whilst in other parts of the country this 
is clearly not the case’, emphasis added). 
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of civilian casualties.190 The Prosecutor-General did not see a general need to address the ques-
tion ofwhether an internal armed conflict like in Afghanistan can be limited to specific regions 
of the territory of a State, because due to military activities of the insurgents in northern Af-
ghanistan, where the German federal armed forces are based, the armed conflict threshold was 
also crossed there. Nevertheless, the report went on to say that: 
[T]he basic fundamental intentions of international humanitarian law and hardly surmount-
able factual problems of differentiation support the view that a subject of international law 
like Afghanistan – including its allies – can only ever be involved as a whole in a non-
international armed conflict. The dynamics immanent to the developments of conflicts, 
which are characterized by an increase and decrease of the intensity of the confrontations 
and by the reaching of different levels of escalation, as well as the connected geographical 
shiftings and dislocations of combat zones, targets of attacks, areas of deployment, retreat 
and logistics, make attempts, which within the territory of a State want to differentiate le-
gally between areas of conflict and areas of peace, necessarily on the basis of daily events, 
look rather theoretical and interest-oriented.191 
It thus rejected the approach of limiting the application of humanitarian law to areas of active 
fighting.192 Despite the advantages of applying humanitarian law to the whole territory of the 
parties to the conflict – without having to consider the oscillating intensity levels and shifting 
locations of combat – this approach may be too broad and too narrow at the same time, espe-
cially in the context of a peace operation involved in an armed conflict. To the extent that the 
troop-contributing states can be considered the parties to the armed conflict, humanitarian law 
does also apply in the territories of these states,193 even though they usually remain unaffected 
by the hostilities related to that conflict.194  
                                               
190  Guardian, ‘NATO Air Strike in Afghanistan Kills Scores’, 4 September 2009, www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2009/sep/04/afghanistan-taliban. 
191  Federal Prosecutor General (Germany), Final Report on Preliminary Investigations against Colonel Klein 
und Sergeant Wilhelm, 3 BJs 6/10-4, 16 April 2010, p. 44, emphasis added, unofficial translation by the 
author. 
192  A similar position has been taken by Dieter Weingärtner, then Head of the Legal Division of the German 
Federal Ministry of Defence: Weingärtner, ‘Bundeswehr und “Neue Formen des Krieges”‘, 23 (3) Journal 
of International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict (2010), 141-145, p. 144 (‘According to the prevailing 
view, a non-international armed conflict can only exist on the entirety of the territory of a State. Conse-
quently, the Federal Government rejected it, with respect to the existence of an armed conflict, to differen-
tiate between the different regions in northern Afghanistan’, emphasis added, unofficial translation by the 
author). 
193  In the hypothetical case that only the international organisation (United Nations, NATO or ECOWAS) 
could be considered the party to the armed conflict on the part of the peace operation, the application of 
humanitarian law would hardly extend beyond the territory of the host state. 
194  Note, however, that Al-Shabab has also carried out numerous attacks on the territory of Uganda and Kenya, 
both major troop-contributors to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): Al Jazeera, ‘Al-Shabab 
Claims Uganda Bombings’, 13 July 2010, www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/07/2010711212520826 
984.html; BBC, ‘Why Is Al-Shabab Targeting Kenya?’, 3 April 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
africa-32174235, (‘Al-Shabab says it has been at war with Kenya ever since Kenyan forces entered Somalia 
in October 2011 in an effort to crush the militants’). 
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By contrast, the ratione loci application in the mission area may be more challenging. Certainly, 
if the host state is also involved in the armed conflict in question – either against the peace 
mission forces or together with them against insurgents – humanitarian law applies in the whole 
territory of that state. The picture becomes, however, more complicated where there is an armed 
conflict without the involvement of the host state, like in Somalia in the early 1990s, when 
international forces were engaged in hostilities with several armed factions. In areas of the host 
state that cannot be considered to be under the control of either the armed groups or the peace 
mission, humanitarian law does not apply, which seems to defeat the purpose of the expansive 
‘in the whole territory’ formula. 
Unrestricted Battlefield 
The shortcomings of the territory-based approach become even more apparent when hostilities 
extend beyond state borders. As widely accepted in the literature, the law has to follow the 
facts. In other words, the jus in bello also applies to the high seas – where naval battles usually 
occur – as well as to the territories of third states to the extent that actual hostilities take place 
there.195 Nevertheless, this extension is subject to additional constraints from other branches of 
international law.196 Such an extension of the reach of humanitarian law seems unproblematic 
for an international armed conflict, since any military engagement between state armed forces 
– regardless of its intensity, duration or location – would in itself be enough to trigger a separate, 
free-standing armed conflict.  
It is, however, unclear whether the same solution can be applied to the realm of non-interna-
tional armed conflicts, which often spill over into the territory of neighbouring states, even if 
the violence there remains sporadic and of low intensity. The issue essentially boils down to 
the question of whether humanitarian law follows armed groups and their individual members 
wherever they go. Otherwise, the law would only apply if the group had control over the area 
abroad in which it is present or, alternatively, if the level of violence passes the threshold to 
trigger a stand-alone non-international armed conflict.  
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights seems to have accepted the application of 
humanitarian law in the case of a non-international armed conflict spilling across the border 
into a neighbouring country. Indeed, in the interstate case of Ecuador v. Colombia (2010), the 
Commission had to deal with a cross-border raid by the Colombian military against a training 
camp of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in March 2008, during which 
                                               
195  David (2008), supra note 23, pp. 256-60, paras. 1231-32; Kolb (2009), supra note 185, pp. 218-19. 
196  For instance, under the jus ad bellum and the law of neutrality. 
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FARC leader Raúl Reyes and twenty-four other guerrilla fighters were killed. However, despite 
the fact that the camp was based in Ecuador rather than on Colombian territory, the Commission 
accepted Colombia’s claim that the raid was governed by humanitarian law, resort to which 
needs to be had when interpreting the relevant human rights provisions at the merit stage.197 
The ICRC has been more explicit in recognising the application of humanitarian law in such 
spill-over scenarios: 
[C]ertain NIACs originating within the territory of a single state between government 
armed forces and one or more organized armed groups have also been known to "spill over" 
into the territory of neighbouring states. … [I]t is submitted that the relations between par-
ties whose conflict has spilled over remain at a minimum governed by Common Article 3 
and customary IHL. This position is based on the understanding that the spill over of a 
NIAC into adjacent territory cannot have the effect of absolving the parties of their IHL 
obligations simply because an international border has been crossed. The ensuing legal 
vacuum would deprive of protection both civilians possibly affected by the fighting, as well 
as persons who fall into enemy hands. 198 
The ICRC fails, however, to explain whether the extension of the reach of humanitarian law is 
based on the mere presence of fighters across the border or whether it is dependent on their 
exercise of control where they are based or on the existence of cross-border fighting reaching a 
certain intensity. Nevertheless, the ICRC’s emphasis on the need for humanitarian law to pro-
vide effective protection and to avoid a legal vacuum seems to imply that it attaches no im-
portance to such additional requirements.  
Yet, what remains unclear is whether the same logic also applies beyond spill-over cases to 
scenarios involving an even greater geographical disjunction between the initial battlefield and 
the new location (of parts) of the armed group. In other words, can a non-international armed 
conflict also stretch across the borders of a number of different states or even across continents? 
An example of significant relevance for peace operations is the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), 
which has been roaming the territory of a number of African states, including Uganda, the Cen-
tral African Republic, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Would humanitar-
ian law still govern the actions of the LRA and its opponents – including MONUSCO and its 
Intervention Brigade, specifically tasked with neutralising the group199 – if the group was pre-
sent in a location not directly affected by any fighting? Giving an affirmative answer to this 
                                               
197  IACmHR, Ecuador v. Colombia (‘Franklin Guillermo Aisalla Molina’), Decision, 21 October 2010, Case 
IP-02, Report No. 112/10, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.140 Doc. 10, paras. 113-25. 
198  ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, Report pre-
pared for the 31st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, 31IC/11/5.1.2, Geneva, 
2011, p. 9. 
199  For instance, S/RES/2211 (DRC), 26 March 2015, para. 28 (‘Recognizes the ongoing contribution of 
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question is just a small step away from the US view that the United States is involved in an 
armed conflict of global dimension with Al-Qaeda and associated forces.200 This position has 
been strongly rejected by the ICRC: 
It should be reiterated that the ICRC does not share the view that a conflict of global di-
mensions is or has been taking place. … [T]he ICRC has taken a case by case approach to 
legally analyzing and classifying the various situations of violence that have occurred in 
the fight against terrorism. Some situations have been classified as an IAC, other contexts 
have been deemed to be NIACs, while various acts of terrorism taking place in the world 
have been assessed as being outside any armed conflict. It should be borne in mind that 
IHL rules governing the use of force and detention for security reasons are less restrictive 
than the rules applicable outside of armed conflicts governed by other bodies of law. 201 
The ICRC position finds support among a number of commentators that are concerned with the 
effects of an ever increasing battlefield.202 However, these concerns are already addressed by 
other fields of international law, including the jus ad bellum and international human rights law, 
both of which may provide additional limitations to an otherwise unrestricted application of 
humanitarian law.  
The position of the ICRC and a number of legal scholars in favour of a spatial limitation of 
humanitarian law along state borders also seems to overlook the fact that the term ‘armed con-
flict’ denotes a functional relationship between two opposing actors. In other words, the law of 
armed conflict governs that relationship whenever these actors meet, regardless of the exact 
location of the encounter. Indeed, states often have a significant number of troops deployed in 
third states, where they may also have air and naval bases or other military installations, far 
away from any actual hostilities. In addition, the very nature of non-state armed groups and the 
increased use of modern technology for warfare makes the dislocation of fighters and weaponry 
from the zone of initial fighting a likely occurrence.  
                                               
MONUSCO in the fight against the LRA, encourages further efforts of the AU-Regional task force (AU-
RTF), and urges greater cooperation, including operational cooperation, and information-sharing between 
MONUSCO, other United Nations Missions in the LRA-affected region, the AU-RTF, regional forces, 
national governments, international actors and non-governmental organizations, as appropriate, in tackling 
the threat of the LRA’). 
200  US DoJ, ‘White Paper on the Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who Is a 
Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida or An Associated Force’, made available on 4 February 2013, 
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf, pp. 2-5.  
201  ICRC, Challenges Report 2011, supra note 198, p. 10. 
202  For instance: O’Connell, ‘Combatants and the Combat Zone’, 43 University of Richmond Law Review 
(2009), 845-63, p. 857-59; Heinsch, ‘Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and the Scope of the “Combat Zone”: 
Some Thoughts on the Geographical Scope of Application of International Humanitarian Law’, 25 (4) 
Journal of International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict (2012), 184-192, p. 192 (‘[W]e need to stick to 
a strict standard when judging the existence of an armed conflict and its geographical scope of application. 
By extending the combat zone lightly one would make it easier to allow for a wider range of targeted 
killings, circumventing the stricter human rights regime’). 
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It also seems rather unprincipled to argue for a strict geographical limitation of non-interna-
tional armed conflicts, while at the same time admitting an exception in the case of spill-over 
conflicts so as to avoid a legal vacuum that would undermine the effective protection of affected 
persons. Indeed, confining the reach of humanitarian law in spatial terms runs the risk of re-
lieving armed groups in certain locations of their obligations. As has been argued above in 
relation to the temporal scope, this would cause a serious protection gap for those persons di-
rectly affected by the acts of armed groups. When the ICTY Appeals Chamber rendered its 
decision in the Tadić case with its territory-based ratione loci concept, it was not about restrict-
ing the application of humanitarian law, but rather about expanding its reach beyond areas of 
active fighting so as to avoid any lacunae.  
With this rationale in mind, one may be tempted to delineate the geographical scope of human-
itarian law by distinguishing between prohibitive and permissive rules: prohibitions, such as 
the ban on attacks against civilians or on mistreatment of detainees, should apply as broadly as 
possible and without any spatial limitations; by contrast, belligerent rights, like the authority to 
target or detain enemy combatants, do not serve any protective purpose and should therefore 
only be available in areas of active fighting. The problem with this distinction is, however, that 
it overlooks a number of challenges. For instance, it may be difficult in practice to neatly dis-
tinguish between prohibitions and rights, since many rules of humanitarian law appear to entail 
both elements, which cannot be easily disentangled from each other. More importantly, how-
ever, the whole existence of belligerent rights under humanitarian law has been increasingly 
challenged in recent years, especially in relation to non-international armed conflicts, and will 
be discussed at greater detail in Chapter 5, concerned with the interplay between humanitarian 
law and human rights law.203 
In view of this, the US Department of Justice seems to be correct in claiming that there is noth-
ing in the law of armed conflict as such that would in any way restrict its application to certain 
territories.204 Indeed, legal scholars have increasingly acknowledged the arbitrariness of delin-
eating the application of humanitarian law along state borders and instead point to the fact that 
                                               
203  See below, p. 208. 
204  See also: US DoJ, White Paper on the Lawfulness of a Lethal Operations (2013), supra note 200, p. 4 (‘The 
Department has not found any authority for the proposition that when one of the parties to an armed conflict 
plans and executes operations from a base in a new nation, an operation to engage the enemy in that location 
cannot be part of the original armed conflict, and thus subject to the laws of war governing that conflict, 
unless the hostilities become sufficiently intense and protracted in the new location’). 
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the geographic reach should depend on whether or not there is a nexus between the armed con-
flict and the actions of the parties to the conflict.205 
Conclusion 
What follows from the above is that the forces of a peace operation that has become a party to 
an armed conflict in the mission area have to observe the rules of humanitarian law for the full 
duration of that conflict or for as long as they are a party thereto. Humanitarian law not only 
applies in areas directly affected by hostilities, but also governs the actions of peace forces in 
other areas. It may even apply outside the mission area to the extent that they have a nexus with 
the armed conflict in question. However, the relevance of this finding is limited, as forceful 
measures in spill-over scenarios and cases involving an even further dislocation would most 
likely need an additional authorisation under the mandate as well as the consent of the affected 
states. But as a matter of principle, humanitarian law would also govern such situations.  
3.3 PEACE OPERATIONS AS OCCUPYING POWER 
INTRODUCTION 
A number of humanitarian law provisions only apply in occupied territories. They form a spe-
cial legal regime known as the law of occupation.206 Generally recognising the role of the oc-
cupying power as de facto administrator for maintaining law and order in the territory at stake, 
the law of occupation assigns a number of restrictions and duties aimed at protecting the terri-
tory’s inhabitants and at maintaining the status quo ante. For the application of these provisions, 
                                               
205  Schmitt, ‘Charting the Legal Geography of Non-International Armed Conflict’, 90 International Law Stud-
ies (2014), 1-19; Lubell and Derejko, ‘A Global Battlefield?: Drones and the Geographical Scope of Armed 
Conflict’, 11 (1) Journal of International Criminal Justice (2013), 65-88; Daskal, ‘The Geography of the 
Battlefield: A Framework for Detention and Targeting Outside the “Hot” Conflict Zone’, 161 (5) University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review (2013), 1165-234; Arimatsu, ‘Territory, Boundaries and the Law of Armed 
Conflict’, 12 YIHL (2009), 157-92; Sivakumaran (2012), supra note 159, pp. 250-52; Corn and Talbot 
Jensen, ‘Untying the Gordian Knot: A Proposal for Determining Applicability of the Laws of War to the 
War on Terror’, 81 Temple Law Review (2008), 787-830, p. 799. 
206  These are in particular, Arts. 42-56 HRLW and Arts. 47-78 GC IV. 
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it is thus an important question during an armed conflict as to which areas can be considered 
‘occupied territories’. 
What is, however, of much greater relevance for the discussion at hand is the fact that situations 
of belligerent occupation also constitute a separate ground for the application of humanitarian 
law. Common Article 2 states that in addition to cases of international armed conflicts: 
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory 
of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.207 
Military occupations of foreign territory are thus governed by humanitarian law, even in the 
absence of an armed conflict.208 Nowadays, many occupations are not (or no longer) accompa-
nied by hostilities.209 This is why, by extending the reach of humanitarian law to such cases, 
Common Article 2 fills a protection gap for the inhabitants of such areas under foreign military 
control. This extension may also be of relevance for peace operations administering territory, 
provided that the situation amounts to a military occupation. This section will therefore discuss 
whether and under which circumstances international forces involved in a peace operation as-
sume the role of an occupying power and what that means for the resulting scope of application 
of humanitarian law.210 
                                               
207  CA2 (2), emphasis added. 
208  It is important to note that a belligerent occupation does not constitute an armed conflict in itself, but that 
the law of international armed conflict merely applies to cases of occupation. The distinction is also evident 
in the wording of other provisions: Art. 6 (1) of GC IV (‘beginning of any conflict or occupation’) and Art. 
99 (1) of AP I (‘end of the armed conflict or occupation’). The term ‘armed conflict’ denotes essentially a 
dynamic concept, as it is bound up with the notion of hostilities; by contrast, the term ‘occupation’ refers 
to a rather static concept. Hence, while the invasion and subsequent occupation of foreign territory is in 
itself enough to trigger an international armed conflict, the latter will come to an end once hostilities cease, 
even if the occupation continues. Unfortunately, this conceptual distinction between international armed 
conflicts stricto sensu and belligerent occupations is not always clearly made in the existing legal literature. 
209  Cases in point are: the occupations of Crimea by Russia, the Golan Heights and the West Bank by Israel, 
Northern Cyprus by Turkey, and Western Sahara by Morocco. 
210  Similar to the discussion above, a peace operation as such cannot sensu stricto be considered an occupying 
power, because it has no distinct legal personality. Such role can only be performed by the different states 
and the organisation involved in the peace operation. Nevertheless, and despite this important clarification, 
it is appropriate – for the sake of simplicity throughout this chapter – to refer to a peace operation as the the 
potential occupying power (covering the different states and the organisation, as the case may be). Only 
where the distinction between the states and the organisation as an occupying power is of actual relevance 
for the application of humanitarian law, will that distinction be explicitly raised in the following subsec-
tions. 
 103 
 
MILITARY OCCUPATIONS AND PEACE OPERATIONS 
The existence of a military occupation is generally accepted for cases in which a peace opera-
tion engages in combat with the armed forces of a state and brings parts of the latter’s territory 
under its control, as was the case during the Korea campaign in the early 1950s.211 While this 
is more likely to happen during an enforcement operation, the mandate does not necessarily 
matter, because it cannot be ruled out that a peacekeeping mission becomes involved in an 
international armed conflict and occupies parts of its enemy’s territory. In their definitions of 
occupations, Eyal Benvenisti and Adam Roberts also explicitly include international organisa-
tions, like the United Nations, in the group of possible occupants alongside states.212  
Nonetheless, the Secretary-General’s Bulletin (1999) does not refer to occupations, nor does it 
list any provision of the law of occupation. This has prompted some commentators to believe 
that the United Nations considers this body of law inapplicable in UN peace operations.213 For 
Daphna Shraga, however, the Bulletin’s recognition that UN forces may become a party to an 
international armed conflict implies the potential relevance of the law of occupation.214 Yet, 
this limits the possibility of occupations involving the United Nations to those few cases in 
which its forces are (or have been) engaged in actual hostilities with state armed forces and 
seems to rule out the application of occupation law to all other peace operations, including 
multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions and international territorial administrations under the 
auspices of the United Nations. It has been a matter of debate among academics and other legal 
experts whether the law of occupation could possibly apply to peace missions administering 
foreign territory without having been involved in an international armed conflict. Opponents of 
the de jure applicability in such cases stress that peace operations differ considerably from typ-
ical military occupations, as their presence and exercise of authority is based on a Security 
Council mandate rather than on a military invasion. They also stress conceptual differences, 
since peace operations are generally premised on the cooperation with the local population and 
thus lack the notorious conflict relationship that characterises ordinary military occupations.215 
                                               
211  Greenwood (1998), supra note 72, pp. 28-31. 
212  Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation (2nd edn, OUP 2012), pp. 62-66; Roberts, ‘What is a 
Military Occupation?’, 55 BYIL (1984), 249-306, pp. 291-92. 
213  For instance: Zwanenburg (2000), supra note 11, pp. 23-24. 
214  Shraga (2009), supra note 146, pp. 374-75. 
215  Shraga, ‘Military Occupation and UN Transitional Administrations – The Analogy and its Limitations’, in: 
Kohen (ed.), Promoting Justice, Human Rights and Conflict Resolution through International Law (Marti-
nus Nijhoff 2007), 479-98, pp. 494-95; Shraga (1998), supra note 7, pp. 69-70; This was also the position 
of two experts during the first and second expert meetings in May and December 2008: ICRC, Expert 
Meetings on Occupation (2012), infra note 216, p. 33 (on peace operations and other multinational forces) 
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During two expert meetings on occupation convened by the ICRC in May and December 
2008,216 most participants agreed that the law of occupation may be relevant to the conduct of 
peace operations and other missions entailing the exercise of functions and powers over terri-
tory as it would be addressing ‘the tension between the suspended sovereignty and the new 
administering authority’.217 Most of the experts agreed that such missions are not prevented 
from becoming occupying powers simply because of their special mandates, their legitimacy 
and altruistic intentions, as these aspects fall under the jus ad bellum and need to be distin-
guished from the jus in bello.218 A case in point is the US-led occupation of Iraq between 2003 
and 2004. In Resolution 1483 in May 2003, the Security Council explicitly mentioned the coa-
lition members’ role as occupying powers and called for full compliance with the Geneva Con-
ventions (1949) and the Hague Regulations (1907).219 It also called for changes to the political 
and legal landscape of Iraq in preparation for the post-occupation period,220 which shows that 
transformative occupations are indeed possible despite the apparent rigour of the preservation 
rule,221 if they are supported by the international community.222 The Security Council may, 
however, also exclude the possibility of military occupations, as it did in the case of Libya in 
March 2011, when it authorised member states:  
to take all necessary measures … to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under 
threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a for-
eign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory …223 
Yet, this would not have prevented the application of the law of occupation, had the NATO-led 
coalition used ground troops and seized parts of Libyan territory – even though in violation of 
                                               
and p. 78 (on international territorial administrations, ITAs). The fact that the term ‘occupation’ generally 
has a negative connotation is certainly a main reason for the reluctance among UN and state officials to-
wards using it for peace operations.  
216  ICRC, Expert Meeting on Occupation and Other Forms of Administration of Foreign Territory. Report of 
the Three Experts Meetings Held in May and December 2008 and in October 2009, prepared and edited by 
Tristan Ferraro, June 2012, hereinafter: ICRC, Expert Meetings on Occupation (2012). 
217  Ibid, p. 33. 
218  Ibid, pp. 33-35 (on peace operations and other multinational forces) and pp. 78-81 (on international territo-
rial administrations, ITAs). Similarly: Sassòli, ‘Legislation and Maintenance of Public Order and Civil Life 
by Occupying Powers’, 16 EJIL (2005), 661-94, pp. 688-89. 
219  S/RES 1483, 22 May 2003, fourteenth unnumbered preambular and para. 5. 
220  Ibid, para. 4. Similarly, S/RES 1500, 14 August 2003, para. 1. 
221  Art. 43 HRLW obliges the occupying power to respect, ‘unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in 
the country’. Arts. 47 and 64 GC IV provide for similar restrictions on the power to legislate in occupied 
territory. 
222  For an excellent discussion on the issue: Fox, ‘Transformative Occupation and the Unilateralist Impulse’, 
94 IRRC (2012), 237-66. For a more critical view on transformative occupations: Bhuta, ‘The Antinomies 
of Transformative Occupation’, 16 (4) EJIL (2005), 721-40. 
223  S/RES/1973 (Libya), 17 March 2011, para. 4, emphasis added. 
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the mandate. Hence, the assessment as to whether there is a military occupation needs to be 
based on the factual test as in other cases of armed forces exercising control over foreign terri-
tory. Article 42 of the Hague Regulations (1907) states that: 
Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile 
army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been estab-
lished and can be exercised.224 
On the basis of this definition, we can identity three cumulative requirements for the existence 
of a belligerent occupation:  
1. Military forces of another state or international organisation are present on foreign ter-
ritory, 
2. the sovereign of that territory has not given its consent to the foreign military presence, 
and 
3. the territory in question is under the authority of these foreign forces. 
The first element is relatively unproblematic, as most peace operations have a strong military 
capacity, regardless of the exact mandate as an enforcement or peacekeeping operation. Some 
missions have, however, a significant civilian component, especially in the case of international 
territorial administrations. Is it thus enough that the military contingents are merely present in 
the area or do they have to actively engage in the administration of the territory in question? In 
Kosovo, for instance, the civilian presence (UNMIK) and its military counterpart (KFOR) are 
both independent from each other and there seems to be no hierarchy between both compo-
nents.225 While it is certainly possible that many tasks of the occupying power are carried out 
by civilian authorities, it seems necessary for a belligerent occupation that there be armed forces 
present in the territory. This flows directly from the wording of Article 42, requiring an ‘army’. 
Furthermore, the reason why humanitarian law applies not only in the midst of an armed con-
flict but also to an occupation that ‘meets with no armed resistance’ is precisely the military 
character of such occupations.226 Due to the presence of troops on the ground, the occupying 
power can be expected to confront and possibly overcome any form of armed resistance.227 It 
                                               
224  Emphasis added. See also the French version, which is the only authentic one: ‘Un territoire est considéré 
comme occupé lorsqu’il se trouve placé de fait sous l’autorité de l’armée ennemie. L’occupation ne s’étend 
qu’aux territoires où cette autorité est établie et en mesure de s’exercer’. 
225  By contrast, UNTAET in East Timor incorporated both functions in one mission after INTERFET had 
handed over command of military operations to UNTAET in February 2000. 
226  See, for instance: Pictet, Commentary on Geneva Convention IV (1958), p. 20 (‘[T]he Government of the 
occupied country considering that armed resistance was useless’). 
227  Sassòli (2005), supra note 218, pp. 688-89; ICRC, Expert Meetings on Occupation (2012), supra note 216, 
pp. 17-19. Ferraro, ‘Determining the Beginning and End of an Occupation under International Humanitar-
ian Law’, 94 IRRC (2012), 133-63, pp. 143-47. Nevertheless, it could perhaps be argued that that police 
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follows that a peace operation needs to have a significant security component – in addition to 
meeting the other two requirements – in order to qualify as an occupying force within the mean-
ing of humanitarian law.228 
The second requirement for the existence of a military occupation – the lack of consent by the 
sovereign – may pose a greater challenge for applying the law of occupation to peace opera-
tions. This prerequisite is based on the use of the term ‘hostile army’ in Article 42,229 which 
denotes a non-consensual relationship between the sovereign and the occupying power. Hence, 
for as long as the peace operation’s presence and exercise of authority in the territory meets 
with the genuine consent of the host government, there is no military occupation.230 By reverse 
logic, where the consent of the sovereign is absent or in doubt, the international presence will 
most likely qualify as an occupying power, subject to the fulfilment of the other two require-
ments. This is clearly the case where a peace operation engages in combat with the armed forces 
of a state and brings parts of the latter’s territory under its control. 
The case is different for other peace operations, especially peacekeeping missions, which are 
generally based on consent as one of their guiding principles.231 As a general rule, such opera-
tions are established following the conclusion of status-of-force agreements with the host state 
and on many occasions similar arrangements are made with other parties involved. A problem 
arises in failed state situations, where there is no functioning host state government to conclude 
an agreement or otherwise consent to the deployment of the peace mission.232 This was report-
edly the case in Somalia following the overthrow of the regime of Siad Barre in 1991. It was 
against this background that the Australian forces involved in UNITAF considered themselves 
as an occupying force in the Bay Province, Australia’s area of operation:  
                                               
and other security forces are enough rather than military personnel in the strict sense. 
228  For obvious reasons, it is highly unlikely that an international presence may be established in a foreign 
territory without the necessary security personnel to respond to challenges of its authority on the ground. 
229  The authoritative French text of Art. 42 uses the term ‘l’armée ennemie’ (emphasis added). 
230  For the opposite view: Kelly, Restoring and Maintaining Order in Complex Peace Operations. The Search 
for a Legal Framework (Kluwer 1999), pp. 149-67 (who claims that Art. 2 (2) GC I-IV also covers cases 
of ‘pacific occupation’ and ‘occupation by agreement’). 
231  Bowett (1964), supra note 39, p. 490 (claiming that peacekeepers with a SOFA can never become an oc-
cupying force). 
232  Faite, ‘Multinational Forces Acting Pursuant to a Mandate of the United Nations: Specific Issues on the 
Applicability of International Humanitarian Law’, 11 International Peacekeeping (2007), 143-57, pp. 148-
50. 
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Australian troops found this to be the case when they were deployed into and given respon-
sibility for, the Bay Province during Operation Restore Hope in 1993. Following a deter-
mination that the Fourth Convention applied to that intervention, the Australian force relied 
on the Convention to provide answers to, and a framework for many initiatives.233  
The other contributing states, including the United States, Canada and Belgium, did not agree 
with that assessment,234 but it is unlikely that this disagreement led to any actual legal or oper-
ational challenges between Australia and its UNITAF partners.235 It remains unclear whether 
the lack of consent can be compensated by the mere fact that the major armed groups on the 
ground agree to the deployment of the peace operation. In the case of Somalia, the armed fac-
tions quickly renounced their initial support for the presence of UNOSOM I and engaged the 
international forces in intensive fighting.236 
Even where the host state’s consent was obtained prior to the deployment of the international 
force, the situation may quickly change. For instance, the central government that had initially 
invited the peace operation may suddenly collapse as a consequence of an ongoing civil war, 
while no other authority can credibly claim to represent the state.237 The host state may also 
suddenly withdraw its consent and demand the prompt departure of the international force. This 
option also seems to exist where a status-of-forces agreement is in place, even though such 
agreements usually do not contain termination clauses.238 Hence, if the international forces do 
                                               
233  Australian Government Statement for the Meeting of Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention, 
Geneva, 27-29 October 1998, 2 YIHL (1999), 450-51. 
234  Faite (2008), supra note 232, p. 151. 
235  Indeed, as the above-cited statement shows (supra note 233), Australia did not consider the law of occupa-
tion (esp. GC IV) as an undue constraint, but rather as a source for answers and initiatives. 
236  The interesting point in the Somalia case is that there was a military occupation occurring at the same time 
as a non-international armed conflict. The reason for this arguably counter-intuitive finding rests on the 
way in which a military occupation is defined, as opposed to an international armed conflict. While the 
latter requires the resort to force between states (including entities acting on behalf of states), the concept 
of occupation is premised on the mere absence of consent of the legitimate government of the host state (or 
any other authority credibly claiming to represent it) to the presence of foreign armed forces. 
237  The Multinational Force in Lebanon (1982-84) found itself in such a situation and arguably assumed the 
role of an occupying force in those areas under its control. See, for instance: Roberts, ‘What is a Military 
Occupation?’, 55 BYIL (1984), 249-306, pp. 289-91 (arguing that ONUC in the Congo (1960-64) provided 
a similar case, as it was at times unclear which authority represented the legitimate government in the 
country). 
238  The case is, however, not as clear-cut as described by: Ferraro, ‘The Applicability of the Law of Occupation 
to Peace Forces’, in: Beruto (ed.), International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights and Peace Operations. 
XXXIst Sanremo Round Table 2008 (IIHL 2009), 120-39, 120-39, p. 138 (who argues that host states are 
at liberty under the law of treaties to terminate the status-of-force agreement). It is, however, unclear 
whether the host state has a right – either intended by the parties or implied – to unilaterally denounce the 
status-of-forces agreement or whether the withdrawal of consent to the presence of foreign troops may be 
considered a fundamental change of circumstances. Nevertheless, there is some practice confirming the 
host state’s right to unilaterally terminate the status-of-forces agreement, even in the absence of an explicit 
provision in the agreement, and to demand the withdrawal of foreign troops. For a detailed discussion of 
the legal aspects of Egypt’s withdrawal of consent concerning the presence of UNEF I in 1967: Di Blasi, 
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not leave the territory as requested, they will most likely take on the role of an occupying power 
in the area under their control.239 Also, the questionable legal value of the consent may perhaps 
lead to the same outcome. In the case of Kosovo, for instance, NATO’s ten-week air campaign 
forced Yugoslavia to accept the presence of KFOR and UNMIK. John Cerone has therefore 
argued that the consent should be seen as null and void.240 In the case of East Timor, political 
pressure certainly played a major role in securing Indonesia’s withdrawal and its consent to the 
deployment of international forces. Moreover, Indonesia was itself an occupying power and 
therefore not entitled to transfer sovereign rights over East Timor to a third party.241 In sum, 
serious doubts as to the validity of the consent may possibly lead to the conclusion that the 
peace operation’s presence amounts to a military occupation, provided that the other two re-
quirements are duly met. 
The third requirement – exercise of authority over the territory – is essentially a question of 
control. In other words, only where the foreign forces have in fact replaced the authority of the 
legitimate government can the area in question be considered occupied.242 A military occupa-
tion does not require a long duration and can also exist in a very small area.243 What is essential 
is the existence of factual control enabling the occupying power to exercise elements of gov-
ernment authority over the area and its population. In complex peace operations with troops 
from different sending states and civilian components operating alongside military ones, it may 
                                               
‘The Role of Host State’s Consent with regard to Non-Coercive Actions by the United Nations’, in: Cassese 
(ed.), United Nations Peace-keeping Legal Essays (Sijthoff & Noordhoff International Publishers 1978), 
55-94. 
239  For a more cautious view: Sassòli (2005), supra note 218, p. 689; Ratner, ‘The Law of Occupation and UN 
Administration of Territory: Mandatory, Desirable or Irrelevant?’, in: ICRC, Expert Meetings on Occupa-
tion (2012), supra note 216, 96-104, p. 98. 
240  Cerone, ‘Minding the Gap: Outlining KFOR Accountability in Post-Conflict Kosovo’, 12 EJIL (2001), 
469-88, p. 484. For the opposite view: Ratner (2012), supra note, p. 97. 
241  Levrat (2001), supra note 64, pp. 96-97. The same can be said about the Vietnam-imposed government in 
Cambodia that agreed to the deployment of UNTAC. Note, however, that at least in the case of East Timor 
all other parties had also given their consent, including the liberation movement FRETELIN and Portugal, 
the former colonial power. It would appear artificial to wait until a new, internationally recognised govern-
ment is formed as a result of the international presence and to apply the law of occupation in the meantime. 
242  Local authorities may continue to operate, but only at the mercy of the occupying power. 
243  In times of IAC, however, the level of control will usually not be reached during the invasion phase or 
short-lived incursions. In order to close the resulting protection gap, the official commentary suggests to 
broaden the notion of ‘occupied territory’ so as to make the relevant protections applicable as soon as 
possible: Commentary on Geneva Convention IV, supra note, Art. 6 (1), pp. 60-61. This approach was 
largely approved by the majority of experts during the first expert meeting in May 2008: ICRC, Expert 
Meetings on Occupation (2012), supra note 216, pp. 24-26. It is, however, important to stress that this does 
in no way broaden the term of ‘military occupations’ and has no impact on the question as to when and 
how international forces involved in a peace operation can be considered an occupying power, in the ab-
sence of an armed conflict. 
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be difficult to make this assessment with sufficient precision. Where individual troop-contrib-
uting states are in control of different areas, they can be identified as the respective occupying 
power for each of these areas without greater difficulty.244  
Moreover, where there is a significant overlap of competences, an additional test may comple-
ment the assessment. Indeed, similar to the participation-based test suggested above in relation 
to a pre-existing armed conflict, states and international organisations may also qualify as oc-
cupying powers on the basis of their contribution to the military occupation by another entity.245 
This is particularly relevant in cases of occupation by a coalition of states (e.g. US-led occupa-
tion of Iraq between 2003 and 2004) where the physical presence of troops and their capacity 
greatly differs among the states. According to the participants of the ICRC expert meeting in 
May 2008, there are two different, but complementary approaches to identify the occupying 
powers in such coalitions:  
The first consisted of applying, to each Member State separately, the legal criteria for oc-
cupation identified during the previous working sessions. Each member of the coalition 
would need to have troops deployed on the ground without the local government’s consent 
and would have to be able to exert authority over the parts of the occupied territory to which 
it had been assigned in order to be defined as an occupying power. The second option was 
to use a functional approach based on the tasks performed within the coalition. Those mem-
ber States performing tasks that would typically be carried out by an occupying power 
within the framework of IHL should be labelled as such and be bound by the rules contained 
in the relevant instruments of occupation law.246 
In other words, even if a state cannot be said to be in control of territory, its contribution to the 
functioning of a military occupation is capable of turning it into an occupying power in its own 
right.247 
                                               
244  See, for instance, the above-mentioned case of Australia’s presence in the Bay region, as part of its UNITAF 
deployment in Somalia, supra note 233. 
245  Shraga (2007), supra note 215, p. 497 ‘The laws of occupation can also apply to UN operations indirectly 
or “by association”, when the UN operation cooperates or carries out activities in an occupied territory 
under the authority and in support of an Occupying Power … To the extent, therefore, that the mandate of 
the UN presence did not provide otherwise, it would have been bound to carry out its activities within the 
limits of international customary laws of occupation’). 
246  This approach found the support of most experts: ICRC, Expert Meetings on Occupation (2012), supra note 
216, pp. 34-35. See alsp specifically on the distinction between different tasks, p. 35 (‘It was also pointed 
out that any task performed by a coalition member, even if not a core one in terms of occupier’s duties 
under IHL, would contribute to the running of the occupation, since it would – if nothing else – free the 
“uncontested” occupying powers from doing secondary tasks and allow them to focus on the main ones, 
such as enforcing law and order. Consequently, the actions of “cooperating” member States would appear 
to be in support of the occupying power and would make the task of determining coalition members’ legal 
status particularly difficult, at least from the enemy’s perspective. … Thus, a presumption – albeit rebutta-
ble – of occupier’s status for those States participating in a coalition enforcing effective control over a 
foreign territory was put forward’). 
247  The above-mentioned case of the Australian presence in Somalia (supra note 233) is less relevant here, as 
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GEOGRAPHIC AND TEMPORAL SCOPE OF APPLICATION 
Once the international forces involved in the peace operation qualify as an occupying power, 
the law of international armed conflict applies. However, in the absence of actual hostilities, 
only the law of occupation – emanating from Geneva Convention IV, the Hague Regulations 
(1907) and corresponding customary law – applies. Moreover, unlike the geographical reach of 
humanitarian law as a whole, the application of the law of occupation is confined to occupied 
areas alone.248 This follows clearly from Article 42 of the Hague Regulations, which states that 
the ‘occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can 
be exercised’. 
The temporal scope of application is particularly complex in occupied territories. As we have 
seen above, the end of the general application of humanitarian law is essentially based on the 
end of hostilities and of the armed conflict as a whole. By contrast, Article 6 (3) of Geneva 
Convention IV states that: 
In the case of occupied territory, the application of the present Convention shall cease one 
year after the general close of military operations; however, the Occupying Power shall be 
bound, for the duration of the occupation, to the extent that such Power exercises the func-
tions of government in such territory, by the provisions of the following Articles of the 
present Convention: 1 to 12, 27, 29 to 34, 47, 49, 51, 52, 53, 59, 61 to 77, 143. 249 
Hence, if an occupation continues to exist one year after the hostilities have come to an end, 
only a limited set of rules applies.250 Yet, the one-year rule has been superseded by Additional 
Protocol I, because Article 3 of the Protocol states that: 
the application of the Conventions and of this Protocol shall cease, … in the case of occu-
pied territories, on the termination of the occupation …251 
                                               
the other states (US, Belgium, Canada etc.) were arguably also in effective control of their respective areas 
of deployment and thus assumed the role as occupying powers in a same way as Australia. 
248  A notable exception are removals or transfers of protected persons to other states, which leads to the exten-
sion of the protection to the new location, in line with Art. 6 (4) GC IV. 
249  Emphasis added. 
250  This means that 10 provisions contained in Section I and Section III of GC IV no longer apply, which 
includes mainly positive obligations on social welfare and limitations of restrictive measures: Arts. 28 (rules 
on danger zones), 48 (right to leave the territory), 50 (duty to provide care of children), 54 (prohibition on 
altering the status of public officials and judges), 55 (duty to provide food and medical supplies), 56 (duty 
to ensure hygiene and public health), 57 (limitations on the requisitioning of hospitals), 58 (duty to give 
spiritual assistance), 60 (limitations on the use of relief consignments) and 78 (rules on security measures, 
internment and assigned residence). 
251  Art. 3 (b) AP I, emphasis added. It also includes a special clause on the continued application in relation to 
persons pending final release, repatriation or re-establishment. 
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The continued validity of the one-year rule is also contested in relation to states not party to 
Protocol I. While the rule was briefly mentioned in the Wall advisory opinion of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in 2004,252 it is today considered largely obsolete among legal schol-
ars.253 Indeed, they point at the original intentions of the drafters of the Geneva Conventions,254 
the fact that most occupation rules enjoy customary status,255 and the wide acceptance of Arti-
cle 3 as a general standard during the drafting of Protocol I and in recent practice.256 This was 
also the widely shared view at the ICRC expert meeting in December 2008.257 
In the context of a peace operation that has become an occupying power, this means that hu-
manitarian law ceases to apply when the occupation comes to an end. Three scenarios can be 
distinguished here: First, the peace operation can lose its control over the territory in question, 
either as a result of active resistance to its presence or due to unilateral withdrawal. Second, the 
state whose territory has been occupied may also give its genuine consent to the presence of 
international forces and their exercise of authority there. Third, the military occupation can also 
come to an end, because of an act of self-determination and the establishment of a new state, as 
we have seen in the case of East Timor in 2003. It should, however, be recalled that irrespective 
of the exact end of occupation, humanitarian law continues to bind peace forces with regard to 
persons deprived of their liberty until their final release, repatriation or re-establishment.258 
                                               
252  ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, 9 July 2004, para. 125. 
253  For the opposite view: Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation (CUP 2009), pp. 280-83 
(who seems to support the continuous validity of the one-year rule). 
254  Kolb and Hyde (2008), supra note 23, p. 104 (highlighting the fact that the drafters had mainly the case of 
Germany and Japan in mind, where most powers had quickly been transferred to the new national authori-
ties). 
255  Ibid, p. 104; Kolb and Vité, Le Droit de l’Occupation Militaire. Perspectives Historiques et Enjeux Jurid-
iques Actuels (Bruylant 2009), pp. 165-66. 
256  Ibid, p. 165; Koutroulis, Le Début et la Fin de l’Application du Droit de l’Occupation (Pedone 2010), p. 
170-81; Ben-Naftali, ‘‘A La Recherche du Temps Perdu’: Rethinking Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention in the Light of the Construction of the Wall Advisory Opinion’, 38 Israel Law Review (2005), 211-
229, p. 217. 
257  ICRC, Expert Meetings on Occupation (2012), supra note 216, pp. 31-33. 
258  Art. 3 (b) AP I; Art. 6 (4) GC IV. 
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3.4 APPLICATION OF HUMANITARIAN LAW 
BY ANALOGY 
The previous sections have outlined the criteria for the application of humanitarian law to peace 
operations, namely if they are a party to an armed conflict or an occupying power in the area of 
operation. This means that armed confrontations between peace operations and an armed group 
are not formally governed by humanitarian law, if they are only of a low intensity or if the 
armed group is insufficiently organised. In the same vein, the law of occupation does not apply 
to a peace operation administering the area of operation in its entirety, if it has obtained the 
explicit consent of the host state authorities to this effect.  
However, even if humanitarian law does not apply de jure, it may still play a significant role in 
regulating the conduct of the peace operation in question. Some authors have suggested that in 
such cases humanitarian law should be applied by analogy.259 A similar approach is reflected 
in the practice of states and international organisations involved in peace operations. The as-
surance given by the United Nations since the early 1950s to abide by the ‘spirit and principles’ 
of the Geneva Conventions follows the idea of applying humanitarian law as a matter of policy. 
Similar language can be found in military manuals of the United States260 and the United King-
dom.261 Moreover, the NATO Allied Joint Doctrine on Peace Support Operations also stipulates 
                                               
259  For instance by Ulf Häußler, who asserts that even below the threshold of application of humanitarian law, 
‘its essence is nevertheless applicable, namely by way of analogy’, to the conduct of peace operations: 
Häußler, Ensuring and Enforcing Human Security. The Practice of International Peace Missions (Wolf 
Legal Publishers 2007), p. 64. See also Ben Klappe, who suggests for that the fundamental principles of 
the 1999 SG Bulletin be applied at all times during a peace operation, whether or not IHL formally applies: 
Klappe, ‘International Peace Support Operations’, in: Fleck (ed), The Handbook of International Humani-
tarian Law (2nd edn., OUP 2008) 635-74, p. 647, para. 1308. See also: Oswald et al., Documents on the Law 
of UN Peace Operations (OUP 2010), p. 196 (‘[E]ven if the GCs are not applicable as a matter of law to a 
particular operation, many provisions in the GCs are useful in establishing best practice standards when 
dealing with the civilian population of the host country’). 
260  Stability Operations and Support Operations, FM 3-07 (FM 100-20), Headquarters, Department of the 
Army, Washington, February 2003, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/ fm3_07.pdf, Appendix B, 
para. B-25 (‘… Although the law of war does not apply to these operations, the US, UN, and NATO have 
their forces apply the “principles and spirit” of the law of war in these operations’). In the meantime, the 
US has adopted a more nuanced position with regard to the application of IHL to peace operations as a 
matter of law, while maintaining the same approach to the application of IHL by analogy in situations where 
it does not formally apply to the conduct of the peace operation in question. Condron (ed.), Operational 
Law Handbook, JA 22, International and Operational Law Department, Judge Advocate General’s Legal 
Center and School, Charlottesville, Virginia, 2011, p. 14. 
261  Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, United Kingdom, 2004, pp. 379-80, paras. 14.9-14.10 
(‘It follows that, below that threshold, members of a PSO force may be involved in fighting without being 
subject to the law of armed conflict … Nevertheless, such fighting does not take place in a legal vacuum. 
Quite apart from the fact that it is governed by national law and the relevant provisions of the rules of 
engagement, the principles and spirit of the law of armed conflict remain relevant,’ emphasis added). 
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that certain provisions of international humanitarian law may be applied where the peace oper-
ation is not a party to an armed conflict.262 For the personnel on the ground, this may have the 
advantage that they are not confronted with two different sets of applicable rules and would 
subsequently diminish the role of the threshold of international humanitarian law. 
Moreover, there is wide support among scholars and practitioners to apply the law of occupation 
by analogy to peace operations performing tasks similar to those of occupying powers, for in-
stance the military components of international territorial administrations.263 Although in most 
of these cases, the law of occupation will generally not be applicable as a matter of law, this 
legal regime offers practical solutions to many problems which such missions may encounter 
and for which the resolutions of the Security Council do not provide sufficient guidance.264 The 
operation in East Timor is a case in point: when INTERFET deployed under Australian com-
mand, it made extensive use of the law of occupation to re-establish order and to set up an 
interim justice system.265 Nevertheless, the United Nations have so far refrained from making 
explicit use of the law of occupation in any of their peace operations.266 
The approach to apply humanitarian law as a matter of policy is partly motivated by the aim to 
close the protection gap that might otherwise arise and to provide individuals affected by the 
conduct of peace operations with at least some protection under international law. Applying 
                                               
262  NATO Allied Joint Doctrine, Peace Support Operations, July 2001, AJP-3.4.1, para. 4B6 (‘The Law of 
Armed Conflict (LOAC) is the body of international law that governs the conduct of hostilities during an 
armed conflict. The PSF will not generally be a party to the conflict, yet certain LOAC principles may be 
applied. Individual civilians along with the civilian population must never be purposefully targeted unless 
they have taken active part in the armed conflict. When military force is used, every effort should be taken 
to minimise the risk of civilian casualties.’ Emphasis added). 
263  ICRC, Expert Meetings on Occupation (2012), supra note 216, pp. 33 and 84-87; Sassòli (2005), supra 
note 218, pp. 691-93; Vité, ‘L’Applicabilité du Droit International de l’Occupation Militaire aux Activités 
des Organisations Internationales’, 853 IRRC (2004), 9-35, pp. 29-33; Kelly (1999), supra note 230, p. 70; 
Faite (2008), supra note 232, pp. 154-56; Kolb and Vite (2009), supra note 255, pp. 227-29. 
264  In particular, the right under the law of occupation to use administrative detentions can prove helpful when 
facing a volatile security situation, including inter-community violence. Moreover, the law is widely ac-
cepted and applies irrespective of the legitimacy of the international presence or the predecessor govern-
ment. Furthermore, unlike evolving concepts for the international administration of territories, the law of 
occupation is an established, ready-to-operate legal framework that can be applied immediately, at least for 
the early stages of the operation in question. Furthermore, extra training is not needed, as all armed forces 
and their military lawyers are familiar with the set of rules. See, in particular: Sassòli (2005), supra note 
218, p. 691. 
265  Kelly et al., ‘Legal Aspects of Australia’s Involvement in the International Force for East Timor’, 841 IRRC 
(2001), 101-139, p. 115. 
266  Shraga (2009), supra note 146, pp. 374-75. This reluctance may be explained by the objections against the 
de jure applicability of the law of occupation, namely the generally negative connotation associated with 
occupation regimes as well as with certain limitations (e.g. on the possibility to legislate effectively) stem-
ming from the law of occupation.  
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humanitarian law by analogy is, however, not without difficulties. Many provisions are specif-
ically designed for situations of armed conflict (or occupation) and are consequently more per-
missive than those applicable in times of peace, for instance with regard to the use of (lethal) 
force, the restriction of liberty or the seizure or destruction of property. Jann Kleffner and Fred-
erik Naert, therefore, caution against applying humanitarian law as a matter of policy and stress 
that states and international organisations are not free to replace the legal framework applicable 
in peacetime (i.e. international human rights law) with the more lenient rules of humanitarian 
law, unless the conditions for their application are met.267 It thus seems more appropriate to 
limit the application by analogy to the protective rules of humanitarian law.268 Nonetheless, 
even some of these rules may prove inadequate for operational purposes. In fact, certain rules 
on the means and methods of warfare, such as the prohibition of certain weapons and certain 
forms of deception, may unnecessarily restrain the personnel of peace operations that have not 
yet become a party to an armed conflict.269  
3.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter considered the circumstances under which humanitarian law applies to the conduct 
of international forces involved in a peace operation. It rejected the arguments whereby peace 
operations should be treated differently from other belligerents because of their special man-
dates or their international nature. As a result, the determination of whether the peace operation 
– or to be precise, the states and the organisation involved therein – is a party to an armed 
conflict has to be based on the ordinary test: When its forces engage in fighting with state armed 
forces, however sporadic and short-lived this may be, there will be an international armed con-
flict. By contrast, violence with non-state armed groups qualifies as a non-international armed 
conflict, provided that it reaches a high level of intensity and that the group in question is suf-
ficiently organised. Even though the law of non-international armed conflicts is more limited 
                                               
267  Kleffner (2010), supra note 22, 51-77, p. 61, para. 20; Naert (2010), supra note 54, pp. 468-69. ICRC, 
Expert Meetings on Occupation (2012), supra note 216, pp. 86-87 (raised by a few experts). 
268  This seems to be the policy of the Netherlands as referred to by: Naert (2010), supra note 54, p. 469. 
269  The use of such means and methods (of warfare), especially expanding bullets, riot control agents and 
covert operations will be addressed at great length in Chapter 5, from p. 244. However, the rules on the 
treatment of civilians and other protected persons, especially the fundamental guarantees, could be applied 
by analogy without major difficulties. 
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and does not guarantee a combatant privilege to captured enemy fighters, there are circum-
stances under which the full set of rules may become applicable, most notably by mutual agree-
ment between the parties. 
This chapter also concluded that the special protection regime that has evolved in the last two 
decades in no way raises the threshold of violence required for triggering an armed conflict 
involving a peace operation. Rather, it shows the need for a participation-based test – in addition 
to the ordinary threshold of armed conflict – in order to ascertain whether and when a peace 
operation (or the individual states and international organisations engaged therein) becomes a 
party to a pre-existing armed conflict. Hence, where the personnel engage in acts amounting to 
direct participation in hostilities it will arguably make the entire peace operation a party to the 
conflict. This test is of particular relevance in situations in which the peace operation has not 
yet (or only sporadically) been involved in fighting and whose activities are mainly focused on 
supporting the host state authorities. The test may also be used for qualifying the interaction 
between the different actors involved in the peace operation itself. The test may help – in addi-
tion to the ordinary threshold of armed conflict –to clarify as to which sending states can be 
considered a party to the armed conflict. 
The chapter also considered the temporal and geographical scope of application, once the peace 
operation has become a party to an armed conflict. It concludes that humanitarian law continues 
to apply for as long as the armed conflict lasts or for as long as the peace operation participates 
in it by committing acts amounting to direct participation in hostilities. Although this analysis 
is essentially based on an objective test, the conclusion of formal agreements between the par-
ties may be evidence of the intentions of the parties to bring the conflict to an end. In the mean-
time, humanitarian law does not only apply in areas directly affected by hostilities, but governs 
also the actions of the international forces in other areas. It may even apply outside the mission 
area to the extent that there exists a nexus with the armed conflict in question, including spill-
over scenarios and cases involving an even further dislocation from the initial battlefield. The 
lawfulness of forceful measures in such situations would, however, also depend on the terms of 
the mandate, the jus ad bellum as a whole and other applicable restrictions under international 
law, including human rights law. 
The last part of the chapter considered the case of military occupations absent hostilities as a 
self-standing ground for the application of humanitarian law in peace operations. It concludes 
that mandate-based considerations do not matter and that the assessment rests entirely on a 
factual test. Hence, whenever international forces involved in a peace operation are deployed 
to an area over which they exercise sufficient control without the explicit and genuine consent 
of the host state, they assume the role of an occupying power. This test is further complemented 
by a participation-based test to capture cases in which the peace operation (or the individual 
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states and international organisations engaged therein) renders direct support to the military 
occupation of another entity in the mission area. In the absence of armed hostilities, only those 
humanitarian law rules that are part of the law of occupation will be of relevance. These rules 
remain applicable in the territory in question until the military occupation comes to an end, for 
instance, when the troops are withdrawn or when their presence has received the genuine con-
sent of the host state. 
The law of occupation is also the primary candidate for the approach of applying humanitarian 
law by analogy. However, while states and international organisations are generally free to 
commit themselves to higher standards, they cannot invoke such standards to justify measures 
that are at odds with otherwise applicable obligations under international law, including human 
rights law. Indeed, the approach of applying humanitarian law by analogy is partly driven by 
the misconception that human rights law is not applicable in the mission area and not tailored 
to the challenging security situation prevailing there. These questions will be addressed at great 
length in the following chapter.
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4 APPLICATION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW IN PEACE 
OPERATIONS 
4.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW 
The foregoing chapter examined the circumstances under which humanitarian law applies in 
the course of a peace operation. In this chapter, we will consider the same question in relation 
to human rights law. As noted above in Chapter 2, states are bound by a number of different 
human rights treaties. Despite some differences in wording and structure, they greatly overlap 
as to the content of the same rights. Many of these rights do also exist under general interna-
tional law (either as customary law or general principles), which is also the main source of 
human rights obligations of an international organisation. There is strong support that at least 
the following rights fall into that category:  
- the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of life;  
- the prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of punishment;  
- the prohibition of slavery; the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of liberty; and 
- in more limited terms: the right to non-discrimination, fair trial rights, the right to free 
movement, and the most basic political rights. 
In this chapter we will examine the circumstances under which these human rights obligations 
apply in the context of a peace operation. This is mainly motivated by the fact that some human 
rights treaties appear to have a restricted geographical scope. It should be recalled that respon-
sibility only arises for the respective duty-bearer. For example, a sending state’s human rights 
obligations are only triggered for acts and omissions in the peace operation duly attributable to 
that state. Moreover, even if human rights law applies in the midst of peace operations, it is 
subject to a complex framework of limitations. Hence, we will also consider the circumstances 
under which permissible limitations and derogations may be available and possible challenges 
that need to be addressed. 
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4.2 GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW  
INTRODUCTION 
As peace operations invariably take place outside the territory of the sending states, a major 
challenge to the application of human rights treaties to which they are a party is the fact that 
many of them contain jurisdiction clauses. For instance, Article 1 of the European Convention 
states that: 
The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights 
and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.1 
In the same vein, Article 1 (1) of the American Convention reads as follows: 
The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recog-
nized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exer-
cise of those rights and freedoms.2 
Similar jurisdiction clauses can be found in a number of other human rights treaties.3 By con-
trast, the International Covenant’s clause seems to contain two separate requirements: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individ-
uals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant …4 
If the two elements ‘within its territory’ and ‘subject to its jurisdiction’ were cumulative re-
quirements, which both need to be fulfilled, the clause would effectively rule out any extra-
territorial application of the Covenant. However, in the case of Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay (1981) 
                                               
1  Emphasis added. 
2  Emphasis added. 
3  See, for instance: Art. 1 CIS Convention (‘The Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms set out in the present Convention’, emphasis added); Art. 3 (1) Arab 
Charter (‘Each State party to the present Charter undertakes to ensure to all individuals subject to its juris-
diction the right to enjoy the rights and freedoms set forth herein …’, emphasis added); Art. 2 (1) CRC 
(‘States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to each child within 
their jurisdiction’, emphasis added). 
4  Art. 2 (1) ICCPR, emphasis added. 
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the Human Rights Committee adopted a disjunctive reading of the text and confirmed this po-
sition in its subsequent jurisprudence and follow-up documents,5 including its General Com-
ment 31.6 Both Israel and the United States have rejected this interpretation.7 As Noam Lubell 
notes, however, they did not enter reservations to that effect, although both states had been 
aware of the Committee’s position when they acceded to the Covenant in the early 1990s.8 The 
disjunctive interpretation has also been confirmed by the International Court of Justice. 9 
Whether the relevant human rights treaties containing a jurisdiction clause apply to the actions 
of states during a peace operation generally depends on when and where states may be consid-
ered to exercise jurisdiction abroad. The same question may arise in the future for international 
organisations to the extent that they become parties to such a human rights treaty.10 
A number of other human rights instruments do not contain any jurisdiction clause, including 
the American Declaration (1948), the African Charter (1981) and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966).11 This begs the question of whether they are 
                                               
5  HRC, Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, View, 29 July 1981, Communication no. R.12/52, para. 12.3 (‘Article 2 
(1) … does not imply that the State party concerned cannot be held accountable for violations of rights 
under the Covenant which its agents commit upon the territory of another State, whether with the acquies-
cence of the Government of that State or in opposition to it … In line with this, it would be unconscionable 
to so interpret the responsibility under article 2 of the Covenant as to permit a State party to perpetrate 
violations of the Covenant on the territory of another State, which violations it could not perpetrate on its 
own territory’). 
6  HRC, General Comment 31, ‘Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the 
Covenant’, 29 March 2004, CCPR/C/21/Rev 1/Add 13, para. 10 (‘States Parties are required by article 2, 
paragraph 1, to respect and to ensure the Covenant rights to all persons who may be within their territory 
and to all persons subject to their jurisdiction’). 
7  HRC, Fourth Periodic Report, Israel, 12 December 2013, CCPR/C/ISR/4, para. 48 (‘Israel believes that the 
Convention, which is territorially bound, does not apply, nor was it intended to apply, to areas beyond a 
state’s national territory’). HRC, Follow-up State Party’s Report, USA, 1 April 2015, No. 038-15, para. 33, 
(‘United States again asserts its longstanding position that obligations under the Covenant apply only with 
respect to individuals who are both within the territory of the State Party and within its jurisdiction’). Hence, 
the US government did not the reasoning expressed in: US DoS, Memorandum Opinion on the ICCPR, 
prepared by Harold Koh (2010), infra note 104 (calling for a far-reaching recognition of the ICCPR’s extra-
territorial reach). 
8  Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of Force against Non-State Actors (OUP 2010), p. 198. 
9  ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, paras. 108-11. ICJ, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 19 December 2005, ICJ Reports 2005, para. 
216. 
10  A case in point is the EU, which is currently in the process of negotiating its accession to the ECHR. Art. 1 
(6), Draft Revised Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 5 April 2013, 47+1(2013)008 (‘Insofar as that term [‘every-
one within their jurisdiction’] refers to persons outside the territory of a High Contracting Party, it shall be 
understood, with regard to the European Union, as referring to persons which, if the alleged violation in 
question had been attributable to a High Contracting Party which is a State, would have been within the 
jurisdiction of that High Contracting Party’). 
11  The same is true for the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(1979) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2007). 
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subject to any geographical limitations. The African Commission did not discuss the issue of 
jurisdiction when considering the interstate case initiated by the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) against Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda for their armed activities in the Congo.12 How-
ever, in the related Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo case, the International Court 
of Justice held that:  
international human rights instruments are applicable in respect of acts done by a State in 
the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory, particularly in occupied territory13 
It referred to, among others, the African Charter. The Court has also applied a spatial limitation 
to the International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights (1966) when applying 
it to Israel with regard to its obligations in the Palestinian Occupied Territories.14 Likewise, the 
Inter-American Commission has read a jurisdictional limitation into the American Declara-
tion.15 In conclusion, it seems that the territorial reach of these instruments is indeed very sim-
ilar to the geographical scope of application of human rights treaties with an explicit jurisdiction 
clause. They would thus equally govern the conduct of state armed forces in the context of a 
peace operation. 
Whether a similar conclusion can be drawn for human rights under general international law 
(especially customary law) is a matter of debate. While some authors have argued that no lim-
itation attaches to the application of human rights obligations stemming from sources other than 
treaties,16 Marko Milanović is more cautious and calls it ‘quite unlikely that states have as-
sumed more extensive obligations under customary human rights law than they have done under 
treaty law’.17 The official US Operational Law Handbook (2012) for JAG officers, however, 
stresses the distinction between these two sources: 
                                               
12  ACmHPR, Democratic Republic of Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, Decision, Communication 
227/1999, 27 May 2003, para. 64 (‘The effect of the alleged activities of the rebels and armed forces of the 
Respondent State Parties to the Charter, which also back the rebels, fall not only within the province of 
humanitarian law, but also within the mandate of the [African] Commission’).  
13  ICJ, Armed Activities case (2005), supra note 9, para. 216. 
14  ICJ, Wall Opinion (2004), supra note 9, paras. 112.  
15  IACmHR, Coard et alia v. United States, Decision, Case 10.951, 29 September 1999, para. 37 (‘Given that 
individual rights inhere simply by virtue of a person’s humanity, each American State is obliged to uphold 
the protected rights of any person subject to its jurisdiction’). 
16  Lubell, ‘Challenges in Applying Human Rights Law to Armed Conflict’, 860 IRRC (2005), 737-54, p. 741; 
Frostad, ‘The Responsibility of Sending States for Human Rights Violations during Peace Support Opera-
tions and the Issue of Detention’, 50 Military Law and the Law of War Review (2011), 127-88, p. 134 
(claiming that those parts of human rights law ‘which have acquired the status of customary international 
law … apply always and everywhere, and thus without the limitations which treaties tend to set up for the 
application of their provisions’); Melzer, Targeted Killing in International Law (OUP 2008), p. 76. 
17  Milanović, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties. Law, Principles, and Policy (OUP 
2011), p. 3. 
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IHRL [international human rights law] exists in two forms: treaty law and customary in-
ternational law (CIL).
 
IHRL established by treaty generally only binds the State in relation 
to persons within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction … If a specific human right falls 
within the category of CIL, it is a “fundamental” human right binding on U.S. forces during 
all overseas operations … Therefore, it is the CIL status of certain human rights that ren-
ders respect for them a legal obligation on the part of U.S. forces conducting operations 
outside the United States.18 
Hence, differing from its position on the extra-territorial reach of human rights treaty obliga-
tions, the United States considers its own troops to be bound by customary human rights law 
during overseas missions.19 A similar approach was taken by a court in the Netherlands in a 
case regarding the actions of Dutch peacekeepers during the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995. 
As the Dutch government had challenged the ratione loci applicability of human rights treaty 
law, the Hague Appeals Court relied on the apparently unlimited reach of human rights law 
stemming from customary international law: 
Additionally, the Court will test the alleged conduct against the legal principles contained 
in articles 2 and 3 ECHR and articles 6 and 7 ICCPR (the right to life and the prohibition 
of inhuman treatment respectively), because these principles, which belong to the most 
fundamental legal principles of civilized nations, need to be considered as rules of custom-
ary international law that have universal validity and by which the State is bound. The 
Court assumes that, by advancing the argument in its defense that these conventions are 
not applicable, the State did not mean to assert that it does not need to comply with the 
standards that are laid down in art. 2 and 3 ECHR and art. 6 and 7 ICCPR in peacekeeping 
missions like the present one.20 
This confirms at least the claim that customary human rights law may apply extra-territorially, 
but the question remains to what extent? This is particularly relevant for the different types of 
obligations. Indeed, customary human rights law provides arguably for a much more limited 
set of positive obligations than human rights treaties. It seems also unlikely that states would 
have accepted to be bound by a set of positive obligations that apply virtually all around the 
                                               
18  International and Operational Law Department – Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, The 
US Operational Law Handbook (2012), www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/pdf/operational-law-handbook 
2012.pdf, pp. 45-48, emphasis added. 
19  The examples of customary human rights that the Handbook provides entail, however, only negative obli-
gations: ibid, p. 48 (among others, the prohibition of ‘slavery or slave trade, murder or causing the disap-
pearance of individuals, torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged 
arbitrary detention … violence to life or limb, hostage taking, punishment without fair trial’). Likewise: US 
DoS, Memorandum Opinion on the ICCPR, prepared by Harold Koh (2010), infra note 104 (‘many obli-
gations to respect rights recognized by the ICCPR already apply to U.S. conduct overseas through the 
operation of other international legal obligations – including … customary international law rules’, empha-
sis added). 
20  Hague Appeals Court, Nuhanović v. Netherlands & Mustafić-Mujić v. Netherlands, 5 July 2011, Case no. 
200.020.174/01, para. 6.3, emphasis added. Indeed, the court was uncertain how the ECtHR would decide 
Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom (2011), infra note 42, two days later. 
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globe.21 Hence, their extra-territorial reach raises questions that are somewhat similar to those 
arising under treaty law, despite the absence of a formal jurisdictional requirement. This is why 
the following subsection on the different models for extra-territorial application are equally 
relevant for the set of human rights stemming from general international law (i.e. custom and 
general principles). Since general international law constitutes the main source of their obliga-
tions under human rights law, this discussion is also of key relevance for international organi-
sations involved in a peace operation. 
MODELS FOR EXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPLICATION 
Introduction 
The term ‘jurisdiction’ may be used in different ways and its meaning is highly context-specific. 
This has been explicitly acknowledged by Ian Brownlie, who notes that certain terminology: 
is not employed very consistently in legal sources such as works of authority or opinions 
of law officers, or by statesmen, who naturally place political meanings in the foreground. 
The terminology as used by lawyers is also unsatisfactory in that the complexity and diver-
sity of the rights, duties, powers, liberties, and immunities of states are obscured by the 
liberal use of omnibus terms like ‘sovereignty’ and ‘jurisdiction’.22  
It is thus surprising that the Grand Chamber of the European Court referred to an ‘ordinary 
meaning’ of jurisdiction when interpreting the meaning of the term in its decision on Banković 
v. Belgium et al. (2001), involving the NATO-bombing of a Belgrade TV station during the 
Kosovo war in 1999: 
As to the “ordinary meaning” of the relevant term in Article 1 of the Convention, the Court 
is satisfied that, from the standpoint of public international law, the jurisdictional compe-
tence of a State is primarily territorial. While international law does not exclude a State’s 
exercise of jurisdiction extra-territorially, the suggested bases of such jurisdiction (includ-
ing nationality, flag, diplomatic and consular relations, effect, protection, passive person-
ality and universality) are, as a general rule, defined and limited by the sovereign territorial 
rights of the other relevant States.23  
                                               
21  Similarly: Kretzmer, ‘Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate 
Means of Defence?’, 16 (2) EJIL (2005), 171-212, p. 185 (‘The duty to respect the right to life is surely one 
of these norms [of customary international law]. A State’s duty to respect the right to life (as opposed to its 
duty to ensure that right) follows its agents, wherever they operate’, emphasis added). 
22  Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (OUP 2003), pp. 105-106.  
23  ECtHR, Banković v. Belgium et al., Decision, 12 December 2001, Application no. 52207/99, para. 59. 
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Consequently, the Court found that a state’s exercise of jurisdiction beyond its own borders was 
exceptional, requiring specific justification under public international law. 24  However, as 
rightly pointed out by Martin Scheinin, the Court discusses the permissibility of exercising ex-
tra-territorial jurisdiction, but not the ‘consequences of the exercise of authority abroad’, 
whether lawful or not.25 The Court’s legality-based concept of jurisdiction surfaces again at a 
later stage of the decision:  
In sum, the case-law of the Court demonstrates that its recognition of the exercise of extra-
territorial jurisdiction by a Contracting State is exceptional: it has done so when the re-
spondent State, through the effective control of the relevant territory and its inhabitants 
abroad as a consequence of military occupation or through the consent, invitation or ac-
quiescence of the Government of that territory, exercises all or some of the public powers 
normally to be exercised by that Government.26 
However, while grounds for lawful exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction under public inter-
national law may help in clarifying the scope of positive obligations, e.g. the duty to investigate 
the death of their own nationals occurring abroad, extra-territorial jurisdiction for the purpose 
of human rights law has to be based on factual rather than legal terms alone. This is supported 
by the practice of most human rights treaty bodies, which have all interpreted the notion of 
‘jurisdiction’ as a factual concept based on control. Both the European Commission and the 
European Court have used the control standard with regard to territory and persons,27 while the 
Inter-American Commission has referred to ‘authority and control’.28 The Human Rights Com-
mittee used a similar notion in its General Comment 31: 
[A] State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone 
within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not situated within the 
territory of the State Party.29 
It also added that: 
This principle also applies to those within the power or effective control of the forces of a 
State Party acting outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such power 
                                               
24  Ibid, paras. 60-61. 
25  Scheinin, ‘Extraterritorial Effect of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’, in: Coomans 
and Kamminga (eds.), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (Intersentia 2004), 73-81, 
p. 79. 
26  ECtHR, Banković v. Belgium (2001), supra note 23, para. 71, emphasis added. 
27  ECmHR, Cyprus v. Turkey (1975), infra note 62, para. 10. ECtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey (1995), infra note 
38, para. 62. 
28  IACmHR, Alejandre v. Cuba (1999), infra note 82, para. 24. 
29  HRC, General Comment 31 (2004), supra note 6, para. 10, emphasis added. 
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or effective control was obtained, such as forces constituting a national contingent of a 
State Party assigned to an international peace-keeping or peace-enforcement operation.30 
Despite this clear reference to peace operations, the statement does not prove very helpful, as it 
fails to explain under which circumstances this level of control may be reached.31 Unfortu-
nately, no individual complaint has so far been lodged with the Committee in relation to mis-
conduct during peace opeartions, which would have allowed it to apply the above-mentioned 
control test to an actual case. The Committee tried, however, to address the issue by including 
references to peace operations in its concluding opinions to state reports.32 But it failed to out-
line in detail the different mission scenarios that entail an exercise of jurisdiction and trigger 
the application of the Covenant in relation to the relevant troop-contributing state. In the same 
vein, follow-up responses by states have remained rather elusive and somewhat circular: 
Wherever its police or armed forces are deployed abroad, in particular when participating 
in peace missions, Germany ensures to all persons that they will be granted the rights rec-
ognized in the Covenant, insofar as they are subject to its jurisdiction.33 
What is necessary is to consider closely the jurisprudence of the other relevant human rights 
bodies and courts in order to identify the circumstances under which states’ human rights obli-
gations will apply in the context of a peace operation. The jurisprudence, especially of the Eu-
ropean Court, is rather inconsistent. Nevertheless, the following four models for extra-territorial 
application can be distinguished.34 
                                               
30  Ibid, para. 10. 
31  For a similar view: Mujezinović Larsen, The Human Rights Treaty Obligations of Peacekeepers 
(CUP 2012), p. 181; For a less critical position on this passage: Quénivet, ‘Human Rights Law and Peace-
keeping Operations’, in: Odello and Piotrowicz (eds.), International Military Missions and International 
Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2011), 99-143, pp. 106-107. 
32  For a very detailed discussion of the HRC’s concluding observations on the state reports from Italy, Poland, 
Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and the UK: Mujezinović Larsen (2012), supra note 31, pp. 
181-85. 
33  HRC, Comments by the Government of Germany to the Concluding Observations, 11 April 2005, 
CCPR/CO/80/DEU/Add.1. See also: HRC, Fifth Periodic Report, Belgium, 17 July 2009, CCPR/C/BEL/5, 
p. 15. But see: HRC, Replies of the United Kingdom, 25 March 2015, para. 6 (‘the UK’s human rights 
obligations are primarily territorial and the ICCPR can only have effect outside the territory of the UK in 
exceptional circumstances. Similarly, the ECtHR has held that the ECHR only applies extra-territorially in 
exceptional circumstances, although international human rights treaties do not necessarily have the same 
scope of application. The UK seeks to comply with its human rights obligations in relation to all persons 
detained by its Armed Forces’, emphasis added). 
34  In support of the claim that the standards under the ECHR and ICCPR have largely converged: Hague 
District Court, Mothers of Srebrenica v. Netherlands (2014), infra note 46, paras. 4.153 (‘Although the 
concept of jurisdiction in both conventions [i.e. ECHR and ICCPR] is not identical it is accepted that both 
concepts be interpreted in the same way and parties do not argue otherwise. In respect of both conventions 
it holds that only in very extreme cases does a state have jurisdiction beyond the borders of its own terri-
tory’). 
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Spatial Model 
Based on the premise that jurisdiction is primarily territorial, the clearest case giving rise to 
extra-territorial jurisdiction for the purpose of human rights law exists when a state exercises 
control over territory abroad, most pertinently as a result of a military occupation. That human 
rights treaties apply also to occupied territories has been confirmed by the Human Rights Com-
mittee and other human rights treaty bodies – e.g. concerning the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait35 
and the Israeli occupation of Lebanon36 – as well as by the International Court of Justice in the 
Wall and the Congo v. Uganda cases.37 It is, however, the European Court that has greatly 
contributed to the conceptualisation of the spatial model based on territorial control. In the case 
of Loizidou v. Turkey (1995), concerning Turkey’s occupation of Northern Cyprus, it stated 
that: 
Bearing in mind the object and purpose of the Convention, the responsibility of a Contract-
ing Party may also arise when as a consequence of military action – whether lawful or 
unlawful – it exercises effective control of an area outside its national territory. The obli-
gation to secure, in such an area, the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention derives 
from the fact of such control whether it be exercised directly, through its armed forces, or 
through a subordinate local administration.38 
In the closely related case of Cyprus v. Turkey (2001), the Court further explained that Turkey’s 
jurisdiction over Northern Cyprus: 
must be considered to extend to securing the entire range of substantive rights set out in 
the Convention and those additional Protocols which she has ratified, and that violations of 
those rights are imputable to Turkey.39 
A state that exercises control over foreign territory is thus required to observe the Convention 
to the same extent as on its own territory, including positive obligations, which implies that the 
degree of control over the territory occupied must be such that it is in the position to carry out 
‘all or some of the public powers normally exercised by the government’ there.40 
                                               
35  HRC, Report to the UN General Assembly, 10 October, UN Doc. A/46/40, para. 652. 
36  HRC, Concluding Observations: Israel, 18 August 1998, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.93, para. 10 (‘the Cov-
enant must be held applicable to the occupied territories and those areas of southern Lebanon and West 
Bekaa where Israel exercises effective control’). 
37  ICJ, Wall Opinion (2004), supra note 9, paras. 112 (‘the territories occupied by Israel have for 37 years 
been subject to its territorial jurisdiction as occupying power’); ICJ, Armed Activities case (2005), supra 
note 9, para. 216 (‘international human rights instruments are applicable in respect of acts done by a State 
in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory, particularly in occupied territory’). 
38 ECtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey, Judgement on Preliminary Objections, 23 March 1995, Application no. 
15318/89, para. 62, emphasis added. 
39  ECtHR, Cyprus v. Turkey, Judgement, Application No. 25781/94, 10 May 2001, para. 77, emphasis added. 
40  ECtHR, Banković v. Belgium et al. (2001), supra note 4023, para. 71. 
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As we concluded in the previous chapter, peace operations are in no way prevented from be-
coming an occupying power in the mission area, provided that all requirements of military oc-
cupation are met. A case in point is the situation in Iraq under US and British forces until the 
hand-over of sovereignty in June 2004. However, when the House of Lords heard the Al-Skeini 
case, involving the killing of six Iraqis by British forces in Basra in 2003, the law lords had 
doubts as to whether the United Kingdom was in effective control of southern Iraq, given the 
strength of the anti-coalition insurgency and the small number of British troops on the ground. 
Subsequently, it denied the existence of jurisdiction with regard to the deceased relatives of the 
first five applicants, who had been killed during patrols on the streets of Basrah.41 By contrast, 
when the European Court heard the case it held that all applicants’ relatives fell within the 
jurisdiction of the United Kingdom; it did not, however, rely on the spatial model (‘effective 
control over territory’) – but on the personal model, which will be discussed further below – 
for satisfying the jurisdiction test.42 The Court thus avoided the question as to whether it was 
enough to be an occupying power for clearing the threshold or whether it takes more for a state 
to exercise effective control over an area. It seems the Court did so because it also had doubts 
as to whether the entire south of Iraq, for which the United Kingdom was in charge, could be 
considered under the effective control of British forces at the time the killings took place. 
Another example for which the spatial model may be relevant is the case of buffer zones under 
the control of peace forces, such as on Cyprus or in the Golan Heights. The exclusive control 
of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) over the buffer zone has been recognised 
by the European Court in cases against Turkey concerning its presence in the north of the is-
land,43 without, however, drawing any conclusion as to UNFICYP’s human rights obligations 
inside the zone, let alone the human rights treaty obligations of the respective troop-contributing 
states.44  
So-called ‘safe zones’, which the United Nations declared in certain places during the war in 
Bosnia, are another example where the spatial model may prove relevant.45 The most notorious 
                                               
41  UKHL, Al-Skeini et al. v. Secretary of State for Defence, Opinions of the Lords of Appeal, 13 June 2007, 
para. 83 (per Lord Rodger). Only Baha Mousa, the sixth applicant’s relative, was deemed within the juris-
diction of the United Kingdom, as he died inside a military prison, para. 97 (per Lord Carswell) and para. 
132 (per Lord Brown). 
42  ECtHR, Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, Judgement, 7 July 2011, Application no. 55721/07, paras. 143-150. 
43  See, for instance, ECtHR, Isaak v. Turkey, Decision, 28 September 2006, Application no. 44587/98; EC-
tHR, Stephens v. Cyprus, Turkey and the UN, Decision on Admissibility, 11 December 2008, Application 
no. 45267/06.  
44  For an excellent discussion: Mujezinović Larsen (2012), supra note 31, pp. 198-202.  
45  Ibid, pp. 194-98 (distinguishing buffer zones from safe areas and other security zones, which usually do 
not entail any real and exclusive control of the area in question). 
 127 
 
among them was the Srebrenica safe zone, infamous for the failure of the Dutch UNPROFOR 
battalion (Dutchbat) to prevent the mass-killing of Bosniak men by Bosnian-Serb soldiers in 
July 1995. In the Mothers of Srebrenica case (2014),46 the Hague District Court found no sup-
port for the claim that Dutchbat had ‘physical power and control’ over the entire safe area in 
and around Srebrenica, or – after its fall – over the mini safe area, where more than 20,000 
refugees had sought refuge.47 It held, however, that the Netherlands had ‘effective control’ over 
their own compound: 
The compound was a fenced-off area in which Dutchbat had the say and over which the 
UN after the fall of Srebrenica exercised almost no actual say any more. … [T]he Bosnian 
Serbs respected this area and left it untroubled after the fall of Srebrenica. … [T]he State 
was only able to supervise observance of the human rights anchored in the ECHR and 
ICCPR vis-à-vis those persons who as of the fall of Srebrenica were in the compound. The 
State was not able to do this for the populace of the safe area prior to the fall of Srebrenica 
and even less after that vis-à-vis the refugees in the mini safe area that lay beyond the 
compound or beyond the mini safe area.48  
Hence, the Dutch peacekeepers in Srebrenica had only control over their compound and were 
thus only in a position and thus expected to protect the refugees present there. This included the 
320 able-bodied men among them, who (with few exceptions) were executed following their 
forced evacuation from the compound.49 
A closely related example is the case of international territorial administrations, such as in Ko-
sovo or formerly in East Timor. In the case of Behrami and Saramati v. France and Norway 
(2007), the European Court avoided the question of whether the troop-contributing states were 
in effective control of territory in Kosovo, as it attributed the conduct of KFOR – albeit wrongly 
– to the United Nations alone. Only on the side-lines did the Court mention that: 
Kosovo was … under the effective control of the international presences [i.e. KFOR and 
UNMIK] which exercised the public powers normally exercised by the Government of the 
FRY.50 
This passage has led Aurel Sari to claim that the Court was perhaps not so wrong when denying 
jurisdiction on the part of France and Norway,51 suggesting that effective control over territory 
                                               
46  Hague District Court, Mothers of Srebrenica v. Netherlands, Judgment, 16 July 2014, Case no. 
C/09/295247. 
47  Ibid, para. 4.159. 
48  Ibid, paras. 4.160-61. 
49  Ibid, para. 4.338. 
50  ECtHR, Behrami and Saramati v. France and Norway, Decision, Application no. 71412/01 and 78166/01, 
2 May 2007, para. 70, references omitted. 
51  Sari, ‘Autonomy, Attribution and Accountability: Reflections on the “Behrami” Case’, in: Collins and 
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can only be exercised by one entity. By contrast, Milanović believes that control does not nec-
essarily have to be exclusive and deems it possible that certain parts of Kosovo may also have 
been under the effective control of the respective troop-contributing states.52 The Court’s posi-
tion on the matter is not entirely clear from its case-law. As mentioned above, the fact that in 
the Al-Skeini case (2011) it did not apply the spatial model seems to suggest that it defines 
effective control in rather exclusive terms.  
A similar conclusion can be drawn from the case of Issa v. Turkey (2004), which involved the 
alleged killing of Iraqi nationals during Turkish military operations in northern Iraq over a six-
week period in spring 1995. The Court disagreed with the applicants that Turkey had effective 
control over the entire area of northern Iraq and distinguished the facts of the case from the 
situation in northern Cyprus on the basis of the size of the area, the duration of the troops’ 
presence and the degree of control exercised.53 However, rather than disregarding the effective 
control model altogether, the Court went on to say that it did: 
not exclude the possibility that, as a consequence of this military action, the respondent 
State could be considered to have exercised, temporarily, effective overall control of a par-
ticular portion of the territory of northern Iraq. Accordingly, if there is a sufficient factual 
basis for holding that, at the relevant time, the victims were within that specific area, it 
would follow logically that they were within the jurisdiction of Turkey.54 
The Court was thus willing to apply the spatial model to a much more limited area where the 
necessary degree of control was exercised, even if only temporarily.55 In other words, a state 
whose national contingent is involved in a peace operation may be considered to exercise juris-
diction towards the inhabitants of a small area under its control, such as a village, to the effect 
that it has to observe the full range of rights there. More interestingly, the European Court has 
applied the model to even smaller places, apparently driven by its quest for locations under 
virtually exclusive control.56 For instance, the Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi case (2009) concerned 
the applicants’ detention in a military prison run by British forces as part of the Multinational 
                                               
White (eds.), International Organizations and the Idea of Autonomy: Institutional Independence in the In-
ternational Legal Order (Routledge, London 2011), 257-277, pp. 264-66. 
52  Milanović (2011), supra note 17, p. 150. 
53  ECtHR, Issa v. Turkey, Judgement, 16 November 2004, Application no. 31821/96, para 75. 
54  Ibid, para. 74, emphasis added. 
55  In addition to this reading of the case, Louise Doswald-Beck offers an alternative interpretation, whereby 
the Court’s examination on whether Turkish troops had been present in the area in question was merely to 
ascertain whether they were responsible for the killings. This plainly follows the functional approach sug-
gested further below: Doswald-Beck, Human Rights in Times of Conflict and Terrorism (OUP 2011), p. 16. 
56  When discussing the spatial model of extra-territorial jurisdiction in the Hirsi case, the Court explicitly 
mentioned situations involving the exercise of ‘full and exclusive control over a prison or a ship’: ECtHR, 
Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, Judgement, 23 February 2012, Application no. 27765/09, para. 73. 
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Force in Iraq following the hand-over of sovereignty at the end of June 2004. The Court held 
that:  
given the total and exclusive de facto, and subsequently also de jure, control exercised by 
the United Kingdom authorities over the premises in question, the individuals detained 
there, including the applicants, were within the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction.57  
It would have been difficult to argue that during the post-occupation phase British forces had 
effective control over parts of Iraq. The Court thus applied the territorial jurisdiction concept 
solely to the building of the detention facility where the applicants were being held. The Euro-
pean Court also made use of the spatial model in a case involving the interception of a foreign 
ship on the high seas by the French navy. It held that France had: 
exercised full and exclusive control over the Winner [i.e. vessel] and its crew, at least de 
facto, from the time of its interception.58 
This finding may be relevant in any peace operation with a maritime component, especially 
during anti-piracy operations. To apply the spatial concept of extra-territorial jurisdiction to 
ever ‘smaller areas’ involves, however, a certain ‘degree of artificiality’.59 Moreover, despite 
its obvious advantage, this approach also clearly has its limits, especially in the course of a 
peace operation. First, even in the case of small areas or places an overlap of jurisdiction cannot 
always be ruled out, as they can be jointly controlled by two or more states and other entities, 
thus running counter to the implicit quest for exclusive control. A case in point is Hess v. United 
Kingdom (1975), involving the detention of Nazi war criminal Rudolf Hess in a detention fa-
cility in Berlin-Spandau, which was run jointly by all four Allied powers.60 Second, while a 
considerable number of ground troops may be considered in control of a small area and thus 
bring persons present there within their jurisdiction, the same will hardly be the case for naval 
or aerial operations. Indeed, while NATO forces during the 1999 bombing campaign may have 
controlled the airspace over Yugoslavia – as alleged by the applicants in Banković – this was 
not enough to exercise control in spatial terms over those on the ground. Likewise, during mar-
                                               
57  ECtHR, Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom, Decision on Admissibility, 30 June 2009, Application 
no. 61498/08, para. 80, emphasis added. In the same passage, the Court added that this conclusion was 
‘consistent with the dicta of the House of Lords in Al-Skeini’, which had held that the sixth applicant’s 
relative, Baha Moussa, was under the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom while detained in a military prison 
inside a British base. 
58  ECtHR, Medvedev v. France, Judgement, 29 March 2010, Application no. 3394/03, para. 67. 
59  Milanović (2011), supra note 17, p. 134. 
60  ECmHR, Hess v. the United Kingdom, Decision as to the Admissibility, 28 May 1975, Application no. 
6231/73, Reports 2 (1975), p. 73. 
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itime operations the concept would only apply from the moment naval forces board the inter-
cepted vessel and bring it under their control. Hence, for both scenarios, one would have to rely 
on a different concept of extra-territorial jurisdiction. In addition, it is worth mentioning that in 
Al-Skeini (2011) the European Court explicitly recognised the limits of applying the spatial 
model to ever smaller places and objects: 
The Court does not consider that jurisdiction in the above cases arose solely from the con-
trol exercised by the Contracting State over the buildings, aircraft or ship in which the 
individuals were held. What is decisive in such cases is the exercise of physical power and 
control over the person in question.61 
This means that the spatial model is essentially complemented by a personal model, which 
seems more appropriate in such situations. 
Personal Model 
Practice of human rights bodies has also recognised a model of extra-territorial jurisdiction 
based on authority and control over individuals, which may be better suited in the context of a 
peace operation. This personal model was first employed by the European Commission in the 
early inter-state case of Cyprus v. Turkey (1975). The Commission held that: 
High Contracting Parties are bound to secure the said rights and freedoms to all persons 
under their actual authority and responsibility, whether that authority is exercised within 
their own territory or abroad … It follows that these [Turkish] armed forces are authorised 
agents of Turkey and that they bring any person or property in Cyprus “within the jurisdic-
tion” of Turkey, in the sense of Art. 1 of the Convention, to the extent that they exercise 
control over such persons or property. Therefore, insofar as these armed forces, by their 
acts or omissions, affect such persons’ rights or freedoms under the Convention, the re-
sponsibility of Turkey is engaged.62 
Rather than relying on Turkey’s role as occupying power in northern Cyprus, the Commission 
focused on the exercise of authority and control over persons. Similar language has been used 
in the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee and the Inter-American Commission. 
There is ample support in the practice of all human rights treaty bodies that a person is within 
the authority and control of a state acting abroad when that person is in the state’s custody, 
                                               
61  ECtHR, Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom (2011), supra note 42, para. 136, emphasis added. 
62  ECmHR, Cyprus v. Turkey, Decision as to the Admissibility, 26 May 1975, Application no. 6780/74 and 
6950/75, paras. 8-10, emphasis added. The Commission maintained this view in its subsequent decision: 
ECmHR, Cyprus v. Turkey, Decision as to the Admissibility, 10 July 1978, Application no. 8007/77, paras. 
24-25. 
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through arrest or detention.63 This was also explicitly accepted by the NATO states before the 
European Court in the Banković case (2001).64 What is of particular relevance for military op-
erations is the fact that the Inter-American Commission applied the American Declaration to 
persons arrested and detained by US forces during the invasion of Grenada in 1983,65 as well 
as to the detainees at Guantanamo Bay.66 The European Court has likewise found the European 
Convention applicable to persons detained by British forces in Iraq67 and it would have come 
to the same conclusion in the Saramati case (2007) had it found the applicant’s detention by 
KFOR in Kosovo to be attributable to Norway rather than to the United Nations alone.68  
However, unlike in the case of detention facilities or similar places to which the spatial model 
could arguably be applied,69 jurisdiction in personal terms already exists once the person is in 
the custody of the state in question, regardless of that person’s location at the time of the arrest. 
British courts disagreed on this point in Al-Skeini with regard to Baha Mousa, who had been 
arrested at a hotel and subsequently detained in a British military prison, where he eventually 
died. While the House of Lords confirmed the view of the District Court that the Convention 
only applied inside the prison, the Appeals Court held that he ‘came within the control and 
authority of the UK from the time he was arrested at the hotel and thereby lost his freedom at 
the hands of British troops’.70 However, it went on to distinguish Baha Mousa from the other 
five victims: 
None of them were under the control and authority of British troops at the time when they 
were killed. This is one of the main points that was decided in Bankovic. The only case 
                                               
63  ECtHR, Öcalan v. Turkey, Judgement, 12 May 2005, Application no. 46221/99, para. 91; ECmHR, Illich 
Sanchez Ramirez v. France, Decision, 24 June 1996, Application no. 28789/95; ECmHR, Freda v. Italy, 
Decision, 7 October 1980, Application no. 8916/80. HRC, Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, View, 29 July 1981, 
Communication no. R.12/52, para. 12.3; HRC, Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, View, 29 July 1981, 
Communication no. 56/1979, para. 10.2. 
64  ECtHR, Banković v. Belgium et al. (2001), supra note 23, para. 37 (‘The arrest and detention of the appli-
cants outside of the territory of the respondent State … constituted, according to the Governments, a classic 
exercise of such legal authority or jurisdiction over those persons by military forces on foreign soil’, em-
phasis added). 
65  IACmHR, Coard et alia v. United States, Decision, Case 10.951, 29 September 1999, para. 37. 
66  IACmHR, Request for Precautionary Measures Concerning the Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, De-
cision, 12 March 2002 (‘[M]ost of the detainees in Guantanamo Bay were apprehended in connection with 
this military operation [in Afghanistan] and remain wholly within the authority and control of the United 
States government’, emphasis added). 
67  ECtHR, Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom (2009), supra note 57, para. 80. 
68  ECtHR, Behrami and Saramati v. France and Norway (2007), supra note 50. The same reasoning applies 
to: ECtHR, Hussein v. Albania et alia, Decision as to the Admissibility, 14 March 2006, Application no. 
23276/04. 
69  See discussion above. 
70  UK EWCA, Al-Skeini et al. v. Secretary of State for Defence, Judgement, 21 December 2005, para. 108 
(Lord Justice Brooke). 
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which might give rise to an argument to the contrary is that of Muhammed Salim (on the 
basis that British troops assumed control of the house when they burst in), but it would in 
my judgment be thoroughly undesirable for questions about the applicability of the ECHR 
to turn for their resolution on sophisticated arguments of this kind. The soldiers, for in-
stance, might have found they were by no means in control of the house if they had all been 
shot dead by hostile gunfire after they had broken in. It is essential, in my judgment, to set 
rules which are readily intelligible. If troops deliberately and effectively restrict someone’s 
liberty he is under their control. This did not happen in any of these five cases.71 
Hence, in the view of the Appeals Court, the exercise of authority and control for the purpose 
of establishing jurisdiction under the Convention requires a custodial situation. This may lead 
to an absurd result: states could evade their responsibility for prima facie human rights viola-
tions abroad by simply killing rather than arresting a person, thus running counter to the objects 
and purposes of human rights law.72 Even with regard to the use of potentially lethal force – the 
topic of the present study – there is a continuum of different scenarios that may be envisaged, 
ranging from close range shooting, for instance, to effect an arrest, to long-distance targeting 
with robust weaponry. The case-law of the human rights monitoring bodies is not entirely clear 
on this matter. 
For a long time, Banković (2001) was the only relevant case under the European Convention 
that involved the extra-territorial use of force, namely the bombing of a Belgrade TV station by 
NATO air forces during the Kosovo war, which left sixteen persons dead and another sixteen 
seriously injured. The Court’s Grand Chamber held unanimously that air strikes were not capa-
ble of bringing the victims within the jurisdiction of the respondent states.73 Yet, the Court’s 
subsequent case-law significantly departed from this restrictive control concept. In the case of 
Isaak v. Turkey (2006), the Court held that the victim, a Greek-Cypriot demonstrator who was 
beaten to death by Turkish security personnel and civilian counter-demonstrators in the neutral 
UN buffer zone in Cyprus, was ‘under the authority and/or effective control’ of Turkey due to 
the acts of its agents.74 Moreover, in a closely related incident involving a rally in the vicinity 
of the UN buffer zone, Turkish armed forces fired into the crowd leading to serious injuries of 
a person standing on the Greek-Cypriot side. In its decision, the Court held that  
even though the applicant sustained her injuries in territory over which Turkey exercised 
no control, the opening of fire on the crowd from close range, which was the direct and 
                                               
71  Ibid, para. 110 (Lord Justice Brooke), emphasis added and references omitted. 
72  In a similar way: Hannum, ‘Remarks, Bombing for Peace: Collateral Damage and Human Rights’, 96 
American Society of International Law Proceedings (2002), 96-99, p. 98. 
73  ECtHR, Banković v. Belgium et alia (2001), supra note 23. This finding was closely linked to the Court’s 
assertion that the case fell outside the espace juridique of the Convention. See the discussion in the section 
below, p. 159. 
74  ECtHR, Isaak v. Turkey, Decision as to the Applicability, 28 September 2006, Application no. 44587/98. 
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immediate cause of those injuries, was such that the applicant must be regarded as “within 
the jurisdiction” of Turkey.75 
Another case, which comes even closer to the situation in Banković, is Pad v. Turkey (2007), 
involving the killing of seven Iranians by Turkish helicopter fire along the Turkish-Iranian bor-
der. Although it was unclear whether the incident had occurred on the Iranian or Turkish side 
of the border, the Court held that  
it is not required to determine the exact location of the impugned events, given that the 
Government had already admitted that the fire discharged from the helicopters had caused 
the killing of the applicants’ relatives … Accordingly, the Court finds that the victims of 
the impugned events were within the jurisdiction of Turkey.76 
This ruling seems to be at variance with the Banković decision with regard to the level of control 
required. It would indeed seem artificial to distinguish these cases from one another merely on 
the basis that the NATO bombing raid was conducted from a higher altitude than the helicopter 
machine-gun fire.  
The practice of other bodies on this issue is also instructive. For instance, in Congo v. Uganda 
the International Court of Justice deemed the International Covenant applicable ‘in respect of 
acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory, particularly in 
occupied territory’.77 The use of the word ‘particularly’ implies that the Covenant also applied 
in areas that were at that time not ‘occupied’ by Ugandan forces. The Court, however, did not 
specify whether the Covenant also applies to the use of lethal force where the victims had not 
yet been taken into custody. A clearer example is the Court’s advisory opinion on the Legality 
of the Use of Nuclear Weapons (1996). Even though the Court did not explicitly discuss the 
extra-territorial application of human rights treaties, it nevertheless implicitly recognised that 
the Covenant applies to the use of nuclear weapons abroad. Given the effects of such weapons, 
their deliberate use on a state’s own territory is highly unlikely. Moreover, the Court resorted 
to humanitarian law rules applicable in international armed conflicts, in other words between 
two or more states. Hence, the Court must have meant that the use of nuclear weapons amounts 
to the exercise of control and thus of jurisdiction in order to trigger the application of the Cov-
enant. 
                                               
75  ECtHR, Andreou v Turkey, Decision as to the Applicability, 3 June 2008, Application no. 45653/99. 
76  ECtHR, Pad v. Turkey, Decision, 28 June 2007, Application no. 60167/00, paras. 54-55. 
77  ICJ, Armed Activities (2005), supra note 37, paras. 216. 
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The Human Rights Committee has also acknowledged the extra-territorial application of the 
Covenant to non-custodial situations, such as in the case of a fatwa issued by the Iranian lead-
ership calling for the killing of Salman Rushdie. The fact that he was based abroad did not pose 
an obstacle for the Committee.78 Likewise, in a 1985 country report the Inter-American Com-
mission found a violation of the right to life on the part of Chile for having carried out two car 
bomb attacks in Argentina (1974) and in the United States (1976) that killed four Chilean dis-
sidents.79 The Commission has also found human rights law applicable to combat situations 
taking place abroad, including a US air force bombing a mental health hospital during the in-
vasion of Grenada in 198380 and rocket shelling like in the case of Salas v. United States, in-
volving the US military intervention in Panama in 1989, in which it held: 
Where it is asserted that a use of military force has resulted in noncombatant deaths, per-
sonal injury, and property loss, the human rights of the noncombatants are implicated. In 
the context of the present case, the guarantees set forth in the American Declaration are 
implicated.81 
Moreover, in Armando Alejandre v. Cuba (1999), which concerned two civilian aircrafts shot 
down by a Cuban military jet in international airspace, the Commission found that by opening 
fire the Cuban pilots ‘placed the civilian pilots of the “Brothers to the Rescue” organization under 
their authority’, which led to their death.82 Admittedly, because neither the United States nor 
Cuba were a party to the American Convention, all three cases had been brought under the 
American Declaration, which does not contain a jurisdiction clause, even though the Commis-
sion has read analogous limitations into it. A similar case arose, however, under the American 
Convention when Ecuador filed an interstate complaint against Colombia for a cross-border 
operation of the Colombian military against a FARC training camp on Ecuadorian soil in March 
2008. The Colombian air force had bombed the camp from the air, killing twenty-five people 
and injuring three, after which troops entered the site from helicopters and removed some of 
                                               
78  HRC, Concluding Observations: Iran (Islamic Republic of), 3 August 1993, CCPR/C/79/Add. 25, para. 9.  
79  HRC, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Chile, 9 September 1985, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66 Doc. 17, 
para. 29. 
80  IACmHR, Disabled Peoples International v. United States, Admissibility Decision, 22 September 1987, 
Application No. 9213, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.71 Doc. 9 rev.1. The Commission did not specifically discuss the 
issue of jurisdiction. The case was dropped following a friendly settlement between the parties: Report to 
Conclude the Case, 1 March 1996 Application No. 9213, Report No. 3/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.91 Doc. 7. 
81  IACmHR, Salas v. United States, Decision, Case No. 10.573, 14 October 1993, para. 6. 
82  IACmHR, Armando Alejandre et al. v. Cuba, Decision, 29 September 1999, Case 11.589, Report No. 86/99, 
para. 25. 
 135 
 
the bodies, including the one of FARC leader Raúl Reyes. The Commission found that Colom-
bia exercised jurisdiction over the camp during that operation.83  
The case of Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom (2011) brought some important clarifications concern-
ing the reach of the European Convention. The Grand Chamber of the European Court explicitly 
outlined different concepts of extra-territorial jurisdiction: 
[T]he Court’s case-law demonstrates that, in certain circumstances, the use of force by a 
State’s agents operating outside its territory may bring the individual thereby brought under 
the control of the State’s authorities into the State’s Article 1 jurisdiction. This principle 
has been applied where an individual is taken into the custody of State agents abroad.84 
This point was further specified in the recent case of Chagos Islanders v. United Kingdom 
(2012), in which the Court found that the Convention applies 
where the State through its agents exercises control and authority over an individual outside 
its territory, such as using force to take a person into custody or exerting full physical con-
trol over a person through apprehension or detention.85 
Hence, in addition to the arrest and detention of a person, the Court also recognised the exercise 
of jurisdiction by a state when its agents use force in order to take a person into custody – a 
scenario similar to that of the Isaak case, where the victim had been beaten to death by Turkish 
agents inside the UN buffer zone on Cyprus. It may, however, be difficult to clearly distinguish 
cases on the basis of whether an arrest was sought or even possible.86  
Public Powers Model 
The Court in Al-Skeini also added another model based on the exercise of public powers: 
[T]he Court has recognised the exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction by a Contracting 
State when, through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the Government of that ter-
ritory, it exercises all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by that Gov-
ernment (Banković, cited above, § 71). Thus where, in accordance with custom, treaty or 
other agreement, authorities of the Contracting State carry out executive or judicial func-
tions on the territory of another State, the Contracting State may be responsible for breaches 
                                               
83  IACmHR, Ecuador v. Colombia (‘Franklin Guillermo Aisalla Molina’), Decision, 21 October 2010, Case 
IP-02, Report No. 112/10, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.140 Doc. 10, paras. 98-102. 
84  ECtHR, Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom (2011), supra note 42, para. 136, emphasis added. 
85  ECtHR, Chagos Islanders v. United Kingdom, Decision on Admissibility, 11 December 2012, Application 
no. 35622/04, para. 70 (v), emphasis added. 
86  Note that the UK has pledged to comply with its human rights obligations (esp. ICCPR and ECHR) in 
‘relation to all persons detained by its Armed Forces’: HRC, Replies of the United Kingdom, 25 March 
2015, CCPR-C-GBR-Q-7-Add.1, para. 6. 
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of the Convention thereby incurred, as long as the acts in question are attributable to it 
rather than to the territorial State.87 
The Court thus repeated its controversial finding in Banković, whereby extra-territorial juris-
diction only exists in situations in which a state carries out public powers on the territory of 
another state in conformity with international law.88 It was precisely this type of model that the 
Court finally chose in Al-Skeini when considering whether British forces exercised jurisdiction 
over the applicants’ killed relatives, rather than the fact that the United Kingdom was an occu-
pying power and thus in effective control of South Iraq. In doing so, it referred extensively to 
UN Security Council resolution 1483 and subsequent resolutions, which authorised the coali-
tion forces to take measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq. 
As stated above, however, the Court is wrong in subjecting the notion of jurisdiction and control 
over persons to the legality element. This approach runs the risk of relieving all those states that 
act unlawfully on the territory of another state from their obligations under the Convention – 
unless they exercise effective control over an area or take a person into custody.  
Nonetheless, while the restriction may be criticised in general terms, it does not necessarily 
pose a serious obstacle for the application of the European Convention in the course of a peace 
operation.89 Indeed, as has been shown above, such missions are usually deployed with the 
consent of the host state. The same seems to be the case where they take the shape of an anti-
piracy mission; such operations typically have the agreement of the relevant coastal states to 
enter their territorial waters and have a legal basis under the Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (1982) to take measures against alleged pirates on the high seas.90 In addition, all such op-
erations have a sound UN mandate by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter. Some difficult questions may arise in this regard: Do such resolutions compensate any 
possible lack of consent given by the host state, for instance, in the case of an enforcement 
operation? Also, what kind of powers and tasks qualify as ‘public powers’? The passage in the 
                                               
87  ECtHR, Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom (2011), supra note 42, para. 135, emphasis added. 
88  Marko Milanović claims that the Court purposefully misplaced the Banković reference to ‘public powers’, 
which according to him ‘was not about jurisdiction as authority and control over individuals (personal 
model), but about jurisdiction as effective control over territory (spatial model)’: Milanović, ‘Al-Skeini and 
Al-Jedda in Strasbourg’ 23 (1) EJIL (2012), 121-139, p. 128. A close reading of the passage in Banković, 
however, reveals that the reference to public powers was not limited to cases of effective control of an area 
alone. 
89  This had already been seen by Lawson with regard to similar statements in the Banković case. Lawson 
(2004), infra note 97, p. 110 (‘The passage quoted here arguably opens the way for complaints about, for 
instance, peace-keeping operations were the armed forces of a Contracting Party exercise all or some of the 
public powers in a specific region’). Likewise: Quénivet (2011), supra note 31, 99-143, pp. 115-11; Frostad 
(2011), supra note 16, p. 143. 
90  Arts. 100-107 and 110 UNCLOS. 
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Al-Skeini judgment lists ‘consent, invitation or acquiescence’ alongside ‘in accordance with 
custom, treaty or other agreement’ without any indication as to a hierarchy between these dif-
ferent legal bases for the exercise of public powers. It could be argued that, since all states are 
members of the United Nations, they have accepted the powers of the Security Council under 
the UN Charter, including its right to adopt binding resolutions under Chapter VII and to au-
thorise military operations against the will of the respective states. Still, it would be necessary 
that the actions of the peace operation qualify as public powers, including executive or judicial 
functions. In Al-Skeini, the Court referred to the ‘maintenance of security and stability’, which 
is common place in most Security Council resolutions authorising peace operations. It remains, 
however, unclear what other tasks may qualify as public powers or ‘executive functions’.91 
Finally, could not also the protection of civilians, which was essentially the mandate for the no-
fly zone in Libya in 2011, fall under these categories?92  
Moreover, unlike the spatial model, which requires virtually exclusive control over a defined 
area, the public powers model clearly recognises the possibility of an overlap of jurisdiction 
between different actors – most likely between the state exceptionally carrying out public pow-
ers abroad and the host state authorities. It merely requires that the acts in question be attribut-
able to the intervening state rather than the territorial state.93 Even though the interpretation 
proposed here may provide a convenient answer, it also has its limits. For instance, if a state 
party to the European Convention takes measures exceeding the mandate of the peace operation 
in which it is involved, the Convention no longer applies to its actions, which may even provide 
a dangerous incentive to take measures not covered by the mandate.94 However, this concern 
seems unfounded after the Court’s recent judgement in Jaloud v. Netherlands (2014), involving 
the shooting of a civilian at a checkpoint manned by Dutch forces in Iraq: 
The checkpoint had been set up in the execution of SFIR’s mission, under United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1483, to restore conditions of stability and security conducive 
to the creation of an effective administration in the country. The Court is satisfied that the 
respondent Party exercised its “jurisdiction” within the limits of its SFIR mission and for 
                                               
91  Even if a specific task falls under this rubric, the exercise of jurisdiction may – in the view of the Court – 
be limited to the performance of only that task, rather than any other actions in the mission area. 
92  Milanović (2012), supra note 88, p. 131 (‘For example, under Al-Skeini the current bombing of Libya by a 
number of European states could not fall under Article 1 ECHR’). 
93  ECtHR, Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom (2011), supra note 42, para. 135 (‘… Contracting State may be re-
sponsible for breaches of the Convention thereby incurred, as long as the acts in question are attributable 
to it rather than to the territorial State’, emphasis added). 
94  Hence, there may well be acts and situations that would not be covered under this model. 
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the purpose of asserting authority and control over persons passing through the check-
point.95 
This indicates a significant shift from legality considerations towards factual control over the 
enjoyment of the right itself. 
Gradual Model 
In his concurring opinion on Assanidze v. Georgia (2004), Judge Loucaides defined jurisdiction 
as the ‘possibility of imposing the will of the State on any person’, which may also take the 
form of military operations abroad.96 This position essentially mirrors the views expressed by 
a number of other commentators. According to Rick Lawson, jurisdiction should be based on 
the existence of a ‘direct and immediate link between the extraterritorial conduct of a state and 
the alleged violation of an individual’s rights’,97 while the scope of positive obligations would 
depend on the degree of control exercised over the person abroad.98 In the same vein, Martin 
Scheinin calls for a ‘contextual assessment of the state’s factual control in respect of facts and 
events’ allegedly amounting to human rights violations.99 By contrast, Françoise Hampson re-
jects the control standards adopted by various human rights treaty bodies for being overly re-
strictive and defines jurisdiction instead as an ‘effective assertion of authority’. Accordingly, a 
state exercises jurisdiction vis-à-vis persons abroad whenever it ‘foreseeably affects’ the per-
son’s rights, usually through the acts of its agents.100 Despite the methodological differences, 
all of these approaches share a strong emphasis on negative human rights obligations.  
                                               
95  ECtHR, Jaloud v. Netherlands, Judgement, 20 November 2014, Application no. 47708/08, para. 152, em-
phasis added and references omitted. For a similar case: ECtHR, Pisari v. Moldova and Russia, Judgement, 
21 April 2015, Application no. 42139/12, para. 33 (involving a Russian-manned checkpoint at the cease-
fire line between Moldova and Transnistria). 
96  ECtHR, Assanidze v. Georgia, Judgement, 8 April 2004, Application no. 71503/01, Concurring Opinion of 
Judge Loucaides. 
97  Lawson, ‘Life after Bankovic’, in: Coomans and Kamminga (eds.), Extraterritorial Application of Human 
Rights Treaties (2004), 83-125, pp. 103-105. 
98  Ibid, p. 120. Similar views have been expressed by other scholars: Oberleitner, Human Rights in Armed 
Conflict. Law, Practice, Policy (CUP 2015), pp. 165-68; Mujezinović Larsen (2012), supra note 31, pp. 
367-74 (calling for a clear distinction between negative and positive HRL obligations); Lubell (2010), supra 
note 8, pp. 227-31; Naert, International Law Aspects of the EU’s Security and Defence Policy, with a Par-
ticular Focus on the Law of Armed Conflict and Human Rights (Intersentia, 2010), pp. 566-67; Lorenz, Der 
Territoriale Anwendungsbereich der Grund- und Menschenrechte (Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag 2005), 
pp. 105-18. 
99  Scheinin (2004), supra note 25, p. 76. 
100  Hampson, ‘The Scope of the Extra-Territorial Applicability of International Human Rights Law’, in: Gil-
bert et al. (eds.), The Delivery of Human Rights: Essays in Honour of Professor Sir Nigel Rodley (2011), 
157-82, pp. 166-71. 
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John Cerone and Marko Milanović follow a very similar approach of distinguishing between 
negative and positive obligations. However, rather than reading down the terms ‘jurisdiction’ 
and ‘control’ for that purpose, they show that this conceptual distinction is reflected in the 
wording of the jurisdiction clauses themselves.101 In fact, the European Convention uses the 
term ‘secure’,102 which implies a positive obligation, rather than ‘respect’. This distinction is 
even more apparent in the American Convention: 
The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recog-
nized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exer-
cise of those rights and freedoms.103 
Moreover, a memorandum prepared by Harold Koh in October 2010 in his capacity as Legal 
Adviser of the Department of State draws the same conclusion for the Covenant.104 It shows 
that the duty to respect is free-standing and not tied to the ‘within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction’ requirement as opposed to the duty to ensure.105 This is also consistent with the 
travaux préparatoires of the Covenant.106 Accordingly, states are not expected to do the sheer 
impossible of guaranteeing the full range of human rights all over the world. The scope of their 
human rights obligations rather depends on the degree of control exercised in the situation at 
hand. The full range of rights, including positive obligations, will therefore only apply when 
the state exercises effective control over territory abroad enabling it to exercise public powers. 
Where a person is in the hands of a state due to arrest or detention which does not exercise 
control over the territory, only the right to liberty and related rights will be triggered. By con-
trast, where the state merely interferes with a specific right, for instance, the right to life by 
using potentially lethal force, the state only has to observe the negative element of the said right, 
                                               
101  Cerone, ‘Human Dignity in the Line of Fire : the Application of International Human Rights Law during 
Armed Conflict, Occupation, and Peace Operations’, 39 (5) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 
(2006), 1447-510, pp. 1505-507; Milanović (2011), supra note 17, pp. 209-27. 
102  Art. 1 ECHR. The same applies to Art. 1 CIS Convention (‘shall secure to everyone within their jurisdic-
tion’) and Art. 3 (1) Arab Charter (‘undertakes to ensure to all individuals subject to its jurisdiction’). 
103  Art. 1 (1) ACHR, emphasis added. The same conclusion can be drawn for the Arab Charter and the 
CIS Convention, supra note 3. 
104  US DoS, Memorandum Opinion on the Geographical Scope of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, prepared by Harold Koh, 19 October 2010, pp. 10-11. 
105  To be precise, the memorandum convincingly shows that it is grammatically incorrect to say ‘to respect … 
to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction’, both in English and in the other authentic 
languages of the ICCPR, ibid. 
106  It was essentially the scope of positive obligations abroad which made the US call for the inclusion of the 
term ‘territory’ into Article 2 during the drafting process of the ICCPR: UN HR Commission, Summary 
Record of the 138th Meeting, UN Doc E/CN 4/SR.194 (1950), paras. 33-34. 
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that is to say not to deprive anyone of his or her life unless justified under the relevant permis-
sible limitations.107 
The practice of the Inter-American Commission and the Human Rights Committee seems to 
implicitly follow the gradual approach, having applied the relevant human rights instruments 
to a variety of different circumstances, including combat operations and extra-territorial kill-
ings. Both bodies have, however, also used more explicit language to that effect. In the Celiberti 
case, for instance, the Human Rights Committee clarified that the term ‘subject to its jurisdic-
tion’ does not refer: 
to the place where the violation occurred, but rather to the relationship between the indi-
vidual and the State in relation to a violation of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant, 
wherever they occurred.108 
Likewise, in the above-mentioned case of Ecuador v. Colombia (2010), concerning a Colom-
bian attack on a FARC camp in Ecuador, the Inter-American Commission made a lengthy state-
ment on the issue of jurisdiction, essentially embracing the gradual approach suggested above: 
[T]he exercise of authority over persons by agents of a State even if not acting within their 
territory, without necessarily requiring the existence of a formal, structured and prolonged 
legal relation in terms of time to raise the responsibility of a State for acts committed by its 
agents abroad. At the time of examining the scope of the American Convention’s jurisdic-
tion, it is necessary to determine whether there is a causal nexus between the extraterrito-
rial conduct of the State and the alleged violation of the rights and freedoms of an individ-
ual. 
What has been stated above does not necessarily mean that a duty to guarantee the cata-
logue of substantive rights established in the American Convention may necessarily be 
derived from a State’s territorial activities, including all the range of obligations with re-
spect to persons who are under its jurisdiction for the (entire) time the control by its agents 
lasted. Instead, the obligation does arise in the period of time that agents of a State interfere 
in the lives of persons who are on the territory of the other State, for those agents to respect 
their rights, in particular, their right to life and humane treatment.109 
The applicants in Banković (2001) relied on this gradual approach in their submissions before 
the European Court. They claimed that they had been brought directly within the jurisdiction 
of the respondent states by the air strikes; but, unlike in the Cyprus cases, the respondent states 
were:  
                                               
107  What is, however, often forgotten in the literature, is that an interference with the negative prong of the 
right to life may also trigger positive obligations such as the duty to conduct an effective investigation into 
the killing, while the duty to protect the person’s life against third persons will not be triggered in this 
scenario. 
108  HRC, Lilian Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay (1982), supra note 63, para. 10.2. 
109  IACmHR, Ecuador v. Colombia (2010), supra note 83, paras. 99-100, emphasis added. 
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not obliged to do the impossible (secure the full range of Convention rights) but rather are 
held accountable for those Convention rights within their control in the situation in ques-
tion (emphasis added).110 
The Court, however, rejected this argument by stating that the concept of Article 1 could not 
be ‘divided and tailored in accordance with the particular circumstances of the extra-territorial 
act in question’, which would otherwise render the term state’s jurisdiction ‘superfluous and 
devoid of any purpose’.111 Yet, in the Al-Skeini case (2011) the Court explicitly departed from 
this all-or-nothing approach for applying the Convention extra-territorially: 
It is clear that, whenever the State through its agents exercises control and authority over 
an individual, and thus jurisdiction, the State is under an obligation under Article 1 to secure 
to that individual the rights and freedoms under Section 1 of the Convention that are rele-
vant to the situation of that individual. In this sense, therefore, the Convention rights can 
be “divided and tailored” (compare Banković, cited above, § 75).112 
This verdict was upheld by the Grand Chamber in the subsequent Hirsi case (2012).113 But the 
Court also stated orbiter dictum that the Convention was not applicable to an ‘instantaneous 
extra-territorial act’.114 Consequently, the new dividing-and-tailoring approach to the rights un-
der the Convention appears to be only of very limited relevance, such as with regard to persons 
in the custody of a state acting abroad. Nevertheless, some of the post-Banković cases discussed 
above seem to follow at least implicitly the gradual approach.115 Moreover, the European Court 
has repeatedly stated that Article 1 of the European Convention:  
cannot be interpreted so as to allow a State party to perpetrate violations of the Convention 
on the territory of another State, which it could not perpetrate on its own territory’.116 
                                               
110 ECtHR, Banković v. Belgium (2001), supra note 23, para. 46. 
111 Ibid, para. 75. 
112  ECtHR, Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom (2011), supra note 42, para. 137. 
113  ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy (2012), supra note 56, para. 74. 
114  Ibid, para. 73, emphasis added (‘which is however ruled out when, as in Banković, only an instantaneous 
extra-territorial act is at issue, since the wording of Article1 does not accommodate such an approach to 
“jurisdiction”‘). It thus repeated an earlier statement made in Medvedyev v. France, (2010), supra note 58, 
para. 64 (‘where – as in the Banković case – what was at issue was an instantaneous extraterritorial act, as 
the provisions of Article 1 did not admit of a “cause-and-effect” notion of “jurisdiction”‘). 
115  There is also increasing support from British courts for the gradual approach: EWHC, Al-Saadoon v. Sec-
retary of State for Defence, Judgement, 17 March 2015, EWHC 715 (Admin), paras. 112-30 (which confirms 
in relation to a number of test cases arising from British military operations in Iraq that, in additional to the 
public powers model, ‘jurisdiction also arose through the exercise of physical power and control over the 
individual who was shot and killed’, which only excludes death and injury caused by (traffic) accidents). 
This broad concept was in principle confirmed in a related case: UK EWCA, Serdar Mohammed et al. v. 
Ministry of Defence, Judgment, 30 July 2015, EWCA Civ 843, paras. 95-106. 
116  For instance: ECtHR, Solomou v Turkey, Judgement, 24 June 2008, Application no. 36832/97, para. 45; 
Issa v. Turkey (2004), supra note 53, para. 71; Isaak v. Turkey (2006), supra note 74; Andreou v. Turkey 
(2008), supra note 75. This wording was borrowed from the case of Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, para. 10.3. 
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The word ‘perpetrate’ seems to refer to violations of negative obligations, which would support 
the gradual approach. Where the personnel of a peace operation do not exercise control over 
territory,117 their use of force would be governed by human rights law to the extent that they 
interfere with the negative rights of individuals. This is most probably the case in situations 
when lethal force is used. However, it is equally conceivable that other rights may be negatively 
affected. While the use of (potentially) lethal force is likely to fall within the scope of the right 
to life, injuries or suffering below this threshold may potentially qualify as inhuman treatment. 
Unlike torture – which requires a quasi-custodial situation – inhuman treatment can also be 
inflicted on the victim from a distance, for instance, in riot-control situations with batons, water 
cannons, tear gas and rubber bullets, all of which are capable of causing severe pain or injuries. 
Moreover, the breaking up of rallies by force would also interfere with the freedom of assembly. 
The same may be said for measures taken at checkpoints with regard to the freedom of move-
ment. Furthermore, house-searches would certainly fall within the scope of the right to privacy 
and family life, and the confiscation or destruction of property would clearly interfere with the 
right to property. 
While the spatial and the personal models are premised on the virtually exclusive control over 
the territory or person in question, the gradual approach lends itself more easily to situations 
where there is an overlap of competences between different troop-contributing states, an inter-
national organisation and the host state authorities. The concept is primarily based on negative 
human rights obligations, the observance of which does not pose a problem where there are 
other actors involved. 
REMAINING CHALLENGES 
Military and Combat Operations 
Even among those in favour of a broad geographical reach of human rights law, the inclusion 
of military or combat operations is not always absolutely clear. In his concurring opinion on 
Al-Skeini, for instance, Judge Bonello criticised the European Court for shying away from fully 
rethinking the concept of extra-territorial jurisdiction. The approach he suggests is essentially 
the same as the gradual model presented above, whereby the rights would apply depending on 
                                               
117  Due to the fact that forces are on the ground, the level of control is certainly higher than in a case of air-
bombing. 
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whether their observance is within the authority and control of the state in question.118 He 
makes, however, the following statement: 
[Jurisdiction] also hangs from the mouth of a firearm. In non-combat situations, everyone 
in the line of fire of a gun is within the authority and control of whoever is wielding it.119 
This leaves open the question of whether combat operations should also be covered by the 
European Convention and human rights law in general. Likewise, Harold Koh held in his laud-
able memorandum that US actions abroad would only be governed by the International Cove-
nant in the case of significant levels of control, which he considers unlikely to be exercised: 
(1) over the conduct of active hostilities; (2) in situations where another state took the action 
in question; or (3) where a nation’s military forces participated in U.N.-controlled peace-
keeping or other operations.120 
This is somewhat surprising because the duty to ‘respect’ does not necessarily require an exer-
cise of control. The possible extension of human rights law to state armed forces acting abroad, 
during armed conflicts and occupations, has also been criticised by others.121 Likewise, in Has-
san v. the United Kingdom (2014), involving the detention of an Iraqi during the invasion of 
Iraq in 2003, the British government had claimed that: 
where State agents operating extra-territorially take an individual into custody, this is a 
ground of extra-territorial jurisdiction which has been recognised by the Court. However, 
they submitted that this basis of jurisdiction should not apply in the active hostilities phase 
of an international armed conflict, where the agents of the Contracting State are operating 
in territory of which they are not the occupying power, and where the conduct of the State 
will instead be subject to the requirements of international humanitarian law.122  
The European Court, however, rejected this assertion and found that the detainee had been, for 
the duration of his internment within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom.123 Certainly, the 
fact that jurisdiction exists does not exclude the possibility of taking humanitarian law into 
account when determining whether there has been a violation of specific rights.124 
                                               
118  ECtHR, Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom (2011), supra note 42, Concurring Opinion of Judge Bonello, paras. 
4-20.  
119  Ibid, para. 28, emphasis added. 
120  US DoS, Memorandum Opinion (2010), supra note 104, p. 50. 
121  Dennis and Surena, ‘Application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in Times of 
Armed Conflict and Military Occupation’, 6 European Human Rights Law Review (2008), 714-31 (mainly 
focusing on the spatially restricted scope of the ICCPR); Modirzadeh, ‘The Dark Sides of Convergence: A 
Pro-Civilian Critique of the Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Law in Armed Conflict’, 86 In-
ternational Law Studies (2010), 349-410. 
122  ECtHR, Hassan v. United Kingdom, Judgement, 16 September, Application no. 29750/09, para. 76.  
123  Ibid, paras. 77-78. 
124  This question will be considered in the last chapter on the interplay between both legal regimes, see below 
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The Court will have to consider similar legal challenges when it has to decide on the merits of 
the up-coming Georgia v. Russia II case125 and a great number of applications lodged by indi-
viduals in relation to the war between Georgia and Russia in 2008.126 It will be the first time 
since the intervention in Cyprus in 1974 that the Court has to decide on alleged human rights 
violations stemming from an armed conflict between two contracting states of the European 
Convention. As the hostilities between Georgia and Russia took place solely on Georgian ter-
ritory, the extra-territoriality issue is limited to the Russian actions. So it would be rather un-
reasonable if this should prevent the Court from applying the same human rights standards to 
both parties.  
It would also be artificial to accept that the Convention protected Georgian property that was 
looted inside territory under the full control of Russian forces (spatial test), but not the lives of 
Georgians that were killed or severely injured by bombings, artillery shelling or sniper fire in 
places that – at the time of the alleged violation – were not under the control of the Russian 
armed forces, e.g. during the Russian advance on the town of Gori or bombing raids against 
targets in Tbilisi. This will be an opportunity for the Court to fully embrace the gradual ap-
proach to extra-territorial jurisdiction, whereby negative rights are always applicable vis-à-vis 
everyone, regardless of the location and circumstances (including combat), while the scope of 
positive obligations under the Convention would depend on the exact situation at hand. 
Regionality 
Forces involved in peace operations do not necessarily come from neighbouring countries of 
the state where the mission takes place. In fact, in many cases sending states are from different 
continents than the host states. This begs the question as to what extent the regional nature of 
(at least some) human rights treaties may be considered an obstacle to their application in the 
mission area. This was the main argument of the Grand Chamber in the case of Banković: 
The Court’s obligation, in this respect, is to have regard to the special character of the 
Convention as a constitutional instrument of the European public order … It is therefore 
                                               
from p. 208. 
125  ECtHR, Georgia v. Russia II, Decision, 13 December 2011, Application no. 38263/08, paras. 63-68 (de-
ciding to join the issue of incompatibility ratione loci with the merits of the case). 
126  Report of the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, 25 March 2009, The Council of Europe and the 
conflict in Georgia – Activities for the promotion of Council of Europe values and standards, 
SG/Inf(2009)5, p. 11 (‘Almost 3 300 individual applications against Georgia have been lodged by persons 
affected by the hostilities in South Ossetia at the beginning of August 2008. Seven of these applications 
were communicated to the Georgian Government on 6 January 2009’).  
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difficult to contend that a failure to accept the extra-territorial jurisdiction of the respondent 
States would fall foul of the Convention’s ordre public objective, which itself underlines 
the essentially regional vocation of the Convention system … [T]he Convention is a multi-
lateral treaty operating … in an essentially regional context and notably in the legal space 
(espace juridique) of the Contracting States. The FRY clearly does not fall within this legal 
space. The Convention was not designed to be applied throughout the world, even in re-
spect of the conduct of Contracting States.127 
The legal space doctrine has been strongly rejected by many scholars. They stress that the Con-
vention does not contain any reference to such a regionally limited scope of application. Al-
tiparmak states that the ‘ECHR is not a citizen’s rights treaty, but a human rights treaty’; thus 
human rights have to be observed universally vis-à-vis all persons falling within the jurisdiction 
of contracting state.128 The universality of human rights protection seems strongly required by 
the object and purpose of the Convention, so that ‘it would be equally unconscionable to pro-
hibit deliberate violations of the Convention on the territories of other States Parties, while 
allowing to commit them at will on the territories of other states, which are not parties to the 
human rights treaty in question’.129  
The only case in which the legal space doctrine has been explicitly relied upon in the Court’s 
post-Banković jurisprudence is Andreou v. Turkey (2008), where the applicant had sustained 
severe injuries when Turkish security forces fired shots across the cease-fire line in Cyprus: 
The Court further notes that, when she was hit by the bullet, the applicant was standing 
outside the neutral UN buffer zone and in close vicinity to the Greek-Cypriot National 
Guard checkpoint. Unlike the applicants in the Bankovic and Others case (cited above) she 
was accordingly within territory covered by the Convention.130  
In the remainder of its subsequent case-law the European Court has, however, significantly 
departed from its legal space doctrine. It has applied the Convention to a number of different 
situations outside the territory of the Council of Europe, such as the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan 
in Kenya,131 the killing of a Cypriot citizen inside the UN buffer zone132 and the interception of 
foreign ships on the high seas,133 without discussing the legal space doctrine. Moreover, in Issa 
v. Turkey (2004) the Court applied a different reading of the term ‘legal space’: 
                                               
127  ECtHR, Banković v. Belgium (2001), supra note 23, para. 80. 
128  Altiparmak, ‘Bankovic: an obstacle to the application of the European Convention on Human Rights in 
Iraq?’, 9 (2) Journal of Conflict & Security Law (2004), 213-51, p. 243.  
129  Gondek, ‘Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on Human Rights: Territorial Focus in 
the Age of Globalization?’, 52 (3) NIHR (2005), 349-87, p. 377. 
130  ECtHR, Andreou v. Turkey (2008), supra note 75, emphasis added. para. 71.  
131  ECtHR, Öcalan v. Turkey (2005), supra note 63. 
132  ECtHR, Isaak v. Turkey (2006), supra note 74. 
133  ECtHR, Medvedev v. France (2010), supra note 58; ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy (2012), supra note 56. 
 146 
 
Accordingly, if there is a sufficient factual basis for holding that, at the relevant time, the 
victims were within that specific area, it would follow logically that they were within the 
jurisdiction of Turkey (and not that of Iraq, which is not a Contracting State and clearly 
does not fall within the legal space (espace juridique) of the Contracting States (see the 
above-cited Banković decision, § 80).134 
The Court thus equated it with the term ‘jurisdiction’ of a contracting party, thus rendering the 
entire doctrine redundant and superfluous. In Pad v. Turkey (2007), the Court even went so far 
as to claim that:  
a State may be held accountable for violations of the Convention rights and freedoms of 
persons who are in the territory of another State which does not necessarily fall within the 
legal space of the Contracting States, but who are found to be under the former State’s 
authority and control through its agents operating – whether lawfully or unlawfully – in the 
latter State.135 
Possible exceptions to the doctrine had already been recognised in the case of Quark Fishing 
Ltd. v. United Kingdom (2006), in which the Court held that Banković merely stressed the ‘ex-
ceptional nature of extensions beyond that legal space’.136 This finding coincides with a similar 
argument made by Ralph Wilde that the use of the terms ‘essentially’ and ‘notably’ in the legal 
space passage of the Banković decision implies that the doctrine itself allows for exceptions and 
thus for extra-territorial jurisdiction outside the Convention’s legal space.137 This reasoning has 
been confirmed by the Court’s Grand Chamber in Al-Skeini (2011). In response to the legal 
space argument advanced by the British Government,138 it held as follows: 
[T]he importance of establishing the occupying State’s jurisdiction in such cases does not 
imply, a contrario, that jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention can never exist out-
side the territory covered by the Council of Europe Member States. The Court has not in 
its case-law applied any such restriction.139 
This statement renders the legal space doctrine virtually obsolete.140 What remains to be seen 
is whether there exists any similar restriction under other human rights treaties, especially of a 
                                               
134  ECtHR, Issa v. Turkey (2004), supra note 53, para. 74, emphasis added. 
135  ECtHR, Pad v. Turkey (2007), supra note 76, para. 53, emphasis added. 
136  ECtHR, Quark Fishing Ltd. v. United Kingdom, Decision as to Admissibility, 19 September 2006, Appli-
cation no. 15305/06, emphasis added. 
137  Wilde, ‘The “Legal Space” or “Espace Juridique” of the European Convention o Human Rights: Is It Rel-
evant to Extra-Territorial State Action?’, 10 European Human Rights Law Review (2005), 115-124, 
pp. 116-17. 
138  ECtHR, Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom (2011), supra note 42, para. 112. 
139  Ibid, para. 142, emphasis added.  
140  In support: Milanović (2012), supra note 88, p. 129 (‘After this ‘espace juridique’ is now rightly nothing 
more than a fishy French phrase, which is all that it was in Bankovic anyway’). For a more nuanced view: 
Mujezinović Larsen (2012), supra note 31, pp. 224-33. 
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regional nature. According to Louise Doswald-Beck, no such limitation features in the juris-
prudence of the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights and the Inter-American 
Commission.141 For instance, in the above-mentioned case Alejandro v. Cuba (2001), the Inter-
American Commission applied the American Declaration to acts taking place in international 
airspace above the high seas. By contrast, for Robert Goldman the jurisprudence of the Com-
mission – whose member he was from 1996 to 2004 – suggests that it considers the Inter-
American human rights system as applying solely within the Americas or that it protects solely 
nationals of member states of the Organisation of American States (OAS). He sees this as a 
possible reason why the Commission has never dealt with complaints it has received regarding 
persons in US custody in Iraq and Afghanistan.142 However, this interpretation seems to be at 
odds with the Commission’s verdict in the Franklin Guillermo case (2010), in which it held 
that: 
[A]lthough jurisdiction usually refers to authority over persons who are within the territory 
of a State, human rights are inherent in all human beings and are not based on their citi-
zenship or location. Under Inter-American human rights law, each American State is obli-
gated therefore to respect the rights of all persons within its territory and of those present 
in the territory of another state but subject to the control of its agents.143 
On the basis of this statement it would appear that the reach of the Inter-American human rights 
instruments is not limited to the territory or nationals of OAS member states. In the same vein, 
it is highly unlikely that the application of any other (regional) human rights treaties is subject 
to any similar restriction.144 
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing shows that human rights law clearly governs the actions of states and interna-
tional organisations involved in a peace operation. Neither the spatial or personal models, nor 
the public powers model provide a sufficient justification for limiting the geographical scope 
of human rights law. There is indeed strong evidence for a convergence in the practice of human 
                                               
141  Doswald-Beck (2011), supra note 55, p. 22. 
142  Goldman, ‘Extraterritorial Application of the Human Rights to Life and Personal Liberty, Including Habeas 
Corpus, during Situations of Armed Conflict’, in: Kolb and Gaggioli (eds.), Handbook of Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Law (Elgar Publishing 2013), 104-24, p. 111. 
143  IACmHR, Ecuador v. Colombia (2010), supra note 83, para. 91. 
144  For instance, Martin Scheinin notes ‘that the correct approach under the ICCPR is based on the universal 
nature of human rights, irrespective of whether the country where the alleged extraterritorial violations 
occur is a party to the ICCPR’: Scheinin (2004), supra note 25, p. 77. 
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rights institutions towards a gradual model for the extra-territorial application of human rights 
law. Accordingly, negative obligations (i.e. the duty to respect) apply everywhere at all times, 
while the scope of positive obligations (i.e. the duty to protect or fulfil) is highly context-spe-
cific. This proposition also has a strong basis in the text of the different jurisdiction clauses and 
is fully consistent with the intentions of the drafters. For the same universalist objectives, the 
reach of human rights treaties cannot be limited to a specific region. Likewise, there is nothing 
in the concept of jurisdiction and human rights law as a whole that excludes its application in 
toto in case of combat or other military operations.145 
While the spatial and the personal models are premised on the virtually exclusive control over 
the territory or person in question, the gradual approach lends itself more easily to situations 
where there is an overlap of competences between different states and other entities. Indeed, 
applied to the context of peace operations, this model allows for the application of human rights 
law in relation to the acts – as opposed to omissions – of all actors involved. In other words, 
any act directly attributable to a sending state or organisation triggers its own human rights 
obligations (under treaty or general international law) in relation to the affected right. Hence, 
the act’s lawfulness depends on the permissible limitations applicable to interferences with that 
specific right.146 
The most obvious case involves the use of (lethal) force. The very fact of targeting prompts the 
victim’s negative right to life and thus the state’s or organisation’s responsibility to abstain from 
it, unless the interference is justified by the circumstances. Human rights law provides not only 
for detailed restrictions for the deprivation of life, but also precautionary duties that need to be 
observed – including adequate training, planning and equipment – to avoid the resort to lethal 
force as far as possible.147 While positive in character, these precautionary duties are closely 
linked to the negative aspect of the right to life and thus equally applicable to any situation 
involving the resort to (lethal) force. There is a broad continuum of different scenarios that may 
                                               
145  Such circumstances raise the issue of derogations from HRL and the interplay between HRL and IHL, 
which will be addressed in the second part of this chapter (from p. 170) and the next chapter (from p. 208), 
respectively. 
146  The complex issue of permissible limitations and possible challenges in the course of peace operations will 
be discussed in the following section, pp. 166-169. 
147  Art. 2 ECHR; Art. 6 ICCPR; Art. 4 ACHR; Art. 5 Arab Charter; Art. 2 CIS Convention; Art. 4 ACHPR; 
Art. I ADRDM. For a detailed discussion on the circumstances under which (potentially) lethal force may 
be used under human rights law and the relevant precautionary duties that have to be observed, see the 
specific section in Chapter 5, from p. 220. 
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be envisaged, ranging from close range shooting (e.g. to effect an arrest) to long-distance tar-
geting with robust weaponry. It should be recalled that this includes also any form of force 
application in active combat and other military operations.  
The use of force against individuals triggers also additional duties. This includes both the duty 
to investigate the incident and assess its lawfulness as well as to provide medical assistance and 
protection to possible survivors. The exact scope of these positive obligations is, however, 
highly context-specific.148 On 20 October 2011, for instance, at the end of the Libyan Civil 
War, NATO air strikes targeted the convoy in which Muammar Gaddafi and his entourage tried 
to flee the beleaguered city of Sirte. Gaddafi survived and tried to hide in a storm pipe before 
being captured by rebels and killed shortly afterwards.149 If NATO forces had been on the 
ground and managed to capture him, they would have had to treat his injuries and protect him 
against lynch attacks by rebels. 
Also other important rights may be relevant. The use of non-lethal weapons in riot-control sit-
uations – e.g. batons, water cannons, tear gas and rubber bullets – is capable of causing severe 
pain or injuries, and thus triggers the prohibition of inhuman treatment, which means that the 
personnel of peace operation have to abstain from using such weapons or other forms of phys-
ical force in an excessive or disproportionate manner.150  
Moreover, breaking up rallies by force would also interfere with the freedom of assembly.151 
The same conclusion can be drawn for measures taken at checkpoints with regard to the free-
dom of movement.152 In addition, house-searches would interfere with the right to privacy and 
family life,153 and the confiscation or destruction of property would certainly fall within the 
scope of the right to property.154 Hence, the negative aspect of these rights – to refrain from any 
undue interference with them – binds the personnel of the peace operation in all possible mis-
sion scenarios, irrespective of circumstances. 
                                               
148  For a detailed analysis on the scope investigative duties under Art. 2 ECHR in overseas military operations: 
ECtHR, Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom (2011), supra note 42, paras. 1451-77; ECtHR, Jaloud v. Netherlands 
(2014), supra note 95, paras. 157-228.  
149  Financial Times, ‘Confusion over NATO Role in Gaddafi Death’, 20 October 2011, 
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/af362fc0-fb2e-11e0-8756-00144feab49a.html. 
150  See, in particular, p. 220, and infra note 156. 
151  Art. 11 ECHR; Art. 21 ICCPR; Art. 15 ACHR; Art. 24 (f) Arab Charter; Art. 12 CIS Convention; Art. 11 
ACHPR; Art. XXI ADRDM. 
152  Art. 2 Protocol 4, ECHR; Art. 12 ICCPR; Art. 22 ACHR; Art. 26 (a) Arab Charter; Art. 22 CIS Convention; 
Art. 12 ACHPR; Art. VIII ADRDM. 
153  Art. 8 ECHR; Art. 17 ICCPR; Art. 11 ACHR; Art. 21 Arab Charter; Art. 9 CIS Convention; 
Art. V ADRDM. 
154  Art. 1 Protocol 1, ECHR; Art. 17 UDHR; Art. 21 ACHR; Art. 31 Arab Charter; Art. 26 CIS Convention; 
Art. 14 ACHPR; Art. XXIII ADRDM. 
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While the gradual model is essentially based on negative human rights obligations and those 
duties that are inherently linked to them, the other models discussed above provide important 
additional grounds for positive obligations. Indeed, detaining a person does not only trigger the 
freedom from arbitrary deprivation of liberty,155 but also a number of positive responsibilities 
under a variety of different rights. This includes, among others, important safeguards on deten-
tion conditions and treatment, habeas corpus and fair trial rights, as well as the non-refoulement 
principle, which prohibits troop-contributing states from transferring detainees to the host state 
authorities or other contingents, if there is a risk that they may be facing torture or cruel, inhu-
man and degrading treatment or punishment.156 This is the crux of the personal model in its 
more limited form, covering only situations in which the person is in custody as a result of 
arrest or detention. 
If the control exercised by the state or organisation acting abroad extends even to territory, the 
full set of rights with all its positive obligations may become applicable. This so-called spatial 
model requires a high level of control, usually to the exclusion of other actors. But it can also 
be applied to very small areas, including the military compound of the relevant contingents, 
thus triggering the duty to take proactive measures to protect vulnerable groups that may have 
sought refuge there.157 The spatial model may also be of relevance for international territorial 
administrations, such as in Kosovo or formerly in East Timor.158 It may be complemented by 
the public powers models as an additional source of positive human rights obligations, triggered 
by delegation of far-reaching powers under the mandate or other explicit authorisations. 
                                               
155  Art. 5 ECHR; Art. 9 ICCPR; Art. 7 ACHR; Art. 14 Arab Charter; Art. 5 CIS Convention; Art. 6 ACHPR; 
Art. I ADRDM. 
156  Art. 3 ECHR; Art. 7 ICCPR; Art. 5 ACHR; Art. 8 (a) Arab Charter; Art. 3 CIS Convention; Art. 5 ACHPR; 
Art. I ADRDM. 
157  See, for instance: Hague District Court, Mothers of Srebrenica v. Netherlands (2014), supra note 46, paras. 
4.160-61. 
158  See also: Stahn, The Law and Practice of International Territorial Administration. Versailles to Iraq and 
Beyond (CUP 2008); Knoll, The Legal Status of Territories Subject to Administration by International 
Organisations (CUP 2008); Wilde, International Territorial Administration. How Trusteeship and the Civ-
ilizing Mission Never Went Away (OUP 2008); Kolb et al. (2005), infra note 333, pp. 233-315. 
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4.3 LIMITATIONS AND DEROGATIONS 
OVERVIEW 
Human rights law is a careful balance between the freedoms of the individual and the legitimate 
interests of the state and the society as a whole, including the rights of others. This means that 
even though human rights law applies in the course of a peace operation, the rights are usually 
not absolute but subject to possible limitations. That is why this section will examine possible 
challenges in applying limitations – especially derogations – in an extra-territorial setting. We 
will therefore consider a number of possible approaches for overcoming these difficulties.  
PERMISSIBLE LIMITATIONS AND POSSIBLE CHALLENGES 
The Universal Declaration (1948) states clearly that:  
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations 
as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for 
the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public 
order and the general welfare in a democratic society.159 
Similar provisions can be found in a number of other human rights instruments.160 However, 
many specific rights contain built-in limitation clauses, according to which the said rights may 
only be restricted to the extent necessary to attain a certain legitimate aim. For instance, Arti-
cle 21 of the International Covenant clearly states under which circumstances the right of as-
sembly can be limited: 
No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed in 
conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health 
or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
A less explicit form of limitations can be found in those provisions that prohibit any ‘arbitrary’ 
interference with the right in question. Clear examples are the right to life and the right to liberty 
                                               
159  Art. 29 (2) UDHR, emphasis added.  
160  Art. 27 (2) ACHPR (‘The rights and freedoms of each individual shall be exercised with due regard to the 
rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest’); Art. 32 (2) ACHR, (‘The rights of 
each person are limited by the rights of others, by the security of all, and by the just demands of the general 
welfare, in a democratic society’); Art. XXVIII ADRDM. 
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under the Covenant,161 as opposed to their counterparts under the European Convention, which 
contain an exhaustive list of exceptions under which deprivations of life and liberty would not 
be a violation.162 The arbitrariness standard also seems to be the basis for human rights under 
customary law. The advantage of using the term ‘arbitrary’ is that it is more flexible and thus 
more open for a harmonious interpretation with other legal regimes, such as humanitarian law. 
In peacetime, however, the exact content of the rights has largely converged, despite the struc-
tural differences of the provisions. Overall, permissible limitations of rights share the following 
common features,163 stemming from the provisions themselves and the practice of human rights 
bodies: 
1. Legal basis: the restriction needs to be provided by law (adequately accessible for the 
general public) to make them foreseeable for anyone that could possibly be affected and 
to maintain the rule of law.164 
2. Legitimate aim: the restriction needs to be taken in pursuance of a legitimate aim, such 
as national security, public safety, public order, public health or morals and the protec-
tion of the rights and freedoms of others.165 
3. Necessity and proportionality: the restriction must be the least intrusive measure and 
proportionate in relation to the legitimate aim pursued and to the democratic society as 
a whole.166 
The application of these requirements to the actions of states abroad and the challenges that this 
may cause has so far received relatively little scholarly attention. Naz Modirzadeh, for instance, 
points at the absence of the normal ‘two-way exchange’ between the rights-holder and the duty-
bearer – on which human rights is premised – during military operations abroad; but her criti-
cism is mainly focused on cases of military occupations.167 Others have instead highlighted that 
terms like ‘national security’ or ‘riot or insurrection’ are restricted to a state’s own territory and 
                                               
161  Arts. 6 (1) and 9 (1) ICCPR. 
162  Arts. 2 (2) (a-c) and 5 (1) (a-f) ECHR. 
163  See also: Scheinin, ‘Core Rights and Obligations’, in: Shelton (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of International 
Human Rights Law (OUP, 2013), 527-40, p. 534 (providing a longer list of common features, which are in 
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164  In a similar way: Kiss, ‘Permissible Limitations on Rights’, in: Henkin (ed.), The International Bill of 
Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Columbia University Press 1981), 290-310, pp. 304-
305; Doswald-Beck (2011), supra note 55, pp. 72-75. 
165  Kiss (1981), ibid, pp. 295-304 (providing detailed definitions for each of these terms); Doswald-Beck 
(2011), supra note 55, pp. 75-76. 
166  Kiss (1981), ibid, pp. 305-308; Doswald-Beck (2011), supra note 55, pp. 76-78. 
167  Modirzadeh (2010), supra note 121, 349-410, pp. 371 and 375 (‘I do not want an occupying power that has 
invaded my State to be recognized by the international community as having a “rights-based” relationship 
with my population’). 
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are therefore not available abroad.168 Such an overly narrow interpretation is, however, not sup-
ported by the human rights case-law. There is indeed no reason why circumstances abroad 
should not enter the equation. The European Court and the Human Rights Committee have, for 
instance, interpreted the term ‘national security’ broadly so as to also cover threats to interna-
tional peace and security169 and even acknowledged its existence as a self-standing purpose.170 
This issue is closely linked to the legal basis requirement. This refers primarily to the legal basis 
for overseas military actions under the sending states’ own internal law, including executive 
decisions or acts of parliament authorising the deployment of troops abroad and outlining the 
specific mandate.171 This should normally not pose any problems, as it is essentially in the 
hands of the states themselves, but legal difficulties may nevertheless arise.172 What compli-
cates the matter even further is the fact that actions performed outside a state’s own territory 
require also a legal basis under international law.173 The mandate of the UN Security Council 
provides generally a good starting point, but may be complemented by other legal bases, in-
cluding the host state’s consent to a number of measures. 
This is perhaps best reflected by the recent case of Hassan v. France (2014), in which the Eu-
ropean Court had to decide on the lawfulness of the arrest and detention of suspected pirates by 
French navy forces acting as part of the NATO-led anti-piracy operation off the coast of Soma-
lia. The Court found a sufficient legal basis in the mandate under Resolution 1816 (2008),174 in 
combination with Somalia’s explicit consent to operations in its coastal waters and the general 
                                               
168  Dennis, ‘Non-Application of Civil and Political Rights Treaties Extraterritorially During Times of Interna-
tional Armed Conflict’, 40 (2) Israel Law Review (2007), 453-502, p. 489 (footnote text); Goldman (2013), 
supra note 142, pp. 115-16. 
169  ECtHR, Nada v. Switzerland, Judgement, 12 September 2012, Application no. 10593/08, para. 174. HRC, 
Sayadi and Vinck v. Belgium (2008), infra note 298, para. 10.7 (‘the obligation to comply with the Security 
Council decisions adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter may constitute a “restriction” covered by article 
12, paragraph 3, which is necessary to protect national security or public order’).  
170  ECtHR, Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc. v. Switzerland, Judgement, 26 November 2013, Appli-
cation no. 5809/08, para. 127 (‘la restriction … poursuit un but légitime, à savoir le maintien de la paix et 
de la sécurité internationales. La Cour est prête à accepter cette conclusion’). 
171  The same can be said to be the case for international organisations under their internal law in relation to 
their actions. 
172  See, for instance: EWHC, Serdar Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence, 2 May 2014, 1369 (QB), in which the 
court concluded that the policy practiced by British ISAF forces of detaining suspects for more than 96 
hours without transfer to the Afghan authorities violated Art. 5 (1) ECHR, because it had no legal basis 
under Afghan law or under international law (UN mandate or IHL), and failed to meet one of the listed 
purposes. 
173  This seems to be precisely the reason why the European Court has shown considerable reluctance in the 
past to extend the reach of the Convention beyond state borders, unless the exercise of extra-territorial 
jurisdiction was permitted under international law. 
174  ECtHR, Hassan v. France, Judgement, 4 December 2014, Application nos. 46695/10 and 54588/10, paras. 
61-68. 
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anti-piracy regime under the Convention on the Laws of the Sea (1982).175 By contrast, the 
Court considered the domestic legal framework in France inadequate to justify the pre-trial 
detention of the suspected Somali pirates. It also criticised France’s delay in bringing them 
promptly before a judge once they had arrived on French soil, but fully accepted the earlier 
delay caused by the arrest and detention on the high seas and the difficult mission conditions.176 
The flexibility applied by the Court shows that human rights law is generally capable of taking 
the circumstances, including the special geographic and operational conditions, under which 
most peace missions operate duly into account.177 However, in many of the operations the se-
curity situation and other conditions on the ground may be such that it is no longer possible to 
operate under the ordinary legal framework and that emergency powers may be required. 
DEROGATIONS FROM HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS 
Nearly all human rights treaties examined here contain derogation clauses, which allow for far-
reaching measures in response to emergency situations. As emphasised by the Human Rights 
Committee in its General Comment 29 (2001), derogations are a specific – albeit more exten-
sive – form of limitations from certain rights, subject to additional requirements and specific 
safeguards.178 While using different wording, the derogation clauses follow largely the same 
pattern and share a number of common features.179 All of them require the existence of an 
emergency situation which poses a serious threat that cannot be addressed any longer with or-
dinary measures.180 Only some of them explicitly mention ‘war’,181 the meaning and relevance 
                                               
175  Arts. 100-107 and 110 UNCLOS. 
176  Ibid, paras. 99-104 (in line with previous case-law), but criticised the undue delay (2 days) once the suspects 
had finally arrived in France). 
177  By contrast, the ECtHR – and arguably other human rights courts – is not willing to show the same level 
of flexibility when it comes to the state’s failure to provide for an adequate domestic legal framework for 
its actions abroad, which is entirely in the hands of the state itself.  
178  HRC, General Comment 29, ‘States of Emergency (Article 4)’, 31 August 2001, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, para. 4. The HRC does not use the term ‘suspension’, which is often (wrongly) 
associated with derogation measures, because it implies a wholesale displacement of HRL. Assuming such 
a sweeping effect does, however, overlook the set of additional restrictions and safeguards under the dero-
gation procedure. 
179  For an excellent outline of the main features: HRC, General Comment 29 (2001), ibid; Oraá, Human Rights 
in States of Emergency in International Law (Clarendon Press 1992), p. 11-206. See also: Ergec, Les Droits 
de l’Homme à l’Épreuve des Circonstances Exceptionnelles : Étude sur l’Article 15 de la Convention Eu-
ropéenne des Droits de l’Homme (Bruylant 1987). 
180  Art. 15 (1) ECHR; Art. 4 (1) ICCPR; Art. 27 (1) ACHR; Art. 35 (1) CIS Convention; Art. 4 (1) Arab 
Charter. The exact wording of this element will be considered in the following section. 
181  Art. 15 (1) ECHR; Art. 27 (1) ACHR; Art. 35 (1) CIS Convention. 
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of which will be discussed in the following section. It suffices here to stress that there is a wide 
consensus that armed conflicts, terrorist activities, disturbances and riots (including sectarian 
violence) as well as natural disasters and epidemics are all situations that may possibly qualify 
as emergencies within the meaning of human rights law.182 It has also been suggested that emer-
gencies have to affect the whole population and the entire territory of the state in question;183 
but this has been widely rejected, as it would gravely disadvantage larger states in comparison 
to smaller ones.184 In other words, localised emergencies of sufficient gravity can also qualify 
as public emergencies within the meaning of the derogation clauses. 
Yet, derogation does not provide states with a carte blanche when facing an emergency. Rather, 
specific derogation measures must not exceed what is ‘strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation’,185 which reflects a strict necessity and proportionality requirement. In addition, these 
measures must be consistent with the state’s other obligations under international law. This 
refers, for instance, to humanitarian law but also to other human rights treaties to which it is 
bound as well as similar obligations under general international law (including jus cogens).186 
That is why there has in practice been a significant convergence of the applicable safeguards. 
This is true both for the principle of non-discrimination as well as the list of non-derogable 
rights, which differs from treaty to treaty.187 Nevertheless, all of them share a common core of 
non-derogable rights: the right to life, the prohibition of torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment, the prohibition of slavery and servitude, and certain fair trial stand-
ards (e.g. the nullem crimen principle). The European Convention and the CIS Convention con-
tain, however, an exception to the non-derogable right to life for ‘deaths resulting from lawful 
                                               
182  Joseph and Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Cases, Materials, and Com-
mentary (3rd edn., OUP 2013), para. 26.53, p. 911. 
183  ECtHR, Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), Judgement, 1 July 1961, Application no 332/57, para. 28 (‘exceptional 
situation of crisis or emergency which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organised 
life of the community of which the State is composed’). 
184  Joseph and Castan (2013), supra note 182, para. 26.53, p. 911; Buergenthal, ‘To Respect and to Ensure: 
State Obligations and Permissible Derogations’, in: Henkin (ed.), The International Bill of Rights: The 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Columbia University Press 1981), 72-91, p. 80; ILA, Minimum 
Standards of Human Rights Norms in a State of Exception, Principle 1 (b). 
185  Art. 15 (1) ECHR; Art. 4 (1) ICCPR; Art. 27 (1) ACHR; Art. 4 (1) Arab Charter; Art. 35 (1) CIS Convention 
(‘extent strictly required by the gravity of the situation’). 
186  HRC, General Comment 29 (2001), supra note 178, paras. 11-16. 
187  Art. 15 (2) ECHR; Art. 4 (2) ICCPR; Art. 27 (2) ACHR; Art. 4 (2) Arab Charter; Art. 35 (2) CIS Conven-
tion. 
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acts of war’.188 In addition, the derogation clauses include procedural requirements: while all 
include the duty to issue a notification,189 some also require an official proclamation.190 
The issue of derogation poses a particular challenge in relation to other human rights instru-
ments without derogation clauses, such as the Universal Declaration (1948), the American Dec-
laration (1948) and the African Charter (1981). Does the absence of a specific clause imply that 
there is an unlimited right to derogate or does it mean that there is no such right at all? Also, 
what is the answer for human rights obligations under general international law, such as cus-
tomary law and general principles?191 The only tenable solution leads to the same option as 
under the treaty-based derogation regime. To be precise, states and international organisations 
can deviate from their human rights obligations under other instruments and general interna-
tional law, subject to largely the same requirements and safeguards outlined above.192 What 
supports this claim is the fact that derogation clauses are considered a concretisation of the state 
of necessity,193 which has been explicitly recognised as a circumstance precluding the wrong-
fulness of states and international organisations.194 The case of the African Charter is, however, 
more challenging, since the African Commission has repeatedly excluded the possibility of 
derogations.195 This has led to a rich debate among scholars.196 But it is fair to say that the 
                                               
188  Art. 15 (2) ECHR; Art. 35 (2) CIS Convention. 
189  Art. 15 (3) ECHR; Art. 4 (3) ICCPR; Art. 27 (3) ACHR; Art. 4 (3) Arab Charter; Art. 35 (3) CIS Conven-
tion. 
190  Art. 4 (1) ICCPR; Art. 4 (1) Arab Charter. 
191  For an overly cautious view: Sari, ‘Derogations from the European Convention on Human Rights in De-
ployed Operations’, written evidence provided to the UK Commons Select Committee on Defence, No-
vember 2013, www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmdfence/931/931we13.htm, para. 
23 (‘the UK also remains bound by any human rights norms forming part of customary international law; 
the effect of a derogation on these customary norms is unclear’).  
192  Oraá, ‘The Protection of Human Rights in Emergency Situations under Customary International Law’, in: 
Goodwill-Gill and Talmon (eds.), The Reality of International Law: Essays in Honour of Ian Brownlie 
(Claredon Press 1999), 413-38; Oraá (1992), supra note 179, pp. 209-59. 
193  Cassella, La Nécessité en Droit International. De l’État de Nécessité aux Situations de Nécessité (Martinus 
Nijhoff 2011), pp. 180-95; Ergec (1987), supra note 179, p. 56-102; Hartmann, ‘Derogation from Human 
Rights Treaties in Public Emergencies’, 22 Harvard International Law Journal (1981), 1-52, pp. 12-13. 
194  Art. 25 ASR and Art. 25 ARIO. For a more detailed discussion of the operation of the state of necessity, 
see the section below on essential and legitimate interests, p. 180. 
195  ACmHPR, Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertés v. Chad, Decision on the Merits, 
11 October 1995, Communication no. 74/92, para. 21 (‘The African Charter, unlike other human rights 
instruments, does not allow for State parties to derogate from their treaty obligations during emergency 
situations. Thus, even a civil war in Chad cannot be used as an excuse by the State violating or permitting 
violations of rights’). This position was most recently confirmed in: ACmHPR, Sudan Human Rights Or-
ganisation and Centre on Housings Rights and Evictions v. Sudan, Decision on the Merits, 27 May 2009, 
Communication nos. 279/03 - 296/05, paras. 165-67. 
196  Critical of the ACmHPR’s position on the non-availability of derogations: Heyns, ‘The African Regional 
Human Rights System: In Need of Reform?’, 1 African Human Rights Law Journal (2001), 155-74, pp. 
161-62; Sermet, ‘The Absence of a Derogation Clause from the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
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derogation option is perhaps less crucial in the African context, because the Charter leaves 
states already much more room for limitations than under any other human rights treaty, so that 
the final outcome may indeed be very similar to that under the regular derogation regime. 
MODELS FOR EXTRA-TERRITORIAL DEROGATIONS 
Introduction 
A major challenge for states to invoke derogations for their participation in peace operations 
abroad is the derogation clauses’ restrictive wording. Indeed, the European Convention, as well 
as the Covenant and the Arab Charter, require the existence of an emergency threatening the 
‘life of the nation’.197 The American Convention and the CIS Convention use similar but less 
restrictive language.198 It is difficult to see how the life of the nation of a state can be said to be 
threatened by that state’s involvement in military operations abroad. On this point, Lord Bing-
ham held in the Al-Jedda case (2007) that the power to derogate: 
may only be exercised in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation seeking to derogate … It is hard to think that these conditions could ever be met 
when a state had chosen to conduct an overseas peacekeeping operation, however danger-
ous the conditions, from which it could withdraw.199 
This sceptical position on extra-territorial derogations was more recently upheld by the British 
Supreme Court.200 Likewise, a great number of international lawyers and military law experts 
are sceptical as to whether derogations could ever be available to states for measures taken in 
                                               
Rights: A Critical Discussion’, 7 African Human Rights Law journal (2007), 142-61. For the opposite view: 
Jibril Ali, ‘Derogation from Constitutional Rights and Its Implication under the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights’, 17 Law, Democracy and Development (2013), 78-110. 
197  Art. 15 (1) ECHR (‘In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation’); Art. 4 (1) 
ICCPR (‘In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation’); Art. 4 (1) Arab Charter (‘In 
exceptional situations of emergency which threatens the life of the nation’). 
198  Art. 27 (1) ACHR (‘In time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the independence or 
security of a State Party, it may take measures’); 35 (1) CIS Convention (‘In time of war or other emergency 
situation threatening the higher interests of any Contracting Party’). 
199  UKHL, Al-Jedda v. Secretary of State for Defence (2007), supra note 65, para. 38, emphasis added; sup-
ported by Lord Carswell (para. 132) and Lord Brown (para. 150). 
200  UKSC, Smith v. Ministry of Defence, Judgement, 19 June 2013, UKSC 41, para. 60 (‘The circumstances in 
which that power can properly be exercised are far removed from those where operations are undertaken 
overseas’). 
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an exclusively extra-territorial context.201 These concerns may also have been the reason why 
the so-called Copenhagen Process Principles and Guidelines (2012), which deal specifically 
with the handling of detainees in international military operations, do not even mention dero-
gations at all.202 What drives this scepticism is the lack of practice on the part of states, but also 
the failure of human rights bodies to provide sufficient clarity on the matter. In its more recent 
case-law on British actions in Iraq, the European Court simply noted that no derogation had 
been made, which could certainly be interpreted as an acknowledgment that the power of der-
ogation had indeed been available to the state in question.203 In the Al-Skeini case (2011), it also 
observed that the International Court of Justice appeared to accept that: 
even in respect of extra-territorial acts, it would in principle be possible for a State to 
derogate from its obligations under the International Covenant …204 
But it failed to express its own views on the issue and to outline necessary preconditions. Inter-
estingly, the respondent states in the Banković case (2001) had warned the European Court that 
an extension of the Convention’s extra-territorial reach would ultimately lead to ‘more protec-
tive derogations under Article 15’ in relation to international military operations abroad.205 In 
the same case, the Court stated that: 
Article 15 itself is to be read subject to the “jurisdiction” limitation enumerated in Article 
1 of the Convention.206 
                                               
201  Pejic, ‘The European Court of Human Rights’ Al-Jedda Judgement: The Oversight of International Hu-
manitarian Law’, 93 IRRC (2011), 837-51, p. 250 (raising doubts as to whether extra-territorial derogations 
could be available in overseas missions); Goldman (2013), supra note 142, p. 114; Hong Ip, ‘PSOs: Estab-
lishing the Rule of Law Through Security and Law Enforcement Operations’, in: Arnold and Knoops (eds.), 
Practice and Policies of Modern Peace Support Operations under International Law (Transnational Pub-
lishers 2006), 3-34, p. 15; Garraway, ‘The Relevance of Jus post bellum : a Practitioner’s Perspective’, in: 
Stahn and Kleffner (eds.), Jus Post Bellum: Towards a Law of Transition from Conflict to Peace (T.M.C. 
Asser Press 2008), 153-62, p. 157; ICRC, Expert Meeting on Multinational Peace Operations (2003), supra 
note, p. 19 (raised by one expert); Roxstrom et al., ‘The NATO Bombing Case (Bankovic et al. v. Belgium 
et al.) and the Limits of Western Human Rights Protection’, 23 Boston University International Law Journal 
(2005), 55-134, p. 118. 
202  Copenhagen Process on the Handling of Detainees in International Military Operations – Principles and 
Guidelines, 19 October 2012. 
203  ECtHR, Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom (2011), supra note 66, para. 100; ECtHR, Hassan v. United Kingdom 
(2014), supra note 122, para. 98. 
204  ECtHR, Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom (2011), supra note 42, para. 90, emphasis. 
205  ECtHR, Banković v. Belgium (2001), supra note 23, para. 43. 
206  Ibid, para. 62. 
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This has led some to claim that the right to derogate goes hand in hand with any extension of 
the Convention’s reach abroad,207 even though this passage was rather about the issue of juris-
diction. There is, however, support for this contention in the earlier Cyprus case (1976) before 
the European Commission, which held that: 
Turkish armed forces in Cyprus brought any other persons or property there "within the 
jurisdiction" of Turkey, in the sense of Art. 1 of the Convention, "to the extent that they 
exercise control over such persons or property". It follows that, to the same extent, Turkey 
was the High Contracting Party competent ratione loci for any measures of derogation un-
der Art. 15 of the Convention affecting persons or property in the north of Cyprus.208 
Hence, the Commission drew a clear link between a state’s exercise of extra-territorial jurisdic-
tion and its power to derogate abroad. In the same vein, Marco Sassòli dismissed the possible 
double-standard of holding states accountable for their actions abroad, while at the same time 
denying them the right to derogate because their own nation is not directly affected by the events 
abroad.209  
The Human Rights Committee has so far largely avoided the issue. In fact, it did not address 
the question of extra-territorial derogations in its statements on derogations and on the extra-
territorial application of the Covenant, including its General Comments 29 and 31.210 In its most 
recent General Comment 35 on detentions, the Committee briefly mentions the possibility of 
derogations during peacekeeping missions abroad,211 but without giving any guidance on the 
preconditions that need to be met and on how this solution could possibly square with the re-
strictive wording of the derogation clauses. That is why the following parts of this section will 
consider four different models for overcoming the conceptual difficulties inherent in extra-ter-
ritorial derogations. 
                                               
207  Mujezinović Larsen (2012), supra note 31, p. 308; ECtHR, Hassan v. United Kingdom (2014), supra note 
122, Party Dissenting Opinion of Judge Spano, para. 8 (‘the extra-jurisdictional reach of the Convention 
under Article 1 must necessarily go hand in hand with the scope of Article 15’). 
208  ECmHR, Cyprus v. Turkey, Report, 10 July 1976, Application no. 6780/74 and 6950/75, para. 525. 
209  Sassòli, ‘The Role of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law in New Types of Armed Con-
flicts’, in: Ben-Naftali (ed.), International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law: Pas 
de Deux (OUP 2011), 34-94, p. 66. Similarly: Frostad (2011), supra note 16, pp. 156-57; Mujezinović 
Larsen (2012), supra note 31, p. 308; Ekins et al., ‘Clearing the Fog of Law. Saving our Armed Forces 
From Defeat by Judicial Diktat’, 30 March 2015, Policy Exchange, www.policyexchange.org.uk/publica-
tions/category/item/clearing-the-fog-of-law-saving-our-armed-forces-from-defeat-by-judicial-diktat. 
210  Note that the issue of extra-territorial derogations has also remained entirely unaddressed in some publica-
tions dealing both with the extra-territorial reach of human rights law and the problem of derogations: 
Buergenthal (1981), supra note 184; Doswald-Beck (2011), supra note 55. 
211  HRC, General Comment 35, 16 December 2014, CCPR/C/GC/35, para. 65, p. 19, footnote text.  
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War and Armed Conflict 
As noted above, some of the regional human rights treaties do indeed mention the term ‘war’ 
in their derogation clauses. For instance, the European Convention provides for the possibility 
to derogate in ‘time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation’.212 This 
raises the question as to whether the requirement of a threat to the life of the nation refers to 
‘other public emergency’ as well as to ‘war’. This seems to be the generally accepted interpre-
tation among commentators, mainly because of the word ‘other’.213 But is there really no room 
for an alternative reading of Article 15? To be precise, could it not be argued that times of war 
constitute a self-standing ground for derogations,214 without having to amount to a threat to the 
life of the nation as required for other public emergencies? In fact, in earlier drafts ‘war’ was 
quite separate from the ‘life of the nation’ formula.215 
However, while convenient for the present purposes, this interpretation of Article 15 may be 
inconsistent with the state’s other international obligations for going against the clear wording 
of the Covenant,216 which in Article 4 only speaks of a ‘public emergency which threatens the 
life of the nation’, without mentioning the term ‘war’. During the drafting process of the Cov-
enant, the reference to war was dropped for symbolic reasons due to the United Nations’ aim 
to prevent war. Nevertheless, the drafters considered war to be the clearest example of a public 
emergency justifying a resort to derogation measures.217 Indeed, war was believed to imply a 
                                               
212  Art. 15 (1) ECHR. Similar wording in 27 (1) ACHR and 35 CIS (1) Convention. 
213  EWHC, Serdar Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence (2014), supra note 172, para. 155 (‘This wording, how-
ever, (in particular the word “other”) tends to suggest that Article 15 was not intended to apply to a war 
overseas which does not threaten the life of the nation’); Sari (2013), supra note 191, para. 15; Krieger, 
‘Die Verantwortlichkeit Deutschlands nach der EMRK für seine Streitkräfte im Auslandseinsatz’, 62 
Zeitschrift für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (2002), 669-702, p. 690; Frowein and 
Peukert, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention. EMRK-Kommentar (Engel Verlag 1996), para. 7, p. 482. 
For the same conclusion in relation to Art. 27 (1) ACHR: Norris and Reiton, ‘The Suspension of Guaran-
tees: A Comparative Analysis of the American Convention on Human Rights and the Constitutions of the 
States Parties’, 30 American University Law Review (1980-1981), 189-223, pp. 194-96 (linking war to the 
‘danger to the independence or security of the state’ requirement). 
214  Marko Milanović raises the same question, but leaves it unanswered: Milanović, ‘Extraterritorial Deroga-
tions from Human Rights Treaties in Armed Conflict’, in: Bhuta (ed.), Human Rights as Cosmopolitan 
Law? Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations in International Law (OUP forthcoming, http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2447183), p. 15. Ekins et al. (2015), supra note 209, pp. 34-35 
(discussing it only briefly in a few lines, but using it as a main argument for derogations from the ECHR in 
relation to overseas military operations). 
215  Indeed, delegates held that the derogation clause ‘had the advantage of excluding, even in the case of war 
or threat to the life of the nation, any derogation of certain fundamental rights’ (emphasis added). Council 
of Europe, Collected Edition of the ‘Travaux Preparatoires’ of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
Vol. IV (Martinus Nijhoff 1978), p. 30.  
216  Strictly speaking, the problem only arises in case the derogation under the first human rights treaty involves 
measures for which there also needs to be a derogation under the second treaty.  
217  A/2929 (1955), para. 37 (‘While it was recognized that one of the most important public emergencies was 
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level of seriousness that other emergency situations still had to reach in order to allow for der-
ogations. That is indeed the main reason why the ‘life of the nation’ formula was added to the 
derogation clauses of the European Convention and the Covenant.218 Hence in the view of the 
drafters of both instruments, situations of war would invariably pose a threat to the life of the 
nation. With this in mind, it is difficult to accept the opposite conclusion by the Human Rights 
Committee in its General Comment 29: 
The Covenant requires that even during an armed conflict measures derogating from the 
Covenant are allowed only if and to the extent that the situation constitutes a threat to the 
life of the nation.219 
What the Committee is implying here is that there may well be armed conflict situations that 
do not cross the ‘threat to the life of the nation’ threshold.220 This brings us to the ultimate 
question: the meaning of the term ‘war’ according to the drafters of the treaties. 
Unfortunately, the travaux préparatoires do not provide a clear definition of the term and its 
link to humanitarian law. There is indeed a whole spectrum of possible interpretations, ranging 
from one extreme to the other. For instance, it is conceivable that the drafters adhered to the 
traditional definition of ‘war’, as a situation of comprehensive use of force between states.221 
This was indeed the view of Adolf Süsterhenn in the Lawless case before the European Com-
mission,222 but the majority of commissioners saw no basis for such an overly restrictive inter-
pretation of the term ‘war’.223 Conversely, the drafters may have been influenced by analogous 
terminology in their own national constitutional laws authorising governments to declare a state 
                                               
the outbreak of war, it was felt that the covenant should not envisage, even by implication, the possibility 
of war, as the United Nations was established with the object of preventing war’). This is well documented 
in the discussion on the matter involving the delegates of Chile, Venezuela, the USA, the Soviet Union, 
France, Egypt and the UK, E/CN.4/SR.330, 1 July 1952, p. 4-10. Also afterwards the term ‘war’ was used 
during the discussions of the derogation clause: A/5655, 10 December 1963, paras. 51-53. See also: Buer-
genthal (1981), supra note 184; p. 79. 
218  ECmHR, Lawless v. Ireland, Report of the Commission, Application no. 332/57, 19 December 1959, Opin-
ions of Commission Members Constantin Eustathiades (para. 92, p. 95) and Adolf Süsterhenn (para. 93, 
p. 98). 
219  HRC, General Comment 29 (2001), supra note 178, para. 3, emphasis added. 
220  This is also the view of the following authors: Provost, International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law 
(CUP 2002), pp. 274-75; Montealegre, ‘The Compatibility of a State Party’s Derogation under Human 
Rights Conventions with its Obligations under Protocol II and Common Article 3’, 33 American University 
Law Review (1983-84), 41-51, p. 43; Debuf (2013), infra note 292, p. 95; Ergec (1987), supra note 179, 
pp. 126-29; and those authorities cited above, supra note 213. 
221  Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (5th edn., CUP 2011), pp. 3-15 (criticising Oppenheim’s tradi-
tional definition).  
222  ECmHR, Lawless v. Ireland (1959), supra note 218, Opinion of Commission Member Adolf Süsterhenn, 
para. 93, p. 98. 
223  Ibid, majority opinion, para. 90, p. 84. 
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of war or to impose martial law. In some cases, such declarations may even be issued for insur-
gencies or without there being any armed hostilities at all, rendering the term ‘war’ void of any 
meaning and prone to abuse. This risk was explicitly raised throughout the expert discussion 
on earlier drafts of the Covenant.224  
The drafting of the major human rights treaties coincided with the revision of humanitarian law 
– namely the adoption of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977 
– which substituted the term ‘armed conflict’ for the notion of ‘war’. It is unclear to what extent 
these developments had an influence on the actual drafting of the human rights treaties.225 The 
travaux préparatoires show, however, that the drafters often referred to humanitarian law ter-
minology and associated concepts when discussing the precise wording of the individual 
rights226 and their inclusion into the list of non-derogable rights.227 In other words, when using 
the term ‘war’, the drafters must have meant a situation giving rise to the application of human-
itarian law,228 including its modern threshold requirements.229 
It is widely acknowledged that the term ‘war’ used in the derogation clauses covers international 
armed conflicts.230 It thus covers any form of inter-state use of force, even cases of low-level 
and incidental violence that would hardly qualify as war under the traditional concept.231 But 
                                               
224  HR Commission, 95th meeting, 29 May 1950, E/CN.4/SR.195, paras. 34-37 (with the delegate of the Board 
of Jewish Organizations inquiring about ‘the exact meaning of certain phrases in the article, such as “in 
time of war”. Theoretically, the Allies were still at war with Germany’). 
225  Marko Milanović believes there was no direct influence: Milanović (2014), supra note 214, p. 14. 
226  Amendment suggested by Australia, E/CN.4/201, 19 May 1949, most likely withdrawn due to the subse-
quent inclusion of a derogation clause (‘After “arrest or detention” in clause 4 of article 9 the following 
words should he added: “except an enemy alien lawfully detained as a prisoner of war”‘). 
227  See in general: Art. 15 (2) ECHR, which excludes ‘deaths resulting from lawful acts of war’; or Art. 35 (2) 
CIS Convention, using very similar wording. For the ICCPR, see A/5655, 10 December 1963, para. 53 
(‘One representative pointed out that, since “public emergency” as defined in article 4 must be understood 
to include a state of war, lawful acts of war could not be regarded as being barred even though the article 
dealing with the right to life (art. 6) was not subject to derogation in times of emergency’). 
228  This is without prejudice to the use of terms such as ‘time of war or of imminent threat of war’ or ‘wartime’ 
used in the exception clauses of protocols that abolish the death penalty in peacetime, namely Art. 2 of 
Protocol 6 (1982) to the ECHR. See also: Doswald-Beck (2011), supra note 55, p. 192. 
229  In a similar way: ECmHR, Cyprus v. Turkey (1976), supra note 208, Separate Opinion of Commission 
Member Felix Ermacora, para. 6 (‘The term “war” is to be understood in the meaning of modern interna-
tional legislation … in particular the attempts to modify the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, avoid 
the expression “war” and use the expression “armed conflict”‘). 
230  Joseph and Castan (2013), supra note 182, para. 26.53, p. 911; Doswald-Beck (2011), supra note 55, pp. 
192-93; Lubell (2010), supra note, p. 188; Van Dijk et al., Theory and Practice of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (4th edn., Intersentia 2006), p. 1059-60; Buergenthal (1981), supra note 184, p. 80; Ergec 
(1987), supra note 179, pp. 123-29 (requiring, however, higher intensity). 
231  Skirmishes and detention of enemy forces is enough for an IAC but would not qualify as war in the tradi-
tional sense. 
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does the same hold true for occupations or non-international armed conflicts?232 Military occu-
pations constitute a special case when they are not accompanied by hostilities. They are, how-
ever, governed by the law of international armed conflicts and structurally have many features 
of ordinary emergency situations. Hence, even calm occupations should be considered a ground 
for derogations, irrespective of the threat that the situation poses to the ‘life of the nation’ of 
the occupying power.233 By contrast, the vast majority of commentators believe that the term 
‘war’ as used by the drafters of the human rights treaties during their discussions does not ex-
tend to non-international armed conflicts.234 What supports the claim that they should also be 
covered, however, is the general intention of the drafters to provide for a derogation option in 
situations governed by humanitarian law. Most importantly, however, non-international armed 
conflicts have a much higher intensity threshold than international ones, which makes them by 
default much more akin to ordinary emergency situations. 
Extending the war-based ground for derogations to non-international armed conflicts would 
make a considerable difference for peace operations, as they are usually involved in fighting 
with non-state armed groups and only rarely become a party to an international armed conflict 
or an occupying power. Nevertheless, this would still leave open the question for a peace oper-
ation to which humanitarian law does not apply at all. 
Essential and Legitimate Interests 
Another possible approach – in support of derogations for overseas operations – is to interpret 
the term ‘life of the nation’ as referring to the essential and legitimate interests of the state, also 
covering its actions abroad. Similar language can be found in earlier drafts of the Covenant and 
the European Convention, primarily in the form of ‘the interests of the people’. Indeed, in 
June 1949 the Human Rights Commission made this addition to its initial derogation clause of 
the draft covenant.235 The passage found its way into the draft of the European Convention in 
                                               
232  Similarly: Milanović (2014), supra note 214, pp. 14-15 (but not providing a definite answer). 
233  Ergec (1987), supra note 179, pp. 128-29. 
234  Doswald-Beck (2011), supra note 55, pp. 192-93 (claiming that NIACs are already covered by the term 
‘insurrection’ mentioned under Art. 2 (2) (c) ECHR, which is, however, highly doubtful); UCIHL, Expert 
Meeting on the Right to Life in Armed Conflicts and Situations of Occupation (2005), pp. 12-13 (a number 
of experts doubting the terms ‘war’ or ‘lawful acts of war’ cover NIACs); Van Dijk et al. (2006), supra 
note 230, pp. 1059-60 (considering it irrelevant, as NIACs may qualify as ‘other public emergencies’). For 
the opposite view: Ergec (1987), supra note 179, pp. 125-28. 
235  Art. 4, Draft Covenant on Human Rights, 23 June 1949, E/1371 and E/CN. 4/350, Annex I, p. 29 (‘In time 
of war or other public emergency threatening the interests of the people’). For the previous draft: HR Com-
mission, Report to the ECOSOC, 17 December 1947, E/600 Annex B 1, p. 30 (Art. 4 ‘In time of war or 
other public emergency’), which had been proposed by the United Kingdom. 
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February 1950.236 In the following months, however, it got incrementally replaced by the ‘life 
of the nation’ formula.237 What had apparently started as an accidental mistranslation in the 
French records238 became by June 1950 the uniform wording in both the English and French 
versions of the draft convention.239 Unfortunately, there is nothing in the discussion records 
that could explain the reasoning behind this shift towards the ‘life of the nation’ phraseology in 
the final version of the European Convention. By contrast, its inclusion into the derogation 
clause of the Covenant caused considerable debate. There was a wide consensus among the 
delegates that the wording of the clause should provide a high degree of clarity and guard 
against possible abuse by states. But there was considerable disagreement as to which text was 
better suited to attain that goal, leading to numerous changes of the draft article.240 When the 
United Kingdom suggested an amendment featuring the ‘life of the nation’ formula, the Soviet 
Union sought to reinstate the earlier wording restricted to emergencies that ‘threaten the inter-
ests of the people’. Nevertheless, both delegations showed support for the proposal of one an-
other.241 There was, however, some resistance against the British amendment, especially from 
Chile, India and Uruguay, which argued that the term ‘life of the nation’ was legally unclear 
and instead favoured the ‘interest of the people’ wording in the previous drafts.242 What played 
probably a significant role for the majority of delegations to eventually adopt the ‘life of the 
nation’ formula was their concern for consistency with Article 15 of the European Convention 
– a crucial point at least for the states in Western Europe. 
The interests-based approach experienced, however, a revival with the adoption of CIS Con-
vention (1995), whose derogation clause reads as follows: 
                                               
236  See, for instance: British proposal: UK Doc. A 782, Meeting of the Committee of Experts, 4 February 1950, 
Council of Europe, Collected Edition of the ‘Travaux Preparatoires’ of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights, Vol. III (Martinus Nijhoff 1976), p. 190. 
237  First appearing in the drafts of the meeting of the Committee of Experts, 6-10 March 1950, ibid, pp. 306-
07 (Art. 7 bis). 
238  Ibid, pp. 312-13 (Art. 2, only in the French version) and pp. 324-25 (Art. 8, only in the French version); 
Report to the Committee of Ministers, 17 March 1950, Council of Europe, Collected Edition of the ‘Travaux 
Preparatoires’ of the European Convention on Human Rights, IV (Martinus Nijhoff 1978), pp. 30-31 (Art. 
8); Conference of Senior Officials, 8-17 June 1950, ibid, pp. 56-57 (only in the French version), pp. 182-
83 (only in the French version) and pp. 226-27 (French text speaks of ‘menaçant (les intérêts du pays) la 
vie de la nation’). 
239  Draft Convention, Annex to the Report of the Conference of Senior Officials, ibid, pp. 280-81. 
240  A number of delegates considered the ‘interests of the people’ wording unclear and open to abuse. Quite 
surprisingly, however, they favoured a French proposal without any gravity threshold (‘state of emergency 
officially proclaimed by the authorities or in the case of public disaster’), which was then adopted as the 
new draft text: Commission on Human Rights, 195th meeting on 16 May 1950, E/CN.4/SR.195, 29 May 
1950, paras. 34-43 and 55-67, finally adopting provisionally the French proposal, para. 97. 
241  E/CN. 4/SR. 330, 1 July 1952, pp. 3-6. 
242  Ibid, pp. 4-5 and 11-14. 
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In time of war or other emergency situation threatening the higher interests of any Con-
tracting Party, that Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Con-
vention …243 
The requirement of a threat to the state’s higher interests certainly implies an exceptional situ-
ation, without, however, ruling out derogations in an exclusively extra-territorial setting.244 The 
focus on interests for the purpose of derogation is also consistent with the definition of necessity 
as a circumstance precluding the wrongfulness of states. Article 25 (1) (a) of the Articles on 
State Responsibility states that necessity can only be invoked for an act that: 
is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent 
peril.245 
The notion ‘essential interests’ does not necessarily denote a legal concept and is therefore 
difficult to define with sufficient precision, but it appears to go far beyond the survival of the 
state alone and may encompass matters of global concern.246 This follows clearly from the 
Commentaries: 
It extends to particular interests of the State and its people, as well as of the international 
community as a whole.247  
Chief among the interests of the international community as a whole is certainly the mainte-
nance of international peace and security. Indeed, if states are allowed to invoke threats to their 
own security as a serious peril to their essential interests, it seems equally appropriate to support 
the same for measures directed against a serious threat to international peace and security. 
Moreover, this approach seems also consistent with the additional requirement that the state did 
not contribute to the threat itself.248 Even though a state may put itself at greater risk by deploy-
ing its own troops to a crisis region, the overall threat to the interests of the international com-
munity as a whole would remain the same, even if the state withdrew its forces. 
                                               
243  Art. 35 (1) CIS Convention. 
244  Lena Svenson-McCarthy rejects the strong emphasis on the state. Yet, even she does implicitly recognise 
the possibility that an emergency situation may arise from a threat to the legitimate interests of a nation as 
such: Svensson-McCarthy (1998), infra note 299, p. 196 (‘The terms “higher interests of any Contracting 
Party” convey the impression that derogations may be justified by reasons of state rather than by the legit-
imate interests of the nation as such’). 
245  ASR, A/RES/56/83, 28 January 2002, Annex. For the equivalent provision: Art. 25 ARIO, A/RES/66/100, 
27 February 2012, Annex.  
246  Cassella (2011), supra note 193, pp. 180-95. 
247  Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, Yearbook 
of the International Law Commission (2001), Vol. II, Part 2, A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1, Art. 25, 
p. 83, para. 15. See also para. 14, emphasis added (‘It has been invoked to protect a wide variety of interests, 
including safeguarding the environment, preserving the very existence of the State and its people in time 
of public emergency, or ensuring the safety of a civilian population’). 
248  Art. 25 (2) (b) ASR. 
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To conclude, the interests-based approach suggested here may be a reasonable basis for extra-
territorial derogations under the CIS Convention and in relation to human rights obligations 
under general international law. It is, however, unclear whether the same holds true for the 
European Convention and the Covenant. As we have seen above, there is certainly some support 
for this approach in the drafting history of both instruments. But it is highly questionable 
whether this is indeed enough for the European Court or the Human Rights Committee to read 
the ‘life of the nation’ formula as referring to the essential and legitimate interests of the state 
in order to allow for extra-territorial derogations.249 
Threat to International Peace and Security 
Another approach goes yet a step further, by looking directly at the mandate of the peace oper-
ations in question and the language used therein. As we have seen before, the resolutions of the 
Security Council usually include the following statement before the reference to Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter: 
Determining that the situation in [the mission area] constitutes a threat to international 
peace and security,250 
One could possibly argue that if the situation in the mission area is sufficiently grave to consti-
tute a threat to international peace and security, then it must also amount to a threat to the life 
of all other nations for the purpose of the relevant derogation clauses. This argument has re-
ceived only little scholarly attention. Martin Scheinin, for instance, found it regrettable that the 
Human Rights Committee did not consider this line of reasoning in Sayadi and Vinck (2008) in 
relation to the terror-listing regime.251 Anne Peters, by contrast, rejects this solution vehe-
mently. According to her, labelling a crisis situation as a ‘threat to international peace and se-
curity’ has nothing to do with a public emergency within the meaning of human rights law and 
should therefore allow for no flexibility in relation to the derogation requirements.252 Her res-
ervation may be explained by the sweeping use of the terminology and its inherent risk to abuse. 
                                               
249  Note, however, that Martin Scheinin, who as a member of the HRC played a leading role in the drafting of 
General Comment 29, considers this a viable interpretation of Art. 4 ICCPR. 
250  Usually in the penultimate preambular paragraph; see for instance S/RES/2100 (Mali), 25 April 2013. 
251  Scheinin, ‘Is the ECJ Ruling in Kadi Incompatible with International Law?’, 28 (1) Yearbook of European 
Law (2009), 637-53, p. 640. Only Sir Nigel Rodley had pointed at the issue of derogations, but without 
going into detail: HRC, Sayadi and Vinck v. Belgium, View, 29 December 2008, Communication no. 
1472/2006, Appendix B, individual opinion of Committee member Sir Nigel Rodley (concurring), p. 37. 
Also sympathetic to the idea, albeit less technical: De Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations 
Security Council (Hart Publishing 2004), pp. 202 and 321-22. 
252  Peters, ‘Article 25’ in: Simma et al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary Vol I (3rd 
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This is certainly a concern with regard to counter-terrorism.253 Nevertheless, any measure taken 
would still have to satisfy the necessity and proportionality requirement, which serves as an 
ultimate safeguard against abuse. 
At least in the case of peace operations, the determination of the crisis situations seems entirely 
appropriate. With the potential of spreading across international borders and affecting other 
member states, these situations do indeed amount to threats to international peace and security, 
and thus an emergency threatening the life of all nations. What is more, the mandate is usually 
subject to renewal (usually after twelve months) and thus allows for a periodical reassessment 
of the whole situation. Hence, a significant improvement of the situation or other changes can 
lead to a phasing-out of the operation.254  
What complicates the picture even more is the Security Council’s own inconsistency when 
adopting resolutions for establishing peace operations or extending their mandates – even in 
consecutive resolutions on the same country. Indeed, some of them do not at all refer to a threat 
to international peace and security, even though they may provide for a robust mandate.255 By 
contrast, other resolutions do include a finding of a threat to international peace and security, 
but were not adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.256 In some other cases, the preamble 
includes only the following statement before the Chapter VII reference: 
Mindful of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and secu-
rity under the Charter of the United Nations257 
Moreover, even where the existence of a threat to international peace and security is acknowl-
edged, it may come with different appreciations. Indeed, a great number of resolutions use a 
more restrictive phraseology: ‘threat to international peace and security in the region’.258 The 
                                               
edn, OUP 2012), 787-854, p. 825, para. 124. 
253  S/RES/1368 (on the 9/11 attacks), 12 September 2001, para. 1; most recently, S/RES/2178 (on terrorism, 
especially ISIS and Al-Nusrah Front), 24 September 2014. For other situations in which the UNSC has 
been using its ‘threat to international peace and security’ formula: S/RES/2141, 5 March 2014 (on the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction); S/RES/2177, 18 September 2014 (on the recent Ebola crisis 
in West Africa). 
254  Nevertheless, some resolutions did provide a permanent mandate, for instance, in the case of Kosovo and 
East Timor: S/RES/1244 (Kosovo), 10 June 1999; S/RES/1272 (East Timor), 25 October 1999. 
255  S/RES/1981 (Côte d’Ivoire), 13 May 2011; S/RES/2124 (Somalia), 12 November 2013. Note that the last 
resolution adopted in relation to ISAF in Afghanistan that used the standard formula and referred to Chap-
ter VII was S/RES/2069, 9 October 2012. 
256  S/RES/1884 (Lebanon), 27 August 2009. 
257  S/RES/2174 (Libya), 27 August 2014; S/RES/2180 (Haiti), 14 October 2014. 
258  Emphasis added, see among others: S/RES/2147 (DRC), 28 March 2014; S/RES/2012 (Haiti), 14 October 
2011; S/RES/2162 (Côte d’Ivoire), 25 June 2014; S/RES/2187 (South Sudan), 25 November 2014; 
S/RES/2184 (Piracy off the coast of Somalia), 12 November 2014; and those resolutions cited below, infra 
notes 260-263. 
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problem with this addition is that it may effectively restrict the availability of derogations to 
those contributing states that are from the same region,259 thus undermining the attempt to find 
a sufficiently broad solution to the ‘life of the nation’ conundrum. In view of this, it seems 
surprising that the use of this regional restriction is not necessarily driven by facts on the ground 
but rather casual, even for consecutive resolutions in relation to the same country, as in the case 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina,260 Central African Republic,261 Somalia262 and Sudan.263 Also, the 
most recent Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council fails to explain this inconsistent 
use of its standard terminology.264 
It is for these reasons that the mandate-based approach does not offer the ultimate solution to 
the ‘life of the nation’ conundrum. This is not surprising, given that it has not been the primary 
intention of the Security Council members to remove the derogation obstacle that troop-con-
tributing nations may be facing. However, it does not have to remain like that. In fact, the 
Council could overcome its own inconsistency by streamlining the use of its standard terminol-
ogy and by clearly stating that the situation in the mission area in question constitutes a ‘threat 
to international peace and security, i.e. a threat to the life of all nations’. In addition, Security 
Council resolutions may also prove useful for the proclamation and notification requirement, 
as we will see further below. 
Host Nation Model  
The most prominent approach among commentators in support of derogations in the course of 
peace operations is to base the assessment entirely on the situation prevailing inside the mission 
area. Hence, rather than reading the ‘life of the nation’ formula as a reference to the sending 
states, the focus is instead put on the situation of the host nation. This interpretation seems quite 
                                               
259  Of course, the resolutions in no way define the geographical limits of the term ‘region’, but it goes without 
saying that they are not meant to include all states around the globe, let alone all international and regional 
organisations. 
260  S/RES/2123, 12 November 2013 (‘… in the region’); S/RES/2183, 11 November 2014 (using the standard 
formula). 
261  S/RES/2149, 10 April 2014, and S/RES/2196, 22 January 2015 (both using ‘… in the region’); S/RES/2127, 
5 December 2013 and S/RES/2181, 21 October 2014 (both using the standard formula). 
262  S/RES/2182, 24 October 2014 (‘… in the region’); S/RES/2142, 5 March 2014 (using the standard for-
mula). 
263  S/RES/2035, 17 February 2012 (‘… in the region’); S/RES/2179, 14 October 2014 (using the standard 
formula to describe the situation in Abyei and along the border between Sudan and South Sudan). 
264  Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 2010-2011, Part VII – Actions with Respect to Threats 
to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression (Chapter VII of the Charter), 17th Supplement, 
Department of Political Affairs – Security Council Affairs Division, www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/2010-
2011/Part%20VII/2010-2011_Part%20VII.pdf, pp. 8-30. 
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appropriate, given that the primary purpose of the presence of international forces is to alleviate 
the security situation in the mission area.  
The main argument for this approach is that the competence to derogate from some human 
rights obligations should go hand in hand with the geographical reach of the obligations, in 
some cases even stretching across state borders. Most of the proponents of this approach see 
little difficulty in simply interpreting the term ‘nation’ as a reference to the local nation in the 
mission area,265 especially where international forces exercise a sufficient level of control.266 
Such a wide interpretation has, however, also met with criticism from other scholars.267 Also, 
the Venice Commission has made it clear that the emergency in question has to threaten the life 
of the nation of the state taking these derogation measures, even though this statement was 
mainly concerned with secret detention and rendition activities.268 
Nevertheless, even some of those who generally support this host nation model are sceptical as 
to whether such a far-reaching interpretation is appropriate without sufficient practice to that 
effect. 269 Indeed, no state has so far made active use of this approach for their participation in 
international military missions abroad. The only practice worth mentioning are the EU Draft 
Guidelines for Criminal Procedure in Crisis Management Operations (2002), which explicitly 
state that: 
In case of public exceptional danger which threatens the life of the nation and the existence 
of which is officially proclaimed, or in case of a threat to the security of the local population 
                                               
265  EWHC, Serdar Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence (2014), supra note 213, para. 156 (‘in the context of an 
international peacekeeping operation, a war or other emergency threatening the life of the nation on whose 
territory the relevant acts take place’, emphasis added); Ekins et al. (2015), supra note 209, pp. 34-35; Sari 
(2013), supra note 213, para. 19 (‘the term ‘nation’ in Article 15 should be construed as extending to any 
third States in which the armed forces of the contracting parties operate’); Milanović (2014), supra note 
214, pp. 16-20. 
266  Sassòli (2011), supra note 209, p. 66 (‘An emergency on an occupied territory or a territory where the state 
has a certain limited control must be sufficient’); Naert (2010), supra note 98, p. 578 (‘the local “nation” is 
under the jurisdiction of the “occupying” State. In that case, it is logical that a threat to the life of this nation 
can justify a derogation’, emphasis added). 
267  See, for instance: Rooney, ‘Hassan v United Kingdom and Extraterritorial Derogations’, Human Rights in 
Ireland Blog, 8 January 2014, http://humanrights.ie/civil-liberties/rooney-on-hassan-v-united-kingdom-
and-extraterritorial-Derogations (‘If one thinks that the ‘life of the nation’ could refer to Iraq or Afghani-
stan, then why should the UK be able to derogate from its obligations when it is the life of another nation 
that is in jeopardy?’). 
268  European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on the International 
Legal Obligations of Council of Europe Member States in Respect of Secret Detention Facilities and Inter-
state Transport of Prisoners, 17 March 2006, CDL-AD(2006)009, para. 72 (‘State may apply Article 15 
only if and to the extent that a war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation presents 
itself in that very same State’). 
269  Mujezinović Larsen (2012), supra note 31, pp. 310-11; Krieger, ‘After Al-Jedda: Detention, Derogation, 
and an Enduring Dilemma’, 50 Military Law and Law of War Review (2011), 419-45, p. 436; Frostad 
(2011), supra note 16, pp. 156-57. 
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or to the maintenance of the law and order in the mission area, competent international 
authorities may take, as provided in their mandate under UN auspices, measures derogating 
from these guidelines …270 
However, this juxtaposition is also somewhat self-defeating, as it implies that a similar outcome 
could perhaps not be obtained from the ordinary ‘life of the nation’ formula itself. Kjetil Muje-
zinović Larsen also considered to what extent the flexibility that the European Court has shown 
in cases of localised emergencies within the territories of states may imply a similar approach 
for the host nation in overseas military operations.271 This approach is, however, inherently 
inward-bound and thus might not be lightly applied across state borders. 
As a matter of methodology, it is apt to look into the derogation practice of states in their colo-
nial possessions, where the application ratione loci of human rights treaties was uncontested.272 
Indeed, the United Kingdom formally derogated from certain rights under the European Con-
vention for some of its overseas territories in which it was facing uprisings against its rule, 
namely: Aden and South Arabia, Cyprus, Guiana, Kenya, the Federation of Malaya and Singa-
pore, Mauritius, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Uganda, and Zanzibar.273 The derogations pro-
vided for far-reaching detention powers, far beyond the strict safeguards under Article 5 of the 
Convention.274 
Jaime Oraá finds it hard to accept that a crisis in a remote territory could have affected ‘the 
whole of the UK population’.275 This is, however, a misreading of the full complexity of this 
practice, in view of the way in which the British Empire was structured. British colonies dif-
fered greatly in their status, ranging from crown colonies to protectorates or protected states. 
                                               
270  EU Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, Draft Guidelines for Criminal Procedure in 
Crisis Management Operations, 30 May 2002, EU Doc. 9465/02, para. 1(6), emphasis added; also cited by 
Naert (2010), supra note 98, p. 578, footnote text. 
271  Mujezinović Larsen (2012), supra note 31, pp. 310-11. But he himself remains sceptical in the absence of 
any state practice or case-law to that effect. 
272  Subject, of course, to Art. 56 ECHR. 
273  Notes Verbales of 24 May 1954, 13 April 1956 and 7 October 1955, 1 YECHR (1955-57), pp. 48-51; Notes 
Verbales of 21 January 1959 (Cyprus) and 25 May 1959 (Nyasaland), 2 YECHR (1958-59), pp. 78-86; 
Notes Verbales of 5 January 1960 (Aden), 11 May 1960 (Singapore) and 21 September 1960 (Kenya), 3 
YECHR (1960), pp. 68-90; Note Verbale of 5 December 1961 (Zansibar), 4 YECHR (1961), p. 38-54; Note 
Verbale of 16 November 1962 (Uganda), 5 YECHR (1962), pp. 8-10; Note Verbale of 27 November 1964 
(Guiana), 7 YECHR (1964), pp. 28-30; Notes Verbales of 1 March and 12 July 1965 (Guiana and Mauri-
tius), 8 YECHR (1965), pp. 10-17; Note Verbale (Aden and South Arabia) of 30 August 1966, 9 YECHR 
(1966), pp. 16-18. 
274  None of the derogation notices (ibid) mentioned the right to life (Art. 2), nor was there any reference to 
‘war’, ‘insurgencies’ or IHL terminology, despite the fact that some of the crises – i.e. the Malayan Emer-
gency (1948-60), the Kenyan Emergency (1952-60), and the Aden Emergency (1963-67) – involved large-
scale battles and arguably amounted to NIACs. 
275  Oraá (1992), supra note 179, p. 29 (‘No state contested the lawfulness of this practice, even if it is hard to 
accept that, for example, the emergency in Guiana … affected the whole of the UK population’). 
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While this could merely have been a euphemism, it is clear that none of these territories was 
legally part of the United Kingdom. Rather, they were characterised as ‘territories for the inter-
national relations of which the United Kingdom is responsible’ in line with the colonial clause 
under Article 63 of the European Convention.276 In other words, when declaring emergencies 
for these territories, it was the local nation – clearly separate and distinguishable from the nation 
of the United Kingdom – that was believed to be at threat. The derogation notice issued for 
Singapore, for instance, clearly speaks of a ‘threat to the life of the nation in Singapore’.277  
This position became even more apparent in the case of Greece v. United Kingdom before the 
European Commission in relation to emergency powers used in Cyprus. During the proceed-
ings, Greece inquired about the meaning of the ‘life of the nation’ and expressed its doubts that 
the United Kingdom could have meant that the situation in Cyprus threatened the ‘whole British 
nation’.278 Greece was, however, ready to accept that the term ‘nation’ did not necessarily refer 
to the ‘entire British Commonwealth’, but could instead be limited to Cyprus.279 This was also 
the position of the United Kingdom, which contended that the term ‘nation’: 
in the Convention is clearly something distinct from ‘Party’ … It is common ground that 
the nation there referred to is for this purpose the nation in Cyprus, the ‘collectivité en 
p1ace’.280  
The Commission agreed with Greece and the United Kingdom that the term ‘nation’ meant the 
island of Cyprus and ‘not the United Kingdom or Commonwealth’,281 and provided a compel-
ling reason for this contention:  
[T]he term "nation" means the people and its institutions, even in a non-self-governing 
territory, or in other words, the organised society, including the authorities responsible 
both under domestic and international law for the maintenance of law and order. Other-
wise, a High Contracting Party, which extended the operation of the Convention to a terri-
tory for whose external relations that Party was responsible under Article 63, would not be 
entitled to invoke the right of derogation under Article 15 in any case of an attempt to 
overthrow by force the established Government of the territory. It seems inconceivable that 
                                               
276  Even the Crown Dependencies (Isle of Man, Guernsey and Jersey) and the remaining British overseas ter-
ritories (including Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands) are not part of the United Kingdom. HRC, 7th Report 
of the United Kingdom, the British Overseas Territories, the Crown Dependencies, CCPR/C/GBR/7, 29 
April 2013, para. 108 (‘The Crown Dependencies are not part of the UK but are self-governing dependen-
cies of the Crown’). 
277  Note verbale of 11 May 1960, 3 YECHR (1960), p. 75. 
278  ECmHR, Greece v. United Kingdom, Report, Vol. I, 26 September 1958, Application no. 176/56, p. 120, 
para. 113. 
279  Ibid, p. 120, para. 115. 
280  Ibid, p. 120-21, paras. 114-15. 
281  Ibid, p. 133, para. 130. 
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the High Contracting Parties can have intended such a result or that any one of them would 
agree to extend the Convention to such territories on that basis.282 
The Commission thus acknowledged that non-self-governing territories had a special status de-
tached from the metropolitan states. Hence, any extension of the Convention to a territory for 
which a state assumes the responsibility (under domestic and international law) to maintain law 
and order should also entail the right for the same state to derogate during emergencies, based 
exclusively on the situation prevailing inside the territory in question in relation to the ‘collec-
tivité en place’.283 Only the Greek member of the Commission, Constantin Eustathiades, disa-
greed with this interpretation due to his strong anti-colonial stance.284 Apart from him, however, 
there was a wide consensus within the Commission and among the parties (Greece and the 
United Kingdom) on this central issue in an otherwise extremely controversial case. Taken to-
gether with the fact that this has so far been the only detailed pronouncement by a Strasbourg 
organ on derogations in an exclusively extra-territorial context, the case is of enormous rele-
vance for emergency situations that states may face abroad.285 
Applied to the context of peace operations, international forces can derogate on the basis of an 
emergency situation inside the area of deployment, provided that they are indeed responsible 
for the maintenance of law and order there. This would require both a sufficiently broad man-
date and the host state consent, which is typically the case in most missions.286 As a result, it is 
not only the plight of the local people that is relevant for the assessment but also the security 
threat faced by the international forces themselves, as they are functionally part of the host 
                                               
282  Ibid. By ten votes to one, the Commission subsequently found that in the instant case the derogation met 
the requirements of Article 15 of the Convention (p. 138, para. 136). 
283  This reasoning is also consistent with colonial clause in Art. 56 (3) ECHR (previously Art. 63 ECHR), 
requiring that the provisions of the Convention – including Article 15 – be applied in such territories ‘with 
due regard, however, to local requirements’. 
284  ECmHR, Greece v. United Kingdom (1958), supra note 278, Dissenting Opinion of Constantin Eustathia-
des, pp. 140-150, para. 139. He strongly rejected the possibility that the colonial authorities could be part 
of the nation in Cyprus, considering the lack of proper democratic participation. Instead, he suggested an 
all-or-nothing approach, whereby state parties that extend the ECHR to their colonies would not have any 
power of derogation. This is, however, a short-sided and disingenuous approach, as it would leave the states 
with no other option but to withdraw their extension under the colonial clause, which would result in the 
wholesale loss of protection under the ECHR for those living in those overseas territories.  
285  It is surprising that this sensible legal construction managed to escape the institutional memory of the EC-
tHR and states party to the ECHR, especially in the UK, where the issue of derogations for overseas military 
operations has been explicitly discussed, both in parliament and in courts, with both the British government 
and most judges being sceptical as to the possibility of derogating from human rights treaties for overseas 
operations. Note, however, that the report was not reported and only made public in 1997, upon the request 
by the UK itself: Committee of Ministers, Greece v. United Kingdom, Resolution, 17 September 1997, 
Application no. 176/56.  
286  The fact that the mandate is based on a Security Council resolution also helps to remove the colonial bias 
that dominated the above-mentioned case. 
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nation – alongside the national authorities and local population – for the purpose of the dero-
gation clauses.  
An additional layer of authorisation or responsibility may also come from other sources of in-
ternational law. As we have seen above, the Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) provides 
for an explicit authorisation for measures against piracy on the high seas.287 The same is true 
for international forces that assume the role as an occupying power in a certain area,288 because 
occupying powers have an explicit duty under humanitarian law to maintain law and order in 
the territory they occupy.289 The picture becomes more complex in case of armed hostilities: 
Non-international armed conflicts in which the peace operation fights on the side of the host 
state against non-state armed groups would fall squarely within the host nation model. The 
situation is, however, different where measures are taken against state armed forces, even if the 
mandate provides an authorisation to protect the civilian population – as in the case of NATO’s 
air campaign against Gaddafi forces in Libya in 2011. Nevertheless, these cases of international 
armed conflicts would clearly fall under the war-based ground, which we discussed above.290  
Conclusion 
In sum, extra-territorial derogations have a clear basis under all derogation regimes. The inter-
ests- and mandate-based models considered above have a lot of merit, especially in relation to 
human rights obligations stemming from general international law and treaties without deroga-
tion clauses. But they fail to offer a fully comprehensive framework for extra-territorial dero-
gations. Nevertheless, they may certainly work in tandem and reinforce the operation of the 
other two models. The host nation model is perhaps best suited to offer a robust basis for dero-
gations in response to an emergency situation. Under this model, international forces are part 
of the host nation and threats against them are crucial for the assessment. Derogations and sim-
ilar acts by the host state authorities are not necessarily required, nor are they enough to cover 
the actions of military forces from different sending states. But they may support the claim that 
there is indeed an emergency under way and that ordinary measures are no longer adequate. 
                                               
287  Arts. 100-107 and 110 UNCLOS. 
288  As we concluded above, however, they would already be covered by the war-based model: see p. 179. 
289  Art. 43 HRLW (‘The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, 
the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and 
safety …’). Blatant disregard for the wishes of the local population may be indeed a complicating factor, 
but emergency measures taken under such circumstances would likely fail the necessity and proportionality 
test, which serves as an additional safeguard against abuse. Moreover, since (at least the core of) the prin-
ciple of self-determination qualifies as jus cogens, derogation measures taken with blatant disregard for the 
wishes of the local population would be equally unlawful on this ground: see from p. 202. 
290  See above, p. 176. 
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Only if the peace operation becomes involved in an international armed conflict with state 
armed forces would the derogation basis shift towards the war-based model. To be precise, 
international armed conflicts constitute a self-standing ground for derogations, regardless of the 
threat felt back home, even under those human rights treaties whose derogation clauses do not 
even mention war. 
NOTIFICATION AND DECLARATION REQUIREMENT 
Introduction 
As noted above, all derogation clauses include a notification requirement, whereas the Cove-
nant and the Arab Charter entail also the duty to officially proclaim the derogation. However, 
apart from the British practice of emergency powers in its colonial possessions, no state has 
ever submitted a derogation notice in relation to measures it had taken outside its own terri-
tory.291 This dilemma is even more apparent in the context of peace operations, even though the 
issue has received increasing attention in recent years. The reluctance of states to derogate in 
extra-territorial settings is mainly due to their flawed litigation strategies. In other words, lodg-
ing a formal derogation would gravely undermine the claim that the relevant treaty was not 
applicable in the place in question. As this strategy is proving increasingly unsuccessful, states 
may well decide to drop it altogether. In addition, states may also have been under the impres-
sion that extra-territorial derogations were simply not available to them due to the rigid wording 
of the derogation clauses. However, as we have seen above, such concerns are rather unfounded 
and the text of the provisions should not be seen as an obstacle by states that encounter genuine 
emergency situations while acting abroad. 
Both aspects may also explain why hardly any state has ever derogated for the measures it has 
taken in the context of an international armed conflict, including military occupations.292 This 
weakens the claim that the absence of derogations in armed conflict situations is mainly driven 
by the belief among states that humanitarian law renders the relevant human rights rules inap-
plicable. If that was the case, states would also refrain from derogations in situations of non-
                                               
291  Indeed, not even the derogation notice of Israel mentions the Palestinian territories, as it continues to reject 
the extra-territorial reach of the ICCPR (of course, with the exception of the Golan Heights and East Jeru-
salem, which Israel has officially annexed). 
292  See the detailed outline of the derogation practice in this regard: Debuf, Captured in War: Lawful Intern-
ment in Armed Conflict (Hart Publishing 2013), p. 164 (text of footnote 521). 
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international armed conflict. Practice, however, shows that states have indeed derogated in 
some cases.293 Where they did not, the authorities may have been worried about the negative 
political repercussions that such public statements might have.  
Policy rather than legal considerations may also be responsible for the absence of derogations 
in some of the countries that contribute troops to peace operations. In fact, emergency legisla-
tion and derogation notifications are rather unpopular and run the risk of eroding public support 
for the country’s participation in such missions, which may already spark enough contro-
versy.294 What is also remarkable is that also the host nation governments only rarely issue 
formal derogations, which makes it even more difficult for states involved in a peace operation 
to invoke derogations on their behalf. This pervasive failure to notify in relation to peace oper-
ations begs the question as to whether derogations are simply unavailable under such circum-
stances or whether they could still be invoked to justify actions that would otherwise be at odds 
with the ordinary human rights standards. That is why this section will consider the legal con-
sequences that the failure to comply with the procedural requirements may have and two pos-
sible alternative models under which derogations may still be available. 
Duty to Notify or to Declare 
When the International Court of Justice rendered its advisory opinion in the Wall case in 2004, 
it considered possible violations of the Covenant as a result of Israel’s construction of a security 
barrier inside the West Bank. The Court observed that the derogation notice submitted only 
mentioned Article 9 (right to liberty and security) and concluded that the other articles of the 
Covenant remained fully applicable both in Israel and inside the West Bank.295 It is, however, 
questionable whether this overly formalistic approach was really warranted by the facts and 
whether it was in line with the Human Rights Committee’s previous practice.296 Indeed, the 
failure of states to formally notify their derogations had never in itself been enough for the 
Committee to deny states the right to invoke derogations throughout the proceedings before 
                                               
293  Ibid. 
294  Krieger (2011), supra note 269, p. 438 (referring to constitutional and political constraints in states party 
to the ECHR like Germany). 
295  ICJ, Wall Opinion (2004), supra note 9, paras. 127-29. 
296  Indeed, focusing on the necessity and proportionality test under Art. 4 (1) ICCPR would probably have led 
to the same findings. 
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it.297 Moreover, the Committee as a whole remained silent on this issue in its General Com-
ment 29, issued in 2001. However, one of its members, Sir Nigel Rodley, stressed this point in 
his concurring opinion in Sayadi and Vinck v. Belgium (2008): 
[T]he absence of compliance with such procedural rules by a State party to an international 
human rights agreement cannot be taken as evidence that derogation has not happened or 
cannot be effected.298 
This position is also widely supported in the legal literature.299 What supports this view is the 
fact that the notification requirement is only part of the third paragraph of the derogation clauses 
and that it uses the wording ‘availing itself of the right of derogation’, which implies the exist-
ence of an unconditional power to derogate. Moreover, notifications do not benefit the affected 
individuals, but are to be sent to third states or the relevant international body in order to ensure 
international control. 
This stands in clear contrast to the duty to officially proclaim the existence of the emergency, 
which is part of the first paragraph of Article 4 of the Covenant. Its primary purpose is to keep 
individuals affected by the derogation measure duly informed and thus to prevent de-facto der-
ogations.300 This important distinction between the notification requirement and the duty to 
publicity is also reflected in the practice and doctrinal writings related to the European Conven-
tion.301 A case in point is Cyprus v. Turkey (1976), decided by the European Commission. Not-
ing that Turkey had made no communication in relation to the invasion and occupation of north-
ern Cyprus, the Commission emphasised the important function of formal notifications but 
                                               
297  HRC, Landinelli Silva v. Uruguay, Views, 8 April 1981, Communication No. R.8/34, UN Doc. Supp. No. 
40 (A/36/40), para. 8.3. 
298  HRC, Sayadi and Vinck v. Belgium, Views, 29 December 2008, Communication no. 1472/2006, Appendix 
B, individual opinion of Committee member Sir Nigel Rodley (concurring), p. 37. 
299  Joseph and Castan (2013), supra note 182, p. 921 (but noting that states failing to notify may have great 
difficulty in proving the existence of a public emergency during legal proceedings); Nowak, U.N. Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (2nd edn., Engel Verlag 2005), p. 107; Oraá (1992), supra 
note 179, p. 58-86 (also for ECHR and ACHR); Schmahl, ‘Derogation von Menschenrechtsverpflichtungen 
in Notstandslagen’, in: Fleck (ed.), Rechtsfragen der Terrorismusbekämpfung durch Streitkräfte (Nomos 
2004), 125-46, pp. 143-44. For the opposite view: Svenson-McCarthy, The International Law of Human 
Rights and States of Exception (Martinus Nijhoff 1998), pp. 683-718 (who sees the notification as a material 
part of the derogation procedure and thus a constitutive requirement for exercising the right to derogate).  
300  Nowak (2005), ibid, p. 92; Oraá (1992), supra note 179, p. 35. 
301  Harris et al., Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (3rd edn., OUP 2014), p. 847 (calling a 
sanction of nullity unnecessarily draconian); White and Ovey, The European Convention on Human Rights 
(5th edn., OUP 2010), pp. 121-122 (but noting that states failing to notify may have great difficulty in 
proving the existence of a public emergency during legal proceedings); Oraá (1992), supra note 179, pp. 
34-86 (confirming this distinction for all three major treaties: ICCPR, ECHR and ACHR). For the opposite 
view: Svensson-McCarthy (1998), supra note 299, p. 683-718. 
 177 
 
found it unnecessary to clarify the consequences of a failure to comply with the procedural 
requirements of Article 15 (3).302 However, it went on to say that: 
[I]n any case, Art. 15 requires some formal and public act of derogation, such as a decla-
ration of martial law or state of emergency, and that, where no such act has been pro-
claimed by the High Contracting Party concerned, although it was not in the circumstances 
prevented from doing so, Art. 15 cannot apply.303 
Unlike Article 4 (1) of the Covenant, the European Convention does not explicitly mention the 
publicity requirement. It does, however, apply indirectly as measures under Article 15 need to 
be consistent with other obligations under international law, including the Covenant.304 Com-
mission member Giuseppe Sperduti clarified in his dissenting opinion the purpose and scope of 
the publicity requirement to which the majority had referred: 
[I]t does not seem compatible with the spirit of the European Convention that it should 
envisage a right of derogation which would be exercised without even the citizens of the 
state, the inhabitants of a territory or other persons subject for some other reason to the 
jurisdiction of the High Contracting Party being warned in what circumstances and under 
what conditions they might be subjected to restrictions, constraints or sanctions contrary to 
the rights and freedoms which the Convention normally assures them.305  
He drew a clear distinction, however, between specific measures and the general acts authoris-
ing and regulating them.306 Turkey had only declared martial law in some provinces on the 
Turkish mainland, but not for Cyprus.307 This led the Commission’s majority to conclude that 
in the absence of ‘some formal and public act of derogation’ Article 15 was inapplicable to 
Turkey’s actions on the island.308 This is, however, hardly convincing. Even without a declara-
tion of martial law extending to Cyprus, everyone present on the island could witness the armed 
invasion and subsequent occupation by Turkish armed forces. They could thus easily anticipate 
what these exceptional events meant for the enjoyment of their rights and freedoms under the 
Convention.  
                                               
302  ECmHR, Cyprus v. Turkey (1976), supra note 208, paras. 526-27. For a clearer position on this issue: 
dissenting opinion of Mr Sperduti, joined by Mr Trechsel, on art. 15 of the Convention, para. 3 (‘In brief, 
the obligation in question should, in principle at least, be seen as an autonomous obligation in the sense 
that its violation does not affect the valid exercise of the right of derogation flowing from the same article’). 
303  Ibid, para. 527. 
304  ECtHR, Brannigan and McBride v. United Kingdom, Judgement, 26 May 1993, Application nos. 14553/89 
and 14554/89, paras. 68-73. However, at the time of the Cyprus case, most European states, including 
Turkey, had not yet become a party to the ICCPR.  
305  ECmHR, Cyprus v. Turkey (1976), supra note 208, dissenting opinion of Sperduti, para. 4. 
306  Ibid, dissenting opinion of Sperduti, para. 4. 
307  Ibid, Cyprus v. Turkey (1976), supra note 208, paras. 520-23. 
308  Ibid, para. 528. 
 178 
 
Effect of Humanitarian Law 
What is most striking about the European Commission’s verdict in Cyprus v. Turkey is its find-
ings on the detention of Cypriot prisoners of war. Despite its conclusion that Turkey was barred 
from invoking its derogation powers, the Commission nonetheless held that it: 
has not found it necessary to examine the question of a breach of Art. 5 with regard to 
persons accorded the status of prisoners of war.309 
While the reasoning behind this finding remains vague, Sperduti provided a convincing expla-
nation for this conclusion:  
[Certain] situations which, from the moment when they arise, render applicable rules – of 
domestic or international law as the case may be – under which exceptional measures can 
be taken in the conditions envisaged by them. One cannot see how one could deduce from 
Art. 15 that it was necessary to resort to further forms of publicity in relation to these rules. 
… [M]easures which are in themselves contrary to a provision of the European Convention 
but which are taken legitimately under the international law applicable to an armed con-
flict, are to be considered as legitimate measures of derogation from the obligations flowing 
from the Convention.310 
Hence, the application of humanitarian law – which is a matter of facts alone – entails an im-
plicit derogation from human rights law without further notice. This automatic effect is con-
sistent with the traditional laws of war,311 but has also found support in recent scholarly writing. 
Rusen Ergec, for instance, sees no need for additional formalism in situations of armed con-
flict.312 Els Debuf, however, confirms the implicit derogation effect of humanitarian law only 
for international armed conflicts, for which Geneva Conventions III and IV provide detailed 
internment regimes for prisoners of war and civilians, respectively.313 Marko Milanović, by 
contrast, calls the automaticity argument ‘seriously flawed’, because in his view derogation 
measures are and should remain the ‘choice of the state’.314 This largely reflects the position of 
Felix Ermacora, who in his separate opinion on the above-mentioned Cyprus case cautioned 
                                               
309  Ibid, para. 313. 
310  Ibid, dissenting opinion of Sperduti, paras. 5 and 7, emphasis added. 
311  See, for instance: Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, Prepared by 
Francis Lieber, promulgated as General Orders No. 100 by President Lincoln, 24 April 1863, Art. 1 (‘A 
place, district, or country occupied by an enemy stands, in consequence of the occupation, under the Martial 
Law of the invading or occupying army, whether any proclamation declaring Martial Law, or any public 
warning to the inhabitants, has been issued or not’, emphasis added). 
312  Ergec (1987), supra note 179, pp. 304-305. 
313  Debuf (2013), supra note 292, pp. 166-70. 
314  Milanović (2014), supra note 214, pp. 20-22 (who is, however, unclear on the distinction between the 
notification and declaration requirement).  
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the Commission against assuming this role ex officio and substituting ‘the sovereign will of a 
State’.315  
The European Court was confronted with a similar legal problem in Hassan v. United Kingdom 
(2014). The case involved the short internment of a young Iraqi in April 2003, during the final 
phase of the coalition-led invasion of Iraq. He was initially interned at Camp Buca under sus-
picion of being a combatant or a civilian otherwise posing a threat to Allied forces, but soon 
cleared by a review panel and promptly released, in full compliance with Article 78 of Geneva 
Convention IV.316 Although the United Kingdom had not formally derogated from the Euro-
pean Convention for its military actions in Iraq, it invoked its powers to intern under humani-
tarian law. The Court largely followed this argument in relation to Article 5 of the Convention:  
[T]the grounds of permitted deprivation of liberty set out in subparagraphs (a) to (f) of that 
provision should be accommodated, as far as possible, with the taking of prisoners of war 
and the detention of civilians who pose a risk to security under the Third and Fourth Geneva 
Conventions. … It can only be in cases of international armed conflict, where the taking 
of prisoners of war and the detention of civilians who pose a threat to security are accepted 
features of international humanitarian law, that Article 5 could be interpreted as permitting 
the exercise of such broad powers.317 
The Court applied the same reasoning to the procedural safeguards, especially the judicial re-
view of detentions,318 and ultimately found no violation of Article 5.319 This novel approach 
seems, however, to push the concept of interpretation to a breaking point. It has been rightly 
criticised by Judge Spano in his laudable dissenting opinion, joined by three other judges. Ac-
cording to them, it remains unclear what the majority means by ‘accommodation’ and to what 
extent it still qualifies as interpretation rather than treaty modification, considering that Article 
5 (1) – unlike some other human rights treaties – contains an exhaustive list of grounds for 
detention. This unprincipled use of methodology is particularly worrying when it concerns the 
restriction of existing rights rather than their expansion.320 This criticism is especially warranted 
in relation to subsequent practice. According to the majority, there is consistent practice among 
states not to derogate from human rights treaties in relation to internment of prisoners of war 
                                               
315  ECmHR, Cyprus v. Turkey (1976), supra note 208, Separate Opinion of Commission Member Felix Erma-
cora, para. 7. 
316  Art. 78 (1) GC IV (‘If the Occupying Power considers it necessary, for imperative reasons of security, to 
take safety measures concerning protected persons, it may, at the most, subject them to assigned residence 
or to internment’, emphasis added). 
317  ECtHR, Hassan v. United Kingdom (2014), supra note 122, para. 104. 
318  Ibid, par. 106. 
319  Ibid, paras. 109-110. 
320  Ibid, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Spano, joined by Judges Nicolaou, Bianku and Kalaydjeva, paras. 
11-19. 
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and civilians during international armed conflicts.321 However, this common pattern is rather 
inconclusive and does not necessarily mean that states intended to modify the content of Article 
5. Indeed, as mentioned above, there are a number of different reasons that may contribute to 
the absence of derogations, including political considerations and the misbelief among certain 
states that human rights treaties do not apply abroad. 
Nevertheless, despite the legitimate criticism by Judge Spano, which is widely shared among 
commentators,322 the approach taken by the European Court is perhaps best understood as a 
subtle confirmation of the concept of implicit derogations rather than a permanent treaty mod-
ification. What supports this conclusion is the fact that the Court still requires the respondent 
states to explicitly invoke humanitarian law in their pleadings.323 What is more, the Court made 
clear that this ad hoc option is only available in cases of international armed conflict, where 
measures of internment are ‘accepted features’ of humanitarian law.324 It would therefore seem 
only of limited relevance in peace operations, as they are more likely to become involved in a 
non-international armed conflict with non-state armed groups. Moreover, it still remains unclear 
whether this approach would also apply to measures other than detentions – a question to be 
considered in the next chapter, focused on the interplay between both legal regimes.325 
Effect of the Mandate 
Even if armed conflicts and occupations may give rise to implicit derogations, this still leaves 
the question open in relation to specific measures or situations not covered by humanitarian 
law. There may be indeed other legal regimes of a similar emergency nature.326 It may be argued 
that the specific mandate of the peace operation could have such a character.327 Indeed, the 
                                               
321  Ibid, para. 101. To support this finding, the majority quotes extensively (para. 42) from the Debuf (2013), 
supra note 292, p. 164, who (as we have just seen) supports the concept of implicit derogations. 
322  See, for instance: Fatima, ‘Reflections on Hassan v UK: A Mixed Bag on the Right to Liberty (Part 2)’, 14 
October 2014, http://justsecurity.org/15942/reflections-hassan-uk-mixed-bag-liberty; Hill-Cawthorne, 
‘The Grand Chamber Judgement in Hassan v UK’, 16 September, www.ejiltalk.org/the-grand-chamber-
judgement-in-hassan-v-uk. 
323  ECtHR, Hassan v. United Kingdom (2014), supra note 122, para. 107. 
324  Ibid, para. 104. 
325  For war-related detentions under the Art. 9 ICCPR, see the following, excellent post on the HRC’s newly 
adopted General Comment 35 (2014), supra note 211: Fatima, ‘UN HRC’s General Comment on the Right 
to Liberty and Security: A Missed Opportunity? (Part Two)’, 20 November 2014, http://justsecu-
rity.org/17596/human-rights-committees-general-comment-no-35-security-detention. 
326  Indeed, Sperduti only referred to IHL as one among many: ECmHR, Cyprus v. Turkey (1976), supra note 
208, dissenting opinion of Sperduti, para. 5. 
327  De Wet (2004), supra note 251, pp. 202 and 321-22 (arguing that the determination of a threat to interna-
tional peace is sufficient for finding that a state of emergency exists and that neither the Council nor the 
participating states should be bound by further requirements for declaration). Naert (2010), supra note 98, 
pp. 579-80 (only briefly entertaining the idea, but considering the resolutions’ content too vague). 
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relevant Security Council resolutions usually contain a detailed description of the emergency 
situation in the mission area and entrust a number of tasks to the peace operation in order to 
mitigate that situation. Moreover, they are published upon adoption, which makes them easily 
accessible for the general public in line with the publicity requirement. In addition, nearly all 
resolutions provide a mandate that is restricted to a limited period of time, with the possibility 
of renewal after periodic review – another common feature of emergency acts. The fact that 
they are almost all adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter does not necessarily matter, but 
certainly adds a level of importance and authority.  
The difficulty, however, is that the resolutions are usually rather vague and do not clearly spell 
out the specific measures that may be taken by the personnel of the peace operation. And while 
there are a number of internal operational regulations and directives, they are usually classified 
and not shared with the general public affected by the relevant exceptional measures. An ex-
ception is perhaps Colin Powel’s letter attached to Resolution 1546 (2004), which had explicitly 
mentioned internment among the measures to be carried out by coalition forces in post-occu-
pation Iraq.328 As shown above in relation to the Al-Jedda case (2011), the British government 
only based its arguments on Article 103 of the Charter and the overriding effect of Security 
Council resolutions.329 The verdict of the European Court should therefore not be seen as a 
wholesale rejection of the derogation option based on the mandate, which is structurally differ-
ent from the effects of Article 103. 
The case may be different where the peace operation is part of an international territorial ad-
ministration, which sets its own comprehensive legal framework in the territory similar to the 
domestic legal order of states. Cases in point are the early years of the international missions in 
Kosovo and East Timor, both established in 1999. In Kosovo, for instance, UNMIK referred to 
an emergency situation to justify its far-reaching detention powers.330 But this was not reflected 
in other public acts331 or during the reporting procedure before the Human Rights Committee.332 
                                               
328  S/RES/1546, 5 June 2004, annex. 
329  ECtHR, Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom (2011), supra note 59, paras. 105-106, emphasis added. 
330  UNMIK Statement on the Ombudsperson Special Report No. 3 (‘The situation in Kosovo is analogous to 
emergency situations envisioned in the human rights conventions’); Ombudsperson Institution, Special Re-
port No. 3 on the Conforming of Deprivations of Liberty under ‘Executive Orders’ with Recognized Inter-
national Standards of 29 June 2001, www.ombudspersonkosovo.org/repository/docs/E4010912a_6337 
02.pdf. 
331  UNMIK/REG/1999/24, On the Law Applicable in Kosovo, 12 December 1999, para. 1 (3), which refers to 
the full application of the relevant human rights treaties. 
332  HRC, Report Submitted by UNMIK to the HRC on the Human Rights Situation in Kosovo since June 1999, 
13 March 2006, CCPR/C/UNK/1; HRC, Concluding Observations, Kosovo, 14 August 2006, 
CCPR/C/UNK/CO/1. 
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Views are therefore divided as to whether there was indeed a duly declared public emergency 
in Kosovo.333 
Conclusion 
The fact alone that no derogation notice has been issued is not enough to deny states the right 
to invoke their derogation powers during legal proceedings. What is essential is that those af-
fected by the emergency measures are duly informed. The factual circumstances of armed con-
flicts or military occupations and the special rules of humanitarian law whose application they 
trigger should be seen as sufficiently clear, so that no further notice would be required.  
It should be emphasised that the need to derogate may vary from state to state. That is to say, 
troop-contributing states that have ratified the European Convention – whose rights set gener-
ally stricter standards than those found in other human rights treaties – may feel a greater ur-
gency to lodge a derogation than states from other regions,334 including the majority of the host 
states. The same holds true for the relevant international organisations (e.g. UN, NATO, AU), 
who are usually bound by less rigid human rights standards under general international law.335 
Nevertheless, it seems more appropriate to adopt a common approach to derogations among all 
states and organisations involved in the mission. 
The specific mandates of the peace operations have so far not been used. However, as shown 
above, this approach has much merit. Indeed, using Security Council resolutions and mission-
related documents proactively for specifying emergency measures would have the advantage 
of combining the mandate authorisations with the notification and public announcement of the 
emergency. Most importantly, it would allow dealing with the derogation issue in one package, 
which would be of relevance for the United Nations, relevant regional organisations and send-
ing states as well as the host states.  
                                               
333  In support: Kolb et al., L’Application du Droit International Humanitaire et des Droits de l’Homme aux 
Organisations Internationales. Forces de Paix et Administrations Civiles Transitoires (Bruylant 2005), 
p. 313. For the opposite view: Stahn, The Law and Practice of International Territorial Administration: 
Versailles to Iraq and Beyond (CUP 2008), pp. 506-508. Note also that the question of emergency powers 
in Kosovo remained entirely unaddressed in any of the cases before the ECtHR, due to its finding in Beh-
rami and Saramati v. France and Norway (2007), supra note 50. 
334  Some national contingents may also be deployed to more peaceful regions and tasked with much fewer 
functions (e.g. no arrests and detentions) than others, making the derogation issue a less pressing question 
for their respective sending states. 
335  See again the discussion above, from p. 38. 
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NECESSITY AND PROPORTIONALITY, AND 
OTHER SAFEGUARDS 
As we noted above, emergency situations do not allow for a whole-sale suspension of all human 
rights that are not specifically listed as non-derogable. In fact, all clauses state that the specific 
derogation measures must not exceed what is ‘strictly required by the exigencies of the situa-
tion’.336 This constitutes a necessity and proportionality requirement in a material sense, as it 
needs to be shown that the usual limitations available under the rights themselves are not suffi-
cient to address the emergency situation.337 The requirement has, however, also an impact on 
the geographical and temporal scope of the emergency measure in question.338 The Human 
Rights Committee is therefore correct in stressing in its recently adopted General Comment 35 
on detentions that:  
When the emergency justifying measures of derogation arises from the participation of 
State party’s armed forces in a peacekeeping mission abroad, the geographic and material 
scope of the derogating measures must be limited to the exigencies of the peacekeeping 
mission.339 
In other words, only in those parts of the mission area directly affected by the emergency and 
only to the extent that the ordinary legal framework proves inadequate can international forces 
involved in a peace operation take measures that derogate from the relevant rights. As previ-
                                               
336  Art. 15 (1) ECHR; Art. 4 (1) ICCPR; Art. 27 (1) ACHR; Art. 4 (1) Arab Charter; Art. 35 (1) CIS Convention 
(‘extent strictly required by the gravity of the situation’). See also more generally: Oraá (1992), supra note 
179, pp. 140-70. 
337  HRC, General Comment 29 (2001), supra note 178, paras. 4-5. 
338  ECtHR, Sakık v. Turkey, Judgement, 26 November, Application nos. 23878/94 et al., paras. 37-39 (requir-
ing the limitation of the measures to the effected provinces); HRC, Concluding Observations on Israel, 18 
August 1998, CCPR/C/79/Add.93, para. 11 (criticising the long-term state of emergency in Israel since 
1948 and calling for a review of its continued need and the material and territorial scope of the measures). 
339  HRC, General Comment 35 (2014), supra note 211, para. 65, p. 19, footnote text.  
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ously noted, this is further restricted by the set of rights deemed non-derogable and other obli-
gations under international law (including jus cogens),340 which are a clear corollary of the ne-
cessity and proportionality requirement.341 That is why there needs to be a comprehensive ap-
proach to derogations from the same rights across different human rights treaties and general 
international law.342  
Nonetheless, this does not mean that derogations will ultimately be the same for all human 
rights treaties, because they do not all use similarly strict language in relation to their rights as 
the European Convention. This is especially apparent in relation to the right to life and the right 
to liberty, where the European Convention uses an exhaustive list of exceptions rather than an 
arbitrariness standard like the Covenant and some other human rights treaties. That is also why 
there is indeed a greater need to derogate from the European Convention in times of armed 
conflict. Having said that, this does not mean that humanitarian law will fully displace the rights 
to life and liberty in case of derogations in times of armed conflict, as some scholars seem to 
suggest.343 Indeed, the extent to which humanitarian law becomes the only determinant is still 
subject to the necessity and proportionality requirement under the derogation clause itself. 
Giuseppe Sperduti, in his laudable dissenting opinion in Cyprus v. Turkey, stated on this issue: 
It is to be noted that the rules of international law concerning the treatment of the population 
in occupied territories … are undeniably capable of assisting the resolution of the question 
whether the measures taken … are or are not justified according to the criterion that only 
measures of derogation strictly required by the circumstances are authorised. In fact these 
rules duly take account of the necessities of the occupying power … [and] will in principle 
assure that that High Contracting Party will not go beyond the limits of the right of deroga-
tion conferred on it by Art. 15 of the Convention.344  
                                               
340  For a list of the most frequently cited examples of jus cogens norms: ILC, Report of the Study Group of the 
International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diver-
sification and Expansion of International Law, finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, 13 April 2006, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.682, para. 33 (‘the prohibition of aggression, slavery and the slave trade, genocide, racial dis-
crimination apartheid and torture, as well as basic rules of international humanitarian law applicable in 
armed conflict, and the right to self-determination’). More generally: Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in 
International Law (OUP 2006). 
341  HRC, General Comment 29 (2001), supra note 178, para. 11-16 (finding that more rights than those listed 
in Art. 4 (2) ICCPR may indeed have a non-derogable character, at least the essential core of these rights). 
On this issue, see also: Scheinin (2013), supra note 163, pp. 532-35. 
342  Given our earlier findings that the requirements for derogations from general international law are indeed 
largely the same as (albeit less restrictive than) those under the derogation clauses, there is little support for 
the concerns expressed by some: Sari (2013), supra note 213, para. 23 (‘the UK also remains bound by any 
human rights norms forming part of customary international law; the effect of a derogation on these cus-
tomary norms is unclear’). 
343  Ekins et al. (2015), supra note 209, p. 34-35. 
344  ECmHR, Cyprus v. Turkey (1976), supra note 208, dissenting opinion of Sperduti, para. 6, emphasis added. 
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In general, this is certainly a correct assessment, but the statement refers foremost to military 
occupations, where many provisions have also built-in necessity clauses. Moreover his careful 
formulation (‘in principle’) implies that there may indeed be situations where the full applica-
tion of humanitarian law might go beyond the acceptable limits of Article 15. It appears that 
this is the correct reading of the Human Rights Committee’s slightly vague statement:  
that even during an armed conflict measures derogating from the Covenant are allowed 
only if and to the extent that the situation constitutes a threat to the life of the nation.345 
This issue is closely related to the relationship between human rights law and humanitarian law, 
which will be considered in great detail in the following chapter. The reference to other obliga-
tions under international law not only covers humanitarian law but also the jus ad bellum. In-
deed, during the drafting of the International Covenant – which partly coincided with that of 
the European Convention – there was consensus among all delegates that derogations had to be 
consistent with the UN Charter, including cases of self-defence or measures authorised by the 
Security Council under Chapter VII.346 Nevertheless, human rights bodies have so far refrained 
from denying the power to derogate in cases of jus ad bellum violations.347 It is also highly 
unlikely that this question would ever play any role in the context of peace operations, given 
that they have usually a sufficiently broad mandate.348 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter shows that human rights law is clearly applicable to the actions of states and in-
ternational organisations during peace operations. Neither the spatial or personal models, nor 
the public powers model provide sufficient justification for limiting the geographical scope of 
human rights law. Rather, there is strong evidence for a convergence in the practice of human 
rights institutions towards a gradual model for the extra-territorial application of human rights 
law. Accordingly, negative obligations apply at all times, while the scope of positive obligations 
                                               
345  HRC, General Comment 29 (2001), supra note 178, para. 3, emphasis added. 
346  See, for instance: E/CN.4/SR.330, 1 July 1952, pp. 4-10 (featuring the comments made by Chile, Vene-
zuela, the USA, the Soviet Union, France, Egypt and the UK). 
347  ECmHR, Cyprus v. Turkey (1976), supra note 208 (not discussing the legality of the Turkish invasion, 
although this had been explicitly pleaded by Cyprus, para. 510); HRC, General Comment 29 (2001), supra 
note 178 (mentioning nowhere the UN Charter); ECtHR, Hassan v. United Kingdom (2014), supra note 
122 (not discussing the legality of the invasion); ECtHR, Georgia v. Russia II (2011), supra note 125 (not 
discussing the legality of the Russian invasion). 
348  Moreover, even in case of transgressions of the mandate, these are usually rather marginal. 
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is context-specific and depends on certain levels of control and possibly explicit authorisa-
tions.349  
Even though human rights law applies directly to the actions of states and international organ-
isations involved in a peace operation, it shows a high degree of flexibility to address security 
concerns. In fact, in addition to the broad range of permissible limitations already available, 
most human rights treaties provide for the possibility of derogations from a large number of 
rights, subject to certain requirements and additional safeguards. In order to overcome the ap-
parent strictures of the derogation clauses (usually requiring a threat to the life of the nation) in 
extra-territorial settings, this chapter suggest the ‘host nation’ model as the best solution for 
derogations in response to emergency situations in the mission area. Under this model, interna-
tional forces are part of the host nation and threats against them are crucial for the assessment. 
Derogations and similar acts by the host state authorities are not necessarily required, nor are 
they enough to cover the actions of military forces from different sending states. But they may 
support the claim that there is indeed a public emergency in motion and that ordinary measures 
are no longer adequate. Only if the peace operation becomes involved in an international armed 
conflict with state armed forces would the derogation basis shift towards the war-based model, 
which provides a self-standing ground for derogations.  
The fact alone that no derogation notice has been issued is not enough to deny states the right 
to invoke their derogation powers during legal proceedings. What is essential is that those af-
fected by the emergency measures are duly informed. The factual circumstances of armed con-
flicts or military occupations and the special rules of humanitarian law, whose application they 
trigger, should be seen as sufficiently clear, so that no further notice would be required. More-
over, Security Council resolutions and related documents could be used proactively for speci-
fying emergency measures. This would allow the derogation issue to be dealt with in one pack-
age, relevant for the United Nations, the regional organisations and sending states involved as 
well as the host states. Yet, even in case of a genuine emergency, the scope of permissible 
measures is clearly restricted by the set of non-derogable rights, other international legal obli-
gations (including humanitarian law and the mandate) and the necessity and proportionality 
requirement. 
                                               
349  See the detailed outline of different mission scenarios giving rise to human rights obligations of states and 
IOs involves in a peace operations (including negative and positive obligations), from p. 162. 
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5 REGIME INTERPLAY IN 
PEACE OPERATIONS 
5.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW 
The two previous chapters considered the grounds for the application of humanitarian and hu-
man rights law in the course of peace operations and concluded that both legal regimes are 
likely to apply and to govern the conduct of such operations in the field. Given the volatile 
security situation in the mission areas, it is indeed not unlikely that the peace operation will 
become – at least for some period of its deployment – a party to an armed conflict.1 Such con-
frontations will usually take the form of a non-international armed conflict, as they almost al-
ways involve members of non-state armed groups on the other side.2 
Human rights law applies virtually everywhere, including in overseas military missions, as 
there is no convincing reason nor any textual support for limiting its operation. The application 
of human rights law is subject to a gradual test: negative obligations need to be observed at all 
times, while the application of positive human rights obligations is context-specific. Moreover, 
individual human rights are subject to permissible limitations and to derogations – which are 
equally available in peace operations – subject to certain requirements and restrictions, includ-
ing the non-derogability of certain rights, and the necessity and proportionality requirement. 
Hence there will often be cases during peace operations in which both legal regimes apply to 
the same situation – both in space and time. This may lead to a clash between opposing rules in 
relation to certain actions, especially on the question as to when and how (lethal) force may be 
used, a question on which both legal regimes differ greatly. Certainly, this potential conflict 
cannot be avoided by exclusively relying on humanitarian law under an absolute lex specialis 
                                               
1  Cases where this is certainly the case: MINUSMA in Mali (10,000 troops), MONUSCO in the DRC (20,000 
troops), AMISOM in Somalia (21,000 troops) and previousy, ISAF in Afghanistan (with more than 100,000 
troops) and the Multinational Force in Iraq (with more than 100,000 troops). 
2  In very exceptional situations, peace operations may also assume the role of an occupying power, which 
will also trigger the application of humanitarian law, even in the absence of armed hostilities with local 
armed forces. 
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concept, making it the only applicable law in times of armed conflict. Nor does it seem appro-
priate to disregard humanitarian law altogether and give exclusive preference to human rights 
law.  
That is why this chapter will consider the interplay between human rights and humanitarian law 
in relation to the different use-of-force rules. We will first consider the general features of norm 
interaction and the norm conflict tools, which we will then apply to the concurrent application 
of human rights and humanitarian law. This will be followed by a detailed examination of the 
substantive rules on the use of (lethal) force under both regimes to identify differences between 
them as a possible source of norm conflicts. Thereafter, we will consider different models in 
order to identify the best solution for overcoming these possible conflicts. 
5.2 INTERACTION AND CONFLICT BETWEEN 
NORMS AND LEGAL REGIMES 
Much has been written in recent years about the conflict between human rights law and human-
itarian law as well as the discontents of the lex specialis doctrine.3 However, some of the schol-
arly writings fail to address what appears to be the primary and most central question: what is 
a norm conflict?4 This section will therefore briefly examine how norms interact for the purpose 
of defining conflicts between legal norms, followed by a discussion on the available tools to 
overcome them in the fragmented international legal order. We will then consider what these 
general considerations on norm interaction may mean for navigating the interplay between hu-
man rights law and humanitarian law. 
                                               
3  For three major compilations on the relationship between IHL and human rights law: Kolb and Gaggioli 
(eds.), Handbook of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (Elgar Publishing 2013); Ben-Naftali (ed.), In-
ternational Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law: Pas de Deux (OUP 2011); Arnold 
and Quénivet (eds.), International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law. Towards a New Merger in 
International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2008). 
4  Krieger, ‘A Conflict of Norms: The Relationship Between Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in 
the ICRC Customary Law Study’, 11 JCSL (2006), 265-91; Prud’homme, ‘Lex Specialis: Oversimplifying 
a More Complex and Multifaceted Relationship?’, 40 (2) Israel Law Review (2007), 356-95; Lindroos, 
‘Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented Legal System: The Doctrine of Lex Specialis’, 74 (1) Nordic 
Journal of International Law (2005), 27-66. 
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GENERAL FEATURES 
Before addressing the issue of norm conflicts, one has to consider the different functions that 
international norms may have. We can generally distinguish between obligations and rights.5 
Obligations can take the form of prohibitions (prohibitive norms or negative obligations) or 
commands (prescriptive norms or positive obligations), while rights may qualify either as ex-
emptions or permissions.6 Permissive norms have to be explicit and thus do not include so-
called ‘negative permissions’, which are premised on the general understanding of international 
law that everything that is not prohibited is allowed. What makes the picture more complicated 
is the fact that many rights are conditional; in other words, they also contain prescriptive or 
prohibitive elements which need to be observed so as to render the exempting or permissive 
elements applicable.7 The relationship between two norms can either take the form of conflict 
or accumulation. According to Joost Pauwelyn, two norms accumulate when they do not con-
tradict each other, either by having distinctive scopes of application or by confirming one an-
other.8 By contrast, norm conflicts arise when two norms overlap in relation to their scopes of 
application and do not accumulate, for instance, because the relationship is not sufficiently ex-
plicit in the text of at least one of these two norms.9  
The precise definition of norm conflict has been a matter of debate, with doctrinal scholars 
traditionally favouring a narrow definition. For them, only a case of direct incompatibility – 
ruling out simultaneous compliance – entails a conflict between two norms.10 There are, how-
ever, a number of shortcomings with this narrow concept of norm conflict: First, it rules out 
any conflict between obligations and rights, and thus risks undermining the object and purpose 
of such permissive rules. Second, this approach is meant to avoid conflicts through the very 
                                               
5  This taxonomy is based on: Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law (CUP 2003), pp. 158-
62; Pauwelyn’s analysis draws largely from: Kelsen, Théorie Générale des Normes (Presses Universitaires 
de France 1996). 
6  While often falling into one of the above types, secondary norms regulate other (primary or substantive) 
norms. 
7  Pauwelyn (2003), supra note 5, pp. 160-61.  
8  For instance: (1) one norm explicitly terminates the application of the other norm, (2) one norm functions 
as an explicit exception to another, more general rule, or (3) two norms provide for different, but not mu-
tually exclusive, solutions for the same matter and (at least) one norm explicitly refers to or incorporates 
the other one. Ibid, pp. 161-63. 
9  Ibid, pp. 161-66. 
10  See, for instance: Jenks, ‘Conﬂict of Law-Making Treaties’, 30 BYIL (1953), 401-53, pp. 426 and 451; 
Karl, ‘Conﬂicts Between Treaties’, in: Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law (North-
Holland 1984), 468-73, p. 468; Caplinski and Danilenko, ‘Conflicts of Norms in International Law’, 21 
Netherlands Yearbook of the International Law (1990), 3-42, pp. 12-13. 
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definition of conflict, thus rendering the accepted tools to overcome norm conflicts largely use-
less.11 It seems therefore more apt to follow a broader definition of norm conflict, as suggested 
by the ILC Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law12 and a number of international 
legal scholars.13 Most helpful for our purposes is the definition provided by Erich Vranes:  
There is a conflict between norms, one of which may be permissive, if in obeying or ap-
plying one norm, the other norm is necessarily or potentially violated.14 
This is clearly the case when there are two opposite commands, but the definition covers also 
clashes between a prohibition and a permission or even between two different prohibitions (one 
being simply stricter than the other one).15 Nonetheless, this broad definition only denotes an 
apparent norm conflict. To be precise, it may still be possible to avoid the conflict by resort to 
conflict avoidance tools.16 There is indeed a strong presumption against conflict in international 
law: where the wording of one of the norms is open-ended and (partly) ambiguous, it allows 
for an interpretation in light of the other norm, within the meaning of Article 31 (3) (c) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties. Where such a harmonious interpretation succeeds, 
there will no longer be a conflict between the norms in question.17 
Only where all attempts to overcome the inconsistency between the two norms by means of 
interpretation fail, can there be a genuine norm conflict, which then requires conflict resolu-
tion.18 The most widely acknowledged conflict resolution techniques are the lex posterior and 
the lex specialis doctrines. The former decides the conflict in favour of the more recent norm, 
while the latter gives priority to the more specific one, because it addresses the particular subject 
                                               
11  Pauwelyn (2003), supra note 5, pp. 184-88; Milanović, ‘Norm Conflict in International Law: Whither Hu-
man Rights?’, 20 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law (2009), 69-132, p. 73. 
12  ILC, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi, 13 April 2006, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (hereinafter: ILC Fragmentation Report), para. 25, 
p. 19 (‘This Report adopts a wide notion of conflict as a situation where two rules or principles suggest 
different ways of dealing with a problem’) and para. 254, p. 130. 
13  Pauwelyn (2003), supra note 5, pp. 175-76 (‘two norms are, therefore, in a relationship of conflict if one 
constitutes, has led to, or may lead to, a breach of the other’); Milanović, ‘Norm Conflicts, International 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law’, in: Ben-Naftali (2011), supra note 3, 95-125, p. 102 (‘when-
ever the application of the two norms leads to two opposite results’); D’Aspremont and Tranchez, ‘The 
Quest for a Non-Conflictual Coexistence of International Human Rights Law and Humanitarian Law: 
Which Role for the “lex specialis” Principle?’, in: Kolb and Gaggioli (2013), supra note 3, 223-50, p. 233 
(using the term ‘competition’ instead of ‘conflict’). 
14  Vranes, ‘The Definition of ‘Norm Conflict’ in International Law and Legal Theory’, 17 (2) EJIL (2006), 
395-418, p. 395. 
15  As we will see below, this is perhaps the best way to describe most conflicts arising between IHL and HRL. 
16  Pauwelyn (2003), supra note 5, p. 178. 
17  Ibid, pp. 240-44; ILC Fragmentation Report (2006), supra note 12, paras. 410-80, pp. 206-44. 
18  Milanović (2009), supra note 11, p. 73; Pauwelyn (2003), supra note 5, p. 178. 
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matter ‘more directly or precisely’. Both doctrines are aimed at identifying the ‘current expres-
sion of state consent’ and therefore often work in tandem.19 However, it needs to be stressed 
that the lex specialis doctrine also plays a key role in the field of interpretation for the purpose 
of conflict avoidance.20 In other words, the more specific rule should be: 
read and understood within the confines or against the background of the general standard, 
typically as an elaboration, updating or a technical specification of the latter.21 
It may, however, sometimes be difficult to clearly distinguish the general norm from the special 
one.22  
Even though the lex specialis doctrine was already used by most early legal scholars in their 
treatises on international law,23 some authors emphasise that it has its origin in domestic legal 
systems and question whether it can be applied to the increasingly fragmented international 
legal order.24 These concerns have been echoed by Pauwelyn himself, who has become increas-
ingly sceptical in his recent writings that international law can be equated to a coherent legal 
system similar to the domestic legal order of states and that the established conflict-of-norms 
rules can be applied to all international legal conflicts: where we deal with one treaty and per-
haps one legal regime, reliance on such rules (including lex specialis) seems appropriate, but 
their use becomes more problematic for conflicts between rules from different specialised re-
gimes.25 With this in mind, we should be particularly cautious when using lex specialis doctrine 
as a conflict-resolution rather than as a conflict-avoidance technique to overcome potential con-
flicts between human rights and humanitarian law. 
                                               
19  Pauwelyn (2003), supra note 5, pp. 385-96. 
20  ILC Fragmentation Report (2006), supra note 12, paras. 56-57 and 88-107; Pauwelyn (2003), supra note 
5, p. 414; Mus, ‘Conflicts between Treaties in International Law’, 45 (2) Netherlands International Law 
Review (1998), 208-32, p. 218; Akehurst, ‘The Hierarchy of Sources of International Law’, 47 BYIL (1974-
75), 273-85; Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951-1954: Treaty 
Interpretation and Other Treaty Points’, 33 BYIL (1957), 203-93, p. 236. 
21  ILC Fragmentation Report (2006), supra note 12, para. 56. 
22  Ibid, para. 58. 
23  See, for instance: De Vattel, The Law of Nations; Or, Principles of the Law of Nature Applied to the Con-
duct of Nations and Sovereigns (London 1793), Livre II, Ch. XVII, p. 511, para. 316; Pufendorf, De Jure 
Naturae et Gentium (1672), Libri V, Ch. XII; Grotius (1625), infra note 27, Livre II, Ch. 16, Sect. XXIX. 
24  Prud’homme (2007), supra note 4; Lindroos (2005), supra note 4. 
25  Michaels and Pauwelyn, ‘Conflict of Norms or Conflict of Laws: Different Techniques in the Fragmenta-
tion of Public International Law’, 22 (3) Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law (2012), 349-
76. For the latter case, they suggest the use of conflict-of-law rules, i.e. those deriving from private inter-
national law. For a very similar approach: Pulkowski, The Law and Politics of International Regime Con-
flict (OUP 2014), p. 329-35. 
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CONCURRENT APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 
Human rights law and international humanitarian law are two distinct bodies of law with dif-
ferent histories and structural features. Indeed, modern human rights law has its origin in do-
mestic constitutional law – before becoming part of international law – and is essentially prem-
ised on the vertical relationship between the state and the individual (i.e. the rights-holder). By 
contrast, humanitarian law has been part of international law since its inception, set out to reg-
ulate the conduct of states based on reciprocity, which was later extended to include also certain 
types of non-state actors. Ultimately, however, the most striking difference is that humanitarian 
law is meant to regulate warfare, while human rights law is essentially made for peacetime.26  
At the time of Hugo Grotius, it was relatively easy to avoid greater systemic conflicts, as one 
could simply distinguish between two mutually exclusive sets of rules: the laws of peace versus 
the laws of war.27 However, while some states have at times argued for a wholesale displace-
ment of human rights law along similar lines,28 this is hardly a viable solution for the relation-
ship between both bodies of law in times of armed conflict. When codifying one regime, cross-
references to the other one were built into the relevant treaty text. Indeed, the so-called Martens 
Clause – contained in the Hague Rules (1907) and Additional Protocol I (1977) alike – can 
clearly be read in that way,29 alongside other, more explicit references to human rights law 
applicable in times of armed conflict.30 Moreover, most human rights treaties include deroga-
tion clauses. As we have seen in the previous chapter, one of the main reasons for their inclusion 
                                               
26  See more generally: Quénivet, ‘The History of the Relationship Between International Humanitarian Law 
and Human Rights Law’, in: Arnold and Quénivet (2008), supra note 3, 1-12; Kolb, ‘Human Rights Law 
and International Humanitarian Law between 1945 and the Aftermath of the Teheran Conference of 1968’, 
in: Kolb and Gaggioli (2013), supra note 3, 35-52. 
27  Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Libri Tres (Paris 1625). 
28  HRC, Comments by the Government of the United States of America on the Concluding Observations, 10 
October 2007, UN Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1/Add.112 (‘The law of war, and not the Covenant, is 
the applicable legal framework governing these detentions’); HRC, Second Period Report of Israel, 4 De-
cember 2001, UN Doc. CCPR/C/ISR/2001/2, para. 8; ECtHR, Georgia v. Russia (II), Decision on Admis-
sibility, 13 December 2011, Application no. 38263/08, para. 69 (Russia’s arguments: ‘the Convention did 
not apply to a situation of international armed conflict … In such circumstances the conduct of the State 
Party’s forces was governed exclusively by international humanitarian law’). 
29  The Martens Clause was first mentioned in the preamble of the Hague Rules of 1899 and those of 1907. It 
was included with minor alterations in the text of Art. 1 (2) AP I (‘In cases not covered …, civilians and 
combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from 
established custom, from the principles of humanity and from dictates of public conscience’).  
30  Art. 72 AP I (‘The provisions of this Section are additional to … other applicable rules of international law 
relating to the protection of fundamental human rights during international armed conflict’); preamble of 
AP II (‘Recalling furthermore that international instruments relating to human rights offer a basic protection 
to the human person’). 
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was to provide for flexibility in times of war, while ensuring that at least a core set of rights 
continues to apply fully. This shows that at the meta-level, both legal regimes clearly accumu-
late rather than being in conflict with one another. The continued application of human rights 
law during armed conflicts has also been confirmed in the practice of the major UN bodies, 
including the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Secretary-General.31 
It is therefore hardly surprising that the International Court of Justice has consistently confirmed 
the continued application of human rights law in situations of armed conflict or military occu-
pation.32 It has repeatedly held that: 
As regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law, 
there are thus three possible situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of interna-
tional humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others 
may be matters of both these branches of international law.33  
The complementary approach suggested by the Court is relatively straight-forward in situations 
that are only governed by one field of law, for instance, the right to assembly under human 
rights law or specific rules on the provision of medical assistance governed by humanitarian 
law. The same is true for cases when the two legal regimes provide the same standard of pro-
tection or even complement each other, for instance, with regard to the prohibition of torture 
and inhuman treatment of detainees.  
Over the past few decades, legal scholars have developed a number of different theories to 
explain the exact relationship between human rights and humanitarian law.34 However, as a 
common denominator in the academic debate it seems nowadays widely accepted35 that both 
                                               
31  Tehran Conference, General Resolution XXIII, ‘Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts’, 13 May 
1968, UN Doc A/Conf.32/41; A/RES/2444, 19 December 1968; UNSG, Reports on the Respect for Human 
Rights in Armed Conflicts, 20 November 1969, A/7720, paras. 23-30, and 18 September 1970, A/8052, 
paras. 24-27; S/RES/1674, 28 April 2006, para. 26; S/RES/1882, 11 November 2009, para. 3. 
32  ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, 
pp. 226-67, para. 25; and the two cases cited infra. 
33  ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, pp. 136-203, para. 106; ICJ, Democratic Republic of the Congo 
v. Uganda, Judgement, 19 December 2005, ICJ Reports 2005, pp. 168-283, para. 216. 
34  See, for instance: Heintze, ‘Theories on the Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and Hu-
man Rights Law’, in: Kolb and Gaggioli (2013), supra note 3, 53-64, who distinguishes the following three 
theories: separation theory, complementary theory, and integration theory (mainly drawing from recent 
development in the field of children’s rights); Gowlland-Debbas and Gaggioli, ‘The Relationship between 
International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: An Overview’, in: Kolb and Gaggioli (2013), supra 
note 3, 77-103, who distinguishes the following three theories: separation theory, complementary theory, 
and harmonisation theory. 
35  For the minority view, i.e. that IHL and HRL are not (or should not be) complementary to each other: 
Modirzadeh, ‘The Dark Sides of Convergence: A Pro-Civilian Critique of the Extraterritorial Application 
of Human Rights Law in Armed Conflict’, 86 International Law Studies (2010), 349-410 (mainly criticising 
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regimes are largely complementary,36 including for the specific case of peace operations and 
other overseas military operations.37 In fact, US Colonel and military lawyer G.I.A.D. Draper 
said already in 1972 that: 
The two systems are essentially complementary, and that is an end of the old dichotomy 
between the Law of War and the Law of Peace into which International Law was tradition-
ally divided. We have moved a long way.38 
The US government has also acknowledged this fact in its most recent state report (2011) to the 
Human Rights Committee: 
In this context, it is important to bear in mind that international human rights law and the 
law of armed conflict are in many respects complementary and mutually reinforcing. These 
two bodies of law contain many similar protections.39  
The picture becomes, however, more complex where the specific rules of human rights and 
humanitarian law provide different solutions that are incompatible with one another: for in-
stance, in relation to the killing or detention of enemy forces. Such cases fall squarely into the 
broad concept of norm conflict adopted above and thus call for an effort to interpret the norms 
                                               
the negative effect of what she calls ‘convergence’ on the integrity of IHL); Dennis and Surena, ‘Applica-
tion of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in Times of Armed Conflict and Military 
Occupation’, 6 European Human Rights Law Review (2008), 714-31 (but mainly focused on the spatially 
restricted scope of the ICCPR). 
36  Oberleitner, Human Rights in Armed Conflict. Law, Practice, Policy (CUP 2015), pp. 81-128 (on concur-
rent application); Hampson, ‘The Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and International 
Human Rights Law’, in: Sheeran and Rodley (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of International Human 
Rights Law (Routledge 2013), 185-213; Doswald-Beck, Human Rights in Times of Conflict and Terrorism 
(OUP 2011), pp. 106-26; Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Non-State Actors (OUP 2010), pp. 
236-47; Henckaerts, ‘Concurrent Application of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: 
A Victim Perspective’, in: Arnold and Quénivet (2008), supra note 3, 237-67, pp. 262-67; Orakhelashvili, 
‘The Interaction Between Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Fragmentation, Conflict, Parallelism, or 
Convergence?’, 19 (1) EJIL (2008), 161-82; Prud’homme (2007), supra note 4; Krieger (2006), supra note 
4; Gillard, ‘International Humanitarian Law and Extraterritorial State Conduct’, in: Coomans and Kam-
minga (eds.), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (Intersentia 2004), 25-39, pp. 35-36; 
Dinstein (2004), infra note 130, pp. 20-25; Provost, International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law 
(CUP 2002). 
37  Mujezinović Larsen, The Human Rights Treaty Obligations of Peacekeepers (CUP 2012), pp. 243-97; 
Odello and Piotrowicz, ‘Legal Regimes Governing International Military Missions’, in: Odello and Pi-
otrowicz (eds.), International Military Missions and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2011), 25-44; 
Kleffner, ‘Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law: General Issues’, in: Gill and Fleck (eds.), 
Handbook of the International Law of Military Operations (OUP 2010), 51-77, pp. 72-75; Naert, Interna-
tional Law Aspects of the EU’s Security and Defence Policy, with a Particular Focus on the Law of Armed 
Conflict and Human Rights (Intersentia, 2010), pp. 589-617. 
38  Draper, ‘Human Rights and the Law of War’, 12 Virginia Journal of International Law (1972), 326-42, 
p. 338. 
39  HRC, Fourth Periodic Report, USA, 30 December 2011, CCPR/C/USA/4, para. 507. Even the most recent 
Israeli report is more sympathetic towards the idea of convergence between both legal regimes, while at the 
same time maintaining the traditional separatist view: HRC, Fourth Periodic Report, Israel, CCPR/C/ISR/4, 
12 December 2013, para. 47. 
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in light of the other so as to possibly overcome the inconsistency. This is precisely what the 
International Court of Justice was doing in its Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion (1996). Since 
the Covenant’s right to life is non-derogable, the Court proceeded as follows: 
In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life applies also in hostilities. 
The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be determined by 
the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed 
to regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thus whether a particular loss of life, through the use 
of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary 
to Article 6 of the Covenant, can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in 
armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself. 40  
To be clear, it was the indeterminacy of the term ‘arbitrary deprivation of life’ that allowed the 
Court to read the humanitarian law solution (lex specialis) into the right-to-life provision of the 
Covenant, without having to resort to any form of conflict resolution.41 A general reference to 
the lex specialis nature of humanitarian law was also made by the Court in its Wall advisory 
opinion (2004), but was eventually dropped in the subsequent judgment of Congo v. Uganda 
(2005), prompting doubts as to whether this doctrine is to be maintained.42  
In one of his most recent writings, Marko Milanović shows meticulously that the lex specialis 
doctrine only entered the debate on the interplay between both regimes once it had been specif-
ically pleaded by the United Kingdom during the proceedings before the Court in the above-
mentioned Nuclear Weapons case and then only as a tool to avoid a possible conflict with hu-
man rights law by means of harmonious interpretation.43 So ‘despite the Latin veneer of antiq-
uity’,44 the notion of lex specialis has only been in active use in academic discussions on the 
relationship between human rights and humanitarian law since the mid-1990s. It is therefore 
unclear whether the doctrine can really serve as a resolution tool for conflicts between rules of 
both regimes that cannot be avoided. What makes its use especially difficult is the fact that the 
substantive content of human rights and humanitarian law is spread across multiple instruments 
                                               
40  ICJ, Nuclear Weapons (1996), supra note 32, para. 25. 
41  Surprisingly, this is what Sandesh Sivakumaran claims the ICJ was doing in the case: Sivakumaran, ‘Inter-
national Humanitarian Law’, in: Moeckli et al. (eds.), International Human Rights Law (2nd edn., OUP 
2013), 479-95, pp. 489-90 (‘In this instance, the relevant rules of international humanitarian law constituted 
the leges specialis and so trumped, to the extent of the inconsistency, the equivalent rule found in interna-
tional human rights law’, emphasis added). 
42  ICJ, Wall Opinion (2004), supra note 33, para. 106 (In order to answer the question put to it, the Court will 
have to take into consideration both these branches of international law, namely human rights law and, as 
lex specialis, international humanitarian law). ICJ, DRC v. Uganda (2005), supra note 33, para. 216. 
43  Milanović, ‘The Lost Origins of Lex Specialis: Rethinking the Relationship between Human Rights and 
International Humanitarian Law’, in: Ohlin (ed.), Theoretical Boundaries of Armed Conflicts and Human 
Rights (CUP forthcoming 2015, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2463957), pp. 8-24. 
44  Ibid, p. 12. 
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adopted at different times and that it relies heavily on custom as well as the practice and case-
law of international judicial bodies. This makes the quest for the most recent expression of state 
consent – the ultimate purpose of the tandem of lex specialis and lex posterior – an almost 
impossible endeavour. 
Even for many of those using the lex specialis notion, including for cases of conflict resolution, 
it is by no means an inherent character of humanitarian law. Rather, both human rights law and 
humanitarian law constitute special regimes compared to international law as a whole. The an-
swer as to which constitutes the special rule may therefore differ from situation to situation.45 
Marco Sassòli and Laura Olson define lex specialis as the law with the ‘larger common contact 
surface area’ with the situation. A major factor for the assessment is therefore whether one of 
the norms addresses the problem at hand more explicitly.46 Moreover, besides speciality it is 
also essential to consider whether the solution is consistent with the systemic objectives of the 
law. This is arguably an element which allows for broader interpretation, taking into account 
aspects of the general law.47 This seems to be also the approach of the Human Rights Commit-
tee, which has previously referred to the ‘more specific rules’ of humanitarian law and their 
relevance for interpreting the Covenant, while explicitly stressing the complementary nature of 
that relationship.48 Likewise, the most recent US report mentions the lex specialis doctrine, but 
adds that: 
Determining the international law rule that applies to a particular action taken by a govern-
ment in the context of an armed conflict is a fact-specific determination, which cannot be 
easily generalized, and raises especially complex issues in the context of non-international 
armed conflicts …49 
The determination is thus highly context-specific and depends on the issue at stake. While a 
number of different aspects may deserve consideration, including detention or the protection of 
                                               
45  D’Aspremont and Tranchez (2013), supra note 13, pp. 40-41; Orakhelashvili (2011), supra note 36, p. 182; 
ILC Fragmentation Report (2006), supra note 12, paras. 111-22; Lindroos (2005), supra note 4, p. 42. 
46  Sassòli and Olson, ‘The Relationship between International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law Where 
It Matters: Admissible Killing and Internment of Fighters in Non-International Armed Conflicts’, 90 
IRRC (2008), 599-627, pp. 604-05. According to the authors, the same reasoning also applies to conflicts 
involving one or more customary rules, as they are most likely to be codified in a treaty, an authoritative 
study or a doctrinal text. 
47  ILC Fragmentation Report (2006), supra note 12, para. 107. 
48  HRC, General Comment 31, ‘Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the 
Covenant’, 29 March 2004, CCPR/C/21/Rev 1/Add 13, para. 11. 
49  HRC, Fourth Periodic Report, USA (2011), supra note 39, para. 507, emphasis added. The last point is 
restricted to NIACs ‘occurring within a State’s own territory’, but seems mainly motivated by the USA’s 
continuous opposition to the ICCPR’s extra-territorial reach. 
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private property, this thesis is focused on the overall question as to when and how physical 
force may be used in peace operations.  
5.3 USE OF FORCE UNDER BOTH REGIMES 
In order to locate potential areas of conflict between human rights law and humanitarian law, 
this section will consider the relevant rules on the use of force. The emphasis here is on the 
standards governing the actions of international forces in the field rather than their possible 
duties.50 The present discussion on the relevant use-of-force standards will be followed by the 
main section of this chapter, aimed at identifying the most appropriate model for the interaction 
of these different sets of rules. 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
Introduction 
In non-custodial situations, the deliberate use of physical force by state agents may affect a 
number of different rights, including the freedom of assembly,51 the freedom of movement,52 
and property rights.53 However, we will consider here only the right to life and the prohibition 
                                               
50  In other words, this section is not concerned with the measures that peacekeepers may be required to take 
in order to protect the local population from attacks. Such a duty (i.e. positive obligation) may indeed arise 
under HRL, but it is highly unlikely to produce any norm conflict between HRL and HRL. For an excellent 
discussion on this issue: Mujezinović Larsen (2012), supra note 37, pp. 386-93 (calling for flexibility to 
avoid a disproportionate burden on the mission and concluding that such HRL duties correspond largely 
with the terms of their mandate already binding on them). HRL provides also for investigative duties in 
response to possible violations, which are also beyond the scope of this section. While the equivalent duty 
under IHL is not (necessarily) the same, this difference is also unlikely to produce any norm conflict be-
tween HRL and HRL and thus less relevant for the present chapter. For an excellent contribution on the 
duty to investigate: Todeschini, ‘Emerging Voices: The Right to a Remedy in Armed Conflict – Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law, Human Rights Law and the Principle of Systemic Integration’, Opinio Juris, 5 
August 2015, http://opiniojuris.org/2015/08/05/ emerging-voices-the-right-to-a-remedy-in-armed-conflict-
international-humanitarian-law-human-rights-law-and-the-principle-of-systemic-integration. 
51  Art. 11 ECHR; Art. 21 ICCPR; Art. 15 ACHR; Art. 24 (f) Arab Charter; Art. 12 CIS Convention; Art. 11 
ACHPR; Art. XXI ADRDM. 
52  Art. 2 Protocol 4, ECHR; Art. 12 ICCPR; Art. 22 ACHR; Art. 26 (a) Arab Charter; Art. 22 CIS Convention; 
Art. 12 ACHPR; Art. VIII ADRDM. 
53  Art. 1 Protocol 1, ECHR; Art. 17 UDHR; Art. 21 ACHR; Art. 31 Arab Charter; Art. 26 CIS Convention; 
Art. 14 ACHPR; Art. XXIII ADRDM. 
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of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, as they are the rights most directly affected.54 They 
also allow for fewer limitations and enjoy a much greater universal recognition than other 
rights.  
While the prohibition of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment is generally considered to be 
an absolute right, it is nevertheless subject to inherent limitations as part of its definition. In 
other words, whether a certain act is to be seen as cruel or inhuman treatment is highly context-
specific and subject to a severity and proportionality test. As rightly put by the Manfred Nowak 
and Elizabeth McArthur:  
Since the police, of course, are entitled to use physical force and arms for lawful purposes, 
the principle of proportionality must be applied in order to determine whether the use of 
force is excessive or not. Only such use of force which results in severe pain or suffering 
and which, in the particular circumstances of a given case, is considered to be excessive 
and non-proportional in relation to the purpose to be achieved amounts to inhuman or cruel 
treatment or punishment.55 
This shows a close similarity with the limitations under the right to life, which is usually en-
gaged whenever lethal force has been used. However, even where the targeted person survived 
the use of life-threatening force, the European Court has usually examined its lawfulness under 
the right to life rather than under the prohibition of cruel and inhuman treatment.56 A similar 
approach has been employed by other human rights bodies.57 The following considerations on 
the right to life are therefore equally relevant for the use of non-lethal force.58 
                                               
54  On the prohibition of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment: Art. 3 ECHR; Art. 7 ICCPR; Art. 5 ACHR; 
Art. 8 (a) Arab Charter; Art. 3 CIS Convention; Art. 5 ACHPR; Art. I ADRDM. The listed articles also 
include the ban on torture, which is not specifically considered here, as it usually requires quasi custodial 
situations; the same reason motivated the exclusion of ‘punishment’. 
55  Nowak and McArthur, The United Nations Convention against Torture. A Commentary (OUP 2008), 
p. 568, emphasis added (with regard to Art. 16 CAT, dealing with cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment).  
56  ECtHR, Andreou v. Turkey, Judgement, 27 October 2009, Application no. 45653/99, para. 41 (‘physical 
ill-treatment by State agents which does not result in death may disclose a violation of that provision. In 
particular, the Court must determine whether the force used against the applicant was potentially lethal and 
what kind of impact the conduct of the officials concerned had not only on her physical integrity but also 
on the interest the right to life is intended to protect. In relation to this, the degree and type of force used 
and the intention or aim behind the use of force may, among other factors, be relevant’) and para. 63 (finding 
it unnecessary to the same facts under Art. 3 ECHR). Also, ECtHR, Makaratzis v. Greece (2004), infra 
note 70, para. 49. 
57  IACmHR, Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, 24 March 2011, Report No. 31/11, Case 12.416, 
para. 118 (quoting the ECtHR and previous IACtHR case-law). See, however: IACtHR, Santo Domingo 
Massacre v. Colombia, Judgement, 30 November 2012, Series No. 259, para. 230 (following a different 
approach, i.e. assessing the use of force vis-à-vis the survivors only under Art. 5 (1) ACHR). ACmHPR, 
Kazeem Aminu v. Nigeria, Decision, 11 May 2000, Communication no. 205/97, para. 18 (‘The Commission 
notes that the Complainant’s client (victim) is still alive but in hiding for fear of his life. It would be a 
narrow interpretation to this right to think that it can only be violated when one is deprived of it’). 
58  In other words, the same considerations on the use of force with respect to the right to life apply a fortiori 
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The formulation of the right to life varies across the different human rights treaties.59 For in-
stance, Article 6 (1) of the International Covenant states that:  
Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. 
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life. 
The same approach of prohibiting arbitrary deprivation of life has been followed by the drafters 
of some of the regional human rights instruments, namely the American Convention, the Afri-
can Charter and the Arab Charter.60 By contrast, the European Convention prohibits the inten-
tional deprivation of life unless ‘it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely 
necessary’ for achieving one of the following three legitimate aims:  
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; 
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully de-
tained; 
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.61 
The equivalent provision under the CIS Convention seems to be inspired by the European Con-
vention, but is somewhat opaque as to its permissible exceptions.62  
As already highlighted in the previous chapters, the right to life also exists outside of treaty law. 
Indeed, it is widely seen as part of customary law and general principles of international law63 
and is also generally considered a rule of jus cogens.64 The contours of this non-treaty right 
                                               
to the use of non-lethal force in relation to the prohibition of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. For 
instance, applying the principle of proportionality (outlined below) means that the pain and injury caused 
by physical force (e.g. truncheons, water cannons, tear gas) must be balanced with (i.e. not exceed) the 
purpose of that use of force (e.g. to break up an illegal rally). 
59  The original texts of most general HRL treaties include the death penalty as an explicit exception from the 
right to life, subject to certain procedural requirements under the provision itself and further limitations or 
complete abolition under subsequent protocols: Art. 2 ECHR, Art. 6 ICCPR, Art. 4 ACHR, Arts. 6-7 Arab 
Charter and Art. 2 CIS Convention. See more generally: Hood and Hoyle, The Death Penalty: A Worldwide 
Perspective (5th edn., OUP 2015). 
60  Art. 4 (1) ACHR (‘Every person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be protected by law 
and, in general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life’); 
Art. 4 ACHPR and Art. 5 Arab Charter. 
61  Art. 2 (2) ECHR. 
62  Art. 2 (4) CIS Convention (‘Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of the 
provisions of this Article when it results from the use of force solely in such cases of extreme necessity and 
necessary defence as are provided for in national legislation’, emphasis added). Due to the lack of relevant 
case-law, the exact meaning of these terms has remained vague and will not be further considered here. 
63  Art. 3 UDHR; Hague Appeals Court, Mustafić-Mujić v. Netherlands & Nuhanović v. Netherlands, Judge-
ment, 5 July 2011, Case no. 200.020.174/01, para. 6.3; Joseph, The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (OUP 2004), p. 154 (highlighting that Art. 6 (1) ICCPR speaks of ‘inherent right to life’, 
which suggests an independent existence of the right prior to the adoption of the ICCPR). 
64  HRC, General Comment no. 24, 2 November 1994, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, para. 8; ECO-
WAS Community Court of Justice, Serap v. Nigeria, Judgement, 27 October 2009, ECW/CCJ/APP/0808, 
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have been incrementally shaped within the framework of the United Nations. Most relevant in 
that context are the statements of special rapporteurs and international standard-setting instru-
ments, in particular, the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforce-
ment Officials, adopted in 1990.65 While not formally binding, these statements and instruments 
have been used as an authoritative interpretation on the use of force by the European Court66 
and the Human Rights Committee67 as well as the Inter-American68 and African human rights 
systems.69 In addition, most of these bodies also regularly refer to the relevant provision of 
other human rights treaties and their related jurisprudence.70 This has led to a significant con-
vergence regarding the content of the right to life,71 which prompted the European Court to 
conclude that: 
                                               
para. 18 (‘Some of the fundamental human rights, such as the right to life, have even been elevated to the 
status of “Jus Cogens”, peremptory norms of international law from which no derogation is permitted’). 
65  Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, adopted by the Eighth 
United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana (Cuba), 
27 August to 7 September 1990, hereinafter: Use of Force and Firearms Principles (1990). See also the 
Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, annexed to UN GA Res. 34/169, adopted by the UN 
General Assembly on 17 December 1979. 
66  ECtHR, Erdogan v. Turkey, Judgement, 25 April 2006, Application no. 19807/92, paras. 56-57; ECtHR, 
Kakoulli v. Turkey, Judgement, 22 November 2005, Application no. 38595/97, paras. 77-79 and 109; EC-
tHR, Nachova v. Bulgaria, Judgement, 6 July 2005, Applications nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, paras. 71-
74 and 96; ECtHR, Makaratzis v. Greece, Judgement, 20 December 2004, Application no. 50385/99, paras. 
30-31 and 59; ECtHR, McCann v. United Kingdom, Judgement, 5 September 1995, Application no. 
18984/91, paras. 138-39. 
67  HRC, Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of the United States of America, 23 April 
2014, CCPR/C/USA/CO/4, para. 11. 
68  IACtHR, Nadege Dorzema v. Dominican Republic, Judgement, 24 October 2012, Case no. 251, paras. 78-
84 and footnote text; IACtHR, Zambrano Vélez v. Ecuador, Judgement, 4 July 2007, Case no. 166, paras. 
84-86 and footnote text; IACtHR, Montero-Aranguran v. Venezuala, Judgement, 5 July 2006, Case no. 
150, paras. 69 and 75; IACmHR, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, 22 October 2002, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116, para. 87. 
69  ACmHPR, Noah Kazingachire v. Zimbabwe, Decision on the Merits, 2 May 2012, Communication no. 
295/04, paras. 107-22; ACmHPR, Working Group on Death Penalty and Extra-Judicial, Summary or Ar-
bitrary Killings in Africa, Intersession Activity Report (November 2013 - April 2014), 12 May 2014, 
www.achpr.org/sessions/55th/intersession-activity-reports/death-penalty, hereinafter: ACmHPR, Arbitrary 
Killings Working Group Report (2014), para. 50. 
70  For instance: IACmHR, Wallace de Almeida v. Brazil, Report No. 26/09, 20 March 2009, Case no. 12.440, 
para. 103; IACtHR, Dorzema v. Dominican Republic (2012), supra note 68, paras. 85-87 and footnote text; 
IACtHR, Zambrano Vélez v. Ecuador (2007), supra note 68, paras. 84-89 and footnote text (all three cases 
referring to ECtHR jurisprudence with regard to Art. 2 ECHR). ECtHR, Makaratzis v. Greece (2004), supra 
note 66, paras. 29 and 58 (referring to the General Comment 6 of the HRC with regard to Art. 6 ICCPR). 
ACmHPR, Noah Kazingachire v. Zimbabwe (2012), supra note 69, para. 133 (referring to the IACtHR 
case-law). 
71  In a similar way: Melzer, Targeted Killing in International Law (OUP 2008), pp. 118-120; Tavernier, ‘Le 
Recours à la Force par la Police’, in: Tomuschat et al. (eds.), The Right to Life (Neihoff Publishers 2010), 
41-64, pp. 58-63. 
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The convergence of the above-mentioned instruments [UDHR, ICCPR and ECHR] is sig-
nificant: it indicates that the right to life is an inalienable attribute of human beings and 
forms the supreme value in the hierarchy of human rights.72 
Hence, despite the textual differences of the relevant treaty provisions outlined above, there are 
a number of common features of the right to life, which will be examined in the following 
sections. 
Legal Basis 
Any deprivation of life requires a sufficient legal basis. This follows from the duty to protect 
life, specifically mentioned in nearly all right-to-life provisions. The Human Rights Committee 
held that: 
The protection against arbitrary deprivation of life, which is explicitly required by the third 
sentence of article 6 (1), is of paramount importance. … The deprivation of life by the 
authorities of the State is a matter of the utmost gravity. Therefore, the law must strictly 
control and limit the circumstances in which a person may be deprived of his life by such 
authorities.73 
This requirement has been confirmed and refined in the subsequent practice of the Committee74 
and the jurisprudence of other human rights bodies.75 It is also explicitly mentioned in the Use 
of Force and Firearms Principles.76 
As for peace operations, their specific mandate – often accompanied by the host state’s explicit 
consent – usually provides a sufficient international legal basis for their actions in the field and 
possible interferences with the rights of individuals. These mandates are, however, worded in 
rather general terms. Commanders draw up specific rules of engagement or tactical directives, 
similar to domestic rules for police and other security forces, to regulate the use of force by 
                                               
72  ECtHR, Streletz et al. v. Germany, Judgement, Applications nos. 34044/96, 35532/97 and 44801/98, 22 
March 2001, paras. 93-94. 
73  HRC, General Comment no. 6, Article 6 (Right to Life), 30 April 1982, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, 
para. 3. 
74  HRC, Guerrero v. Colombia, Views, 31 March 1982, Communication no. 11/45, paras. 13.1-13.3; HRC, 
Baboeram v. Suriname, Merits, 10 April 1984, Communication nos. 146/1983 and 148–154/1983, para. 
14.3. 
75  IACtHR, Nadege Dorzema v. Dominican Republic (2012), supra note 68, paras. 79-82 and 85; ECtHR, 
Nachova v. Bulgaria (2005), supra note 66, paras. 96-97; ECtHR, Makaratzis v. Greece (2004), supra note 
66, para. 66; ECtHR, Kakoulli v. Turkey (2005), supra note 66, para. 109. 
76  Use of Force and Firearms Principles (1990), supra note 65, Principles 1 (‘Governments and law enforce-
ment agencies shall adopt and implement rules and regulations on the use of force and firearms against 
persons by law enforcement officials. In developing such rules and regulations, Governments and law en-
forcement agencies shall keep the ethical issues associated with the use of force and firearms constantly 
under review’) and Principle 11 (listing specific aspects such rules and regulations should entail). 
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their troops in the field. These may vary greatly from contingent to contingent, depending on 
the national caveats entered by their respective troop-contributing states.  
Moreover, these rules are usually classified for the purpose of force protection.77 Nevertheless, 
some parts of them are occasionally made available in order to ensure broader awareness, es-
pecially among those possibly affected by their actions.78 Certainly, the rules of engagement 
and tactical directives do not necessarily cover all possible mission scenarios. However, human 
rights bodies have shown their willingness to distinguish between routine police operations and 
unique cases, such as large-scale hostage-taking situations, that require more tailor-made re-
sponses.79 Given the high level of unpredictability in the mission area, the legal basis require-
ment applies with a great level of flexibility to the reality of peace operations. 
Necessity and Proportionality 
The meaning of the term ‘arbitrary’ is not only restricted to unlawfulness.80 During the drafting 
process of the Covenant, the delegates suggested spelling out the circumstances in which kill-
ings would be considered lawful. Most of the suggested exceptions were modelled on the three 
grounds listed under the Article 2 (2) of the European Convention.81 Of particular relevance for 
peace operations, however, was one of the proposals which included: ‘killing in the case of 
enforcement measures authorized by the Charter’.82 Nevertheless, any list of exceptions was 
                                               
77  On this issue: Rowe, ‘The Rules of Engagement in Occupied Territory: Should they be Published?’, 8 
Melbourne Journal of International Law (2007), 327-39. 
78  See, for instance, parts of the ISAF Tactical Directive, issued by HQ ISAF, 6 July 2009, 
www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/Tactical_Directive_090706.pdf. See also: IIHL, Sanremo Handbook 
on Rules of Engagement, November 2009.  
79  ECtHR, Finogenov v. Russia (2011), infra note 115, para. 230 (involving the 2002 hostage crisis at Mos-
cow’s Dubrowka musical theatre). 
80  Joseph and Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Cases, Materials, and Com-
mentary (3rd edn., OUP 2013), para. 8.04, p. 168. 
81  UNGA, ‘Annotations on the Text of the Draft International Covenants on Human Rights’, 1 July 1955, UN 
Doc. A/2929, p. 29. Interestingly, Art. 2 (2) ECHR is modelled on an earlier draft of Art. 6 ICCPR, proposed 
by Australia, Denmark, France, Lebanon and the United Kingdom, E/1371 and E/CN. 4/350, 23 June 
1949, p. 53. 
82  UN Doc. A/2929, ibid, p. 29 (‘Among the exceptions proposed were : (a) execution of death sentence 
imposed in accordance with law; (b) killing in self-defence or defence of another; (c) death resulting from 
action lawfully taken to suppress insurrection, rebellion or riots; (d) killing in attempting to effect lawful 
arrest or preventing the escape of a person in lawful custody; (e) killing in the case of enforcement measures 
authorized by the Charter; (f) killing in defence of persons, property or State or in circumstances of grave 
civil commotion; (g) killing for violation of honour’). There is no indication that the the proposal ‘killing 
in the case of enforcement measures authorized by the Charter’ was specifically discussed during any of 
the sessions, but it seems most likely that it refered to a case like the military campaign in Korea at that 
time, to which IHL of IACs was clearly applicable. Its inclusion in the list was thus rather uncontroversial. 
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seen as necessarily incomplete and the use of the term ‘arbitrary’ was favoured,83 despite the 
lack of clarity as to its exact meaning.84 
Similar considerations may have motivated the drafters of the regional instruments that in-
cluded the same ‘arbitrariness’ wording. It is generally acknowledged that security forces may 
use force to defend themselves or others, to effect an arrest or to otherwise maintain law and 
order,85 in line with the exceptions listed in Article 2 (2) of the European Convention.86 
The exact level of force that can be used and whether it may include lethal force, however, 
depends entirely on the necessity and proportionality test.87 While both principles are often used 
interchangeably, they do denote quite different legal concepts. Indeed, as we know from the 
previous chapter, the principle of necessity requires that there be a no less drastic alternative to 
the measure in question. Hence, for a concrete use of force to be considered necessary, it must 
be the only means to achieve one of the above-mentioned objectives.88 
By contrast, the principle of proportionality requires that a balance be ‘struck between the aim 
pursued and the means employed to achieve it’.89 In other words, a deprivation of life can only 
be justified in order to protect life.90 Hence, not every use of force that is necessary can be 
                                               
83  Ibid, p. 29-30 (‘it was maintained that any enumeration of limitations would necessarily be incomplete and 
would, moreover, tend to convey the impression that greater importance was being given to the exceptions 
than to the right. An article drafted in such terms would seem to authorize killing rather than safeguard the 
right to life. … The article should simply but categorically affirm that “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived 
of his life”’). 
84  Ibid, p. 30 (‘It was explained that a clause providing that no one should be deprived of his life “arbitrarily” 
would indicate that the right was not absolute and obviate the necessity of setting out the possible exceptions 
in detail. The use of the term "arbitrarily" was criticized, however, on the ground that it did not express a 
generally recognized idea and that it was ambiguous and open to several interpretations’). 
85  HRC, Guerrero v. Colombia (1982), supra note 74, para. 13.2; IACmHR, Report on Terrorism and Human 
Rights (2002), supra note 68, para. 87; IACmHR, Alejandre v. Cuba, Decision, 29 September 1999, Case 
11.589, Report No. 86/99, para. 43 (‘the civilian light aircraft posed no danger to Cuba’s national security, 
to the Cuban people, or to the military pilots’); Use of Force and Firearms Principles (1990), supra note 65, 
para. 9 and paras. 12-13 (on the use of force to disperse non-violent and non-violent assemblies). 
86  See above, p. 222. 
87  IACmHR, Alejandre v. Cuba (1999), supra note 85, paras. 42-45 (with regard to the right to life under the 
ADRDM); IACmHR, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights (2002), supra note 68, paras. 87 and 91-92; 
IACmHR, Wallace de Almeida v. Brazil (2009), supra note 70, paras. 105-106; IACtHR, Uzcátegui v. 
Venezuela, Judgement, 3 September 2012, Case no. 249, paras. 141-43; IACtHR, Nadege Dorzema v. Do-
minican Republic (2012), supra note 68, paras. 85-87; IACtHR, Montero-Aranguran v. Venezuala (2006), 
supra note 68, paras. 67-68; ACmHPR, Noah Kazingachire v. Zimbabwe (2012), supra note 69, para. 111-
16; ECtHR, Nachova v. Bulgaria (2005), supra note 66, paras. 94-95 and 106-08; ECtHR, Makaratzis v. 
Greece (2004), supra note 66, paras. 64-66; HRC, Guerrero v. Colombia (1982), supra note 74, paras. 
13.2-13.3. 
88  Melzer further distinguishes between qualitative, quantitative and temporal necessity: Melzer (2008), supra 
note, p. 101. 
89  ECtHR, Güleç v.Turkey, Judgement, 27 July 1998, Application no. 21593/93, para. 71. 
90  See, in particular: ACmHPR, Noah Kazingachire v. Zimbabwe (2012), supra note 69, para. 116. 
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considered proportionate and thus lawful. The interaction of the principle of necessity and pro-
portionality is well reflected in the Use of Force and Firearms Principles, which state that 
firearms can only be used: 
in self-defence or defence of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury, 
to prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life, to 
arrest a person presenting such a danger and resisting their authority, or to prevent his or 
her escape, and only when less extreme means are insufficient to achieve these objectives. 
In any event, intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable 
in order to protect life.91 
On the basis of that, we can examine different scenarios that peace operations may be facing. 
The most obvious case are genuine self-defence situations, in which a person poses an imminent 
threat to the life or limb of others. A case in point is an attack by armed individuals on the 
personnel of peace operations or other people in their vicinity.92 For as long as that threat per-
sists and if there are no other means to contain it, lethal force may be used.93 An even more 
pertinent case is the threat by suicide bombers or by armed hostage-takers determined to kill 
the hostages or members of the rescue teams. The use of lethal force in such scenarios is not 
only permissible, but even required to comply with the duty to protect the life of those threat-
ened. 
Attempts to arrest or to prevent an escape are more complex. While force may generally be 
used, it has to be proportionate to the situation and the threat the person poses. Indeed, practice 
shows that direct lethal force is only available as a last resort against persons who pose a threat 
that is analogous to classic self-defence situations considered above. This is well reflected in 
the case of Nachova v. Bulgaria (2006), in which the European Court held that the use of fire-
arms was disproportionate and thus unlawful: 
where it is known that the person to be arrested poses no threat to life or limb and is not 
suspected of having committed a violent offence, even if a failure to use lethal force may 
result in the opportunity to arrest the fugitive being lost.94 
                                               
91  Use of Force and Firearms Principles (1990), supra note 65, para. 9. 
92  Mujezinović Larsen (2012), supra note 37, pp. 378-79. 
93  The option of lethal targeting disappears once the assailants no longer pose an immediate threat, most evi-
dently once they have surrendered.  
94  ECtHR, Nachova v. Bulgaria (2005), supra note 66, para. 95, emphasis added; also followed by: ECtHR, 
Kakoulli v. Turkey (2005), supra note 66, para. 108; IACtHR, Nadege Dorzema v. Dominican Republic 
(2012), supra note 68, para. 85. 
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This shows clearly also the complex interplay between the necessity and the proportionality 
requirements.95 The same is true for the use of force in other law-and-order scenarios, such as 
riot and crowd control,96 or at checkpoints when approaching vehicles fail to stop.97  
The perhaps most controversial use-of-force cases are those in defence of property. Some have 
suggested that such cases in peace operations would indeed be compatible with the Covenant 
and perhaps even with the European Convention.98 This is, however, hardly the case under any 
human rights regime.99 While it is true that mob violence against dwelling houses of certain 
ethnic groups or against their cultural property poses a serious threat to inter-communal peace 
and reconciliation, this does not warrant the use of (potentially) lethal force unless there is a 
threat to life and limb. The same applies to the theft and pillage of the peace operation’s equip-
ment. An important exception exists, however, with regard to weapons and other dangerous 
objects, whose unauthorised removal may easily pose a direct threat to the safety of the person-
nel or others in the vicinity, and thus allow for the use of force in a same way as in other self-
defence situation outlined above.100 
Precautionary Duties 
In addition to the necessity and proportionality test, human rights law requires states and inter-
national organisations to take all feasible precautions so as to minimise the recourse to poten-
tially lethal force. As with other positive obligations, this is of course not meant to impose an 
unrealistic or impossible burden on the relevant authorities. For instance, the Use of Force and 
                                               
95  Consider also the illustrative example provided by Noam Lubell, where the use of firearms is a necessary 
but grossly disproportionate means to prevent a driver from speeding away to evade a parking ticket that a 
police officer tries to issue. Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of Force against Non-State Actors (OUP 2010), 
p. 173. 
96  ACmHPR, Arbitrary Killings Working Group Report (2014), supra note 69, para. 50 (‘the use of lethal 
force to clear even an unauthorised public gathering is unlawful unless lives are threatened’). 
97  ECtHR, Kakoulli v. Turkey (2005), supra note 66, para. 108; IACtHR, Nadege Dorzema v. Dominican 
Republic (2012), supra note 68, para. 85. 
98  Hong Ip, ‘PSOs: Establishing the Rule of Law Through Security and Law Enforcement Operations’, in: 
Arnold and Knoops (eds.), Practice and Policies of Modern Peace Support Operations under International 
Law (Transnational Publishers 2006), 3-34, pp. 28-30. 
99  ACmHPR, Arbitrary Killings Working Group Report (2014), supra note 69, para. 51 (criticising the au-
thorisation in national police codes to use lethal force in defence of property). 
100  Penny, ‘‘Drop That or I’ll Shoot … Maybe’: International Law and the Use of Deadly Force to Defend 
Property in UN Peace Operations’, 14 (3) International Peacekeeping (2007), 353-67, p. 364. See also: 
Mujezinović Larsen (2012), supra note 37, pp. 379-81 (who seems generally more willing to accept the use 
of lethal force in defence of property or defence of the mission). 
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Firearms Principles require law-enforcement agents to give a clear warning of their intent to 
use firearms: 
unless to do so would unduly place the law enforcement officials at risk or would create a 
risk of death or serious harm to other persons, or would be clearly inappropriate or pointless 
in the circumstances of the incident.101 
Police operations should be planned and implemented in a manner to minimise, as far as possi-
ble, the risk of having to resort to lethal force.102 This is perhaps best reflected in the case of 
McCann v. United Kingdom, involving the fatal shooting of three suspected members of the 
Irish Republic Army (IRA) by British special forces in Gibraltar. The European Court accepted 
that the soldiers genuinely believed that they had to use lethal force against the suspects to 
prevent them from detonating a car bomb.103 Nevertheless, the Court criticised the failure to 
prevent the entry of the suspects and to arrest them already at the border with Spain, which 
made the fatal shooting a ‘foreseeable possibility if not a likelihood’.104 The Court also criti-
cised the handling of intelligence information and the failure to make provision for a margin of 
error.105 The need for exceptional care and cross-checking in handling decisive intelligence has 
also been stressed with regard to other terror-related scenarios, such as suicide bombings.106  
Appropriate training of law-enforcement officers is a vital component for the planning and im-
plementation of operations. This may include teaching alternatives to the use of lethal force and 
                                               
101  Para. 10. See also, HRC, Guerrero v. Colombia (1982), supra note 74, paras. 13.2; IACmHR, Alejandre v. 
Cuba (1999), supra note 85, para. 42 (denouncing the lack of prior warning by Cuban military pilots shoot-
ing down a civilian light plane); Heyns, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or 
Arbitrary Executions, ‘The Protection of Life in the Context of Arrest’, 30 August 2011, A/66/330, para. 
38. 
102  ECtHR, Andronicou and Constantinou v. Cyprus, Judgement, 9 October 1997, Application no. 25052/94, 
paras. 181-86 (on the planning and execution of a hostage-rescue operation); ECtHR, Makaratzis v. Greece, 
supra note 66, paras. 66-71; ECtHR, Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy, Judgement, 24 March 2011, Application 
no. 23458/02, paras. 244-62 (on the planning and on-site implementation of crowd control measures during 
violent protests). IACmHR, Neira Alegria v. Peru, Judgement, 19 January 1995, Case no. 21, para. 62 
(criticising the lack of precautionary measures to reduce the cost of lives when raiding a prison affected by 
rioting). 
103  ECtHR, McCann v. United Kingdom (1995), supra note 66, paras. 195-201. 
104  Ibid, para. 205. 
105  Ibid, paras. 206-11. 
106  Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, 8 
March 2006, E/CN.4/2006/53, paras. 50-51. 
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firearms,107 or training for different operational scenarios, including hostage-takings, check-
point situations, access denial or crowd control.108 According to the Inter-American Court, in-
ternal disturbances should, as a matter of principle, be dealt with by the police rather than the 
military: 
States must restrict to the maximum extent the use of armed forces to control domestic 
disturbances, since they are trained to fight against enemies and not to protect and control 
civilians, a task that is typical of police forces.109 
While this is generally true, the use of armed forces personnel for law-enforcement tasks is 
explicitly envisaged by the Use of Force and Firearms Principles.110 Moreover, the use of sol-
diers for policing and related tasks is an operational reality in contemporary peace operations, 
which makes it even more necessary to provide troops with relevant training across the full 
operational spectrum. 
In addition, police and security forces also have to be equipped with protective gear and ar-
moured vehicles and with a variety of different weapons, including non-lethal incapacitating 
weapons, to allow for a differentiated use of force.111 A case in point is Güleç v. Turkey, in-
volving an illegal and violent pro-Kurdish demonstration.112 Turkish forces started firing into 
the crowd from a vehicle-mounted machine gun, resulting in the deaths of several demonstra-
tors. The European Court criticised that:  
The gendarmes used a very powerful weapon because they apparently did not have trun-
cheons, riot shields, water cannon, rubber bullets or tear gas. The lack of such equipment 
is all the more incomprehensible and unacceptable … in a region in which a state of emer-
gency has been declared, where at the material time disorder could have been expected.113 
 
                                               
107  Principles 19 and 20. 
108  IACtHR, Nadege Dorzema v. Dominican Republic (2012), supra note 68, paras. 87-90 (criticising the lack 
of planning and training for dealing with unauthorised border crossings); ECmHR, Aytekin v. Turkey, Re-
port, 18 September 1997, Application no. 22880/93, para. 97 (criticising the lack of planning and training 
for road checkpoints). 
109  IACtHR, Montero-Aranguran v. Venezuala (2006), supra note 68, para. 78. 
110  Footnote 1 to the preamble (‘In countries where police powers are exercised by military authorities, whether 
uniformed or not, or by State security forces, the definition of law enforcement officials shall be regarded 
as including officers of such services’). 
111  Use of Force and Firearms Principles (1990), supra note 65, para. 2. 
112  ECtHR, Güleç v. Turkey (1998), supra note 89. 
113  Ibid, para. 71-72. See also, ECtHR, Erdogan v. Turkey, Judgement, 25 April 2006, Application no. 
19807/92, para. 74 (on the failure to equip with tear gas and stun grenades). ACmHPR, Movement Burkin-
abé des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples v. Burkina Faso, Decision on the Merits, 7 May 2001, Commu-
nication no. 204/97, para. 43. 
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In the same vein, human rights bodies have criticised the lack of appropriate traffic control 
equipment for checkpoints, including barricades, speed bumps or tire puncturing devices.114 
Finally, authorities must also ensure speedy rescue and evacuation operations and provide ad-
equate medical treatment to injured persons.115 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 
Introduction 
Humanitarian law is generally referred to as a careful balance between military necessity and 
humanity, which constitute the cardinal principles of humanitarian law, alongside the principle 
of distinction and proportionality. However, the function of these principles differs greatly from 
their counterparts in the field of human rights law, where necessity and proportionality play a 
constant role in assessing the lawfulness of state conduct. In humanitarian law, they constitute 
overarching principles, which have already been taken account of in the formation of the de-
tailed rules that have evolved as a matter of positive law. Hence, unless there is an explicit 
reference in the norm text itself, they play no role in the actual operation of these rules.  
As we have seen in the previous chapters, there is a large body of customary humanitarian law, 
which mirrors many of the detailed rules that can be found in the most relevant humanitarian 
law conventions. It is particularly relevant in relation to non-international armed conflict, which 
is the more likely type of armed conflict for peace operations and for which treaty law remains 
fairly limited. This is why the following analysis will be primarily based on the rules contained 
in the Customary IHL Study, with some cross-references to the Sanremo NIAC Manual, the 
Secretary-General’s Bulletin and relevant practice as well as more specific treaty provisions. 
                                               
114  IACtHR, Nadege Dorzema v. Dominican Republic (2012), supra note 68, para. 88. See also: ECtHR, Pisari 
v. Moldova and Russia, Judgement, 21 April 2015, Application no. 42139/12, para. 57 (on the lack of 
appropriate equipment for immobilising vehicles at Russian military checkpoints in Moldova). 
115  Use of Force and Firearms Principles (1990), supra note 65, para. 5 (c); ECtHR, Finogenov v. Russia, 
Judgement, 20 December 2011, Applications nos. 18299/03 and 27311/03, paras. 237-266 (‘information 
exchange between various services, the belated start of the evacuation, limited on-the-field coordination of 
various services, lack of appropriate medical treatment and equipment on the spot, and inadequate logis-
tics’); IACmHR, Neira Alegria v. Peru (1995), supra note 102, para. 74 (failure to search for survivors). 
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Distinction, Proportionality and Feasible Precautions  
Humanitarian law is premised on the existence of fighting. That is why the principle of distinc-
tion is of utmost importance and has led to the development of rules setting out clear categories 
of persons and objects that can be targeted and those that have to be spared. Rule 1 of the 
Customary IHL Study states clearly that: 
The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants. 
Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must not be directed against 
civilians.116 
For that purpose, civilians are negatively defined as all those who are not members of the armed 
forces.117 They are protected against attack ‘unless and for such time as they take a direct part 
in hostilities’.118 The armed forces consist of combatants and medical and religious person-
nel.119 While combatants have a right to participate in hostilities and may be attacked at any 
time, unless they are placed hors de combat,120 medical and religious personnel are protected 
against attacks, provided they abstain from hostile acts.121 As we have seen above, there is no 
combatant status in non-international armed conflicts. In other words, members of armed 
groups are civilians who no longer enjoy protection against attack due to their direct participa-
tion in hostilities.122 Their special status and the general concept of direct participation in hos-
tilities is examined in greater detail in the following subsection. 
                                               
116  See also: Sect. 1.2.2 (Distinction) and 2.1.1.1 (Attacking Civilians and Civilian Objects), Sanremo NIAC 
Manual; Sect. 5.1, SG Bulletin. 
117  Rule 5, CIHL Study. 
118  Rule 6, ibid. See also Sect. 5.2, SG Bulletin. 
119  Rule 3, CIHL Study. 
120  Rule 47, ibid (‘Attacking persons who are recognized as hors de combat is prohibited. A person hors de 
combat is: (a) anyone who is in the power of an adverse party; (b) anyone who is defenceless because of 
unconsciousness, shipwreck, wounds or sickness; or (c) anyone who clearly expresses an intention to sur-
render; provided he or she abstains from any hostile act and does not attempt to escape’). See also: Art. 41 
AP I and Sect. 2.3.2 (Surrender), Sanremo NIAC Manual; Sect. 7.1, SG Bulletin. 
121  Rules 25 and 27, CIHL Study. See also: Sect. 3.2 (Medical and Religious Personnel), Sanremo NIAC Man-
ual; Sect. 9.4, SG Bulletin. 
122  Similar, but differently structured: Sect. 1.1.2 (Fighters) and 1.1.3 (Civilians), Sanremo NIAC Manual; 
Sect. 5.2, SG Bulletin. 
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The civilian-military distinction is replicated in relation to objects.123 To be precise, civilian 
objects are protected against direct attack, unless and for such time as they are military objec-
tives.124 As far as objects are concerned, Rule 8 of the Customary IHL Study defines military 
objectives as all those: 
which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military 
action and whose partial or total destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circum-
stances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.125 
This certainly includes any military equipment, such as weapons, ammunition or vehicles, as 
well as fixed military installations and barracks. The reach of the definition is, however, much 
broader: Also dual-use objects (e.g. landing strips, railways, ports, roads and bridges), which 
may be used both for military and civilian purposes, can easily qualify as a military objective. 
The same applies to genuine civilian objects and sites (e.g. schools, hospitals and places of 
worship), if they are used for military purposes by enemy forces.  
Since military objectives may be subjected to direct attack, this qualification may have serious 
consequences for civilians and civilian objects in the vicinity. For that reason, Rule 14 of the 
Customary IHL Study encapsulates a proportionality test by prohibiting attacks that: 
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to 
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the con-
crete and direct military advantage anticipated ...126 
The rule is thus aimed at preventing attacks where the expected collateral damage to civilians 
and civilian objects would outweigh (‘excessive in relation to’) the expected military advantage, 
while acknowledging that incidental harm and damage may occur as a result of attacks on le-
gitimate targets.127 Hence, the underlying rationale of proportionality under humanitarian law 
greatly differs from its counterpart in human rights law, which does not distinguish between 
different categories of people, but instead treats all human lives the same.  
What is more, unlike human rights law – which appears to be relatively clear on what amounts 
to a proportionate or disproportionate outcome – the answer under humanitarian law is rather 
vague. Apart from very extreme cases, there is indeed little guidance as to whether the collateral 
                                               
123  Rule 7, CIHL Study (‘… distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives. Attacks may only be 
directed against military objectives. Attacks must not be directed against civilian objects’). See also, Sect. 
1.2.2 (Distinction) and Sect. 2.1.1.1, Sanremo NIAC Manual. 
124  Rules 9-10, CIHL Study. See also, Sect. 1.1.5 (Civilian Objects), Sanremo NIAC Manual. 
125  Emphasis added. See also: Sect. 1.1.4 (Military Objectives), Sanremo NIAC Manual. 
126  Emphasis added. See also: Sect. 2.1.1.4 (Proportionality), Sanremo NIAC Manual; Sect. 5.5, SG Bulletin. 
127  For the ICRC view that also medical personnel are covered by the rules on proportionality and precaution: 
Gisel, ‘Can the Incidental Killing of Military Doctors Never be Excessive?’, 95 IRRC (2013), 215-30. 
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damage is excessive. The ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols suggests that ‘exten-
sive civilian losses’ are by default disproportionate, regardless of the importance of the military 
advantage at stake.128 This is, however, a misreading of the term ‘excessive in relation to’, 
which clearly entails a balancing test.129 Overall, it seems widely accepted that no rule of thumb 
exists for assessing how many dead civilians are acceptable for specific targeting scenarios,130 
such as disabling a tank of the enemy or destroying their main command centre attended by 
their military commanders. Rather, it appears that views on these questions differ greatly, even 
among key allies.131  
Moreover, even if there was a bright-line test based on numbers that commanders and targeting 
officers could rely on, it would still remain unclear how it should be applied to the wide range 
of different mission scenarios of contemporary peace operations. Is the notion of ‘military ad-
vantage’ static or does its meaning depend on the objectives and exact mandate of the operation 
in question? According to Michael Bothe, where an operation is specifically tasked with pro-
tecting civilians, this should inform the meaning of the term ‘military advantage’ for identifying 
military objectives and for assessing whether or not the attack would result in excessive inci-
dental harm to civilians.132 This would, however, create a difficult imbalance between the par-
ties to the conflict. Indeed, enemy forces – which are primarily interested in the total defeat of 
the adversary – would be free to cause much greater levels of collateral damage than the peace 
operation. Moreover, where international forces act in support of the host government (for in-
stance, against local rebel groups), there would also be an imbalance, creating possible chal-
lenges for joint operations. 
However, in genuine air campaigns – which need to be less concerned about force protection 
than peace operations with ground troops – this concept may prove workable and may indeed 
help reduce the number of civilian casualties deemed proportionate and thus acceptable. A case 
in point is Operation Unified Protector in 2011, the NATO-led operation carrying out air strikes 
in Libya to protect civilians. According to NATO statements: 
                                               
128  Sandoz et al., Commentary on the Additional Protocols (ICRC 1987), para. 1980, p. 626. 
129  This may explain why the CIHL Study refrains from making any detailed comments. 
130  Sanremo NIAC Manual, Commentary, p. 23, para. 5 (‘Proportionality is not an exact science and it is 
impossible to draw in advance hard and fast rules as to what outcome is proportionate to military ad-
vantage’). Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict (CUP 2004), 
p. 121. 
131  For an excellent outline of this dilemma: Noll, ‘Analogy at War: Proportionality, Equality and the Law of 
Targeting’, 43 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law (2012), 205-30. 
132  Bothe, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and International Humanitarian Law’, in: Beruto (ed.), International 
Humanitarian Law, Human Rights and Peace Operations. XXXIst Sanremo Round Table 2008 (IIHL 2009), 
224-26, p. 225. 
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The OUP targeting policy was designed and implemented with the Security Council man-
date to “protect civilians and civilian-populated areas under threat of attack” ﬁrmly at its 
core. The overriding objective throughout the campaign was to avoid any harm to civilians. 
Not one of the targets struck, involving over 7,700 weapons, was approved for attack, or in 
fact attacked, if either those designating and approving the target or the pilot executing it 
had any evidence or other reason to believe that civilians would be injured or killed by a 
strike.133  
This zero-expectation standard goes far beyond what the proportionality rule would normally 
require. It is, however, unclear whether this standard was merely adopted for policy reasons or 
whether it reflects a mission-dependent adaption of the proportionality test as a matter of bind-
ing law. Moreover, as we have seen, the proportionality rule is based on collateral damage 
expectations prior to the attack itself. In order to fill the protection gap that may arise, human-
itarian law also comprises far-reaching precautionary duties that the parties to the conflict have 
to fulfil. As a general rule: 
[C]onstant care must be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects. 
All feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental 
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.134 
This may include measures, such as target verification, damage assessment and advance warn-
ings prior to an attack.135 Parties to the armed conflict are also required to take all feasible 
precautions against the effects of possible enemy attacks, for instance, by removing military 
objectives from civilian areas.136 
In sum, humanitarian law contains a tightly-woven net of rules aimed at limiting the possible 
effects of warfare on the civilian population, as well as other specifically protected persons and 
objects, while acknowledging that incidental harm and damage may occur as a result of attacks 
against legitimate military targets.137 
                                               
133  HR Council, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, 2 March 2012, A/HRC/19/68, 
Annex II, Correspondence from NATO, p. 30, emphasis added. 
134  Rule 15, CIHL Study. See also: Sect. 5.3, SG Bulletin. 
135  CIHL Study: Rule 16 (Target Verification), Rule 17 (Choice of Means and Methods of Warfare), Rule 18 
(Assessment of the Effects of Attacks), Rule 19 (Control during the Execution of Attacks), Rule 20 (Ad-
vance Warning) and Rule 21 (Target Selection). See also: Sect. 2.1.2 (Precautions in Planning and Carrying 
out Attacks), Sanremo NIAC Manual. 
136  Ibid, Rules 22-24. See also: Sect. 4.1 (General Protection) and 2.3.7 (Location of Military Objectives), 
Sanremo NIAC Manual; Sect. 5.4, SG Bulletin. 
137  IHL also contains a number of rules on specifically protected persons and objects, including hospitals, 
cultural property, installations containing dangerous forces and the natural environment. See for a full list: 
Rules 25-45, CIHL Study. See also: Sect. 6.6-6.8, SG Bulletin. 
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Direct Participation in Hostilities 
As we have seen above, the lack of a combatant status is a particular feature of the law of non-
international armed conflict. To be precise, members of armed groups are prima facie civilians 
who forfeit their protection against attack due to their role as fighters. Moreover, both in inter-
national and non-international armed conflicts civilians also join the fighting on a more spon-
taneous or incidental basis. As a general rule: 
Civilians are protected against attack, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in 
hostilities.138 
In order to explore the concept of direct participation in hostilities and the modalities governing 
the loss of civilian protection, the ICRC and the T.M.C. Asser Institute convened five expert 
meetings between 2003 and 2008.139 The discussions among the experts proved highly conten-
tious, which meant that the final outcome – the Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities, issued in May 2009 – solely reflects the views of the ICRC.140 The 
document has attracted strong criticism from a number of military lawyers.141 But most parts 
of the Interpretative Guidance are fairly uncontroversial, including the status of fighters in non-
international armed conflicts and the constitutive elements of acts amounting to direct partici-
pation in hostilities. 
As noted above, civilians only lose their protection ‘for such time’ as they take a direct part in 
hostilities. This implies a revolving door between protection and loss of protection, which can 
be easily exploited by members of armed groups: they can be farmers by day and fighters by 
night. This would, however, shield them from direct attack for most of the time and would thus 
create an imbalance by unfairly favouring such fighters over members of state armed forces, 
who can be targeted at any time. In order to solve the revolving door dilemma many experts 
advocated a membership approach, making fighters liable to attack along the same lines as 
                                               
138 Rule 6, CIHL Study, emphasis added. This rule is based on an identical formulation contained in 
Art. 50 (3) AP I and Art. 13 (3) AP II. See also CA3 (1) (‘Persons taking no active part in the hostilities … 
shall in all circumstances be treated humanely’, emphasis added). 
139  See, for instance, the summary reports of all five expert meetings, between 2003 and 2008: www.icrc.org/ 
eng/resources/documents/article/other/direct-participation-article-020709.htm. 
140  ICRC, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Hu-
manitarian Law, prepared and edited by Nils Melzer, May 2009, hereinafter: ICRC, Interpretive Guidance 
(2009). 
141  See, in particular, Nils Melzer’s detailed response to the individual points raised by Kenneth Watkin, Mi-
chael Schmitt, William Boothby and Hays Parks, who had all participated in the expert meetings: Melzer, 
‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the 
ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’, 42 (3) NYU Journal of 
International Law and Politics (2010), 831-916. 
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regular soldiers.142 In the end, the ICRC chose to focus on the person’s exact function within 
the group rather than their mere membership.143 According to the Interpretative Guidance, per-
sons that are continuously involved in: 
the preparation, execution, or command of acts or operations amounting to direct partici-
pation in hostilities are assuming a continuous combat function.144  
Hence, they lose their protection and can be targeted (in the same way as government soldiers, 
unless hors de combat) for as long as they assume that continuous combat function within the 
armed group.145 While some human rights experts have expressed their concern at this novel 
concept,146 there seems to be an increasing appreciation for the fact that it does at least provide 
useful guidance on a matter virtually unaddressed in treaty law.147 Whether a person has a con-
tinuous combat function needs to be assessed based on the circumstances. Carrying combat 
weapons openly or wearing uniforms or other distinctive emblems of the group are relatively 
clear signs. But also conclusive behaviour – involving repeated rather than sporadic acts of 
direct participation in hostilities – may indicate the role as a fighter.148 
Where the continuous combat function cannot be established beyond doubt, the general test of 
direct participation in hostilities for civilians in relation to the commission of specific acts ap-
plies.149 As noted above, their loss of protection is limited to the duration of such acts amount-
ing to direct participation in hostilities, which results in a much more limited targetability. The 
Interpretative Guidance makes clear, however, that preparatory measures as well as prior de-
ployment and return from the scene constitute an integral part of the specific act in question and 
                                               
142  Summary Report of the Third Expert Meeting on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities co-organ-
ised by the ICRC and the TMC Asser Institute, Geneva, 23-25 October 2005, pp. 59-64. See also: Kleffner, 
‘From “Belligerents” to “Fighters” and Civilians Directly Participating in Hostilities’ 54 (2) Netherlands 
International Law Review (2007), 315-36 (discussing the different approaches in detail). 
143  ICRC, Interpretive Guidance (2009), pp. 31-35. 
144  Ibid, p. 34, emphasis added. Unlike the pure membership approach, the ‘continuous combat function’ con-
cept does not automatically cover members of the political and religious leadership of the armed group, 
despite the important role they may play inside the group. However, they do squarely fall into that category 
if they have command over the military wing, similar to supreme command powers over regular state forces, 
which usually lies with the head of the executive branch of government.  
145  Ibid, pp. 71-73. 
146  HR Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip 
Alston, Study on targeted killings, 28 May 2010, A/HRC/14/24/Add.6, para. 65 (deploring mainly the lack-
ing legal basis of this far-reaching concept in existing treaty-based IHL). 
147  HR Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof 
Heyns, 13 September 2013, A/68/382, para. 70. 
148  ICRC, Interpretive Guidance (2009), p. 35. 
149  In case of doubt, e.g. in relation to the performance of a continuous combat function or to the commission 
of acts amounting to DPH, the retention of the protected status is to be presumed (ibid, pp. 74-76). 
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thus have a direct impact on the duration of the loss of protection.150 In order to qualify as direct 
participation in hostilities, the specific act must meet the three following cumulative criteria: 
1. The act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or military capacity of 
a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruction on 
persons or objects protected against direct attack (threshold of harm), and 
2. There must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to result either 
from that act, or from a coordinated military operation of which that act constitutes an 
integral part (direct causation), and 
3. The act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm 
in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another (belligerent nexus).151 
The first requirement (threshold of harm) goes beyond mere harm to military operations and 
covers also attacks against protected persons (e.g. civilians or persons hors de combat) and 
protected objects, provided such attacks have a belligerent nexus. The second requirement (di-
rect causation) makes sure that the contribution to the general war effort – which may involve 
significant parts of the civilian population – does not amount to direct participation in hostilities. 
Moreover, the third requirement (belligerent nexus) entails an objective test, focusing on 
whether the act in question can ‘reasonably be perceived’ as being specifically designed to help 
one party by directly causing harm to the other.152  
This allows us to consider a number of different mission scenarios that international forces 
participating in a peace operation may be facing in the field: Guerrilla-style ambushes and sim-
ilar violent attacks against ground troops are perhaps the clearest case. But also sabotage acts 
and other unarmed activities aimed at disturbing deployments, logistics and communication of 
the international forces or their local allies qualify as direct participation in hostilities. The same 
is the case for the removal of mines to allow the deployment of enemy forces or providing them 
with tactical targeting information on troop movements.153 All these acts will lead to the loss of 
civilian protection for the persons involved. In other words, they can be targeted with lethal 
force during the commission of these acts, regardless of whether they do pose any threat to life 
and limb of peace-keepers or any third persons. 
                                               
150  Ibid, pp. 65-68. 
151  Ibid, p. 46. 
152  Ibid, p. 64. 
153  Ibid, pp. 48-49. 
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Civilians who act as voluntary human shields constitute a particular challenge for peace opera-
tions, especially when conducting air strikes, since they place themselves around military ob-
jectives to render them immune from attack. Their presence does indeed have a negative effect 
on the attacking side, by upsetting the outcome of the proportionality assessment. This creates, 
however, only a legal obstacle, but does in no way physically impede air strikes against the 
target.154 Hence, civilians who act as human shields in this scenario do not cross the threshold 
to direct participation in hostilities and remain protected against attack.155 This may, however, 
create an incentive to use ground troops, which would allow for an entirely different legal con-
clusion.156 Indeed, if civilians try to block roads or bridges to obstruct the movement of ground 
troops or try to shield enemy fighters from sniper fire, their actions do amount to direct partic-
ipation in hostilities. The same conclusion can be drawn for cases of riots or large-scale inter-
communal violence, provided the acts are specifically designed to support enemy forces, while 
causing direct harm to the peace operation or their allies.157  
Direct participation in hostilities does not require a minimum age. In fact, international forces 
involved in peace operations are on many occasions confronted with children that are used by 
armed groups, such as in Sierra Leone or in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Despite their 
young age, they may be attacked when they perform genuine fighting tasks, either on a contin-
uous basis or more sporadically.158 But also non-violent assignments in support of the group 
(e.g. as scouts for gathering tactical intelligence) may lead to a loss of protection and make 
them targetable. In the recent Lubanga case (2012), the International Criminal Court held that 
also other roles – including as porters, cooks or sex slaves for armed groups – may qualify as 
‘active participation’ in hostilities.159 This interpretation was, however, concerned with the 
meaning of the war crime of: 
Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into armed forces or groups 
or using them to participate actively in hostilities;160 
In view of the Court, active participation had to be interpreted as referring to the act of exposing 
the child to ‘real danger as a potential target’.161 In other words, the broad interpretation was 
                                               
154  Ibid, p. 57. 
155  For the opposite view: Schmitt, ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Ele-
ments’, 42 (3) NYU Journal of International Law and Politics (2010), 697-739, p. 732. 
156  ICRC, Interpretive Guidance (2009), p. 56 
157  Ibid, p. 63.  
158  This presupposes of course that the armed group they support is indeed involved in an armed conflict with 
the international forces involved in the peace operation in question. 
159  ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Trial Chamber, Judgement, 14 March 2012, Case no. ICC-01/04-01/06, 
para. 628. 
160  Art. 8 (2) (e) (vii), ICC Statute, emphasis added. 
161  ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo (2012), supra note 159, para. 628. 
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only meant to expand the protective scope of the war crime – so as to cover any child placed in 
harm’s way – and does in no way affect the notion of direct participation in hostilities in relation 
to the civilian protection from direct attack.  
Less-Harmful Means Approach 
As we have seen in the two previous subsections, humanitarian law is mainly concerned with 
limiting the effects of warfare on the civilian population as well as other specifically protected 
persons and objects. It accepts the deliberate lethal targeting of persons on the basis of status 
and conduct, even when they are far from posing any direct threat to life or limb as required 
under human rights law. 
Section IX of the Interpretive Guidance is devoted to limiting these far-reaching effects of the 
targeting under humanitarian law. It specifically states that: 
[T]he kind and degree of force which is permissible against persons not entitled to protec-
tion against direct attack must not exceed what is actually necessary to accomplish a legit-
imate military purpose in the prevailing circumstances.162 
Even though this does not necessarily imply an absolute capture-rather-than-kill requirement, 
Section IX stresses that there is no licence to kill combatants and civilians that have forfeited 
their right to protection.163 In large-scale confrontations with well-armed forces or rebel fight-
ers, the suggested restriction is unlikely to have any effect.164 The outcome is, however, differ-
ent where operating forces have firm control over an area and encounter an unarmed fighter, a 
person who transmits viable targeting information or a crowd of villagers that deliberately 
blocks a bridge to shield enemy forces. What is essential is the ability to control the circum-
stances on the ground rather than the lack or loss of protection from attack. According to Sec-
tion IX, less harmful means must be employed before lethal force can be used, provided they 
do not pose additional risks to the forces on the ground.165 This approach greatly reflects the 
position previously taken by Nils Melzer,166 the main author of the Interpretive Guidance, but 
also echoes the long-held view of Jean Pictet: 
                                               
162  ICRC, Interpretive Guidance (2009), p. 77. 
163  Ibid, p. 78. 
164  Ibid, p. 81. 
165  Ibid, pp. 81-82. 
166  Melzer (2008), supra note 71, pp. 278-96. 
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[I]f a combatant can be put out of action by taking him prisoner, he should not be injured; 
if he can be put out of action by injury, he should not be killed; and if he can be put out of 
action by light injury, grave injury should be avoided.167 
Section IX is undoubtedly the most controversial part of the Interpretive Guidance and has 
attracted strong criticisms from military lawyers168 and general international lawyers alike.169 
Its inclusion proved already controversial during the expert meetings, with many experts ques-
tioning the legal basis of this duty under humanitarian law, while being more open to the idea 
that such limitations may derive from applicable human rights law or policy considerations.170 
According to the Interpretive Guidance, the ‘less-harmful means’ approach advocated in Sec-
tion IX has its grounding in the restrictive function of the principle of military necessity in 
harmony with the principle of humanity.171 It is also reflected in the preamble of the St. Peters-
burg Declaration (1868), which states:  
That the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is 
to weaken the military forces of the enemy;  
That for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of men; 
That this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate 
the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable;172 
The difficulty with this argument lies in the fact that the principles of military necessity and 
humanity are not self-standing rules. As noted above, they rather constitute overarching princi-
ples that have already been taken into account in the formation of the individual rules of positive 
humanitarian law and have thus no bearing on the operation of these rules absent an explicit 
reference. 
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172  Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles under 400 Grammes Weights, 
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Ryan Goodman has more recently come out in support of the ‘less-harmful means’ approach 
adopted by the ICRC in the Interpretive Guidance.173 He argues that this approach is supported 
by the text and the negotiating history of Additional Protocol I,174 especially Article 35 (2), 
which reads as follows: 
It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a 
nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.175 
Michael Schmitt is, however, not convinced that ordinary killing was ever meant to be covered 
by the term ‘method of warfare’, while certain ways of killing would undoubtedly fall into that 
category.176 Hence, he considers it unlikely that Article 35 (2) prohibits killings that are mili-
tarily unnecessary. Schmitt agrees, however, with Goodman177 that some relevant scenarios fall 
under the hors de combat protection, because the persons are ‘in the power’ of the enemy (even 
prior to capture),178 unless they show the ability or willingness to resist.179 
In view of these considerations, it remains debatable whether humanitarian law really contains 
a ‘less-harmful means’ requirement that goes any further than the hors de combat exception.180 
We shall therefore proceed on the assumption that no such requirement exists and that targeting 
based on status or conduct is fully consistent with humanitarian law, as opposed to human rights 
law, which requires threats to life or limb prior to the use of lethal force. 
Means and Methods of Warfare 
Despite its liberal targeting rules, humanitarian law restricts the choice of means and methods 
that the belligerents can employ.181 As we have seen above, it bans the use of weapons and 
                                               
173  Goodman, ‘The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants’, 24 (3) EJIL (2013), 819-53. He remains less 
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methods that are of a nature to ‘cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering’.182 In addi-
tion to this general rule, humanitarian law contains a number of bans and restrictions on the use 
of specific methods and weapons.183 There have been attempts in the field of human rights law 
to apply these rules also to peacetime situations. A case in point is the Turku Declaration of 
Minimum Humanitarian Standards (1990), which states that: 
Weapons or other material or methods prohibited in international armed conflicts must not 
be employed in any circumstances.184 
There is, however, little that such specific bans could add to human rights law, considering that 
it already contains far stricter rules on the use of (lethal) force. Quite the opposite, adopting the 
same prohibitions and limitations may sometimes even prove counterproductive in peacetime 
situations. 
Tear gas and other chemical substances used as riot control agents provide an illustrative ex-
ample: As shown above, human rights law strongly recommends their use alongside other less-
lethal equipment for crowd control and gradual force application. By contrast, the use of riot-
control agents in warfare is explicitly prohibited, alongside other substances falling under the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (1993).185 These prohibitions are widely regarded as rules of 
customary law applicable both in international and non-international armed conflicts.186 Also 
the Secretary-General’s Bulletin contains an explicit ban on the use of asphyxiating, poisonous 
or other gases.187 There are a number of reasons why the ban on chemical weapons has been 
extended to cover riot control agents and other less-toxic substances. As a general rule, many 
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chemical agents can prove lethal or lead to grave injuries, depending on the quantity and con-
centration, the location and duration of exposure as well as the age and health condition of the 
person affected. Moreover, riot control agents were notoriously used as the first chemical weap-
ons in modern warfare and carry the danger of escalation, including the use of more dangerous 
substances.188 Furthermore, the effects of chemical agents cannot be easily limited to a specific 
area and may thus strike combatants and civilians without distinction. The ban on the use of 
such substances as a method of warfare is thus a concretisation of the general prohibition on 
indiscriminate weapons.189 Likewise, other forms of non-lethal or less-than-lethal weapons may 
pose a problem under humanitarian law – even if they are not explicitly prohibited – to the 
extent that they have indiscriminate effects, for instance: acoustic weapons, heat rays, sticky or 
slippery foam and malodorants.190 
Bullets that ‘expand or flatten easily in the human body’ are another example of weapons sub-
ject to different rules in peace and wartime. Their use in international armed conflicts has been 
explicitly outlawed since 1899.191 What makes them especially reprehensible is their high de-
gree of lethality: Unlike regular ammunition, these projectiles (also known as hollow-point, 
soft-nose or dum-dum bullets) mushroom upon entering the target’s body, causing excessive 
tissue damage and leaving little chance of survival. However, despite this age-old ban in war-
fare, expanding bullets are commonly used by national police forces in many different coun-
tries. They are an effective tool in confrontations with armed, recalcitrant hostage-takers and 
suicide bombers, as these projectiles are more likely to kill the targeted person instantly, without 
the risk of over-penetration, thus avoiding the dangerous ricochet effect that ordinary bullets 
may have for bystanders. From a human rights perspective, the use of expanding bullets is thus 
not only justified but might even be mandatory for being the only viable way to protect the lives 
of innocent people in such situations. 
The Customary IHL Study claims that the ban on expanding bullets also extends to non-inter-
national armed conflicts.192 This view is supported by the Secretary-General’s Bulletin, which 
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pp. 69-73. See also: NATO Research and Technology Organisation, ‘Non-Lethal Weapons and Future 
Peace Enforcement Operations’, RTO-TR-SAS-040, December 2004, Annex . 
191  Declaration Concerning Expanding Bullets, The Hague, 29 July 1899. 
192  Rule 77, CIHL Study. 
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explicitly mentions expanding bullets in a list of prohibited weapons.193 By contrast, the drafters 
of the Sanremo NIAC Manual considered it doubtful whether the prohibition equally applies to 
non-international armed conflicts, considering the above-mentioned common use of expanding 
bullets in domestic law-enforcement.194 The Customary IHL Study tries to distinguish these 
projectiles from the banned military version, by claiming that the former are commonly fired 
from pistols rather than rifles and thus deposit much less energy, which may result in less severe 
injuries.195 Practice shows, however, that expanding bullets used by police are often fired from 
rifles to ensure better long-distance targeting.196 At the Kampala Review Conference in 2010, 
the state parties to the ICC Statute adopted an amendment to Article 8 of the Statute, which 
makes it a war crime to employ certain weapons in non-international armed conflicts whose use 
had until then only been a crime in international armed conflicts. Besides poison and gases, it 
also lists expanding bullets, which finally confirms the customary law prohibition of these pro-
jectiles in any type of armed conflict.197 
Another area where human rights law and humanitarian law come to different solutions in-
volves the use of deceptive methods by operating forces. Ruses are commonly used in wartime 
to gain a tactical advantage by confusing or surprising the enemy, for instance, by using decoy 
weapons or by launching mock attacks or ambushes. As a general rule, parties to the conflict 
are free to use ruses and deceptive tactics as long as they are not specifically prohibited.198 
Examples of such bans include: the improper use of the Red Cross emblem or other protected 
signs,199 the misuse of the white flag200 and the use of flags, insignia and uniforms of neutrals 
and other states not party to the conflict.201 These cases are closely connected to perfidy, which 
involves: 
                                               
193  Sect. 6.2, SG Bulletin. 
194  Sect. 2.2.2, Sanremo NIAC Manual, para. 12, p. 35. See also: Haines (2007), supra note, p. 272 (criticising 
the ICRC’s CIHL Study for its unqualified ban of expanding bullets in NIAC). 
195  Rule 77, CIHL Study, p. 270. 
196  See, for instance, the very elaborate outline of recent practice highlighting the police use of rifles: 
Vanheusden, Parks and Boothby (2011), infra note 335, pp. 541-42, text of footnote 17. 
197  Amendments to Article 8 of the Rome Statute, RC/Res.5, adopted at the 12th plenary meeting, 10 June 
2010, www.icc-cpi.int/icedocs/aspdocs/Resolutions/RC-Res.5-ENG.pdf. For a more detailed discussion on 
this amendment and the role of Resolution 5, see the section further below, p. 45. 
198  Rule 57, CIHL Study (‘Ruses of war are not prohibited as long as they do not infringe a rule of international 
humanitarian law’). 
199  Rules 59-61, CIHL Study (including the UN emblems and uniforms); Sect. 2.3.4, Sanremo NIAC Manual. 
200  Rule 58, CIHL Study. 
201  Rule 63, CIHL Study; Sect. 2.3.4, Sanremo NIAC Manual. Moreover, it is also prohibited to use the flags 
or emblems, insignia or uniforms of the adversary in combat: Rule 62, CIHL Study; Sect. 2.3.5, Sanremo 
NIAC Manual. 
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Acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or 
is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed 
conflict, with intent to betray that confidence … The following acts are examples of per-
fidy: 
(a) the feigning of an intent to negotiate under a flag of truce or of a surrender; 
(b) the feigning of an incapacitation by wounds or sickness; 
(c) the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status; and 
(d) the feigning of protected status by the use of signs, emblems or uniforms of the 
United Nations or of neutral or other States not Parties to the conflict.202 
The essence of perfidy is thus the abuse of good faith among the parties to the conflict. Suicide 
bombings against international forces in Afghanistan, Mali and Somalia by fighters dressed as 
civilians are a more recent form of perfidious attacks,203 which may seriously undermine the 
respect for the protection of civilians and other protected persons and objects. Article 37 of 
Additional Protocol I explicitly bans the resort to perfidy to ‘kill, injure or capture the adver-
sary’.204 The Customary IHL Study uses the same wording in its customary rule on perfidy, 
applicable in both types of armed conflict.205 State practice is, however, not fully consistent as 
to the inclusion of capture by resort to perfidy in addition to the acts of killing and injuring.206 
For instance, under the original ban contained in the Hague Regulations (1907) it is only pro-
hibited ‘to kill or wound treacherously’.207 This is why the Sanremo NIAC Manual uses a more 
narrow definition limited to only these two acts and questions whether customary law covers 
also capture.208 It appears, however, more reasonable to include capture, as any attempt to seize 
                                               
202  Art. 37 (1) AP I, emphasis added. This definition is also used by the commentary to Rule 65, CIHL Study, 
p. 223. 
203  Munir, ‘Suicide Attacks: Martyrdom Operations or Acts of Perfidy?’, in: Frick and Müller (eds.), Islam 
and International Law: Engaging Self-Centrism from a Plurality of Perspectives (Martinus Nijhoff 2013), 
99-123. 
204  Art. 37 (1) AP I. 
205  Rule 65, CIHL Study. See also: Jackson, ‘Perfidy in Non-International Armed Conflicts’, 88 International 
Law Studies (2012), 237-259, pp. 246-47 (but unclear in distinguishing the prohibition of perfidy from the 
crime of treacherous killing or wounding); Dehn, ‘Permissible Perfidy?’, 6 (4) Journal of International 
Criminal Justice (2008), 627-53. 
206  Rule 65, CIHL Study, commentary, p. 225. 
207  Article 23 (b), Hague Regulations (1907). 
208  Sect. 2.3.6, Sanremo NIAC Manual (‘if the intent in doing so is to kill or wound an adversary’). See also 
the relevant commentary, p. 43, para. 2. See also: Rule 111, HPCR Manual on International Law Applicable 
to Air and Missile Warfare, With Commentary, March 2010, pp. 244-45, paras. 5-6 (divided on the question 
whether capture is covered as a matter of customary IHL, with only the minority of experts in favour of its 
inclusion). 
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a person usually involves ‘a threat to kill or injure’ and may even result in the death or injury 
of the person in question.209 
The Secretary-General’s Bulletin does not specifically mention perfidy or other forms of un-
lawful deceptions, but these acts are arguably covered by the general obligation to respect the 
rules ‘prohibiting or restricting the use of certain weapons and methods of combat’ under hu-
manitarian law.210 In 1997, a group of SFOR peacekeepers in post-Dayton Bosnia reportedly 
misused a Red Cross sign to facilitate the arrest of a suspected war criminal.211 If that action 
had taken place during an armed conflict (to which the peace operation was a party) it would 
have been a clear violation of the rule banning the misuse of the emblem and arguably an act 
of perfidy, broadly defined to include attempts to capture. For the same reason, military plan-
ners in peace operations have to be especially careful when using special forces commandos in 
plain clothes or non-conventional uniforms during armed conflict situations.212 
By contrast, no such restrictions exist in peacetime as an obligation under human rights law. 
While law-enforcement agents are usually required to identify themselves as such, especially 
before using firearms, this does not prevent them from using plain clothes to gain a tactical 
advantage.213 Indeed, the use of undercover commandos, as in the above-mentioned McCann 
case, may often be the best way to confront and arrest dangerous suspects. Using plain-clothed 
agents for such specific tasks is therefore fully consistent with human rights law, especially 
where other alternatives carry a greater risk to the lives of those involved (i.e. suspects, police 
and bystanders). 
APPRAISAL AND CONCLUSION 
Human rights law contains strict limitations on the use of force in peacetime. To be precise, 
lethal force can only be employed to protect life and limb against unlawful attacks. Moreover, 
security forces have to take the appropriate measures (e.g. continuous training and adequate 
equipment) to minimise the resort to force in all possible scenarios. These standards apply as 
the default framework in all peace operations. By contrast, humanitarian law accepts the exist-
ence of warfare as a fact and sets out clear categories of persons and objects that can be targeted 
                                               
209  Rule 65, CIHL Study, commentary, p. 225  
210  Sect. 6.2, SG Bulletin. 
211  Rule 59, CIHL Study, practice part, para. 458, p. 1316. 
212  Cathcart, ‘Legal Dimensions of Special Forces and Information Operations’ in: Fleck and Gill (eds.), supra 
note, 395-414, p. 401; Parks, ‘Special Forces’ Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms’, 4 (2) Chicago Journal of 
International Law (2003), 493-560; Lubell (2010), supra note, pp. 160-61. 
213  Use of Force and Firearms Principles (1990), supra note 65, para. 10. 
 225 
 
and those that have to be spared in times of armed conflict. It accepts the use of deliberate 
deadly force against combatants and other persons with a continuous combat function (i.e. sta-
tus-based) and persons who commit specific acts amounting to direct participation in hostilities 
(i.e. conduct-based), even without there being any threat to the life and limb of others. Moreo-
ver, on many occasions the fighting causes incidental harm to the civilian population and other 
protected persons and objects. For this reason, humanitarian law provides strict rules on how 
such effects must be limited: for instance, by abstaining from disproportionate attacks and tak-
ing all feasible precautions, including target verification and damage assessment. When it 
comes to the use of specific means and methods of warfare, humanitarian law contains very 
specific prohibitions and limitations. In particular, it bans the use of tear gas and other non-
lethal chemical agents, as well as expanding bullets and offensive operations with plain-clothed 
personnel – all of which are lawful under human rights law and widely used in domestic law-
enforcement situations. 
Despite the fact that we rejected the less-harmful-means approach advocated by the ICRC’s 
Interpretive Guidance, this does not necessarily mean that humanitarian law provides peace 
forces involved in an armed conflict with a right-vouched licence to kill combatants or fighters 
belonging to the enemy. Most parts of humanitarian law use prohibitive rather than permissive 
terminology.214 While there is an explicit authorisation allowing combatants ‘to participate di-
rectly in hostilities’, it is only applicable in international armed conflicts.215 Moreover, how 
combatants (or the states on behalf of which they fight) conduct their operations is then subject 
to further prohibitions rather than authorisations. The same reasoning applies a fortiori to non-
international armed conflicts, where there exists no formal combatant status. Indeed, the prin-
ciple of equality would have meant that such combatant status could be invoked both by mem-
bers of state forces and anti-government fighters, effectively shielding the latter from any crim-
inal prosecution for taking up arms illegally. Admittedly, the ICRC’s Customary IHL Study 
uses language that sounds rather permissive when it states in Rule 1 that attacks ‘may only be 
directed against combatants’.216 This wording, however, has its origin in some military manu-
als, where the language is not meant to be as legalistic as in international conventions.217 
                                               
214  Similarly: Jinks, ‘International Human Rights Law in Time of Armed Conflict’, in: Clapham and Gaeta 
(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict (OUP 2014), 656-74, pp 666-68. 
215  Art. 43 (2) AP I. 
216  See also: Rule 7, CIHL Study (‘…Attacks may only be directed against military objectives …’, emphasis 
added) 
217  See the practice parts of the CIHL Study, www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule7. The same 
caveat must be made in relation to the Interpretive Guidance’s wording, when it says that ‘civilians may 
be directly attacked’ for the duration of their direct participation in hostilities, in view of the less-harmful-
means approach, which follows in Section IX. Interpretive Guidance, p. 12. See also: ICRC Commentary 
to the Additional Protocols, supra note 128, Art. 13 AP II, para. 4789 (‘Those who belong to armed forces 
or armed groups may be attacked at any time’, emphasis added). 
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In sum, rather than authorising killings, the targeting rules of humanitarian law are better un-
derstood as a set of more lenient prohibitions, which simply allow for broader exceptions for 
using force against individuals than human rights law. 
It goes without saying that status- and conduct-based targeting is only available in times of 
armed conflict. This may sound like a truism, but is aimed at cases of military occupations 
without hostilities. As we have seen in Chapter 3, such occupations are governed by the law of 
international armed conflicts. But in the absence of armed hostilities, the far-reaching targeting 
rules cannot be invoked. To be precise, if there is no armed conflict, then there are no enemy 
forces or military objectives either, nor civilians that participate directly in hostilities. Hence, 
every individual in territories under this form of military occupation is a protected person; as a 
result, the use of force against them is subject to the same restraints as against civilians or 
persons hors de combat in times of armed conflict.  
However, apart from the general protection against attack, treaty-based humanitarian law is 
rather silent as to when and how (lethal) force can be used against civilians and other protected 
persons. A notable exception is Article 42 of Geneva Convention III, which deems the use of 
weapons against prisoners of war an ‘extreme measure’ and requires prior warnings. However, 
this rule is mainly concerned with (attempted) escapes, which is one of the clearest cases of 
hostile acts that result in the loss of protection for persons hors de combat. While other provi-
sions prohibit certain violent acts, including ‘attempts upon their lives’, ‘murder’ and ‘causing 
death’,218 they fail to give clear guidance as to when and how (lethal) force may be used against 
protected persons. In fact, in order to give meaning to the customary rules on fundamental guar-
antees, the commentary part of the Customary IHL Study refers extensively to human rights 
treaty law and related practice,219 especially on the right to life.220 This shows clearly the need 
for considering the interplay between humanitarian law and human rights law, which is the 
focus of the next section. 
                                               
218  Common Arts. 12, 12, 13 and 32, GC I-IV. See also: Sect. 7.2, SG Bulletin (e.g. violence to life and mur-
der); Sect. 1.2.4, Sanremo NIAC Manual (‘they must be treated humanely’). 
219  Chapter 23, Rules 87 (Human Treatment), 89 (Murder) and 90 (Torture and CIDT), CIHL Study, commen-
tary, pp. 299-319.  
220  Ibid, pp. 313-14. 
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5.4 MODELS OF INTERACTION 
OVERVIEW 
The review of the relevant substantive rules in the foregoing sections revealed that there are 
considerable differences between human rights law and humanitarian law as to when and how 
(lethal) force can be used. This has also direct repercussions for peace operations. Admittedly, 
the case is rather simple when there is no armed conflict, because then any use of force is subject 
to the strict peacetime rules provided by human rights law. However, given the volatile security 
situation in the mission areas, it is far more likely that the peace operation will become – at 
least for some period of its deployment – a party to an armed conflict. Such confrontations will 
usually take the form of a non-international armed conflict, as they almost always involve mem-
bers of non-state armed groups on the other side. As we have seen above, human rights and 
humanitarian law apply concurrently in such cases and will potentially conflict as to when and 
how force may be used. 
That is why this section examines how human rights courts and similar (quasi) judicial bodies 
have dealt with the interaction of these two legal regimes and which approaches they have used 
to overcome the underlying norm conflicts, both in international and non-international armed 
conflicts.221 Much has been written about the question as to whether and how such bodies – 
whose mandate, unlike that of the International Court of Justice and domestic courts, is usually 
limited to the relevant human rights treaty – may employ humanitarian law. Nowadays, how-
ever, it seems relatively clear that they can and should take the relevant humanitarian law pro-
visions into account.222 Throughout the following examination, some weight is also given to 
                                               
221  Note that the majority of the cases considered are related to NIAC situations. Nevertheless, some of those 
cases involving IACs and military occupations have gained more prominence for the question at issue, 
especially the more recent ECtHR case-law in relation to coalition actions during the invasion and occupa-
tion of Iraq (2003/04). 
222  See, for instance: Kälin, ‘Universal Human Rights Bodies and International Humanitarian Law’, in: Kolb 
and Gaggioli (2013), supra note 3, 441-65; Tigroudja, ‘The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and 
International Humanitarian Law’, in: ibid, 466-79; Moir, ‘The European Court of Human Rights and Inter-
national Humanitarian Law’, in: ibid, 480-502; Pinzauti, ‘Good Time for a Change: Recognizing Individ-
uals’ Rights under the Rules of International Humanitarian Law on the Conduct of Hostilities’, in: Cassese 
(ed.), Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law (OUP 2012), 571-82; Byron, ‘A Blurring of the 
Boundaries: The Application of International Humanitarian Law by Human Rights Bodies’, 47 Virginia 
Journal of International Law (2007), 839-96. 
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the case-law of national courts to the extent that their decisions refer directly to the relationship 
between humanitarian law and human rights law.223 
Our analysis of these different interaction models aims at clarifying how the possible norm 
conflict in relation to the use of force can be resolved or otherwise overcome. As a word of 
caution, it should be noted that detention cases feature prominently in the jurisprudence of cer-
tain courts and have played a significant role in shaping the way these courts have been looking 
at the interplay between human rights and humanitarian law. This is why some of these more 
important cases will also be considered. Having said that, however, this section does not attempt 
to provide a conclusion for the interplay between the different standards of detention and in-
ternment under both regimes.224 
 
TRADITIONAL LEX SPECIALIS MODEL 
The best-known approach is the lex specialis model in its most traditional form, according to 
which humanitarian law provides always the more specific norm, which invariably trumps any 
conflicting human rights norm. This was arguably the position of the International Court of 
Justice when it handed down its Nuclear Weapons case (1996), in which it referred to humani-
tarian law as the lex specialis for the purpose of interpreting the term ‘arbitrary deprivation of 
life’. The Court’s advisory opinion was, however, merely a general and abstract assessment in 
order to examine the overall lawfulness of the use of nuclear weapons under international law. 
It is therefore necessary to see how this traditional lex specialis model has proven viable in the 
practice of human rights bodies when dealing with right-to-life cases. 
                                               
223  The most prominent group of cases have been decided by British courts on the basis of the UK Human 
Rights Act, which incorporates the ECHR (as interpreted by the ECtHR). 
224  For a number of excellent contributions on this issue, with a special focus on peace operations and similar 
overseas military operations: Direk, Security Detention in International Territorial Administrations: Ko-
sovo, East Timor, and Iraq (Brill 2015), pp. 58-216; Debuf, Captured in War: Lawful Internment in Armed 
Conflict (Hart Publishing 2013); Mujezinović Larsen (2012), supra note 37, pp. 393-418; Sassòli (2011), 
infra note 315, pp. 616-27; Naert (2010), supra note 37, pp. 624-33. See also: Copenhagen Process on the 
Handling of Detainees in International Military Operations – Principles and Guidelines, 19 October 2012.  
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Inter-American Human Rights System 
In its seminal Report on Human Rights and Terrorism (2002), the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights held that:  
[I]n situations of armed conflict, international humanitarian law may serve as lex specialis 
in interpreting and applying international human rights instruments. ... [The American] 
Convention is devoid of rules that … specify the circumstances under which it is not illegal, 
in the context of an armed conflict, to attack a combatant or civilian or when civilian casu-
alties as a consequence of military operations do not imply a violation of international law. 
Consequently, in such circumstances, one must necessarily look to and apply definitional 
standards and relevant rules of international humanitarian law as sources of authoritative 
guidance in the assessment of the respect of the inter-American Instruments in combat sit-
uations.225 
It reproduced almost verbatim the position it had previously taken in the case of Abella v. Ar-
gentina (1997), roughly a year after the International Court of Justice had delivered its opinion 
on Nuclear Weapons.226 The case involved a thirty-hour battle over the control of an Argentin-
ian military base seized by forty members of a left-wing rebel group. The Commission held that 
the confrontation was a non-international armed conflict, despite its short duration,227 and re-
ferred explicitly to humanitarian law when considering whether the battle-related killing of 
twenty fighters was an arbitrary deprivation of life:  
Specifically, when civilians, such as those who attacked the Tablada base, assume the role 
of combatants by directly taking part in fighting, whether singly or as a member of a group, 
they thereby become legitimate military targets. As such, they are subject to direct individ-
ualized attack to the same extent as combatants. Thus, by virtue of their hostile acts, the 
Tablada attackers lost the benefits of the above mentioned precautions in attack and against 
the effects of indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks pertaining to peaceable civilians.228 
Hence, it did not question the legality of the shoot-to-kill policy pursued by the Argentinian 
forces against the rebels.229 The same interpretive approach to clarify the meaning of ‘arbitrary’ 
                                               
225  IACmHR, Report on Human Rights and Terrorism, 22 October 2002, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116, para. 61. 
226  IACmHR, Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina, Decision of the Merits, 18 November 1997, Report No 55/97, 
Case No. 11.137, paras. 158-61. 
227  Ibid, paras. 154-56. This finding was necessary because the seizure of the military base was the first and 
last action of that group. The confrontation thus amounted to an extremely short-lived NIAC. 
228  Ibid, para. 178. 
229  Ibid, para. 188. See also: IACmHR, Third Report on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia, 26 February 
1999, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, Ch. IV, para. 61 (‘The Commission notes that when they assume the role of 
combatants, members of paramilitary groups clearly lose their protection against direct attack until such 
time as they cease all their hostile acts against the adversary. However, when the direct participation of 
such persons in hostilities becomes their principal daily activity, the question arises as to whether they may 
have thereby divested themselves of their civilian status and effectively become combatants subject to di-
rect attack to the same extent as members of regular armed forces’). 
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in times of armed conflict has been used by the Commission in relation to cases of detention, 
e.g. during the US-led invasion of Grenada and in Guantanamo.230 The Inter-American Court 
confirmed this practice of interpreting the meaning of certain human rights in times of armed 
conflict by resort to humanitarian law.231 However, all cases involving the right to life were 
only concerned with the unlawful killing of civilians and the facts were such that the outcome 
of the assessment would have been the same if pure human rights standards had been applied.232  
The assessment would probably have been different in the case of Ecuador v. Colombia, previ-
ously pending before the American Commission.233 As already mentioned above, this case in-
volved the cross-border operation of the Colombian military against a FARC training camp in 
Ecuador in March 2008, during which FARC commander Raúl Reyes and twenty-four others 
were killed. In its decision on admissibility, the Commission confirmed the role of humanitarian 
law as a source of interpretation: 
[A]s the existence of an armed conflict has been established, it is indispensible [sic] to refer 
to IHL as a source of authorized interpretation which permits the American Convention’s 
application – with due consideration to the particular set of circumstances in this situa-
tion.234 
It remains an open question of whether the Commission would have fully applied the humani-
tarian law targeting rules (including status-based targeting), if the case had not been terminated 
by friendly settlement between Ecuador and Colombia before reaching the merits stage.235 
                                               
230  IACmHR, Coard v. United States, Decision, Case 10.951, Report No. 109/99, 29 September 1999, paras. 
45-61. IACmHR, Precautionary Measures in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, 13 March 2002. 
231  IACtHR, Las Palmeras v. Colombia, Judgement on Preliminary Objections, 4 February 2000, Case No. 67, 
paras. 33-34. Most recently: IACtHR, Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia (2012), infra note 232, paras. 
21-26 and 187-241. 
232  For instance: IACtHR, Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia, Judgement, 30 November 2012, Series No. 
259, paras. 187-241 (involving a disproportionate aerial attack on a village believed to harbour FARC 
fighters). 
233  IACmHR, Ecuador v. Colombia (‘Franklin Guillermo Aisalla Molina’), Decision, Case IP-02, Report No. 
112/10, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.140 Doc. 10, 21 October 2010. 
234  Ibid, para. 118. See also paras. 113-25, including para. 122 (featuring the term ‘lex specialis’). 
235  As reported by: Radio Equinoccio, ‘Colombia Indemniza a Familia de Franklin Aisalla’, 23 September 
2013, http://radioequinoccio.com/inicio/item/4161-colombia-indemniza-a-familia-de-franklin-aisalla. 
html. 
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African Human Rights System 
The African Commission has so far only dealt with armed conflict situations on the sidelines.236 
For instance, in the inter-state case of DRC v. Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda (2003), the Com-
mission highlighted the importance of humanitarian law treaties for the case,237 but as it was 
mainly concerned with the inhumane treatment of civilians the outcome was no different from 
an assessment exclusively based on human rights law.238 However, one of the Commission’s 
working groups has recently held that: 
International law permits States to take life in the context of armed conflict only with the 
limits of safeguards for the right to life. It is important that International Humanitarian Law 
be seen as a complement, rather than a replacement of Human Rights Law.239  
It remains to be seen whether this is meant as a limitation to status- and conduct-based targeting 
in times of armed conflict and to what extent it will influence the future case-law of the African 
Commission and the Court in relation to combat-related killings. 
European Human Rights System 
Unlike most other human rights treaties, the text of the European Convention does not lend 
itself so easily to an interpretation based on humanitarian law. To be precise, its right-to-life 
provision does not use the term ‘arbitrary’, but instead prohibits the intentional deprivation of 
life unless it is absolutely necessary in pursuit of one of the three legitimate aims.240 The last of 
the aims listed refers to ‘quelling a riot or insurrection’, which may potentially also cover non-
international armed conflicts. But any deprivation of life would still have to meet the strict 
requirements of necessity and proportionality (inherent in ‘absolutely necessary’), which is un-
likely in combat-based targeting absent a direct threat to life and limb. Article 5 (1) of the 
European Convention follows the same concept in relation to detention: It prohibits any depri-
vation of liberty, unless it falls into one of the six listed exceptions and is based on a procedure 
                                               
236  No case involving an armed conflict situation has so far reached the more recently established African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR). 
237  ACmHPR, Democratic Republic of Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Decision on the Merits, 29 May 
2003, Communication no. 227/99, para. 70 (‘the Commission holds that the Four Geneva Conventions and 
the two Additional Protocols covering armed conflicts constitute part of the general principles of law rec-
ognized by African States, and take same into consideration in the determination of this case’). 
238  Ibid, paras. 71-89. 
239  ACmHPR, Arbitrary Killings Working Group Report (2014), supra note 69, para. 46. 
240  Art. 2 (2) (a) - (c) ECHR. 
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prescribed by law.241 In addition, Article 5 (4) entitles those detained to have the lawfulness of 
their detention reviewed by a court.  
Due to the strict language used in the respective provisions, the derogation clause in Article 15 
plays a much greater role than in other human rights instruments. Indeed, the drafters of the 
European Convention expected states to derogate in wartime, allowing them to engage in acts 
of war – including the targeting of enemy forces or the internment of prisoners of war or civil-
ians considered a security threat – without falling afoul of their obligations under the Conven-
tion. The Strasbourg organs, therefore, had to work around the failure of states to derogate in 
relation to their acts in armed conflict. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the legal rea-
soning in Cyprus v. Turkey (1976) and Hassan v. United Kingdom (2014) leaves many ques-
tions unanswered. In both cases, however, the European Commission and the Court tried to do 
the sheer impossible, to bridge the normative gap between the state’s failure to lodge a formal 
derogation and war-related internment under humanitarian law.  
The Hassan case involved the internment of a young Iraqi during the invasion of Iraq in April 
2003. He was initially believed to be a combatant or a civilian otherwise posing a threat to 
Allied forces, but was eventually cleared by a review panel and promptly released, in full com-
pliance with Article 78 of Geneva Convention IV.242 In deciding the case, the European Court 
heeded the call of the British government as well as the third-party interveners from the Essex 
Human Rights Centre. In their amicus curiae brief, they had cautioned against disregarding 
humanitarian law entirely, as this ‘might run the risk of appearing disconnected from reality’, 
but they equally rejected the lex specialis doctrine for being of little practicable help.243 As we 
concluded already in the previous chapter, the Court’s approach – of accommodating the con-
straints of Article 5 as far as possible with internment under Geneva Convention III and IV – is 
best understood as an implicit derogation. What supports this conclusion is the fact that the 
Court still requires the respondent states to explicitly invoke humanitarian law in their plead-
ings.244 This differs from the operation of the traditional lex specialis model. Also, on substance 
the outcome is not a full-hearted adoption of the lex specialis concept, which the Court does 
not mention at all. This is most noticeable in relation to the review procedure required: 
                                               
241  Art. 5 (1) (a) - (f) ECHR. 
242  Art. 78 (1) GC IV (‘If the Occupying Power considers it necessary, for imperative reasons of security, to 
take safety measures concerning protected persons, it may, at the most, subject them to assigned residence 
or to internment’, emphasis added). 
243  Hampson and Lubell, Amicus Curiae Brief, Hassan v. United Kingdom, 29750/09, University of Essex, 
Human Rights Centre, 30 October 2013, http://repository.essex.ac.uk/9690/1/hampson-lubell-amicus-ec-
thr-oct-2013.pdf, referred to in: ECtHR, Hassan v. United Kingdom (2014), supra note, paras. 91-95.  
244  ECtHR, Hassan v. United Kingdom, Judgement, 16 September, Application no. 29750/09, para. 107. 
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Whilst it might not be practicable, in the course of an international armed conflict, for the 
legality of detention to be determined by an independent “court” in the sense generally 
required by Article 5 § 4, … the “competent body” should provide sufficient guarantees of 
impartiality and fair procedure to protect against arbitrariness.245  
What the Court is trying to do here is to beef up the review procedure under Geneva Convention 
IV, which only requires a ‘competent body’, by adding the additional requirements of ‘impar-
tiality’ and ‘fair procedure’ in order to bring it more in line with the general safeguards in 
peacetime. Indeed, very similar to the effects of the necessity and proportionality requirement 
under the regular derogation procedure, the application of humanitarian law in this case is not 
unlimited.  
The Court’s novel approach is, however, restricted to international armed conflicts, where the 
internment of prisoners of war and enemy civilians are ‘accepted features of international hu-
manitarian law’.246 By excluding non-international armed conflicts, Hassan is fully consistent 
with the Judgment rendered by Justice George Leggatt in Serdar Mohammed (2014) on behalf 
of the High Court of England and Wales. The case involved the long-term internment of an 
Afghan citizen by British forces in Afghanistan, which Justice Leggatt deemed a breach of 
Article 5 of the European Convention, because he saw no explicit power for internment under 
the law of non-international armed conflict.247 This has led to a heated debate as to whether 
such a power does indeed exist, both for internment as well as lethal targeting.248 As we con-
cluded already in the previous section, there is certainly no licence to kill under the law of non-
international armed conflict.249 In the most recent Al-Saadoon case (2015), Justice Leggatt used 
the opportunity to express his support for the European Court’s novel approach to humanitarian 
law: 
It seems to me that the same approach [as in Hassan] must in principle apply to article 2. 
Thus, where the armed forces of a state kill someone in the course of an armed conflict the 
killing will be lawful provided it is consistent with IHL even if it results from use of force 
                                               
245  Ibid, para. 106, emphasis added and references omitted. 
246  Ibid, para. 104. 
247  EWHC, Serdar Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence, Judgement, 2 May 2014, 1369 (QB), paras. 239-94. 
This view was upheld on appeal: UK EWCA, Serdar Mohammed et al. v. Ministry of Defence, Judgment, 
30 July 2015, EWCA Civ 843, paras. 164-253 (conducting a remarkably detailed analysis on the alleged 
authority to detain under the law of NIAC). 
248  For those in support in support of the argument that no such (explicit) powers exist under the law of NIAC: 
Hill-Cawthorne and Akande, ‘Locating the Legal Basis for Detention in Non-International Armed Con-
flicts: A Rejoinder to Aurel Sari’, EJIL talk blog, 2 June 2014, www.ejiltalk.org/locating-the-legal-basis-
for-detention-in-non-international-armed-conflicts-a-rejoinder-to-aurel-sari. For the opposite view: 
Aughey and Sari, ‘Targeting and Detention in Non-International Armed Conflict: Serdar Mohammed and 
the Limits of Human Rights Convergence’, 91 International Law Studies (2015), 60-118. 
249  For a largely similar view, see: Hill-Cawthorne and Akande (2014), ibid. 
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which is not absolutely necessary to achieve any of the purposes set out in sub-paragraphs 
(a) to (c) of article 2.250 
Interestingly, he does not explicitly limit this approach to only international armed conflicts. 
Maintaining a strict distinction between international and non-international armed conflicts 
may also be difficult, as some recent wars involved elements of both, like in Georgia (2008) 
and currently in Ukraine. Nevertheless, in its admissibility decision on Georgia v. Russia (II), 
currently pending in Strasbourg, the European Court had already held that: 
Article 2 must be interpreted in so far as possible in the light of the general principles of 
international law, including the rules of international humanitarian law which play an in-
dispensable and universally accepted role in mitigating the savagery and inhumanity of 
armed conflict. In a zone of international conflict Contracting States are under an obligation 
to protect the lives of those not, or no longer, engaged in hostilities. Generally speaking, 
the Convention should so far as possible be interpreted in harmony with other rules of 
international law of which it forms part.251 
It therefore remains to be seen whether the Court will take humanitarian law fully into account 
in future cases involving war-related deaths and to what extent it will insert some additional 
constraints as it did in Hassan (2014). In the two most relevant cases that involved killings 
during multinational overseas operations – Al-Skeini (2011) and Jaloud (2014) – the Court 
could elegantly avoid the substantive issue, as the applicants had limited their complaints to the 
inadequacy of the investigation into the deaths.252 
The European Court has so far only dealt with war-related deaths resulting from Turkey’s armed 
conflict with Kurdish separatists (PKK) and the so-called Second Chechen War in Russia.253 
For instance, in Ergi v. Turkey (1998) it tacitly applied the humanitarian law standard of feasible 
precautions with a view to ‘avoiding and, in any event, to minimising, incidental loss of civilian 
life’ to an armed clash between PKK and Turkish forces in 1993.254 The Court followed a sim-
                                               
250  EWHC, Al-Saadoon v. Secretary of State for Defence, Judgement, 17 March 2015, EWHC 715 (Admin), 
para. 111 (also cautioning that ‘courts should recognise their lack of institutional competence to judge ac-
tions or decisions taken on the battlefield or when seeking to maintain security in dangerous and hostile 
conditions’). 
251  ECtHR, Georgia v. Russia II, Decision on Admissibility, 13 December 2011, Application no. 38263/08, 
para. 72. 
252  ECtHR, Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, Judgement, 7 July 2011, Application no. 55721/07; ECtHR, Jaloud 
v. Netherlands, Judgement, 20 November 2014, Application no. 47708/08. 
253  The vast majority of Art. 2 cases from Chechnya involve enforced disappearances, which are not considered 
here, as they strictly prohibited, both the ECHR and IHL. 
254  ECtHR, Ergi v. Turkey, Judgement, 28 July 1998, Application no. 66/1997/850/1057, para. 79. In another 
case, the Court found no violation of Art. 2 ECHR as the Turkish forces had previously come under attack 
and acted in proper self-defence: ECtHR, Ahmet Özkan v. Turkey, Judgement, 6 April 2004, Application 
no. 21689/93, para. 305 (‘there were serious disturbances in south-east Turkey involving armed conflict 
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ilar approach in the two Isayeva cases (2005), the two most prominent judgments on Chech-
nya.255 Both cases involved the killing of civilians after their vehicles had been hit by Russian 
air strikes in autumn 1999. The Court generally accepted the Russian claim that the strikes had 
been aimed at heavily-armed Chechen fighters, but concluded that the operations were not 
‘planned and executed with the requisite care for the lives of the civilian population’.256 What 
is, however, most astonishing is the zigzag course in the Court’s reasoning. Even though Russia 
had not explicitly invoked humanitarian law during the proceedings, the Court accepted that: 
[T]he situation that existed in Chechnya at the relevant time called for exceptional 
measures by the State in order to regain control over the Republic and to suppress the ille-
gal armed insurgency. … [T]hose measures could presumably include the deployment of 
army units equipped with combat weapons, including military aviation and artillery. The 
presence of a very large group of armed fighters … may have justified use of lethal force 
by the agents of the State, thus bringing the situation within paragraph 2 of Article 2.257 
Nevertheless, and in a rather surprising move, it then went on to criticise the use of heavy bombs 
and missiles: 
[U]sing this kind of weapon in a populated area, outside wartime and without prior evacu-
ation of the civilians, is impossible to reconcile with the degree of caution expected from a 
law-enforcement body in a democratic society. No martial law and no state of emergency 
has been declared in Chechnya, and no derogation has been made under Article 15 of the 
Convention. The operation in question therefore has to be judged against a normal legal 
background.258 
This finding has led to much debate as to whether the Court had indeed used the usual peacetime 
standards under human rights law or whether its reasoning is rather inspired by humanitarian 
law.259 What is obvious, however, is that the use of the term ‘civilian’ does indeed reflect a 
                                               
between the security forces and members of the PKK … the Court accepts, taking due account of all these 
circumstances, that the security forces’ tactical reaction to the initial shots fired at them from the village on 
20 February 1993 cannot be regarded as entailing a disproportionate degree of force’, emphasis added). 
255  ECtHR, Isayeva v. Russia, Judgement, Application no. 57950/00, 24 February 2005; ECtHR, Isayeva, 
Yusupova and Bazayeva v. Russia, Judgement, Application nos. 57947/00 et al., 24 February 2005, 
para. 175. 
256  ECtHR, Isayeva v. Russia, ibid, para. 200; ECtHR, Isayeva et al v. Russia, ibid, para. 199. 
257  ECtHR, Isayeva v. Russia, ibid, para. 180, emphasis added; similar wording in Isayeva et al v. Russia, ibid, 
para. 178 (but the facts, including the attack by fighters from within the convoy, were more disputed here). 
258  ECtHR, Isayeva v. Russia, ibid, para. 191, emphasis added and references omitted. Surprisingly, this pas-
sage is not included in Isayeva et al v. Russia, ibid. 
259  In support of the view that the Court implicitly applied humanitarian law in the two Chechen cases: Droege, 
‘Elective Affinities? Human Rights and Humanitarian Law’, 90 IRRC (2008), 501-48, p. 532; Quénivet, 
‘The Rights to Life in Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law’, in: Quénivet and Arnold (2008), supra 
note 3, 331-353, pp. 335-52. For the opposite view: Abresch, ‘A Human Rights Law of Internal Armed 
Conflict: The European Court of Human Rights in Chechnya’, 16 EJIL (2005), 741-67; Bowring, ‘Frag-
mentation, Lex Specialis and the Tensions in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’, 
14 (3) Journal of Conflict & Security Law (2010), 485-98, pp. 494-97. 
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distinction from legitimate targets. To be precise, nowhere in these two judgments does the 
Court question the possibility to target enemy fighters belonging to the Chechen resistance. 
What is more, due to the gross disregard for civilian life, an assessment based purely on hu-
manitarian law would arguably have come to the same results.260 This seems to be also the 
underlying rationale in the more recent judgments on killings related to the war in Chechnya.261 
The European Court became even more explicit in Benzer v. Turkey (2013), concerning Turkish 
air strikes on two Kurdish villages in the South-East of Turkey in 1994, resulting in the death 
of thirty-eight civilian villagers.262 The Court held that: 
[A]n indiscriminate aerial bombardment of civilians and their villages cannot be acceptable 
in a democratic society, and cannot be reconcilable with any of the grounds regulating the 
use of force which are set out in Article 2 § 2 of the Convention or, indeed, with the cus-
tomary rules of international humanitarian law or any of the international treaties regulat-
ing the use of force in armed conflicts.263 
This was indeed the first time that the Court referred explicitly to humanitarian law standards 
when assessing Article 2 cases involving armed conflicts.264 However, neither this statement 
nor the novel approach adopted in Hassan v. United Kingdom can be read as a full-hearted 
adoption of the traditional lex specialis model. Quite the contrary, there are indeed a number of 
cases in which the European Court or other human rights bodies have provided reasoning that 
seems to be at odds with humanitarian law, which will be considered in the following section. 
                                               
260  This is so because of the failure to take all feasible precautions, but perhaps also under the proportionality 
test, had the pilots and planners indeed expected an excessive number of civilian deaths. 
261  ECtHR, Abdulkhanov v. Russia, Judgement, Application no. 22782/06, 3 October 2013 (artillery and air 
attack on village in Chechnya in 2000, resulting in the death of 18 civilian villagers); Damayev v. Russia, 
Judgement, Application no. 36150/04, 29 May 2012 (aerial bombing of Chechen village in April 2004); 
Khamzatov v. Russia, Judgement, Application no. 31682/07, 28 February 2012 (shooting of civilian car); 
Khashuyeva v. Russia, Judgement, Application no. 25553/07, 19 July 2011 (Special forces operation on 
village by ground troops, leading to the wounding and subsequent death of a village boy); Suleymanova v. 
Russia, Judgement, Application no. 9191/06, 12 May 2010 (shooting of civilian vehicle by Russian forces 
in Chechnya in 2000); Abdurashidova v. Russia, Judgement, Application no. 32968/05, 8 April 2010 (kill-
ing of child in cross-fire during raid against suspected fighters in Dagestan in 2005); Akhamdoc v. Russia, 
Judgement, Application no. 21586/02, 14 November 2008 (interception and shooting of civilian vehicle by 
Russian forces in Chechnya in 2001); Umayeva v. Russia, Judgement, Application no. 1200/03, 4 December 
2008 (Russian attack on a civilian vehicle in Chechnya in 2000). 
262  ECtHR, Benzer v. Turkey, Judgement, 12 November 2013, Application no. 23502/06. 
263  Ibid, para. 184, emphasis added and references omitted. 
264  For a similar statement made by a number of individual judges in their joint concurring opinion: ECtHR, 
Abuyeva v. Russia, Judgement, 2 December 2010, Application no. 27065/05, concurring opinion of Judge 
Malinervni, joined by Judges Rozakis and Spielmann. 
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MOST FAVOURABLE PROTECTION MODEL 
Another approach that may help to moderate the interplay between human rights law and hu-
manitarian law is the most-favourable-protection principle. It is an established tool to overcome 
norm conflicts,265 especially in human rights law, where it can be found in the text of most 
relevant conventions.266 In a nutshell, this principle gives priority to any norm that provides for 
a higher level of protection. It is also reflected in the reference to ‘other obligations under in-
ternational law’, which can be found in the derogations clauses. The same is true for the above-
mentioned Martens Clause and other provisions in humanitarian law treaties that explicitly refer 
to other legal rules or regimes offering better protection. What is less clear, however, is whether 
it is appropriate to use the most-favourable-protection principle to overcome potential conflicts 
between the different use-of-force rules under both legal regimes.267 There is certainly a signif-
icant overlap between this principle and the lex specialis doctrine, since the level of protection 
may indeed reflect the speciality of the norm. Moreover, the more protective rule does not nec-
essarily come from human rights law, but may also belong to humanitarian law (e.g. on the use 
of certain means and methods of warfare), depending on the exact circumstances. On this im-
portant point, the most-favourable-protection model differs from the so-called human rights 
model, with which it shares some similarities and which is at times also considered by some 
scholars.268 However, by disregarding entirely the rules of humanitarian law – which provides 
certainly more freedom for lethal targeting than human rights law but contains also stricter 
                                               
265  Sadat-Akhavi, Methods of Resolving Conflicts Between Treaties (Brill 2003), pp. 213-31 (among the few 
authors considering the principle at great length for conflicts between treaties). 
266  They operate first and foremost as saving clauses: Art. 53 ECHR (‘Nothing in this Convention shall be 
construed as limiting or derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be 
ensured … under any other agreement’); Art. 5 (2) ICCPR (‘There shall be no restriction upon or derogation 
from any of the fundamental human rights recognized or existing … pursuant to law, conventions, regula-
tions or custom’); Art. 29 (b) ACHR; Art. 43 Arab Charter; Art. 33 CIS Convention. 
267  See, for instance: Graf-Brugère, ‘A Lex Favorabilis? Resolving Norm Conflicts between Human Rights 
Law and Humanitarian Law’, in: Kolb and Gaggioli (2013), supra note 3, 251-70, pp. 262-63 (cautioning 
against reliance on the approach where the difference was intended or relates to the conduct of hostilities); 
ICRC, Expert Meeting on the Use of Force in Armed Conflicts (2013), infra note 308, pp. 21-22 (model 
supported by only one expert); Mujezinović Larsen (2012), supra note 37, pp. 260-61; Cassimatis, ‘Inter-
national Humanitarian Law, International Human Rights Law, and Fragmentation of International Law’, 
56 (3) ICLQ (2007), 623-39, p. 633 (but somewhat unclear whether he means indeed the most-favourable-
protection model or the so-called human rights model considered infra). Prud’homme (2007), supra note 
4, p. 358 (calling it detached from reality). 
268  Mujezinović Larsen (2012), supra note 37, pp. 261-63; Schabas, ‘Lex specialis? Belt and Suspenders?: The 
Parallel Operation of Human Rights Law and the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Conundrum of Jus ad 
Bellum’, 40 (2) Israel Law Review (2007), 592-613, p. 612 (suggesting a pure HR approach for HR courts 
in cases of jus ad bellum violations, but unclear on the general interplay between HRL and IHL, especially 
in NIACs); Martin (2001), infra note 306 (suggesting a unified force rule drawing from both IHL and HRL 
as a new de lege ferenda approach). 
 238 
 
rules, including on the use of certain weapons and methods – the human rights model fails to 
offer any guidance on overcoming the potential norm conflict between human rights and hu-
manitarian law in a principled and comprehensive manner. 
Inter-American Human Rights System 
In the above-mentioned Abella case (1997), the Inter-American Commission referred explicitly 
to the most-favourable-protection principle: 
where there are differences between legal standards governing the same or comparable 
rights in the American Convention and a humanitarian law instrument, the Commission is 
duty bound to give legal effort to the provision(s) of that treaty with the higher standard(s) 
applicable to the right(s) or freedom(s) in question. If that higher standard is a rule of hu-
manitarian law, the Commission should apply it.269 
Nevertheless, the Commission had seemingly no problem with finding that the insurgents had 
lost their civilian protection, making them liable to attack for the duration of their engagement 
as quasi combatants. The Commission did, however, examine specific weapons prohibitions 
under humanitarian law and concluded that the incendiary weapons allegedly used by the Ar-
gentinian forces did not fall under a sufficiently comprehensive ban at the time of the events.270 
Another case of relevance is Cruz Sánchez v. Peru (2011), which concerned the so-called Jap-
anese Embassy hostage crisis.271 In December 1996, a group of fourteen heavily armed mem-
bers of the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), a left-wing armed group that was 
fighting the Peruvian government at that time, seized the Japanese Embassy in Lima (Peru) 
during an official reception and took hundreds of hostages, including many foreign diplomats, 
high-level state and military officials, and business executives. While most of them were soon 
released, the MRTA fighters kept over seventy of the most valuable hostages. They were even-
tually freed four months later after a successful rescue operation, which resulted in the killing 
of one hostage and two commandos, as well as all of the MRTA hostage-takers. Some of their 
families lodged a case with the Inter-American Commission. In its verdict, the Commission 
                                               
269  IACmHR, Abella v. Argentina (1997), supra note 226, para. 165. See also: IACmHR, Report on Human 
Rights and Terrorism (2002), supra note 225, para. 45 (‘Under this interconnected regime of treaty obliga-
tions, one instrument may not be used as a basis for denying or limiting other favorable or more extensive 
human rights that individuals might otherwise be entitled to under international or domestic law or prac-
tice’). 
270  IACmHR, Abella v. Argentina (1997), supra note 226, paras. 180-88. Even today, there is no absolute ban 
on the use of incendiary weapons under IHL: Rule 85, CIHL Study. See, however: Sect. 6.2, SG Bulletin, 
which explicitly mentions incendiary weapons in the list of prohibited weapons during UN peace operations 
involved in armed conflicts. 
271  IACmHR, Cruz Sánchez v. Peru, Merits, 31 March 2011, Report No. 66/10, Case No. 12.444. 
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included only one meagre reference to humanitarian law, in which it denounced the hostage-
taking by the MRTA as a violation of humanitarian law.272 By contrast, the assessment of the 
core question – whether or not the use of lethal force against the MRTA militants was lawful – 
is entirely based on human rights law.273 However, the outcome would hardly have been any 
different under humanitarian law, given that even human rights law authorises the direct use of 
lethal force in order to save the lives of hostages and security forces when confronting well-
armed hostage-takers.274  
Obviously, the case would have been different, had the commandos used expanding bullets to 
kill the MRTA militants; but it is up to speculation whether this would have led the Commission 
to find a violation of the right to life, having recourse to the special weapons rules under hu-
manitarian law. In sum, despite being explicitly mentioned in some early practice, the most-
favourable-protection approach appears to have never played a role in moderating the interplay 
between both legal regimes within the Inter-American human rights system. 
European Human Rights System 
The previous section has already considered a number of cases decided by the European Court 
in relation to the conflict in Chechnya. Some of the most recent cases from the northern Cau-
casus even go a step further and entail conclusions that seem to be at odds with humanitarian 
law. A case in point is Khatsiyeva v. Russia (2008), which involved a helicopter attack on vil-
lagers in Ingushetia who were believed to be armed insurgents involved in a previous attack on 
Russian aircraft.275 It appears that the pilots had wrongly identified the villagers, which allowed 
the Court to find a violation of their right to life. The Court added, however, an interesting 
orbiter dictum: 
[T]he Court is not persuaded that the killing of Khalid Khatsiyev and Kazbek Akiyev, even 
assuming that they were armed [as claimed by Russia], constituted a use of force which 
was no more than absolutely necessary in pursuit of the aims provided for in Article 2 § 2 
(a) and (b) of the Convention.276 
                                               
272  Ibid, para. 132. 
273  Ibid, paras. 118-61. 
274  Likewise, both humanitarian law and human rights law prohibit the killing of militants once they have 
surrendered or been taken into custody, which the Commission deemed to be the case for three of the 
MRTA militants and thus found a violation of their right to life (ibid, para. 161). 
275  ECtHR, Khatsiyeva v. Russia, Judgement, 17 January 2008, Application no. 5108/02. 
276  Ibid, para. 138, emphasis added. 
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This could be read as suggesting that the Convention did not allow for status- or conduct-based 
targeting in contrast to what humanitarian law was providing for. This seems to be supported 
by more recent case-law. For instance, in Kerimova v. Russia (2012) the Court examined the 
lawfulness of several air strikes on the Chechen town of Urus-Martan in October 1999, at the 
very beginning of the Second Chechen War. The town had long been under the control of a 
large number of well-armed fighters, who had turned it into a ‘fortress’, which prevented the 
use of ground troops.277 The Court was therefore prepared to: 
accept that the Russian authorities had no choice other than to carry out aerial strikes in 
order to be able to take over Urus-Martan, and that their actions were in pursuit of one or 
more of the aims set out in paragraph 2 (a) and (c) of Article 2 of the Convention. It is, 
however, not convinced, having regard to the materials at its disposal, that the necessary 
degree of care was exercised in preparing the operations of 2 and 19 October 1999 in such 
a way as to avoid or minimise, to the greatest extent possible, the risk of a loss of life, both 
for persons at whom the measures were directed [i.e. the rebels] and for civilians.278 
While generally allowing the use of heavy combat weapons, the Court still applied the usual 
peacetime standard of precaution to avoid or minimise the risks to life, including that of the 
rebel fighters. In other words, the Court simply disregarded the more liberal targeting rules 
available under humanitarian law. This is perhaps the most controversial finding of a human 
rights court on the use of force in a conflict situation. It was also entirely unnecessary, since the 
applicants’ complaint was concerned with the killing of their civilian relatives and not the death 
of the Chechen fighters.279 
Another relevant case was brought by the widow of former Chechen rebel leader Aslan Maskha-
dov and decided by the European Court in 2013.280 Maskhadov died in March 2005 when Rus-
sian security forces entered the bunker in which he was hiding. The Court confirmed the official 
Russian version that Maskhadov had been killed by one of his own men to evade capture during 
the raid; it thus found no violation of the right to life on the part of Russia.281 The facts of the 
case allowed the Court to elegantly avoid the difficult question of whether it would have been 
                                               
277  ECtHR, Kerimova v. Russia, Judgement, 3 May 2011, Applications nos. 17170/04 et al., paras. 241-47. 
278  Ibid, para. 248, emphasis added and references omitted. For exactly the same approach and wording: EC-
tHR, Khamzayev v. Russia, Judgement, 3 May 2011, Application no. 1503/02, para. 180 (involving the very 
same attack on Urus-Martan); ECtHR, Eshmukhambetov v. Russia, Judgement, 29 March 2011, Application 
no. 23445/03, para. 146 (involving a similar aerial attack on Chechen village in September 1999). 
279  Moreover, it is highly doubtful whether there were indeed any others means available to limit the risks to 
the life of the rebel fighters, considering that they had turned the town into a ‘fortress’, which made the use 
of ground troops impossible and the use of air strikes the only viable option (as explicitly acknowledged 
by the Court itself). 
280  ECtHR, Maskhadova v. Russia, Judgement, 6 June 2013, Application no. 18071/05. 
281  Ibid, paras. 187-91. 
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acceptable to kill Maskhadov on sight, for instance, through an air strike on his hideout. As the 
chief commander of the Chechen armed resistance, he undoubtedly had a continuous combat 
function, which made him a military target under humanitarian law at any time.282 
Another case where humanitarian law had a role to play is Finogenov v. Russia (2011).283 Sim-
ilar to Cruz Sánchez v. Peru (2011), the case involved a major hostage crisis but with a much 
more fatal ending. In October 2002, a group of forty to fifty Chechen rebel fighters (armed with 
assault rifles and explosive vests) seized a Moscow musical theatre, taking 850 hostages and 
demanding the immediate withdrawal of Russian forces from Chechnya. In order to render the 
hostage-takers unconscious, Russian special forces pumped an unknown chemical agent (prob-
ably fentanyl) into the building’s ventilation system. While all militants were killed by gunshots 
during the subsequent raid, about 130 hostages died due to adverse reactions to the gas. In 
response to a complaint lodged by the victims’ relatives, the European Court found only a vio-
lation of the right to life due to the poor planning and implementation of the rescue and evacu-
ation operations after the raid by Russian forces.284 The Court did discuss extensively the use 
of the chemical agent as such,285 but eventually concluded that: 
[T]he gas used by the Russian security forces, while dangerous, was not supposed to kill, 
in contrast, for example, to bombs or air missiles. The general principle stated in the Isa-
yeva case, condemning the indiscriminate use of heavy weapons in anti-terrorist operations, 
can be reaffirmed, but it was formulated in a different factual context, where the Russian 
authorities used airborne bombs to destroy a rebel group which was hiding in a village full 
of civilians. Although the gas in the present case was used against a group consisting of 
hostages and hostage-takers, and although the gas was dangerous and even potentially le-
thal, it was not used “indiscriminately” as it left the hostages a high chance of survival, 
which depended on the efficiency of the authorities’ rescue effort.286 
Nowhere in the judgment did the Court discuss the legality of using such chemical agents under 
humanitarian law when confronting fighters belonging to an armed group. It is unclear whether 
the judges considered human rights law to take precedence due to the law-enforcement nature 
of the situation or whether they deemed humanitarian law to be entirely inapplicable, despite 
the obvious nexus to the war in Chechnya.287 
                                               
282  However, the fact that the Court made an effort to meticulously validate the official Russian account that 
Maskhadov was indeed killed by one of his comrades, seems to imply that the judges did perhaps not feel 
comfortable enough with simply concluding that he was targetable under humanitarian law and thus not 
protected by the stricter human rights rules at the moment of his killing. 
283  ECtHR, Finogenov v. Russia, Judgement, 20 December 2011, Applications nos. 18299/03 and 27311/03. 
284  Ibid, paras. 237-263. 
285  Ibid, paras. 227-236 
286  Ibid, para. 232, emphasis added. 
287  Unlike the Inter-American Commission in Cruz Sánchez v. Peru (2011), supra note 271 (which rightly 
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The European Court had taken a similarly liberal approach on the use of chemical agents against 
direct military targets in Kaplan v. Turkey (2005).288 The case involved a police raid against 
suspected PKK members, who were meeting in an apartment, which led to a heavy exchange 
of gunfire resulting in the killing of a policeman, the believed fighters and two children. Even 
though the Court was convinced by the facts that the suspects were indeed PKK fighters, it 
criticised the police’s handling of the raid for unduly putting the lives of the militants at risk, 
especially by relying exclusively on the use of firearms rather than ‘tear gas or stun grenades’.289 
To be precise, the Court applied the ordinary human rights test to the use of force against fight-
ers and even went as far as suggesting (as a more preferable option) the use of tear gas against 
them, despite the ban on using riot control agents as a method of warfare. 
Human Rights Committee 
Similar conclusions can be drawn from the practice of the Human Rights Committee in relation 
to the deprivation of life in times of armed conflict. For instance, in an early case involving the 
killing of seven individuals, believed to be members of a guerrilla group and behind the abduc-
tion of a senior state official, the Committee found a violation of the right to life under the 
Covenant. They were shot and killed when they returned to their house, without prior warning 
or giving them the opportunity to surrender: 
There is no evidence that the action of the police was necessary in their own defence or that 
of others, or that it was necessary to effect the arrest or prevent the escape of the persons 
concerned. Moreover, the victims were no more than suspects of the kidnapping which had 
occurred some days earlier and their killing by the police deprived them of all the protec-
tions of due process of law laid down by the Covenant.290 
Hence, the Committee applied a pure human rights test without showing deference to the tar-
geting rules under humanitarian law, which would arguably have allowed for the killing of 
guerrilla fighters under such circumstances.291 The Committee also criticised Israel in 2003, at 
                                               
called the hostage-taking an IHL violation by the MRTA rebel group). 
288  ECtHR, Hamiyet Kaplan v. Turkey, Judgement, 13 September 2005, Application no. 36749/97. 
289  Ibid, para. 51 (‘la maîtrise probablement insuffisante par les agents de police des méthodes permettant 
l’arrestation des personnes recherchées et dangereuses sans porter atteinte à leur vie ont augmenté les 
risques pour la vie de ceux qui se trouvaient à l’intérieur de la maison encerclée. En effet, lors de l’opération 
en question, les policiers ont exclusivement utilisé des armes à feu. Ils n’ont pas fait usage de gaz lacrymo-
gène ou de grenades paralysantes’, emphasis added). 
290  HRC, Guerrero v. Colombia (1982), supra note 74, para. 13.2, emphasis added. 
291  An argument could be made that under the exceptional circumstances of the case, such fighters would have 
been ‘in the control’ of the adversary and thus hors de combat (see p. 222). Moreover, their identification 
as active members of the armed group was apparently not supported by the facts of the case. 
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the height of the Second Intifada (2000-2005), for its targeted killing policy against Palestinian 
militants in the Occupied Territories: 
While noting the [Israeli] delegation’s observations about respect for the principle of pro-
portionality in any response to terrorist activities against civilians and its affirmation that 
only persons taking direct part in hostilities have been targeted, the Committee remains 
concerned about the nature and extent of the IDF’s responses to Palestinian terrorist attacks. 
... All measures to arrest a person suspected of being in the course of committing acts of 
terror must be exhausted in order to avoid resorting to the use of deadly force.292 
Here, the Committee openly referred to some humanitarian law targeting standards, but adds 
an arrest-rather-than-kill standard vis-à-vis the suspected militants (based on human rights law). 
Likewise, the Committee recently criticised the United States for its extensive drone pro-
gramme, aimed at targeting members of Al-Qaeda and associated groups: 
The Committee remains concerned about the State party’s very broad approach to the def-
inition and geographical scope of “armed conflict”, including the end of hostilities, the 
unclear interpretation of what constitutes an “imminent threat”, who is a combatant or a 
civilian taking direct part in hostilities, the unclear position on the nexus that should exist 
between any particular use of lethal force and any specific theatre of hostilities, as well as 
the precautionary measures taken to avoid civilian casualties in practice (arts. 2, 6 and 
14).293 
This means that the Committee clearly accepts lethal targeting based on status and conduct 
during times of armed conflict. What it is concerned about, however, are the spatial dimensions 
of this targeting option. As we have seen above, there is no obvious limitation to the geographic 
reach of humanitarian law. To be precise, it governs the conduct of hostilities between the par-
ties to the conflict wherever they may take place. This does not, however, mean that human 
rights law has to stand idle and accept lethal targeting operations to be conducted against enemy 
forces in areas that are not affected by active fighting. What the Committee seems to be imply-
ing is that the balance between human rights and humanitarian law is not necessarily determined 
by the level of protection offered by each regime, but rather the situational circumstances under 
which the relevant force has been used. 
                                               
292  HRC, Concluding Observations, Israel, 21 August 2003, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR, para. 15, emphasis 
added. 
293  HRC, Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of the USA, UN Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/4, 
23 April 2014, para. 9, emphasis added. 
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PARADIGM-BASED MODEL 
The two previous sections revealed that neither the traditional lex specialis model nor the most-
favourable-protection model are capable of fully explaining the use of humanitarian law by the 
relevant human rights bodies. This section tries to show that a third model – based on a distinc-
tion between two different legal paradigms – yields the best results in order to determine the 
interplay between humanitarian law and human rights in relation to the use of force. The first 
subsection will outline the main features of this paradigm-based model – including what it 
means for targeting decisions – and its existing foundation under positive international law. 
This will be followed by a critical discussion of the possible challenges that this model may 
pose to peace operations and other overseas military campaigns. 
Hostilities and Law-Enforcement 
Humanitarian law has been playing an unclear role within the universal and regional human 
rights systems. While it is true that the respective courts and bodies have on some occasions 
referred to humanitarian law standards in their case-law and statements, this practice has been 
rather inconsistent. There are indeed cases in which these bodies seemed critical of state actions 
that were fully consistent with humanitarian law. What is more, some courts even cleared ac-
tions or gave recommendations that appear to be at odds with certain constraints under human-
itarian law. While some may see in this clear evidence of the fact that the mandate and expertise 
of these bodies – unlike that of domestic courts – is simply limited to human rights law,294 the 
issue seems far more complex. As a matter of fact, domestic courts and other state institutions 
have also taken largely similar decisions.295 The most instructive cases come surprisingly from 
Israel and the United States, whose governments are generally associated with the traditional 
lex specialis position.  
In the Targeted Killings case of 2006, the Supreme Court of Israel followed largely the position 
of the Human Rights Committee.296 To be precise, while confirming the concept of continuous 
combat function under the applicable humanitarian law,297 it subjected lethal targeting to addi-
tional constraints.  
                                               
294  See the brief discussion on the so-called human rights approach, p. 264. 
295  The British case-law has already been examined above as part of the European human rights system. 
296  See above, p. 269. 
297  Supreme Court of Israel, Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, Judgement, 
11 December 2006, HCJ 769/02, hereinafter: Targeted Killings case, para. 39. 
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[A] civilian should not be attacked at a time that he is taking a direct part in hostilities if it 
is possible to act against him by means of a less harmful measure. In our internal law this 
rule is derived from the principle of proportionality. Indeed, of the possible military 
measures one should choose the measure whose violation of the victim’s human rights is 
the least. Therefore, if it is possible to arrest, interrogate and prosecute a terrorist who is 
taking a direct part in hostilities, these steps should be followed. A trial is preferable to the 
use of force. A country governed by the rule of law resorts to the use of trials rather than 
the use of force.298 
This passage has led to intense debate as to the origin of this additional constraining element.299 
But it seems to have its origin in Israeli domestic law, which itself is largely influenced by 
international human rights law.300 This is also supported by the fact that the Court refers explic-
itly to the McCann case in the lines that follow.301 The US Department of Justice seems to have 
replicated this approach in its White Paper on the Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed 
Against U.S. Citizens (2013), in which it sets out the conditions under which US citizens who 
are senior operational leaders of Al-Qaeda or an associated force may be killed outside the area 
of active hostilities:  
[A] U.S. operation using lethal force in a foreign country against a U.S. citizen who is a 
senior operational leader of al-Qa’ida or an associated force would be lawful: (1) an in-
formed; high level official of the U.S. government has determined that the targeted indi-
vidual poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States; (2) capture is 
infeasible, and the United States continues to monitor whether capture becomes feasible; 
and (3) the operation would be conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of 
war principles.302 
To be clear, the imminent-threat and feasibility-of-capture tests function as additional con-
straints,303 since they are not required by humanitarian law as such. Rather, they have their 
                                               
298  Ibid, para. 40, emphasis added. 
299  Melzer, ‘Targeted Killing or Less Harmful Means? – Israel’s High Court Judgement on Targeted Killing 
and the Restrictive Function of Military Necessity’, 9 YIHL (2009), 87-113 (seeing it as evidence for the 
less-harmful-means approach under IHL). For the opposite view: Milanović, ‘Lessons for Human Rights 
and Humanitarian law in the War on Terror: Comparing Hamdan and the Israeli Targeted Killings Case’, 
89 IRRC (2007), 373-93, pp. 389-92 (holding that this is rather a reflection of HRL). 
300  Cohen and Shany, ‘A Development of Modest Proportions: The Application of the Principle of Proportion-
ality in the Targeted Killings Case’, 5 (2) JICL (2007), 310-32, p. 313, (acknowledging the influence of 
human rights law on domestic constitutional and administrative law). Barak, ‘International Humanitarian 
Law and the Israeli Supreme Court’, 47 Israel Law Review (2014), 181-89, p. 188 (unfortunately somewhat 
unclear despite the fact that the Aharon Barak was the judge delivering the judgement). 
301  SCI, Targeted Killings (2006), supra note 297, para. 40. 
302  DoJ, White Paper on the Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior 
Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida or An Associated Force, made available on 4 February 2013, p. 1. It makes 
clear that different standards apply in other scenarios (‘including an operation against enemy forces on a 
traditional battlefield or an operation against a U.S. citizen who is not a senior operational leader of such 
forces’, emphasis added). 
303  The exact formulation of these two standards (ibid, pp. 7-8) can certainly be criticised, but this is not the 
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origin in US constitutional law, which continues to limit the deprivation of citizens’ lives even 
when humanitarian law is generally applicable.304 These requirements are essentially the same 
as under international human rights law.305 
Indeed, the requirement of necessity and proportionality under human rights law – as reflected 
in the arbitrariness test of most right-to-life provisions as well as Articles 2 and 15 of the Euro-
pean Convention – should be seen as a limiting factor against the potential over-application of 
humanitarian law. In other words, only where it is fully warranted by the circumstances, should 
the stricter rules of human rights law give way to the more flexible targeting standards under 
humanitarian law. This does not, however, mean that these two sets of rules have morphed into 
one ‘unified use of force rule’, as suggested by some authors.306 The forgoing rather suggests 
the co-existence of two distinct paradigms in times of armed conflict:  
1. Paradigm of hostilities, which is characterised by active combat and governed by hu-
manitarian law, 
2. Paradigm of law-enforcement, which covers all remaining situations and is based on the 
ordinary human rights standards.307  
                                               
focus here. 
304  Ibid, pp. 5-6. Indeed, the DoJ refers explicitly to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the US Constitution. 
Note also that the White Paper asserts that there is no geographic limitation to the application of IHL 
(ibid, p. 4). 
305  The small but important exception is that the US Constitution also protects US citizens while abroad 
(ibid, p. 5), as opposed to the ICCPR, whose extra-territorial reach the USA still denies. Nevertheless, as a 
matter of policy, the same test seems to guide the targeting of non-US nationals: HRC, Fourth Periodic 
Report of the United States of America, Summary Record of 3045th Meeting, 14 March 2014, June 2014, 
UN Doc. CCPR/C/SR.3045, para. 7 (‘Outside of war zones the policy was to aim only at targets that rep-
resented a constant threat to the American people and to carry out the strikes only when there was no other 
effective means of neutralizing the threat’, emphasis added). 
306  Martin, ‘Using International Human Rights Law for Establishing a Unified Use of Force Rule in the Law 
of Armed Conflict’, 64 (2) Saskatchean Law Review (2001), 347-96. Alternatively, a mixed model has 
been suggested in relation to targeted killing, i.e. as a policy framework drawing from both IHL and HRL: 
Kretzmer, ‘Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of 
Defence?’, 16 (2) EJIL (2005), 171-212, pp. 201-204. For a critical view on Kretzmer’s mixed model: 
Bhuta, ‘States of Exception: Regulating Targeted Killing in a “Global Civil War”’, in: Alston and Macdon-
ald (eds.), Human Rights, Intervention, and the Use of Force (OUP 2008), 243-74, pp. 270-73. 
307  Similar paradigms have been suggested by other authors, for instance: Melzer, ‘Conceptual Distinction and 
Overlaps between Law Enforcement and the Conduct of Hostilities’, in: Gill and Fleck (eds.), The Hand-
book of the International Law of Military Operations (OUP 2010), 33-49, pp. 43-45 (whose paradigms do, 
however, overlap and therefore fail to provide guidance on the different sets of rules); Fleck, ‘Law Enforce-
ment and the Conduct of Hostilities: Two Supplementing or Mutually Excluding Legal Paradigms’, in: 
Fischer-Lescano et al. (eds.), Peace in Liberty (Nomos 2008), 391-407 (who seems to use the terms simply 
as synonyms for ‘armed conflict’ and ‘peace time’ and thus in a different way than suggested here); Sassòli 
and Olson (2008), supra note 46 (whose use of terminology and conceptual distinction of different situa-
tions – determined on the basis of which set of rules provides the more specific norm, i.e. the lex specialis 
– corresponds largely to the one adopted here); Doswald-Beck, ‘The Right to Life in Armed Conflict: Does 
International Humanitarian Law Provide all the Answers?’ 88 IRRC (2006), 881-904, p. 893 (distinguish-
ing the ‘law-enforcement model’ from ‘military hostilities’); Droege, ‘The Interplay between International 
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Under which paradigm a particular use of force falls is largely a question of facts.308 An im-
portant factor in the assessment is whether the force is directed at military targets, i.e. persons 
(and objects) that are not protected against direct attack. An affirmative answer would normally 
suggest that the situation is part of the paradigm of hostilities. This changes of course once the 
person in question becomes hors de combat – for instance, due to injuries or capture – and thus 
gains protection from direct attack under humanitarian law. There are, however, other circum-
stances that may affect the final outcome. 
A determining factor is indeed the degree of control over the situation as such. For instance, if 
the area in question is not in the middle of the battlefield but rather under the control of the 
operating forces (or their allies), the case comes very close to a domestic police operation in 
peacetime.309 As a result, the use of force under these circumstances falls within the law-en-
forcement paradigm and is thus subject to the stricter human rights rules. Relevant scenarios 
for peace operations include riots even when individual fighters are intermingled as was the 
case with the violent protests throughout Afghanistan in April 2011 against Koran burnings.310 
A similar case exists where civilian demonstrators actively block roads and other means of 
transport to obstruct the movement of the peace operation’s troops with the aim of shielding 
enemy forces in neighbouring areas. Even though this a clear case of direct participation in 
hostilities on the part under the test discussed above,311 firm control over the relevant area and 
the overall situation provides the international forces and their allies with a wide range of risk-
less options, which makes it a case of law-enforcement. Hence, in both scenarios graduated 
                                               
Humanitarian law and International Human Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict’, 40 (2) Israel Law 
Review (2007), 310-55, p. 347. 
308  There are, however, strongly diverging views on the factors that delimit the conceptual boundary between 
both paradigms: ICRC, Expert Meeting on the Use of Force in Armed Conflicts – Interplay between the 
Conduct of Hostilities and Law Enforcement Paradigms, prepared and edited by Gloria Gaggioli, Novem-
ber 2013. 
309  There is wide support among scholars that this should be a key determinant for the assessment: Hampson 
and Lubell, Amicus Curiae Brief, Georgia v. Russia (II), 38263/08, University of Essex, Human Rights 
Centre, 10 June 2014, para. 29; Sassòli and Olson (2008), supra note 46, p. 614; Doswald-Beck (2006), 
supra note 307, p. 897; Droege (2007), supra note 307, p. 347; UCIHL, Expert Meeting on the Right to 
Life in Armed Conflict and Situations of Occupation, Geneva, 1-2 September 2005, pp. 34-41. By contrast, 
the degree of control played a surprisingly limited role during the most recent expert discussion: ICRC, 
Expert Meeting on the Use of Force in Armed Conflicts (2013), supra note 308, pp. 19-42 (while discussing 
a number of pertinent scenarios, including sleeping fighters, riots, common crime, escape of captured fight-
ers and checkpoints). See also: OHCHR, Outcome of the Expert Consultation on the Issue of Protecting the 
Human Rights of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 4 June 2009, A/HRC/11/31, paras. 14-15 (suggesting a slid-
ing-scale, which would, however, result in a significant overlap between both paradigms, thus undermining 
the whole purpose of the paradigm-based approach). 
310  LA Times, ‘Taliban Exploits Afghan Riots over Koran Burning’, 4 April 2011, http://arti-
cles.latimes.com/2011/apr/04/world/la-fg-afghan-koran-riots-20110404 (‘Officials say insurgents have 
used the riots as cover for attacks against Western and government targets’). 
311  See the subsection on direct participation in hostilities, from p. 236. 
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force must be used in line with human rights law, even though humanitarian law would allow 
for lethal targeting based on status and conduct.  
The same conclusion applies to hostage-takings by rebel fighters, similar to the cases of the 
Japanese Embassy in Lima and the Moscow musical theatre mentioned above, which would 
only allow for lethal targeting in order to save the lives of the hostages and the rescue teams. A 
case in point is the recent attack by jihadist insurgents against the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bam-
ako (Mali) in November 2015, where international forces (including French troops and UN 
peacekeepers) played an essential part in the counterattack and rescue of the hostages.312 
International forces should also make use of traffic control equipment at checkpoints (including 
barricades, speed bumps or tire puncturing devices) and use an escalation-of-force procedure 
vis-à-vis approaching vehicles that fail to stop.313 The case changes of course where a failed 
suicide car attack against a frontline checkpoint is followed by a full-blown assault by enemy 
forces – a situation clearly falling within the hostilities paradigm. The same applies to any other 
classic battlefield situation, including air operations. 
The distinction between the paradigms of law-enforcement and hostilities plays typically an 
important role in non-international armed conflicts and calm occupations,314 but may also be of 
great relevance during international armed conflicts, such as in rear areas not affected by active 
fighting; and similar situation-based distinctions have been suggested for peace operations and 
similar overseas military deployments.315 
Legal Challenges in Relation to Specific Weapons and Methods 
If a situation falls within the law-enforcement paradigm, what set of weapons and techniques 
would be permissible? This question has received surprisingly little scholarly attention, despite 
the fact that it is of paramount importance where the overall situation is characterised as an 
                                               
312  CNN, ‘Deadly Mali Hotel Attack’, 21 November, http://edition.cnn.com/2015/11/20/africa/mali-shoot-
ing/index.html (‘Dozens of people were trapped in the building for hours, officials in the West African 
nation said, before Malian and U.N. security forces launched a counterattack and rushed guests away. Oliv-
ier Salgado, a spokesman for the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Mali, put the death toll at 21’). 
313  Lack of positive identification is another indicator for the law-enforcement paradigm: Sassòli and Olson 
(2008), supra note 45, p. 614 (‘law enforcement is by definition directed against suspects’). 
314  Watkin, ‘Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in Contemporary Armed Conflict’, 
98 (1) AJIL (2004), 1-34, pp. 30-34; Sassòli and Olson (2008), supra note 46, pp. 605-16; UCIHL, Expert 
Meeting on the Right to Life (2005), supra note 309, pp. 34-41. 
315  Kleffner (2010), supra note 37, p. 75; Naert (2010), supra note 37, pp. 618-24; Sassòli, ‘The Role of Human 
Rights and International Humanitarian Law in New Types of Armed Conflicts’, in: Ben-Naftali (2011), 
supra note 3, 34-94;  
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armed conflict and governed by humanitarian law.316 As we have seen in an earlier part of this 
chapter, both legal regimes set very different standards on the use of weapons and methods. 
While human rights law is silent on the matter, humanitarian law contains very specific prohi-
bitions and limitations. In particular, it bans the use of tear gas and similar non-lethal chemical 
agents, as well as expanding bullets and offensive operations with plain-clothed forces (quali-
fying as acts of perfidy). By contrast, all three are widely used in domestic law-enforcement 
situations and are often the most effective tool to deal with challenging scenarios. 
It would appear artificial to give precedence to the more restrictive provisions under humani-
tarian law simply because they are more specific than under human rights law, which neither 
prohibits nor explicitly allows their use. To do so would lead to the absurd situation where 
international forces would have to act within the constraints of law-enforcement, while being 
deprived of some essential law-enforcement tools. But it seems equally wrong to disregard en-
tirely – simply as a matter of convenience – the specific set of humanitarian law rules. Rather, 
one should consider possible avenues for a harmonious interpretation of the legal framework in 
order to overcome the potential norm conflicts. 
The most obvious case is the use of riot control agents and similar non-lethal or less-than-lethal 
chemical agents, which are an effective tool for domestic law-enforcement and have reportedly 
also been used by peace operations during non-combat situations.317 The Chemical Weapons 
Convention (1993) contains a general ban on the use of chemical weapons, covering any toxic 
chemicals and their precursors,318 unless they are intended for permitted purposes, such as ‘law 
enforcement including domestic riot control purposes’.319 In addition, the Convention contains 
an explicit prohibition on the use of ‘riot control agents as a method of warfare’.320 Regrettably, 
the Convention fails to provide a clear definition of the terms ‘method of warfare’ and ‘law 
enforcement’, but their use and position in the Convention implies that both terms must be seen 
as mutually exclusive. The newly published Commentary to the Convention tries to fill that gap 
                                               
316  For two very helpful analyses: Watkin, ‘Chemical Agents and Expanding Bullets: Limited Law Enforce-
ment Exceptions or Unwarranted Handcuffs’, 36 IYHR (2006), 43-69; Melzer (2010), supra note 307, pp. 
44-49. See also: Fleck (2008), supra note 307, pp. 394 (simply outlining the differences between both 
regimes, without, however, providing any solution for the potential norm conflict in law-enforcement situ-
ations during armed conflicts). 
317  Fry, ‘Gas Smells Awful. U.N. Forces, Riot Control Agents and the Chemical Weapons Convention’, 
31 Michigan Journal of International Law (2010), 475-558, pp. 485-97 (providing an account of situations 
in which riot control agents have been used by personnel involved in UN-led and UN-authorised peace 
operations). 
318  Arts. I (b) and 2 (1), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). 
319  Art. II (9) CWC, (‘“Purposes Not Prohibited Under this Convention” means: … (d) Law enforcement in-
cluding domestic riot control purposes’). 
320  Art. 1 (5) CWC. 
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by defining the terms unambiguously,321 but the outcome is rather disappointing. According to 
the authors, the term ‘as a method of warfare’ is simply a synonym for ‘use in armed conflict’,322 
which leads them to the vague and controversial conclusion that any use of riot control agents: 
in war or other armed conflict does, of course, constitute a method of warfare, which is 
prohibited ... Such action cannot be misconstrued as law enforcement.323 
Moreover, they even question the availability of the law-enforcement exception in most extra-
territorial settings, especially in the course of peace operations.324 This is, however, a serious 
misreading of both terms. As we have seen above, the meaning of law-enforcement is suffi-
ciently broad to cover the actions of international forces involved in peace operations abroad. 
Moreover, law-enforcement even extends to times of armed conflict provided that the situation 
does not involve active combat, which falls within the hostilities paradigm and would exclude 
the use of riot control agents and similar chemical substances.325 
This is precisely why the inclusion of chemical weapons in the list of war crimes of the 
ICC Statute proved so problematic. It was argued that it would be absurd if peacekeepers han-
dling riots during armed conflict situations were allowed to use live bullets but not tear gas or 
other riot control agents.326 These considerations had an impact on the formulation of the ele-
ments of the crime of employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases in international armed 
conflicts, which among others require that:  
The gas, substance or device was such that it causes death or serious damage to health in 
the ordinary course of events, through its asphyxiating or toxic properties.327  
This effect-based definition sets a particularly high threshold, which riot control agents and 
other non-lethal substances are unlikely to reach. Their use would therefore appear to fall out-
side the scope of the crime.328 By focusing on the effects rather than on the context of the use, 
                                               
321  Krutzsch et al, The Chemical Weapons Convention. A Commentary (OUP 2014), p. 94. 
322  Ibid, pp. 70 and 95. 
323  Ibid, p. 101. 
324  Ibid, pp. 101-102. In this regard, they adopt the rather extreme position of Fry (2010), supra note 317, p. 
525 (admitting only a case of law-enforcement when the UN is acting ‘specifically as a domestic police 
force (and when authorized to act as such), and possibly within areas of their direct and complete control, 
such as at the U.N. Headquarters in New York’).  
325  Similarly: Fidler, ‘The Meaning of Moscow: “Non-lethal” Weapons and International Law in the Early 21st 
Century’, 87 IRRC (2005), 525-52, pp. 540-47. 
326  Cottier, ‘War Crimes, Article 8, para 2 a-f’, in: Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (2nd edn, Nomos 2008), p. 180. 
327  ICC, Elements of Crimes, 30 June 2000, UN Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2, Article 8 (2) (b) (xviii) of the 
ICC Statute, emphasis added. 
328  See also: Dörmann, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(CUP 2003), pp. 285-87. Nevertheless, an accompanying footnote clarifies that the narrow definition of the 
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the drafters of the elements of the crimes avoided the arduous task of defining the terms ‘law-
enforcement’ and ‘method of warfare’.  
Amendment to Article 8, adopted at the Kampala Review Conference in 2010, makes it also a 
war crime in non-international armed conflicts to employ asphyxiating, poisonous or other 
gases as well as poison, poisoned weapons and prohibited bullets. Resolution 5 – through which 
the amendment to Article 8 and the relevant elements of the crimes were adopted – held that 
the requirement that the conduct took place in the context of an armed conflict confirmed ‘the 
exclusion from the Court’s jurisdiction of law enforcement situations’.329 While this was cer-
tainly meant to highlight the distinction between both legal paradigms (hostilities versus law-
enforcement) in relation to the use of prohibited weapons, the formulation chosen is clearly too 
broad, because many war crimes listed under Article 8 can indeed be committed during law-
enforcement.330  
To conclude, humanitarian law clearly provides for a built-in law-enforcement exception in 
relation to the use of tear gas and similar substances.331 Hence, international forces involved in 
peace operations that have become a party to an armed conflict can still make active use of 
these weapons in situations other than active combat.332 Only where riots and similar disturb-
ances descend into full-blown combat against enemy fighters would international forces have 
to abstain from using such weapons.333 
The case of expanding bullets is more challenging, because the prohibition on their use appears 
to be termed in a more absolute language.334 Resolution 5, adopted at the Kampala Review 
Conference in 2010, brought some interesting developments.335 In addition to the troublesome 
law-enforcement reference mentioned above, the preamble also explicitly refers to expanding 
bullets and stresses that the respective war crime: 
                                               
crime by this element does in no way affect the rules of international law with regard to chemical weapons. 
329  Resolution RC/Res.5, Amendments to Article 8 of the Rome Statute, adopted on 10 June 2010 by consen-
sus, unnumbered preambular para. 7. 
330  This is so at least for all war crimes that involve a quasi custodial situation, e.g. all grave breaches listed 
under Art. 8 (2) (b), Art. 8 (2) (b) (vi), (x), (xxi), (xxii) and (xxvi), Art. 8 ( c) and (e) (v-viii) ICC Statute. 
331  In support of this: Watkin (2006), supra note 316, pp. 67-69; Hains (2007), supra note 186, p. 270;  
332  Quite logically, the same solution should be available to other non-lethal or less-than-lethal weapons that 
may be seen as inconsistent with IHL because of their indiscriminate effects. See more generally: Mayer, 
‘Non-Lethal Weapons and Non-Combatant Immunity: Is It Permissible to Target Noncombatants’, 6 (3) 
Journal of Military Ethics (2007), 221-31. 
333  Similarly: Melzer (2010), supra note 307, p. 45. 
334  See, for instance: Rule 77, CIHL Study (‘The use of bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human 
body is prohibited’). 
335  Vanheusden, Parks and Boothby, ‘The Use of Expanding Bullets in Military Operations: Examining the 
Kampala Consensus’, 50 Military Law and the Law of War Review (2011), 535-56. 
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is committed only if the perpetrator employs the bullets to uselessly aggravate suffering or 
the wounding effect upon the target of such bullets, as reflected in customary international 
law,336 
Amnesty International pointed out that this resolution should have no bearing on the elements 
of the crime or on the ‘absolute character’ of the ban on expanding bullets under humanitarian 
law.337 That is, however, a misrepresentation of the special context in which the resolution was 
adopted. The Review Conference was also attended by states not party to the Rome Statute 
(including China, India, Israel, Iran, Russia and the United States) as well as different UN bod-
ies and regional organisations.338 During the working group sessions, the delegates stressed that 
there was ‘no absolute prohibition’ on the use of expanding bullets, which was not challenged 
by any of the delegations.339 This is also reflected by the fact that Resolution 5 was adopted by 
consensus. Hence, there is clear evidence of subsequent practice among states for a narrower 
scope of the prohibition on expanding bullets, restricted only to cases of useless and thus un-
necessary suffering. Indeed, the ban was an early concretisation of the general prohibition of 
means and methods of warfare that cause superfluous injuries and cause unnecessary suffer-
ing.340  
According to Christopher Greenwood, suffering caused by a certain weapon cannot be consid-
ered ‘unnecessary if it is inflicted for the purpose of protecting the civilian population’,341 which 
may be relevant when individual enemy forces use civilians as hostages or human shields or 
                                               
336  RC/Res.5, supra note 329, unnumbered preambular para. 9. 
337  Amnesty International, Public Statement, Comments regarding the language included in the resolution 
amending Article 8 of the Rome Statute, 11 June 2010, www.iccnow.org/documents/AI_Public_Statement 
_on_Weapons_Amendment_20100611_SJ.pdf. For a similar view: Geiß, ‘Poison, Gas and Expanding Bul-
lets: The Extension of the List of Prohibited Weapons at the Review Conference of the International Crim-
inal Court in Kampala’, 13 YIHL (2010), 337-52, p. 347. 
338  See the list of delegations, re-issued 26 August 2010, RC/INF.1 (listing the delegates from 84 state parties, 
and 32 states not party to the ICC Statute as attending the Review Conference, as well as regional organi-
sations, including the EU, the AU and the Arab League). 
339  Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Kampala, 31 May - 11 June 
2010, Report of the Working Group on Other Amendments, 10 June 2010, RC/6/Rev.1, para. 5 (‘There was 
no absolute prohibition on the weapons referred to in preambular paragraph 9, i.e. bullets which expand or 
flatten easily in the human body … It was also stressed that law enforcement situations are excluded from 
the Court’s jurisdiction’, emphasis added).  
340  See, for instance, the wording suggested by the US delegate, with which all other delegates at the Hague 
Peace Conference in 1899 generally agreed: ‘The use of bullets inflicting wounds of useless cruelty, such 
as explosive bullets, and in general, every kind of bullets which exceeds the limit necessary for placing a 
man hors de combat’, emphasis added. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Proceedings of 
the Hague Peace Conferences. The Conference of 1899 (OUP 1920), p. 80. For the full discussion on the 
ban of expanding bullets: ibid, pp. 79-88 and 276-357. 
341  Greenwood, Keynote Speech Delivered on the Occasion of the Third International Workshop on Wound 
Ballistics, held in Thun, Switzerland, on 28 and 29 March 2001, cited by: Vanheusden, Parks and 
Boothby (2011), supra note 335, pp. 541-42. 
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engage in suicide attacks. This leads to the conclusion that the ban on the use of expanding 
bullets under humanitarian law is subject to a built-in necessity test and thus much narrower 
than under the Customary IHL Study and the Secretary-General’s Bulletin.342 In other words, 
international forces involved in peace operations are clearly allowed to use expanding bullets 
and similar projectiles in exceptional law-enforcement situations – whenever human rights law 
would permit or even require the direct use of lethal force – including hostage-taking crises 
involving heavily-armed rebel fighters. 
The use of undercover or plain-clothed operations presents yet another challenge. As we have 
seen above, they run the risk of qualifying as unlawful perfidy, even if the primary aim is to 
effect an arrest of suspected militants rather than to injure or kill them. To be precise, while 
relying on such tactics for the purpose of inoffensive intelligence gathering qualifies as a ruse 
of war, engaging enemy forces in such ways will usually be unlawful as it involves feigning 
civilian status with the intent to betray that confidence. A major challenge presents itself in the 
personal scope of those that the perfidy ban is meant to protect.  
Article 37 of Additional Protocol I only mentions the ‘adversary’. The original ban contained 
in the Hague Regulations (1907), however, appears to protect a broader group of people: ‘indi-
viduals belonging to the hostile nation or army’.343 The war crime of treachery in the Rome 
Statute is based on the same formulation,344 at least in relation to international armed conflict.345 
According to the ICRC, the reference to the ‘individuals belonging to the hostile nation’ clearly 
covers civilians alongside combatants as possible victims of unlawful acts of perfidy.346 In view 
of this, Nils Melzer cautions that any undercover arrest conducted in times of armed conflict 
runs the risk of amounting to perfidy.347 This overlooks, however, the object and purpose of the 
relevant provisions. There is simply no reason why ordinary civilians should fall under the 
protection of the perfidy ban. As a matter of fact, they are already protected against direct attack 
for being civilians. Unlike in the case of regular combatants or civilians taking a direct part in 
                                               
342  Rule 77, CIHL Study; Sect. 6.2, SG Bulletin. 
343  Art. 23 (b) of the Hague Regulations (1907), emphasis added. 
344  Art. 8 (2) (b) (xi) ICC Statute. 
345  Indeed, Art. 8 (2) (e) (ix) ICC Statute mentions only ‘combatant adversary’. For further guidance see: Dö-
rmann (2003), supra note 328, p. 478 (‘This might lead to the conclusion that killing or wounding a civilian 
adversary (not taking an active/direct part in hostilities) by means of perﬁdy is not a war crime under Art. 
8 (2) (e) (ix)’). Interestingly, the Elements of Crimes require in both types of armed conflict that the victim 
‘belonged to an adverse party’ (pp. 240 and 476). 
346  Rule 65, CIHL Study, Commentary, p. 226. Also supported by: Melzer (2010), supra note 307, pp. 47-48 
347  Melzer (2010), supra note 307, p. 48. 
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hostilities, perfidious acts by enemy forces should have no bearing on the confidence and be-
haviour of ordinary civilians.348 The exclusion of ordinary civilians is also supported by the 
drafting history of the prohibition of treachery, which goes back to the Brussels Declaration 
(1874).349 The initial draft of the provision only protected members of the ‘hostile army’.350 The 
‘hostile nation’ phraseology was only added during the negotiations, but the records are unclear 
as to the reason for this amendment.351 It appears, however, most plausible that the term ‘hostile 
nation’ was meant to refer only to the participants of a leveé en masse – a concept internationally 
recognised for the first time by the Brussels Declaration – in addition to the regular army.352 
As a consequence, acts of perfidy can only be committed against combatants and civilians tak-
ing a direct part in hostilities. 
In addition, the official ICRC Commentary makes clear that the prohibition of perfidy contained 
in Article 37 only covers ‘acts that take place in combat’,353 which is supported by the fact that 
it is part of Section I ‘Methods and Means of Warfare’ of Protocol I. The same conclusion can 
be drawn from the systematic position of equivalent perfidy provisions in the text of other in-
struments.354 In other words, the drafters of these instruments never intended to ban the use of 
covert operations outside active combat, including by police and other security forces.355 This 
allows for a sufficiently broad law-enforcement exception for the use of undercover and plain-
                                               
348  Indeed, ordinary civilians have no reason to believe that they are ‘entitled to, or obliged to accord, protec-
tion’ vis-à-vis undercover forces, as required by Art. 37 (1) AP I. 
349  Art. 13 (b) prohibiting: ‘Murder by treachery of individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army’. Project 
of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War, Brussels, 27 August 1874, here-
inafter: Brussels Declaration. The Brussels Declaration was initially unsuccessful but served as a blueprint 
for most rules contained in the subsequent Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907. 
350  Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Actes de la Conférence de Bruxelles de 1874 sur le Projet d’une Con-
vention Internationale Concernant la Guerre : Protocoles des Séances Plénières, Protocoles de la Commis-
sion Déléguée par la Conférence, Annexes (Brussels 1874), p. 5 (‘Le meurtre par trahison des individus 
appartenant à l’armée ennemie’). 
351  Ibid, p. 41 (‘Au litt. B, M. le général de Voigts-Rhetz propose de dire : « appartenant à la nation ou à l’armée 
ennemie ». L’assemblée admet cette addition’). 
352  Art. 10, Brussels Declaration (‘The population of a territory which has not been occupied, who, on the 
approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops …’). For the nearly iden-
tical provision eventually adopted, see Art. 2, Hague Regulations. 
353  Sandoz et al., Commentary to the Additional Protocols, Article 37, para. 1484, p. 430. See also para. 1494, 
p. 433 (‘Article 37 is devoted essentially to combat ... it is aimed at regulating one of the problems of 
combat’) and para. 1524, p. 444 (‘The rule prohibits acts performed in combat: killing, injuring and captur-
ing by resort to perfidy’). 
354  See in particular: Art. 23 (b) Hague Regulations (1907), part of ‘Section II – On Hostilities’; Rule 65, CIHL 
Study (part of ‘Specific Methods of Warfare’); Sect. 2.3.6 Perfidy, Sanremo NIAC Manual, p. 43-44 
(placed under the heading ‘Methods of Combat’, as part of the broader chapter ‘Conduct of Military Oper-
ations’). 
355  Similarly: Melzer (2010), supra note 307, p. 48. 
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clothed personnel in peace operations.356 This includes not only attempts to arrest civilians, but 
also applies to commando raids to capture individual enemy forces or suspected militants who 
find themselves in the territory under the firm control of the peace operation or associated 
forces.357 
In conclusion, the specific humanitarian rules on certain weapons and methods – namely on 
tear gas and similar chemical agents, expanding bullets and the offensive use of plain-clothed 
personnel – provide for a sufficiently broad law-enforcement exception. This means that they 
can also be used in times of armed conflict, even against legitimate targets, provided that the 
situation falls under the law-enforcement paradigm. As we have seen above, the use of force in 
such situations would be subject to the stricter rules under the human rights law, which requires 
a graduated use of force and allows killings only in order to save. By reverse logic, situations 
of active and intensive combat fall under the hostilities paradigm and are primarily governed 
by humanitarian law, including its detailed rules on certain weapons and methods of warfare. 
This means that the peace mission has to abstain from using tear gas and similar chemical 
agents, expanding bullets and plain-clothed personnel during combat operations. 
Remaining Challenges 
The military may have serious objections against this approach for being operationally unfea-
sible and exposing its soldiers to undue risks and legal uncertainty. This criticism may, how-
ever, be countered by reference to the rules of engagement applicable in various overseas op-
erations. Indeed, they are often restricted, containing a built-in necessity standard and requiring 
a gradual escalation of force,358 even though this is reportedly due to policy rather than legal 
considerations.359 This has also been confirmed by Richard Gross – former Chief Legal Advisor 
for ISAF in Afghanistan – who stresses that capture is the preferred options, because it may 
                                               
356  It is unlikely that the ICC or other tribunals with jurisdiction over the war crime of treacherous killing or 
injury (contained in the ICC Statute) will ever have to deal with relevant cases due to the limited scope of 
the crime. But in view of Resolution 5, adopted at the Kampala Review Conference, we can expect that 
they would confirm the law-enforcement exception suggested here. 
357  Similarly: Melzer (2010), supra note 307, p. 48. This includes calm areas under military occupation: Giladi, 
‘Out of Context: ‘Undercover’ Operations and IHL Advocacy in the Occupied Palestinian Territories’, 
14 (3) Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2009), 393-439, pp. 428-31 
358  Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict (CUP 2010), pp. 502-505. 
359  Schmitt, ‘The Principle of Distinction and Weapon Systems on the Contemporary Battlefield’, 7 (1) The 
Quarterly Journal (2008), 46-56, p. 53. 
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yield valuable intelligence through interrogation.360 In addition, it may support the general 
counter-insurgency objective to ‘win hearts and minds’.361 
The role as law-enforcement agent, however, may lead to a loss of combat readiness among 
troops, as a high portion of the training will focus on evidence gathering and similar techniques 
rather than combat skills.362 Furthermore, the distinction between two regimes appears to re-
quire more sophisticated rules of engagement in order to capture the full operational matrix. 
The Colombian Operational Law Manual (2009) provides an illustrative example on how this 
challenge can be addressed. Its rules of engagement are based on two sets of cards: ‘blue cards’ 
are for law-enforcement and based on human rights law, while ‘red cards’ apply to areas of 
hostilities and are governed by humanitarian law. The labels for different areas are constantly 
updated to reflect recent activities and changes in strength of the enemy forces.363 The obvious 
advantage is that it provides a simple and clear system for mission-planning and briefing of 
troops prior to the deployment. Moreover, peace operations can also make use of specialised 
types of forces, including police-style gendarmerie and special forces,364 and seek the assistance 
from police units of the host state in order to cover the full spectrum of possible scenarios. In 
addition, the peace operation’s personnel need to be provided with a wide, highly diversified 
equipment (including crowd-control gear e.g. shields, truncheons, water cannons and rubber 
bullets) and need to be given training and mission-specific instructions prior to each deploy-
ment, in particular, on the use of tear gas and similar chemical agents, expanding bullets and 
the offensive use of plain-clothed personnel.365 
                                               
360  Gross, ‘The Use of Force in the Different Phases of the Conflict in Afghanistan’, Presentation Summary, 
Appendix 5, in: ICRC, Expert Meeting on the Use of Force in Armed Conflicts (2013), supra note 308, 85-
87, p. 87 (‘there is no specific written ISAF policy, but in practice operational commanders will prefer the 
capture of someone rather than his killing. The reason for this preference is one of policy: a captured person 
can be interrogated and will possibly provide useful intelligence. Even though under international human-
itarian law (IHL) a legitimate target may be killed, in practice his capture will be preferred’). 
361  ICRC, Expert Meeting on the Use of Force in Armed Conflicts (2013), supra note 308, p. 23. 
362  Lewis, ‘Battlefield Perspectives on the Laws of War’, in: Corn et al. (eds.), The War on Terror and Laws 
of War. A Military Perspective (OUP 2009), 209-34, pp. 228-33. 
363  Gómez Ramírez, ‘Reflections on the Colombian Operational Law Manual (2009)’, Presentation Summary, 
Appendix 4, in: ICRC, Expert Meeting on the Use of Force in Armed Conflicts (2013), supra note 308, pp. 
81-83.  
364  Also suggested by some experts: ICRC, Expert Meeting on the Use of Force in Armed Conflicts (2013), 
supra note 308, p. 47. 
365  Adequate training and specific instructions prior to each deployment is especially relevant for these weap-
ons and methods because their illegal use in armed conflict (i.e. during active combat) does not only engage 
the international responsibility of the states/organisations under IHL as such, but may also give rise to 
individual criminal liability. To be clear, the illegal use may result in the prosecution of the relevant soldiers 
for war crimes before national courts or the ICC. 
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Another challenge may exist when the adversary party to the conflict is a non-state armed group, 
as it remains a matter of serious debate whether and to what extent such groups are bound by 
human rights law. It seems most reasonable to conclude that they are not, unless they have firm 
control over territory allowing them to exercise public power in a state-like manner there.366 
This means that most armed groups are only bound by humanitarian law, which may seriously 
disadvantage their adversaries.367 Unlike armed groups, peace operations and other state armed 
forces would indeed have to observe additional human rights constraints in certain situations 
throughout the conflict, which runs the risk of seriously undermining the long-established prin-
ciple of reciprocity between belligerent parties. This principle, however, only applies in relation 
to humanitarian law obligations, which are indeed the same for both parties to the armed con-
flict.368 Ultimately, it is common for states as well as international organisations to have addi-
tional obligations under international law.  
What needs to be stressed is that members of armed groups invariably violate domestic law 
when they participate directly in hostilities against government or international forces.369 In 
other words, they can be prosecuted for any hostile act, even those that are fully compliant with 
humanitarian law, which means that they are by no means less constrained in comparison to 
government soldiers or international forces serving as part of a peace operation.370 
                                               
366  Henckaerts and Wiesener, ‘Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Armed Groups: A Possible Contribu-
tion from Customary International Law?’, in: Kolb and Gaggioli (2013), supra note 3, 146-69 (who show 
that international practice so far confirms the existence of human rights obligations on the part of armed 
groups only in areas under their firm control). See also: ILA, Non-State Actors, Conference Report Wash-
ington 2014, pp. 5-11; Zegveld, Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law (CUP 
2002), pp. 39-46. For a more expansive view: Clapham, ‘Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors 
in Conflict Situations’, 88 IRRC (2006), 491-523. 
367  Note, however, that some consider the paradigm of law-enforcement also to exist in a more rudimentary 
form under IHL: ICRC, Expert Meeting on the Use of Force in Armed Conflicts (2013), supra note 308, p. 
11 (raised by several experts). Nonetheless, the exact contours of the IHL-based law-enforcement paradigm 
in relation to non-state armed groups and its limitations on the use of force remain extremely vague. 
368  Indeed, even our findings on specific weapons and methods (above, p. 276) does not affect the equality 
between belligerents under IHL, since the law-enforcement exceptions (implicit in these bans) are in prin-
ciple also available to armed groups. However, outside areas under their firm territorial control the use of 
such weapons and methods would virtually always fall within the paradigm of hostilities. 
369  Doswald-Beck (2006), supra note 307, p. 890; Droege (2008), supra note 259, p. 537; UCIHL, Expert 
Meeting on the Right to Life (2005), supra note 309, pp. 40-41. 
370  Indeed, most acts of rebel fighters already fall under the ordinary criminal law provisions of states 
(e.g. physical assault, murder or other types of unlawful killing, abduction, theft, arson, and unlawful pos-
session of weapons). The penalisation and prosecution of these acts is not only consistent with HRL but 
even required by it because of the positive HRL obligations of states vis-à-vis their own soldiers and secu-
rity forces as well as civilians (e.g. right to life, right to liberty, right to property). In other words, members 
of non-state armed groups are indirectly bound by virtually the same HRL standards as state armed forces. 
Moreover, this parity is only marginally affected by the general duty under the law of NIAC to ‘endeavour 
to grant the broadest possible amnesty’ to former fighters at the end of hostilities (Art. 6 (5) AP II and Rule 
159 CIHL Study). 
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5.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined the likely scenario during peace operations when human rights law and 
humanitarian law apply to the same situation – both in space and time. This may lead to poten-
tial conflicts between opposing rules, especially in relation to the use of (lethal) force. Both 
regimes provide for different requirements as to when and how force may be used. In a nutshell, 
human rights law generally requires a graduated use of force and only allows for direct lethal 
targeting as a measure of last resort in order to protect life from an imminent threat. By contrast, 
humanitarian law provides for lethal targeting based on status and conduct, even absent any 
threat to the life and limb of others. It does, however, contain stricter rules on the use of certain 
weapons and methods of warfare. 
The outline of the practice revealed that neither the traditional lex specialis model nor the most-
favourable-protection model are capable of fully explaining the use of humanitarian law by the 
relevant human rights bodies. The most suitable interaction model is instead based on the dis-
tinction between two mutually exclusive paradigms:  
1. Paradigm of hostilities, which is characterised by active combat and governed by hu-
manitarian law, 
2. Paradigm of law-enforcement, which covers all remaining situations and is based on the 
ordinary human rights standards.  
Whether a situation involving the use of force falls under the hostilities or law-enforcement 
paradigm largely depends on the degree of control over the situation as such. For instance, if 
the area in question is not in the middle of the battlefield but rather under the control of the 
peace operation’s own forces or those of their allies (e.g. host state or others), the case comes 
very close to a police operation in peacetime. As a result, the use of force under these circum-
stances falls within the law-enforcement paradigm and is thus subject to the stricter human 
rights rules, including the graduated force approach. This is so even despite the presence of 
legitimate military targets, for instance, when fighters intermingle with rioters or are involved 
in hostage-takings, or when civilians commit hostile acts amounting to direct participation in 
hostilities in friendly territory. By contrast, more classic battlefield situations and air operations 
would typically fall under the hostilities paradigm.  
What is more, the specific humanitarian rules on certain weapons and methods – namely on 
tear gas and similar chemical agents, expanding bullets and the offensive use of plain-clothed 
personnel – provide for a sufficiently broad law-enforcement exception. This means that they 
can also be used in times of armed conflict, even against legitimate targets, provided that the 
situation falls into the law-enforcement paradigm and that the stricter rules on the use of force 
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are adhered to. By contrast, in situations of active and intensive combat, which fall under the 
hostilities paradigm and are primarily governed by humanitarian law, including its detailed 
rules on certain weapons and methods of warfare, international forces have to abstain from 
using tear gas and similar chemical agents, expanding bullets and plain-clothed personnel.  
Moreover, operational challenges resulting from this paradigm-based model do not pose un-
solvable problems and are best addressed by careful planning of operations and real-time in-
structions as well as by diversifying the skills, functions and equipment of the forces involved 
in international military operations abroad.  
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6 GENERAL CONCLUSION  
The traditional distinction between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement has become increas-
ingly blurred. Today, almost all peace operations operate under a robust mandate based on a 
Security Council resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This allows for sig-
nificant levels of military force to be used, especially in support of the host states’ authorities 
against members of non-state armed groups. The exercise of ‘effective control’ over specific 
acts and omissions is the appropriate yardstick for identifying areas of responsibility of states 
and international organisations involved in peace operations. The detailed command and con-
trol arrangements considered above will usually be of help in order to provide an answer to the 
critical question: who gave the direct order or instruction for the specific conduct. While dual 
or multiple attribution be excluded, it is rather the exception than the norm. Instead, a specific 
act or its different sub-elements will usually only be attributable to one entity. Taken together, 
however, the totality of all acts and omissions of the peace operation will typically engage the 
responsibility of a great number of actors, usually the international organisation in command as 
well as the different sending states. 
States have undertaken very different treaty obligations under human rights and humanitarian 
law. While some multilateral agreements – like the four Geneva Conventions (1949) and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) – enjoy (nearly) universal ratifica-
tion, there is great disparity between states when it comes to other, more specific treaties, in-
cluding a number of different arms control conventions and regional human rights treaties. 
However, these differences are to a large extent levelled out by the fact that many of the sub-
stantive treaty provisions form also part of general international law, binding on all states. Gen-
eral international law, which covers both customary law and general principles, is also the pri-
mary source of obligations for international organisations, as they have largely abstained from 
becoming parties to human rights and humanitarian law treaties. Hence, despite the fragmented 
ratification record under treaty law, states and international organisations share a wide range of 
similar obligations in the field of human rights and humanitarian law. Even though the mandates 
have been adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, they do not obstruct the application 
of human rights and humanitarian law, either as a whole or of some of their specific rules. 
Whether the obligations of the states and the organisations actually apply in the context of a 
peace operation depends on their specific actions and whether they meet the threshold require-
ments set by the regimes themselves for their application. 
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This thesis rejects the calls for a special treatment of peace operations compared to other bel-
ligerents, inspired by their special mandates or international status. Rather, the modalities for a 
peace operation to become a party to an armed conflict has to be based on the ordinary test: 
When its forces engage in fighting with state armed forces, however sporadic and short-lived 
this may be, there will be an international armed conflict. By contrast, violence with non-state 
armed groups – the far more likely scenario for peace operations – qualifies as a non-interna-
tional armed conflict, provided that it reaches a high level of intensity and that the group in 
question is sufficiently organised. Moreover, the special protection regime that has evolved in 
the last two decades is not capable of raising the threshold of violence required for triggering 
an armed conflict. It rather shows the need for a participation-based test – in addition to the 
ordinary threshold of armed conflict – in order to ascertain whether and when a peace operation 
becomes a party to the pre-existing armed conflict. Hence, where the personnel engage in acts 
amounting to direct participation in hostilities, the entire peace operation will most likely be-
come a party to the conflict. This test is of particular relevance in situations in which the peace 
operation has not yet (or only sporadically) been involved in fighting and whose activities are 
mainly focused on supporting the host state authorities. The same test can also be used for 
qualifying the interaction between the different actors involved in the peace operation itself. To 
be precise, it proves particularly helpful –in addition to the ordinary threshold requirement – 
for assessing as to which sending states can be considered a party to the armed conflict. 
Where the peace operation has become a party to an armed conflict, the temporal and geograph-
ical scope of application is of particular relevance. The thesis concludes that humanitarian law 
continues to apply for as long as the armed conflict lasts or as long as the peace operation 
participates in it by committing acts amounting to direct participation in hostilities. Although 
this analysis is essentially based on an objective test, the conclusion of formal agreements be-
tween the parties may be evidence of the intentions of the parties to bring the conflict to an end. 
In the meantime, humanitarian law does not only apply in areas directly affected by hostilities, 
but governs also the actions of the international forces in other areas. It may even apply outside 
the mission area to the extent that there exists a nexus with the armed conflict in question, 
including spill-over scenarios. 
This thesis also considers the case of military occupations absent hostilities as a self-standing 
ground for the application of humanitarian law in peace operations. It concludes that mandate-
based considerations do not matter and that the assessment rests entirely on a factual test. 
Hence, whenever international forces involved in a peace operation are deployed to an area 
over which they exercise sufficient control without the explicit and genuine consent of the host 
state, they assume the role of an occupying power. This test is further complemented by a par-
ticipation-based test so as to cover also cases in which international forces render direct support 
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to the military occupation of another entity. The law of occupation remains applicable in the 
territory in question until the military occupation comes to an end, for instance, when the troops 
are withdrawn or their presence has received the genuine consent of the host state. The law of 
occupation is also the primary candidate for the approach of applying humanitarian law by 
analogy. However, while states and international organisations are generally free to commit 
themselves to higher standards, they cannot invoke such standards to justify measures that are 
at odds with otherwise applicable obligations under international law.  
The approach of applying humanitarian law by analogy is partly driven by the misconception 
that human rights law is not applicable in the mission area and not tailored to the challenging 
security situation prevailing there. The thesis shows that human rights law is clearly applicable 
to the actions of states and international organisations involved in a peace operation. Neither 
the spatial or personal models, nor the public powers model provide sufficient justification for 
limiting the geographical scope of human rights law. There is indeed strong evidence for a 
convergence in the practice of human rights institutions towards a gradual model for the extra-
territorial application of human rights law. Accordingly, negative human rights obligations ap-
ply everywhere at all times, while the scope of positive obligations is highly context-specific. 
Certain duties apply as they are inherently linked to the interference with the negative rights. 
The other models discussed above provide important additional grounds for positive obliga-
tions: (1) personal model, requiring control over persons through arrest or detention; (2) spatial 
model, requiring quasi exclusive control over territory, and (3) public powers model, requiring 
delegation of far-reaching powers under the mandate or other explicit authorisations. 
Even though human rights law applies directly to the actions of states and international organ-
isations involved in a peace operation, it shows a high degree of flexibility in addressing secu-
rity concerns. In fact, in addition to the broad range of permissible limitations already available, 
human rights treaties provide for the possibility of derogations from a large number of rights, 
subject to certain requirements and additional safeguards. In order to overcome the apparent 
strictures of the derogation clauses in extra-territorial settings, the thesis suggests the ‘host na-
tion’ model as the best solution for derogations in response to emergency situations in the mis-
sion area. Under this model, international forces are also part of the host nation and threats 
against them are crucial for the overall assessment, in addition to the security situation of the 
local population. Derogations and similar acts by the host state authorities are not necessarily 
required, nor are they enough to cover the actions of military forces from different sending 
states. But they may support the claim that there is indeed an emergency in full swing and that 
ordinary measures are no longer adequate. Only if the peace operation becomes involved in an 
international armed conflict with state armed forces would the derogation basis shift towards 
the war-based model, which provides a self-standing ground for derogations.  
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The fact alone that no derogation notice has been issued is not enough to deny states the right 
to invoke their derogation powers during legal proceedings. What is essential is that those af-
fected by the emergency measures are duly informed. The factual circumstances of armed con-
flicts or military occupations and the special rules of humanitarian law whose application they 
trigger should be seen as sufficiently clear, so that no further notice would be required. More-
over, Security Council resolutions and related documents could be used proactively for speci-
fying emergency measures. This would allow the derogation issue to be dealt with in one pack-
age, relevant both for the United Nations, the regional organisations and sending states involved 
as well as the host states. Nonetheless, even in case of a genuine emergency the scope of the 
measures is clearly restricted by the set of non-derogable rights, other international legal obli-
gations (including humanitarian law and the mandate) and the necessity and proportionality 
requirement. 
The last chapter of the thesis examined the likely scenario during peace operations when human 
rights law and humanitarian law apply to the same situation – both in space and time. This may 
lead to potential conflicts between the different use-of-force rules. Indeed, both regimes do 
provide for different requirements under which (lethal) force may be used. In a nutshell, human 
rights law generally requires a graduated use of force and only allows for direct lethal targeting 
as a measure of last resort in order to protect life from an imminent threat. By contrast, human-
itarian law provides for lethal targeting based on status and conduct, even absent any threat to 
the life and limb of others. It does, however, contain seemingly stricter rules on the use of 
certain weapons and methods of warfare. Charles Garraway once likened the legal regimes of 
human rights and humanitarian law to two tectonic plates and cautioned that:  
If the pressure is not released in some way and the plates are allowed to continue to push 
up against each other, there will sooner or later be the equivalent of an earthquake … The 
cost would inevitably be paid by the victims of conflict and violence, the very people that 
both systems seek to protect.1 
This is perhaps an unnecessary over-dramatisation; but it is illustrative of the legal uncertainty 
caused by what Martti Koskenniemi once described as the ‘struggle’ between opposing groups 
of experts and institutions.2 Indeed, by confirming their competence to review acts of states 
abroad as well as measures taken during times of armed conflict, human rights bodies have 
incrementally extended their mandate, but also the reach of human rights law itself.3 Likewise, 
                                               
1  Garraway, ‘“To Kill or Not To Kill?” Dilemmas on the Use of Force’, 14 JCSL (2009), 499-510, p. 510. 
2  Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law – 20 Years Later’, 20 (1) EJIL (2009), 7-19, pp. 10-12. 
3  This is, of course, without prejudice to the strong textual, historical and teleological support for both devel-
opments under the relevant human rights instruments. 
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and inspired by the same quest for effective protection and accountability, the reach of human-
itarian law has been extended far beyond the traditional battlefield of inter-state wars to cover 
also asymmetrical conflict scenarios and areas not affected by active fighting.4 That is why the 
relevant scopes of application of both legal regimes are no longer able to avoid the impending 
norm conflicts. Also the traditional lex specialis doctrine and the most-favourable-protection 
principle are not in a position to govern the interaction between both legal regimes in a satis-
factory and principled manner. There is, however, support in recent practice for a more suitable 
interaction model based on the distinction between two mutually exclusive paradigms: the par-
adigm of hostilities, characterised by active combat and governed by humanitarian law, and the 
paradigm of law-enforcement, covering all remaining situations and based on the ordinary hu-
man rights standards. 
Whether a situation involving the use of force falls under the hostilities or law-enforcement 
paradigms largely depends on the degree of control over the situation as such. For instance, if 
the area in question is not in the middle of the battlefield but rather under the control of the 
operating forces (or their allies), the case comes very close to a police operation in peacetime. 
As a result, the use of force under these circumstances falls within the law-enforcement para-
digm and is thus subject to the stricter human rights rules, including the graduated force ap-
proach. This is so despite the presence of legitimate military targets, for instance, when fighters 
intermingle with rioters or are involved in hostage-takings, or when civilians commit hostile 
acts amounting to direct participation in hostilities in friendly territory. By contrast, more clas-
sic battlefield situations and air operations would typically fall under the hostilities paradigm. 
What is more, the specific humanitarian rules on certain weapons and methods – namely on 
tear gas and similar chemical agents, expanding bullets and the offensive use of plain-clothed 
personnel – provide for a sufficiently broad law-enforcement exception. This means that they 
can also be used in times of armed conflict, even against legitimate targets, provided that the 
situation falls under the law-enforcement paradigm and that the stricter rules on the use of force 
are observed. This makes it even more necessary for commanders to provide careful planning 
and real-time instructions in order to fully operationalise the suggested distinction between the 
two paradigms. 
This approach is not only relevant in modern peace operations, but also in more traditional 
(internal) non-international armed conflicts as well as other forms of overseas military deploy-
ments and future combat scenarios.5 However, the following caveat must be made: This thesis 
                                               
4  This is to a large extent a result of the efforts by the ICRC, various international criminal tribunals, but also 
a great number of like-minded states. 
5  A case in point is the military campaign by an international coalition against the self-proclaimed Islamic 
State in Iraq and Syria. 
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was able to avoid the impact of the jus ad bellum on the interplay between human rights and 
humanitarian law because peace operations usually have a sufficiently broad mandate. Cer-
tainly, there is a strict and long-held distinction between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. 
Nevertheless, there is no reason why the same reasoning should apply in relation to human 
rights law. Indeed, the drafters of the Covenant made it clear that derogations in times of armed 
conflict should only be allowed for measures that are consistent with the UN Charter. Likewise, 
many states, including the United States, called for the need of consistency with the jus ad 
bellum during the Nuclear Weapons proceedings.6 Hence, human rights courts and similar bod-
ies should perhaps consider to what extent (flagrant) violations of the jus ad bellum may affect 
the careful balance between human rights and humanitarian law suggested here.7  
Moreover, some of the positions taken here should be seen in the broader context of technolog-
ical development. There is indeed a strong potential for more effective non-lethal or less-lethal 
weapons that could possibly make the reliance on live ammunition as well as riot control agents 
and expanding bullets less pressing. A similar effect can be expected from the increasing role 
of robotics in defence technologies. Nevertheless, while drones, robots and similar devices may 
help to observe human rights and humanitarian law obligations more effectively in future mil-
itary operations, they do raise complex legal and moral questions beyond the scope of this 
study.8 
Future research on the interplay between human rights law and humanitarian law should engage 
more closely with non-state armed groups, as they are nowadays the adversary par excellence 
in most armed conflicts. Especially their role in the process of norm-creation of human rights 
and humanitarian law should be examined in more detail,9 as this may in the long run also affect 
                                               
6  Milanović, ‘The Lost Origins of Lex Specialis: Rethinking the Relationship between Human Rights and 
International Humanitarian Law’, in: Ohlin (ed.), Theoretical Boundaries of Armed Conflicts and Human 
Rights (CUP forthcoming 2016, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2463957), p. 37 (who 
is, however, himself undecided as to whether this is indeed the right approach). 
7  Schabas, ‘Lex specialis? Belt and Suspenders?: The Parallel Operation of Human Rights Law and the Law 
of Armed Conflict, and the Conundrum of Jus ad Bellum’, 40 (2) Israel Law Review (2007), 592-613, 
p. 612 (arguing that human rights bodies should apply a strict human rights approach to those cases of war 
inconsistent with the principle of non-use of force, in order to safeguard the rights of combatants and those 
affected by collateral damage); Jinks (2014), supra note, p. 668. For a more cautious view: Lubell (2010), 
supra note, p. 240 (pointing at the risk of undermining IHL). 
8  See, for instance: Bhuta et al. (eds.), Autonomous Weapons Systems: Law, Ethics, Policy (CUP 2015); 
Liu, Legal Responses to Autonomous Weapons Systems (Hart Publishing, forthcoming 2016); Sassòli, ‘Au-
tonomous Weapons and International Humanitarian Law: Advantages, Open Technical Questions and Le-
gal Issues to Be Clarified’, 90 International Law Studies (2014), 308-40; Anderson et al., ‘Adapting the 
Law of Armed Conflict to Autonomous Weapon Systems’, 90 International Law Studies (2014), 386-411; 
Nasu and McLaughlin (eds.), New Technologies and the Law of Armed Conflict (Asser Press 2014). 
9  For instance, more than fifty armed groups have made unilateral commitments, so-called ‘deeds of com-
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the scopes of application of both regimes as well as the interaction between their respective sets 
of rules. Eventually, it may also be necessary to reconsider the approach of declaring armed 
groups to be bound by humanitarian law (and increasingly by human rights law) without offer-
ing them any real incentive for compliance.10  
                                               
mitment’, under the auspices of Geneva Call, an NGO dedicated to engaging non-state groups armed com-
pliance with IHL and HRL. For more information: www.genevacall.org. See, however: CIHL Study, Intro-
duction, p. xlii (‘The practice of armed opposition groups, such as codes of conduct, commitments … and 
other statements, does not constitute State practice as such. While such practice may contain evidence of 
the acceptance of certain rules in non-international armed conflicts, its legal significance is unclear’, em-
phasis added). 
10  In fact, under IHL, an incentive only exists by reverse logic: while those that comply with strict IHL stand-
ards can at least hope for some form of amnesty, this option is in principle not available for war crimes and 
other IHL violations. For an extreme position on how this problem should be addressed: Crawford, The 
Treatment of Combatants and Insurgents under the Law of Armed Conflict (OUP 2010), pp. 153-69 (calling 
for a ‘universal combatant status’, applicable in IAC and NIAC, to incentivise better compliance with IHL). 
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